Event Notification Report for December 27, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 12/23/1999 - 12/27/1999 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 36535 36536 36537 36538 36539 36540 +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 36535 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/23/1999| |LICENSEE: SYNCOR |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:49[EST]| | CITY: REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 12/23/1999| | COUNTY: SENECA STATE: OH |EVENT TIME: 08:30[EST]| |LICENSE#: 02500490001 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/23/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |MARK RING R3 | | |DON COOL NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE SNEE |JOHN COOK NMSS | | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES |WHITE DOE | +------------------------------------------------+REDDY DOT | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | | |NTRA TRANSPORTATION EVENT | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A VEHICLE ACCIDENT CARRYING TECHNETIUM-99M | | | | The Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) received a notification | | concerning an accident involving a Syncor truck in Seneca County, Ohio. The | | truck is on fire, and there is a possible fatality involved. The truck was | | being used to deliver technetium-99m to area hospitals and used to pick up | | waste. The report indicates that waste containers are strewn across the | | highway. Emergency Medical and Fire Department personnel have responded, | | and the highway patrol was en route to the scene. The Ohio BRP is sending a | | team to the accident site, which is located about 100 miles from their | | offices. Syncor is also sending representatives to the accident site. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1145 EST ON 12/23/99 FROM MIKE SNEE TO FANGIE JONES * * * | | | | Two Ohio BRP representatives, the radiation safety officer from the Syncor | | facility in Holland, Ohio, and an Ohio Public Utility Commission HAZMAT | | expert are on the scene as well as personnel from the state police and the | | county emergency management agency. The Ohio BRP has received the following | | updated information on the accident: | | | | The accident involved a head on collision of two vehicles, and both vehicles | | are currently located on the side of the road. The accident resulted in | | both drivers being killed. A county coroner is en route the scene, and the | | scene has been cordoned off by the state police. The accident occurred on | | state route 635 and county road 38 in Seneca County, Ohio. The cause of the | | accident is under investigation. The weather in the area is currently clear | | and cold with no snow on the ground. | | | | There were 12 ammo boxes (which were used to transport radioactive | | materials) in the Syncor truck. Two boxes had doses (technetium-99m) that | | had yet to be delivered. Both of these boxes were intact and have been | | recovered. Approximately eight ammo boxes broke open and were scattered | | around the scene. These boxes contained waste material (most of which had | | already decayed or had significantly decayed). Most of the boxes have been | | recovered. However, there are a few lead pigs that were inside the ammo | | boxes that opened up, and there are some syringes on the scene that have not | | yet been recovered. One of the ammo boxes was in the fire and burned up. | | The lead pigs in this box were charred, but both were intact. This box has | | also been recovered. Therefore, the radioactive hazard at the scene is very | | minimal. The Ohio BRP representatives at the scene plan to continue | | searching the area for any other syringes or radioactive material that may | | still be on the ground. At the time of this update, recovery efforts for | | the radioactive material had stopped in order to allow for removal of the | | drivers from the vehicles. | | | | The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Ring), NMSS (Cool), and IRO | | (Miller). | | | | (Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36536 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/23/1999| | UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:36[EST]| | RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/23/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:45[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: SANTINI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/23/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD CONTE R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |2 N Y 99 Power Operation |99 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DURING PERFORMANCE OF THE CABLE SPREADING ROOM (CSR) HALON SYSTEM | | SURVEILLANCE, APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF OF THE CSR FIRE DAMPERS FAILED TO | | CLOSE. | | | | During performance of surveillance test PT-EM19, "Cable Spreading Room (CSR) | | Halon System," approximately one-half of the CSR fire dampers (FD-02, 03, 06 | | and 07) failed to close on a Halon fire suppression system actuation. | | Damper closure upon Halon system actuation is required to ensure that a | | proper concentration of Halon is achieved in the CSR to suppress a fire. | | With the dampers not fully closed, Halon concentration cannot be ensured as | | described in the Fire Protection Program Plan. Damper closure by other | | means such as heat was not affected by this condition. Appendix R safe | | shutdown capabilities were not affected. The apparent cause of this failure | | was incorrect wiring which has been corrected. Subsequent attempts to close | | these dampers via Halon system actuation were successful, but investigation | | into the source of the incorrect wiring is ongoing. This surveillance is | | performed every 24 months. After the surveillance test was performed last | | time, a modification was performed on the Transformer Deluge System. The | | wiring problem which caused only one-half of the dampers to close came from | | the Transformer Deluge System. The licensee is investigating the cause of | | this wiring problem. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36537 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/24/1999| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:02[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 12/24/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:07[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: NEIL CONSTANCE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/24/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE MALLETT R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 A/R Y 77 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE (Refer to event #36532 | | for a similar event that occurred on 12/21/99.) | | | | "Unit 2 tripped on RCS high pressure at 0207 [EST]. The RPS setpoint of | | 2345 psig was exceeded, resulting in an RPS actuation and tripping all CRD | | breakers. The initiating event was a spurious closure of all main turbine | | intercept/reheat stop valves and main turbine control valves. The plant is | | stable in Mode 3, with a trip investigation in progress." | | | | No primary power-operated relief valves (setpoint 2405 psig) or code safety | | valves lifted. Secondary side code safeties lifted as expected on the trip, | | and all valves shut with the turbine bypass valves in operation to remove | | decay heat to the main condenser. Main feedwater is maintaining steam | | generator level. | | | | The NRC resident inspector was notified. | | | | (Call the NRC operations officer for additional information.) