Event Notification Report for October 29, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/28/1999 - 10/29/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
36376363733636936370
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36376
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/30/1999
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/1999
Event Time: 10:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/1999
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/1999
Event Time: 10:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN
On 10/29/99 at 1040 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that Procedure XP2-GP-MM2000, Rev. 1, "Operation of the Negative Air Machine" was activated and used prior to the implementation of Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) PLANT068.A01. Procedure (XP2-GP-MM2000, Rev. 0) was revised (Rev. 1) and implemented on 9/1/99. This revised procedure contained the flowdown requirements from the new
revision or the NCSA, without the NCSA being implemented. Several requirements of the original NCSA were removed in the revision process, including the requirement to have a second, knowledgeable person VERIFY that the Negative Air Machine (NAM) is only used on equipment containing 5.25% U235 enrichment or less.
Since personnel operating the NAM were utilizing the newly revised procedure, which reflects the requirements of the revised NCSA, they failed to complete the requirement for the second person verification. This lack of verification is deemed to be the loss of one control because the governing NCSA (Rev.0) still lists this verification as a requirement.
The Negative Air Machine was immediately tagged out of service, Procedure XP2-GP-MM2000, Rev. 1 was placed on hold, and the previously approved procedure was reactivated until NCSA PLANT068A01 is activated. This Criticality Safety Incident is a Level 3 Severity Index (Loss of controls such that only one double contingency control remains in place).
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The safety significance, or this event is very low. The lack of documented verification of enrichment for the Negative Air Machine since 9/10/99 did not result in a loss of the enrichment parameter. Virtually all of the equipment in X-333 is operated below 5.25% assay. A review of equipment worked on with the NAM was performed and none of the equipment worked on had been operated above 5.25% U-235 enrichment in the time period of interest.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS
The components of the negative air machine are not favorable geometry for all enrichments. Current approved analysis limits uranium to 5.25%. however a revised analysis which has been PORC approved has shown that an enrichment up to 20% U-235 is safe in the Negative Air Machine. Therefore, an enrichment above 20% would have to be present for a criticality to be possible. However, this is extremely unlikely In the X-333 Facility.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS
Enrichment is controlled with a first check arid a second verification. Interaction Is controlled and mass is inherently controlled through the physical limits of the filtration system to tolerate significant plugging. Neither mass nor interaction were violated in this event.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT
The filter units at PORTS typically contain less than 10 grams U-235 (<1.5% critical mass). Since the negative air machine is used primarily to protect personnel from hydrogen fluoride fumes, no significant mass of U-235 is expected in the equipment. Due to the enrichment limits on the cascade equipment In the X-333, enrichment is not expected to exceed 5%.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS
The control on this system included a first and second check to ensure the enrichment limit was not violated for the negative air machine. The requirement to perform the second check was removed from the procedure without implementing a new analysis to support its removal. The second check was not performed on over 15 maintenance jobs.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent, the Negative Air Machine was immediately tagged out of service and the procedure was placed on hold.
THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS THE RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. THE DOE REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE NOTIFIED.
On 10/29/99 at 1040 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that Procedure XP2-GP-MM2000, Rev. 1, "Operation of the Negative Air Machine" was activated and used prior to the implementation of Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) PLANT068.A01. Procedure (XP2-GP-MM2000, Rev. 0) was revised (Rev. 1) and implemented on 9/1/99. This revised procedure contained the flowdown requirements from the new
revision or the NCSA, without the NCSA being implemented. Several requirements of the original NCSA were removed in the revision process, including the requirement to have a second, knowledgeable person VERIFY that the Negative Air Machine (NAM) is only used on equipment containing 5.25% U235 enrichment or less.
Since personnel operating the NAM were utilizing the newly revised procedure, which reflects the requirements of the revised NCSA, they failed to complete the requirement for the second person verification. This lack of verification is deemed to be the loss of one control because the governing NCSA (Rev.0) still lists this verification as a requirement.
The Negative Air Machine was immediately tagged out of service, Procedure XP2-GP-MM2000, Rev. 1 was placed on hold, and the previously approved procedure was reactivated until NCSA PLANT068A01 is activated. This Criticality Safety Incident is a Level 3 Severity Index (Loss of controls such that only one double contingency control remains in place).
