Event Notification Report for November 05, 1999

24-HOUR FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR EMPLOYEE

CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR EMPLOYEE CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR COCAINE FOLLOWING RANDOM DRUG TESTING. THE INDIVIDUAL'S ACCESS HAS BEEN DENIED. CONTACT THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS CENTER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

24-HOUR REPORT PURSUANT TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.133

"At 1538 CST, on November 5, 1999, the River Bend Station (RBS) staff concluded that a loose part had been detected in the primary system.

"The RBS staff was alerted to this condition when channel six of the Loose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS) began to alarm at approximately three to five minute intervals. Channel six monitors the Feedwater 45° line. Over the remainder of the day, the alarms gradually decreased to none and there is currently no alarming condition. No other Loose Parts Monitoring channels detected this condition.

"The RBS staff and the LPMS vendor reviewed the data and concluded that the loose part is of relatively low mass, probably less than two pounds. The RBS staff will continue to evaluate this condition.

"This report is submitted pursuant to Reg. Guide 1.133."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.

STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVES CLOSED

At 0232 on 11/05/99 steam generator liquid radiation monitor R-19 failed. This failure caused the following valves to close: BT-2A/MV-32077, steam generator blowdown isolation valve A1; BT-2B/MV-32079, steam generator blowdown isolation valve B1; BT-3A/MV-32078, steam generator blowdown isolation valve A2; and BT-3B/MV-32080, steam generator blowdown isolation valve B2. These valves have a containment isolation function for a main steam line rupture within containment. Their post - Loss of Coolant Accident function is to provide steam generator isolation.

The monitor failure will not allow the re-establishment of steam generator blowdown flow. Plant chemistry and instrument and control personnel have been contacted to determine corrective actions and to repair the radiation monitor. Radiation monitor R-15, Air Ejector Exhaust, is indicating normal readings and is being monitored by operations. Local indication of radiation monitor R-19 are the normal count rate. The actual problem appears to be that the Control Room indication for R-19 has failed.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

60% THROUGH WALL CRACK DISCOVERED DURING AN ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION

While performing ultrasonic examination of recirculation riser weld RRB-F002 (nozzle to safe-end weld) indications that are indicative of intergranular stress-corrosion cracking (IGSCC) were identified. Specifically, a 60% through wall crack was found on the "B" recirculation riser nozzle to safe-end weld. This weld was replaced in 1978. The licensee will take review the codes and expand the scope of work as appropriate.

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

SEE RELATED EVENT: #36416.

TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR SCRAM ON "1B" MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER HIGH WATER LEVEL.

Turbine trip resulted in Reactor scram. Turbine trip was a result of a high level alarm in the "1B" Moisture Separator Reheater. Just prior to the turbine trip there appears to have been a level transient in the "4B" feedwater heater. All control rods fully inserted into the core. Reactor Feedwater Pumps tripped on High Reactor Vessel Water Level. A Reactor Feedwater Pump was restarted when Reactor Vessel Water level decreased and is currently maintaining Reactor Vessel Water Level. The Main Condenser is being used as the heat sink. No Emergency Core Cooling Systems started as a result of the turbine trip/Reactor scram. The offsite electrical grid is stable, and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed.

The Licensee is investigating what caused the level transient in the "4B" feedwater heater.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

Unit 1 was manually scrammed following the unplanned trip of the "1B" Reactor Feed Pump during monthly surveillance testing.

"On November 5,1999 at 1050 [hours] a manual Reactor Scram was inserted on Unit 1 after Reactor Feed Pump '1B' tripped during feed pump testing and Reactor Water Level was not maintained by the '1A' Reactor Feed Pump. Primary Containment Groups 2, 6 and 8 Isolations were received following the manual reactor scram from low Reactor Water Level. There is normally a level transient following a reactor scram, which is anticipated by the operating crew. Reactor Water Level lowered to 112 inches. The High Pressure Coolant Injection system was manually started, but was not used for injection. All required Isolations occurred as a result of the Reactor Water Level Low Level One initiation signal. Group 2 isolation valves include Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Traversing Incore Probe, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge Isolation to Radwaste and RHR Process Sampling Valves. Group 6 isolation valves include Containment Atmosphere Control System and Post Accident Valves. Group 8 isolation valves include RHR System Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valves, these valves were closed prior to the isolation sign.

"[The initial safety significance is] minimal, all systems functioned as designed. The licensee took conservative action to insert a manual Reactor Scram.

"The cause of the '1B' Reactor Feed Pump trip will be determined and corrected."

All rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via the Main Condenser. The automatic reactor scram level setpoint is 162 inches with HPCI injection occurring at 108 inches.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION

The licensee reported that a patient received treatment of an incorrect site as the result of an error in setting up the Nucletron HDR (high dose rate) afterloader device. When the treatment simulation was run, a dwell setting of 1.0 cm was used; however, when the actual treatment was administered, a dwell setting of 0.5 cm was selected. This resulted in the actual treatment site being displaced 5 cm from the intended site. The intended site received less than 10% of the prescribed dose. The misadministration was discovered at approximately 1600 CST on 11/8/1999. The licensee plans to revise treatment procedures to ensure that the dwell setting used during treatment planning is the same as that used during the administration of treatment.

The licensee intends to continue treatment of the patient at a later date. The licensee has contacted NRC Region III (Null) regarding this event.