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 36538 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: STATE OF CALIFORNIA |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/24/1999| |LICENSEE: UC SAN DIEGO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:59[EST]| | CITY: SAN DIEGO REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 08/12/1999| | COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: 00:00[PST]| |LICENSE#: 1339-37 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/24/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |WILLIAM JOHNSON R4 | | |SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: K . HANNER | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | RESEARCH STUDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RECEIVED AND EXTREMITY DOSE | | OF 61.65 REM TO HER LEFT INDEX FINGER. | | | | The event occurred between April of 1999 and June 1999 at the University of | | California in San Diego. The individual was observed holding a petri dish | | with her left index finger over the unshielded portion of the dish. The | | radioactive element in the petri dish was P-32. Her film badge was | | processes on August 12, 1999, and it was discovered that her left index | | finger had received a dose of 61.65 Rem. The State of California Department | | of Health Services Radiological Health Branch was notified of this event on | | 10/14/99. There were no adverse health affects to the individual. The | | State of California Department of Health Services Radiological Health Branch | | event number assigned to this incident is 10-14-99. | | | | (Call the NRC operations officer for additional information.) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36539 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/25/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:45[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 12/25/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:00[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN SULLIVAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/25/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD CONTE R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii) DEGRAD COND DURING OP | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOW SWITCHGEAR ROOM TEMPERATURE DUE TO DEGRADED HEATING, VENTILATION, AND | | AIR CONDITIONING (HVAC) COMPONENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH COLD WEATHER | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "[The] 'A' switchgear room temperature [was] outside the [final safety | | analysis report] design temperature limit of 60�F. [The] temperature | | decreased to 59�F due to degraded [heating, ventilation, and air | | conditioning (HVAC)] components. No known operability issues have been | | identified." | | | | The licensee stated that the temperature in the 'A' switchgear room has | | returned to 60�F but that cold weather is expected again tonight. The | | licensee is currently in the process of repairing the degraded HVAC | | components. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36540 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/26/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:57[EST]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/26/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 05:45[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/26/1999| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MARK RING R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: SPAETH | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ATTENDANT HAD TO EVACUATE AREA BEFORE THREE PIPE FLANGES TO A CELL WERE | | COVERED TO PREVENT MODERATION INTRUSION. (NRC Bulletin 91-01 24-hour | | notification) | | | | AT 0545 hours on 12/26/99, an emergency response was initiated in the X-333 | | process building due to a report of smoke coming from a piece of process | | equipment., i.e., a seal exhaust pump (vacuum pump). All personnel in the | | building were required to evacuate "see & flee" to a safe area until the | | emergency condition was mitigated. | | | | The "see & flee" took place while a maintenance evolution was ongoing that | | required a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) required attendant to be | | present. The "see & flee" resulted in the attendant being required to | | evacuate the work area with piping flanges uncovered (left three large | | compressor pipe openings uncovered to cell #33-8-9 after one of its | | compressors had been removed). | | | | This violated requirement #4 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which states, | | "openings/penetrations made during, or as a result of, maintenance | | activities will be covered to minimize the potential for moderation | | collection and moist air exposure when unattended." This constitutes the | | loss of one NCS control (moderation) with mass and interaction controls | | maintained throughout this event. | | | | Moderation control was reestablished at 0655 hours by covering the openings | | under the direction of the Incident Commander and concurrence of NCS | | personnel. | | | | There was no loss of hazardous/ radioactive/material or | | radioactive/radiological exposure as a result of this event. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: The safety significance of this event is | | extremely low. The limited amount of time the flanges were uncovered and | | unattended did not allow any more moisture to enter than if work had | | continued and the equipment had been attended for the entire period. Lack | | of attending personnel during the "see & flee" simply removed the ability to | | mitigate an unlikely event involving the entrance of liquid water (or other | | moderator) into the equipment. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): If the equipment had been mis-categorized and | | actually contained greater than the minimum critical mass of uranium (more | | than 900 pounds of uranyl fluoride, UO2F2, at 1.908 wt% enrichment) and | | liquid water entered the exposed openings, a critical configuration might | | have formed inside the cascade equipment. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | The controlled parameters include mass and moderation. | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): The exact amount is unknown; | | however, the cell was categorized as "uncomplicated handling" which means | | the cell has less than the safe mass (approximately 400 pounds uranyl | | fluoride, UO2F2, at 1.908 wt% enrichment). The form would be uranyl | | fluoride. | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: By leaving the exposed flanges unattended, | | control #4 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which requires, "openings/penetrations made | | during maintenance activities shall be covered to minimize the potential for | | moderation collection and moist air exposure when unattended. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | Moderation control was reestablished at 0655 hours on 12/26/99, under the | | direction of Incident Commander, by covering the opening. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate | | holder. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021