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Event Notification Report for November 4, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           11/03/1999 - 11/04/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36303  36385  36390  36391  36392  36393  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36303       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/17/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:24[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        10/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:32[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ED HYNE                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/03/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INTEGRATED LEAK TEST FAILURE IN THE REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER    |
| SYSTEM                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Failure of IST [Integrated System Test] testing for RBCLC [reactor building |
| closed loop cooling] containment isolation AOVs resulted in performance of   |
| 'as-found' Type-C LLRT.  Results of local leak test was 'gross' failure.     |
| The failure was determined from inability to obtain test pressure and        |
| quantify leakage.  Based on these results, it is assumed Tech Spec allowable |
| containment leakage has been exceeded."                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The plant will remain shutdown until repairs are made.                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1422 ON 11/03/99 BY MARK ABRANSKI TO JOLLIFFE * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee desires to retract this event for the following rational:       |
|                                                                              |
| The RBCLC piping forms a closed loop inside containment which serves as a    |
| redundant containment isolation barrier in the event an RBCLC containment    |
| isolation valve fails.  Therefore, it need not be assumed that Tech Spec     |
| allowable leakage had been exceeded as reported above.                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Mohamed Shanbaky.               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36385       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALISADES                REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/02/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:45[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE                               |EVENT DATE:        11/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BOB VINCENT                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/03/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES CREED          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - INDICATIONS DISCOVERED ON CONTROL ROD DRIVE SEAL HOUSINGS -                |
|                                                                              |
| At 0900 on 11/02/99, a dye penetrant (PT) examination of the control rod     |
| drive seal housing for control rod #44 revealed a potential crack-like       |
| indication in the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary.  The PT          |
| examination was performed to investigate a boric acid deposit on the         |
| exterior surface of the housing which was discovered during a previous       |
| visual inspection.  A small indication was also found on the seal housing    |
| for control rod #30.  The plant is in a refueling outage.  An investigation  |
| to characterize the indications and determine their cause and extent is in   |
| progress.  This situation will be resolved prior to plant restart.           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1432 ON 11/03/99 BY HUGH NIXON TO JOLLIFFE * * *             |
|                                                                              |
| At 1215 on 11/03/99, a PT examination revealed a circumferential indication  |
| on the seal housing for control rod #26.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Jim Creed.                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36390       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/03/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:10[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        11/03/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN LAMB                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/03/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MOHAMED SHANBAKY     R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v)      EMERGENCY SIREN INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       99       Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - FOUR OF SIXTEEN OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE AND BEING REPAIRED -   |
|                                                                              |
| Four of 16 offsite emergency sirens in Harriman State Park, Orange County,   |
| NY, are inoperable due to the loss of an electrical line to the park during  |
| a thunderstorm.  The line is being repaired.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                     |
|                                                                              |
| Refer to identical Event #36391 for Unit 3.                                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36391       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/03/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:51[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        11/03/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:15[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE DAVIS                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/03/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MOHAMED SHANBAKY     R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v)      EMERGENCY SIREN INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - FOUR OF SIXTEEN OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE AND BEING REPAIRED -   |
|                                                                              |
| Four of 16 offsite emergency sirens in Harriman State Park, Orange County,   |
| NY, are inoperable due to the loss of an electrical line to the park during  |
| a thunderstorm.  The line is being repaired.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| Refer to identical Event # 36390 for Unit 2.                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36392       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/03/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:09[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE:        11/03/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RANDY TODD                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/03/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |AL BELISLE           R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Low Pressure Injection System removed from Engineered Safeguards alignment |
| due to erroneous procedure -                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| At 0230 on 11/03/99, both trains of the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) System  |
| were removed from their normal Engineered Safeguards (ES) alignment due to   |
| an erroneous procedure.  Approximately 20 minutes later, the proper ES       |
| alignment was restored after the operators questioned the valve position     |
| specified by the procedure.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Although this event was terminated at approximately 0250 on 11/03/99, the    |
| potential impact on system operability remained in question.  Engineering    |
| was notified and began evaluating operability. This included discussions     |
| with Operations as to expected actions, alarm responses, etc.  It was        |
| concluded that operability could not be assured without a detailed analysis. |
| At 1330 on 11/03/99, Engineering and Operations concluded that there was no  |
| longer "reasonable expectation" of past operability.  Pending the results of |
| a full evaluation by Engineering, Duke Power decided that this was           |
| potentially a "Condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of  |
| the safety function...to...mitigate the consequences of an accident."        |
| Therefore, this event is considered reportable.                              |
|                                                                              |
| Impact on Postulated Accident:                                               |
| The valves that were opened were #3LP-92 and #3LP-93, the train 'A' and 'B'  |
| Decay Heat Cooler Bypass Valves.  As a result of the alignment, flow         |
| immediately after an accident could have been higher than expected.  This    |
| could affect the available NPSH to the LPI and Reactor Building Spray (RBS)  |
| System pumps.  Per the Emergency Operating Procedure, operators would have   |
| throttled the cooler outlet valves to establish the desired total flow.      |
|                                                                              |
| Later in the scenario, the Borated Water Storage Tank inventory would be     |
| depleted and operators would realign the LPI and RBS suctions to the Reactor |
| Building Emergency Sump.  Also, Low Pressure Service Water  would be aligned |
| to the decay heat coolers to cool the sump water.  With #3LP-92 and #3LP-93  |
| open, a large portion of the LPI System flow would bypass the coolers,       |
| resulting in cooling flow at higher temperatures than expected.  Inadequate  |
| core cooling might result until the inappropriate alignment could be         |
| diagnosed and corrected.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Cause:                                                                       |
| Operators were performing a periodic procedure "Tech Spec Flow Path          |
| Verification" which had recently been changed to include additional valves.  |
| They repositioned two of the newly added valves to "OPEN" as directed by the |
| procedure.  Subsequently, they questioned this action and verified from      |
| other procedures that the proper position for these valves is "CLOSED".  The |
| valves were reclosed within approximately 20 minutes.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The root cause for the inaccurate procedure change will be investigated.     |
|                                                                              |
| Corrective action:                                                           |
| The proper positions of the valves were questioned and the valves were       |
| returned to the original positions, thus ending the event.                   |
|                                                                              |
| Because the impact on operability of the affected systems was not            |
| immediately apparent, and it did not become apparent until well after the    |
| termination of the event, no Tech Spec Action Statements were entered.       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36393       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MONTICELLO               REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/03/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:02[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        10/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:20[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DUANE BISTODEAU              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/03/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES CREED          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE FOR EIGHT DAYS -          |
|                                                                              |
| At 1720 CDT on 10/19/99, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System    |
| was removed from service for a surveillance test and corrective maintenance. |
| During post maintenance testing following corrective maintenance, a problem  |
| was identified that may have made the RCIC System inoperable.  Subsequently, |
| the RCIC System was repaired, tested, returned to service and operable       |
| status at 0135 CDT on 10/27/99.  This event was originally determined to be  |
| not reportable to the NRC.  However, at 1500 CST on 11/03/99, plant          |
| management decided to report this event to the NRC.                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+