Event Notification Report for November 15, 1999

DIVISION 1 AND 2 DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE.

Approximately 20 hours after restoring the Division 1 Diesel Generator (DG) to service and removing the Division 2 DG from service for outage work, the Division 1 Load Shedding and Sequencing (LSS) failed. This resulted in the Division 1 DG being declared inoperable because of its inability to meet the required surveillance tests. The Division 1 DG is capable of operating and supplying the ESF bus manually.

The Division 2 DG has test equipment installed to allow ECCS testing. The Division 2 DG is considered functional but not operable with the test equipment installed. The licensee is reviewing Division 2 equipment status to determine if Division 2 was fully operable, and if so, this notification will be retracted.

The licensee intends to notify the NRC resident inspector.

*************** UPDATE AT 2256 EST ON 12/06/99 FROM BOB CARROLL TO LEIGH TROCINE ***************

The licensee is retracting this notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"After further investigation, we are retracting the 4-hour call-in, which was made on 11/15/99 regarding the loss of [the Division] I Load Shedding and Sequencing (LSS) power supply. The initial evaluation conservatively considered [the Division] Il Diesel Generator (DG) [inoperable] due to the installation of test equipment in preparation for [Division] II surveillance testing. It has now been concluded, that even with the surveillance test equipment installed, [the Division] II DG was still capable of timely and correct automatic operation, [it] was [also] capable of performing its safety function for the duration required, and there was no reason to expect that [the Division] II DG would not have fulfilled its safety function if the need had arisen. We have determined that all other redundant trains needed to perform the required safety functions as discussed in NUREG-1022, Rev. 1, were operable and available. Therefore, we conclude that loss of the [Division] I LSS power supply did not meet the notification requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)."

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Andrews).

LICENSEE IDENTIFIED CONDITION INVOLVING POTENTIAL COMMON MODE FAILURE OF SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED COMPONENTS

"In accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B), PG&E is making a 1-hour non-emergency report of a condition that was outside the design basis for Units 1 and 2. PG&E has concluded that, due to a common mode failure mechanism, multiple degraded indicating lamp sockets in the control room boards could have caused redundant safety-related equipment to become inoperable during a postulated seismic event. The sockets are Westinghouse EZC Minalite part number 449D187GXX.

"In September 1999, PG&E identified an adverse trend in the number of broken lamp sockets in the main control board. An investigation was initiated where numerous sockets were found broken, in some cases the lamps remained lit even though the socket was degraded. The concern with the socket failures is that the socket can separate during a seismic event and create a short circuit. This could result in loss of indication and potentially a loss of control function for the associated component.

"PG&E has identified the cause of socket failures to be tensile stress placed on the socket during assembly which exceeds the plastic material yield strength. The sockets crack and fail over time due to creep.

"Sockets which have not been replaced, but may be degraded, have undergone an inspection and are considered operable."

The total population of EZC Minalite sockets installed is approximately 1,300. Of this number 2-3% have been replaced and <1% remain to be inspected. This problem was identified in September 1999.

The licensee plans to inform the NRC resident inspector.

24 HOUR REPORT - VIOLATION OF 10CFR50 APPENDIX R "FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM"

"24 hour report required by Facility Operating Licenses.

"McGuire Nuclear Station has determined that provisions of their fire protection program had not been maintained as required by conditions C. (4) [Unit 1] and C. (7) [Unit 2] of the Facility Operating Licenses.

"Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9-5 requires that all fire rated assemblies and sealing devices separating (1) Safety from non-safety related areas, (2) Redundant analyzed post fire safe shutdown equipment or, (3) The Control Complex (Control Rooms, and Battery Rooms) from the remainder of the plant or, (4) Containment from non-containment areas shall be operable. Contrary to this, six penetrations were discovered during a configuration inspection to not satisfy the commitment for separation of safety from non-safety related areas. Specifically, two penetrations were discovered with no seal installed, and four penetrations found with an improper installation of the seal. Remedial actions required by Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9-5 have been implemented (fire watches). This condition did not impair the ability of the Standby Shutdown System to perform the function of mitigating all 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire event. Therefore McGuire did not operate outside the design basis of the plant.

"A follow-up written report will be issued within 14 days. The NRC resident inspectors have been notified."