Event Notification Report for December 27, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
12/23/1999 - 12/27/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36535 36536 36537 36538 36539 36540
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36535 |
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| REP ORG: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/23/1999|
|LICENSEE: SYNCOR |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:49[EST]|
| CITY: REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 12/23/1999|
| COUNTY: SENECA STATE: OH |EVENT TIME: 08:30[EST]|
|LICENSE#: 02500490001 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/23/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MARK RING R3 |
| |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE SNEE |JOHN COOK NMSS |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES |WHITE DOE |
+------------------------------------------------+REDDY DOT |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
|NTRA TRANSPORTATION EVENT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A VEHICLE ACCIDENT CARRYING TECHNETIUM-99M |
| |
| The Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) received a notification |
| concerning an accident involving a Syncor truck in Seneca County, Ohio. The |
| truck is on fire, and there is a possible fatality involved. The truck was |
| being used to deliver technetium-99m to area hospitals and used to pick up |
| waste. The report indicates that waste containers are strewn across the |
| highway. Emergency Medical and Fire Department personnel have responded, |
| and the highway patrol was en route to the scene. The Ohio BRP is sending a |
| team to the accident site, which is located about 100 miles from their |
| offices. Syncor is also sending representatives to the accident site. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1145 EST ON 12/23/99 FROM MIKE SNEE TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| Two Ohio BRP representatives, the radiation safety officer from the Syncor |
| facility in Holland, Ohio, and an Ohio Public Utility Commission HAZMAT |
| expert are on the scene as well as personnel from the state police and the |
| county emergency management agency. The Ohio BRP has received the following |
| updated information on the accident: |
| |
| The accident involved a head on collision of two vehicles, and both vehicles |
| are currently located on the side of the road. The accident resulted in |
| both drivers being killed. A county coroner is en route the scene, and the |
| scene has been cordoned off by the state police. The accident occurred on |
| state route 635 and county road 38 in Seneca County, Ohio. The cause of the |
| accident is under investigation. The weather in the area is currently clear |
| and cold with no snow on the ground. |
| |
| There were 12 ammo boxes (which were used to transport radioactive |
| materials) in the Syncor truck. Two boxes had doses (technetium-99m) that |
| had yet to be delivered. Both of these boxes were intact and have been |
| recovered. Approximately eight ammo boxes broke open and were scattered |
| around the scene. These boxes contained waste material (most of which had |
| already decayed or had significantly decayed). Most of the boxes have been |
| recovered. However, there are a few lead pigs that were inside the ammo |
| boxes that opened up, and there are some syringes on the scene that have not |
| yet been recovered. One of the ammo boxes was in the fire and burned up. |
| The lead pigs in this box were charred, but both were intact. This box has |
| also been recovered. Therefore, the radioactive hazard at the scene is very |
| minimal. The Ohio BRP representatives at the scene plan to continue |
| searching the area for any other syringes or radioactive material that may |
| still be on the ground. At the time of this update, recovery efforts for |
| the radioactive material had stopped in order to allow for removal of the |
| drivers from the vehicles. |
| |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Ring), NMSS (Cool), and IRO |
| (Miller). |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.) |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36536 |
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| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/23/1999|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:36[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:45[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SANTINI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD CONTE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 99 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| DURING PERFORMANCE OF THE CABLE SPREADING ROOM (CSR) HALON SYSTEM |
| SURVEILLANCE, APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF OF THE CSR FIRE DAMPERS FAILED TO |
| CLOSE. |
| |
| During performance of surveillance test PT-EM19, "Cable Spreading Room (CSR) |
| Halon System," approximately one-half of the CSR fire dampers (FD-02, 03, 06 |
| and 07) failed to close on a Halon fire suppression system actuation. |
| Damper closure upon Halon system actuation is required to ensure that a |
| proper concentration of Halon is achieved in the CSR to suppress a fire. |
| With the dampers not fully closed, Halon concentration cannot be ensured as |
| described in the Fire Protection Program Plan. Damper closure by other |
| means such as heat was not affected by this condition. Appendix R safe |
| shutdown capabilities were not affected. The apparent cause of this failure |
| was incorrect wiring which has been corrected. Subsequent attempts to close |
| these dampers via Halon system actuation were successful, but investigation |
| into the source of the incorrect wiring is ongoing. This surveillance is |
| performed every 24 months. After the surveillance test was performed last |
| time, a modification was performed on the Transformer Deluge System. The |
| wiring problem which caused only one-half of the dampers to close came from |
| the Transformer Deluge System. The licensee is investigating the cause of |
| this wiring problem. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36537 |
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| FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/24/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:02[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 12/24/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:07[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: NEIL CONSTANCE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/24/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE MALLETT R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 77 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE (Refer to event #36532 |
| for a similar event that occurred on 12/21/99.) |
| |
| "Unit 2 tripped on RCS high pressure at 0207 [EST]. The RPS setpoint of |
| 2345 psig was exceeded, resulting in an RPS actuation and tripping all CRD |
| breakers. The initiating event was a spurious closure of all main turbine |
| intercept/reheat stop valves and main turbine control valves. The plant is |
| stable in Mode 3, with a trip investigation in progress." |
| |
| No primary power-operated relief valves (setpoint 2405 psig) or code safety |
| valves lifted. Secondary side code safeties lifted as expected on the trip, |
