Event Notification Report for January 11, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/10/2000 - 01/11/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36579
Facility: WNP-2
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN SIMS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN SIMS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/11/2000
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2000
Event Time: 09:50 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2000
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2000
Event Time: 09:50 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
1-HOUR REPORT INVOLVING THE LOSS OF THE DEDICATED LAND LINES TO STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES FOR REASONS UNKNOWN.
"THE DEDICATED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION LINK TO STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES IS LOST. NO PROJECTED TIME OF REPAIR."
THE LICENSEE INFORMED STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES AND WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
"THE DEDICATED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION LINK TO STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES IS LOST. NO PROJECTED TIME OF REPAIR."
THE LICENSEE INFORMED STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES AND WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36580
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/11/2000
Notification Time: 22:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2000
Event Time: 17:52 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2000
Notification Time: 22:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2000
Event Time: 17:52 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
POSTULATED CONDUCTOR-TO-CONDUCTOR SHORT IN FIRE PUMP CONTROL CIRCUITRY COULD INHIBIT THE ABILITY OF THE PLANT TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN FOLLOWING A FIRE.
"During preparation of the permanent plant modification to replace a Temporary Modification associated with LER 96-009-03, another configuration was found that could inhibit the ability of the plant to safely shutdown following a fire. For an Alternate Shutdown Fire (10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.L) in the Cable Spreading Room fire area, the Diesel Fire pump is relied upon to provide emergency backup gland seal water to the essential service water pumps. A fire scenario in the cable spreading room assumes of a loss of offsite power (which disables the normal gland water supply) as well as concurrent hot shorts which disable the emergency gland seal water supply MOV's (because their control cables are routed through the Cable Spreading Room). A multi-conductor cable located in the Cable Spreading Room carries 24 VDC start control circuits and 120 VAC annunciator power circuits. The postulated fire scenario requires the assumption that the fire could cause a conductor to conductor short within this cable such that the 24 VDC circuits would be energized by the 120 VAC power. This would disable the automatic starting capability of the diesel fire pump (the currently credited emergency backup gland seat water). A fire watch has been posted in the Cable Spreading Room as a compensatory measure. The Cable Spreading Room fire area is the only fire area affected by this configuration. The operator's ability to recognize and correct a loss of gland water to the Service Water pumps would not be impaired. Sufficient procedural guidance is provided for the post-fire restoration of the essential service water pumps such that loss of gland seal water would have been detected prior to service water pump damage. Fire fighting activities would have immediately indicated loss of the fire pump. A modification to separate the starting circuits from the power circuits is being pursued. CNS has conservatively concluded that this postulated scenario is reportable under 10CFR50. 72(b)(2)(iii)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE 1833EST ON 1/12/00 FROM STEVEN JOBE TO S. SANDIN * * *
"Per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (c) (2), the licensee is providing the following additional information.
"The 120 VAC annunciator power circuits referred to in the initial report are more appropriately described as indicating lamp power circuits.
"As additional clarification, the diesel fire pump running capability would be disabled along with the automatic starting capability.
"Based on further investigation, the licensee has determined that insufficient time exists to recognize and correct the loss of gland seal water prior to the onset of service water pump damage.
"The compensatory measures described in the initial report (posting of fire watch) are still in place. These measures, in conjunction with the defense in depth fire protection program, are adequate to ensure the ability of the plant to safely shutdown following a fire, and are consistent with the facility license and the guidance of Information Notice 97-78 'Inadequate or Inappropriate Interim Fire Protection Compensatory Measures."
"Evaluation of this postulated scenario is ongoing and additional action will be taken as appropriate.
"The Senior Resident lnspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO(Shackelford).
"During preparation of the permanent plant modification to replace a Temporary Modification associated with LER 96-009-03, another configuration was found that could inhibit the ability of the plant to safely shutdown following a fire. For an Alternate Shutdown Fire (10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.L) in the Cable Spreading Room fire area, the Diesel Fire pump is relied upon to provide emergency backup gland seal water to the essential service water pumps. A fire scenario in the cable spreading room assumes of a loss of offsite power (which disables the normal gland water supply) as well as concurrent hot shorts which disable the emergency gland seal water supply MOV's (because their control cables are routed through the Cable Spreading Room). A multi-conductor cable located in the Cable Spreading Room carries 24 VDC start control circuits and 120 VAC annunciator power circuits. The postulated fire scenario requires the assumption that the fire could cause a conductor to conductor short within this cable such that the 24 VDC circuits would be energized by the 120 VAC power. This would disable the automatic starting capability of the diesel fire pump (the currently credited emergency backup gland seat water). A fire watch has been posted in the Cable Spreading Room as a compensatory measure. The Cable Spreading Room fire area is the only fire area affected by this configuration. The operator's ability to recognize and correct a loss of gland water to the Service Water pumps would not be impaired. Sufficient procedural guidance is provided for the post-fire restoration of the essential service water pumps such that loss of gland seal water would have been detected prior to service water pump damage. Fire fighting activities would have immediately indicated loss of the fire pump. A modification to separate the starting circuits from the power circuits is being pursued. CNS has conservatively concluded that this postulated scenario is reportable under 10CFR50. 72(b)(2)(iii)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE 1833EST ON 1/12/00 FROM STEVEN JOBE TO S. SANDIN * * *
"Per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (c) (2), the licensee is providing the following additional information.
"The 120 VAC annunciator power circuits referred to in the initial report are more appropriately described as indicating lamp power circuits.
"As additional clarification, the diesel fire pump running capability would be disabled along with the automatic starting capability.
"Based on further investigation, the licensee has determined that insufficient time exists to recognize and correct the loss of gland seal water prior to the onset of service water pump damage.
"The compensatory measures described in the initial report (posting of fire watch) are still in place. These measures, in conjunction with the defense in depth fire protection program, are adequate to ensure the ability of the plant to safely shutdown following a fire, and are consistent with the facility license and the guidance of Information Notice 97-78 'Inadequate or Inappropriate Interim Fire Protection Compensatory Measures."
"Evaluation of this postulated scenario is ongoing and additional action will be taken as appropriate.
"The Senior Resident lnspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO(Shackelford).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36594
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: NUCLETRON CORP
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT 18-00001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JULIE FELICE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: NUCLETRON CORP
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT 18-00001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JULIE FELICE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 01/14/2000
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2000
Event Time: 14:01 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2000
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2000
Event Time: 14:01 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) (NMSS)
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) (NMSS)
POSSIBLE COMPUTER PROBLEM WITH HIGH DOSE REMOTE APPLICATOR (Utah Report #00-0001)
This is a preliminary report of a possible problem existing with the computer for a Nucletron Corporation, Model 105.999, MicroSelectron-HDR, version 2, remote afterloader brachytherapy device, serial #31062, that could lead to a medical misadministration. This device is located at the University of Utah Medical Center. The problem is being investigated by the vendor, and the problem is thought to be a CPU communication fault. The CPU has been sent to the manufacturer for further testing.
Utah has contacted the State of Maryland as well as Nucletron Corporation.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a contact telephone number.)
This is a preliminary report of a possible problem existing with the computer for a Nucletron Corporation, Model 105.999, MicroSelectron-HDR, version 2, remote afterloader brachytherapy device, serial #31062, that could lead to a medical misadministration. This device is located at the University of Utah Medical Center. The problem is being investigated by the vendor, and the problem is thought to be a CPU communication fault. The CPU has been sent to the manufacturer for further testing.
Utah has contacted the State of Maryland as well as Nucletron Corporation.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a contact telephone number.)