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The safety significance, or this event is very low. The lack of documented verification of enrichment for the Negative Air Machine since 9/10/99 did not result in a loss of the enrichment parameter. Virtually all of the equipment in X-333 is operated below 5.25% assay. A review of equipment worked on with the NAM was performed and none of the equipment worked on had been operated above 5.25% U-235 enrichment in the time period of interest.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS
The components of the negative air machine are not favorable geometry for all enrichments. Current approved analysis limits uranium to 5.25%. however a revised analysis which has been PORC approved has shown that an enrichment up to 20% U-235 is safe in the Negative Air Machine. Therefore, an enrichment above 20% would have to be present for a criticality to be possible. However, this is extremely unlikely In the X-333 Facility.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS
Enrichment is controlled with a first check arid a second verification. Interaction Is controlled and mass is inherently controlled through the physical limits of the filtration system to tolerate significant plugging. Neither mass nor interaction were violated in this event.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT
The filter units at PORTS typically contain less than 10 grams U-235 (<1.5% critical mass). Since the negative air machine is used primarily to protect personnel from hydrogen fluoride fumes, no significant mass of U-235 is expected in the equipment. Due to the enrichment limits on the cascade equipment In the X-333, enrichment is not expected to exceed 5%.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS
The control on this system included a first and second check to ensure the enrichment limit was not violated for the negative air machine. The requirement to perform the second check was removed from the procedure without implementing a new analysis to support its removal. The second check was not performed on over 15 maintenance jobs.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent, the Negative Air Machine was immediately tagged out of service and the procedure was placed on hold.
THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS THE RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. THE DOE REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE NOTIFIED.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36373
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 10/29/1999
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/1999
Event Time: 12:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/1999
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/1999
Event Time: 12:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
GENERATOR TRIP - REACTOR SCRAM
On October 29, 1999, at 1255 with the plant at 100% reactor power and in Mode 1, a generator trip followed by a reactor scram occurred at River Bend Station. The plant responded as expected, except that recirculation pump 'A' failed to downshift to slow speed and tripped to off. The plant is stable, and currently in Mode 3. Hot -Shutdown. Plant personnel continue with an orderly shutdown. Work activities were in progress in the switchyard at the time of the event. These activities are included in an investigation of the cause of the event.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
On October 29, 1999, at 1255 with the plant at 100% reactor power and in Mode 1, a generator trip followed by a reactor scram occurred at River Bend Station. The plant responded as expected, except that recirculation pump 'A' failed to downshift to slow speed and tripped to off. The plant is stable, and currently in Mode 3. Hot -Shutdown. Plant personnel continue with an orderly shutdown. Work activities were in progress in the switchyard at the time of the event. These activities are included in an investigation of the cause of the event.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36369
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: EMLING
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: EMLING
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/29/1999
Notification Time: 02:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/1999
Event Time: 01:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/1999
Notification Time: 02:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/1999
Event Time: 01:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
MARK LESSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF MAIN TURBINE BEARING OIL PRESSURE
The reactor automatically tripped from 100% power when the main turbine tripped due to low bearing oil pressure. All control rods inserted completely, and all systems functioned as expected. The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started to feed the steam generators.
The licensee reported that a main turbine low bearing oil pressure alarm had been received in the control room several minutes before the trip. An operator had just been dispatched to investigate the cause of the alarm when the main turbine automatically tripped.
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.
The reactor automatically tripped from 100% power when the main turbine tripped due to low bearing oil pressure. All control rods inserted completely, and all systems functioned as expected. The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started to feed the steam generators.
The licensee reported that a main turbine low bearing oil pressure alarm had been received in the control room several minutes before the trip. An operator had just been dispatched to investigate the cause of the alarm when the main turbine automatically tripped.
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36370
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/29/1999
Notification Time: 04:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/1999
Event Time: 02:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/1999
Notification Time: 04:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/1999
Event Time: 02:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR AUTOSTART DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKE
The licensee reported that one of the standby diesel generators autostarted, but did not load, due to a lightning strike. The load dispatcher informed the site that numerous strikes were also taken on the electrical grid in the vicinity of the site, causing some breaker repositioning. However, the site was unaffected, except for the autostart of the diesel generator.
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
The licensee reported that one of the standby diesel generators autostarted, but did not load, due to a lightning strike. The load dispatcher informed the site that numerous strikes were also taken on the electrical grid in the vicinity of the site, causing some breaker repositioning. However, the site was unaffected, except for the autostart of the diesel generator.
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.