| and all valves shut with the turbine bypass valves in operation to remove |
| decay heat to the main condenser. Main feedwater is maintaining steam |
| generator level. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for additional information.) |
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 36538 |
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| REP ORG: STATE OF CALIFORNIA |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/24/1999|
|LICENSEE: UC SAN DIEGO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:59[EST]|
| CITY: SAN DIEGO REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 08/12/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: 00:00[PST]|
|LICENSE#: 1339-37 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/24/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |WILLIAM JOHNSON R4 |
| |SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: K . HANNER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| RESEARCH STUDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RECEIVED AND EXTREMITY DOSE |
| OF 61.65 REM TO HER LEFT INDEX FINGER. |
| |
| The event occurred between April of 1999 and June 1999 at the University of |
| California in San Diego. The individual was observed holding a petri dish |
| with her left index finger over the unshielded portion of the dish. The |
| radioactive element in the petri dish was P-32. Her film badge was |
| processes on August 12, 1999, and it was discovered that her left index |
| finger had received a dose of 61.65 Rem. The State of California Department |
| of Health Services Radiological Health Branch was notified of this event on |
| 10/14/99. There were no adverse health affects to the individual. The |
| State of California Department of Health Services Radiological Health Branch |
| event number assigned to this incident is 10-14-99. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for additional information.) |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36539 |
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| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/25/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:45[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 12/25/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN SULLIVAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/25/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD CONTE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii) DEGRAD COND DURING OP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOW SWITCHGEAR ROOM TEMPERATURE DUE TO DEGRADED HEATING, VENTILATION, AND |
| AIR CONDITIONING (HVAC) COMPONENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH COLD WEATHER |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "[The] 'A' switchgear room temperature [was] outside the [final safety |
| analysis report] design temperature limit of 60�F. [The] temperature |
| decreased to 59�F due to degraded [heating, ventilation, and air |
| conditioning (HVAC)] components. No known operability issues have been |
| identified." |
| |
| The licensee stated that the temperature in the 'A' switchgear room has |
| returned to 60�F but that cold weather is expected again tonight. The |
| licensee is currently in the process of repairing the degraded HVAC |
| components. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36540 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/26/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:57[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/26/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 05:45[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/26/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MARK RING R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SPAETH | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| ATTENDANT HAD TO EVACUATE AREA BEFORE THREE PIPE FLANGES TO A CELL WERE |
| COVERED TO PREVENT MODERATION INTRUSION. (NRC Bulletin 91-01 24-hour |
| notification) |
| |
| AT 0545 hours on 12/26/99, an emergency response was initiated in the X-333 |
| process building due to a report of smoke coming from a piece of process |
| equipment., i.e., a seal exhaust pump (vacuum pump). All personnel in the |
| building were required to evacuate "see & flee" to a safe area until the |
| emergency condition was mitigated. |
| |
| The "see & flee" took place while a maintenance evolution was ongoing that |
| required a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) required attendant to be |
| present. The "see & flee" resulted in the attendant being required to |
| evacuate the work area with piping flanges uncovered (left three large |
| compressor pipe openings uncovered to cell #33-8-9 after one of its |
| compressors had been removed). |
| |
| This violated requirement #4 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which states, |
| "openings/penetrations made during, or as a result of, maintenance |
| activities will be covered to minimize the potential for moderation |
| collection and moist air exposure when unattended." This constitutes the |
| loss of one NCS control (moderation) with mass and interaction controls |
| maintained throughout this event. |
| |
| Moderation control was reestablished at 0655 hours by covering the openings |
| under the direction of the Incident Commander and concurrence of NCS |
| personnel. |
| |
| There was no loss of hazardous/ radioactive/material or |
| radioactive/radiological exposure as a result of this event. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: The safety significance of this event is |
| extremely low. The limited amount of time the flanges were uncovered and |
| unattended did not allow any more moisture to enter than if work had |
| continued and the equipment had been attended for the entire period. Lack |
| of attending personnel during the "see & flee" simply removed the ability to |
| mitigate an unlikely event involving the entrance of liquid water (or other |
| moderator) into the equipment. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): If the equipment had been mis-categorized and |
| actually contained greater than the minimum critical mass of uranium (more |
| than 900 pounds of uranyl fluoride, UO2F2, at 1.908 wt% enrichment) and |
| liquid water entered the exposed openings, a critical configuration might |
| have formed inside the cascade equipment. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| The controlled parameters include mass and moderation. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): The exact amount is unknown; |
| however, the cell was categorized as "uncomplicated handling" which means |
| the cell has less than the safe mass (approximately 400 pounds uranyl |
| fluoride, UO2F2, at 1.908 wt% enrichment). The form would be uranyl |
| fluoride. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: By leaving the exposed flanges unattended, |
| control #4 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which requires, "openings/penetrations made |
| during maintenance activities shall be covered to minimize the potential for |
| moderation collection and moist air exposure when unattended. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| Moderation control was reestablished at 0655 hours on 12/26/99, under the |
| direction of Incident Commander, by covering the opening. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate |
| holder. |
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