Event Notification Report for October 21, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/20/1999 - 10/21/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
36330363263632736328
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36330
Rep Org: US AIR FORCE
Licensee: US AIR FORCE
Region: 2
City: MACON State: GA
County:
License #: 42-32539-01AF
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MAJ. WROBEL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: US AIR FORCE
Region: 2
City: MACON State: GA
County:
License #: 42-32539-01AF
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MAJ. WROBEL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 07:39 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/1999
Event Time: 16:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/17/1999
Notification Time: 07:39 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/1999
Event Time: 16:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/17/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
THE AIR FORCE REPORTED THAT A LANTERN POD WAS LOST IN SHIPMENT
A LANTERN POD (INFRARED IMAGING POD) CONTAINING TWO 4 MICROCURIES OF AMERICIUM-241 SOURCES WAS LOST IN A SHIPMENT FROM KIRKLAND AFB, NEW MEXICO TO ROBINS AFB, GEORGIA. THE DEVICE WAS AN AMERSHAM MODEL AMM.7. FEDEX WAS THE CARRIER FOR THIS SHIPMENT AND THE AIRBILL NUMBER IS 5654077161. THE SHIPMENT WAS DETERMINED TO BE LOST AT THE FEDEX DISTRIBUTION CENTER IN MACON, GA. THE DEVICE IS STILL BEING TRACKED BY FEDEX.
* * *UPDATE AT 1120 ON 11/17/99 BY WROBEL, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *
The lantern pod was received at Robins AFB, but had not been properly logged in, hence the lost shipment report. The Ops Center notified the R2DO (MCALPINE); R4DO(JONES); NMSS(PICCONE).
A LANTERN POD (INFRARED IMAGING POD) CONTAINING TWO 4 MICROCURIES OF AMERICIUM-241 SOURCES WAS LOST IN A SHIPMENT FROM KIRKLAND AFB, NEW MEXICO TO ROBINS AFB, GEORGIA. THE DEVICE WAS AN AMERSHAM MODEL AMM.7. FEDEX WAS THE CARRIER FOR THIS SHIPMENT AND THE AIRBILL NUMBER IS 5654077161. THE SHIPMENT WAS DETERMINED TO BE LOST AT THE FEDEX DISTRIBUTION CENTER IN MACON, GA. THE DEVICE IS STILL BEING TRACKED BY FEDEX.
* * *UPDATE AT 1120 ON 11/17/99 BY WROBEL, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *
The lantern pod was received at Robins AFB, but had not been properly logged in, hence the lost shipment report. The Ops Center notified the R2DO (MCALPINE); R4DO(JONES); NMSS(PICCONE).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36326
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DICK LUCKETT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DICK LUCKETT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 10/21/1999
Notification Time: 15:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/1999
Event Time: 10:22 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/1999
Notification Time: 15:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/1999
Event Time: 10:22 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
- OFFSITE AGENCIES NOTIFIED OF A SPILL OF 3 OUNCES OF HYDRAULIC FLUID INTO PACIFIC OCEAN -
THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER (EPA CASE #503190), THE CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES, AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR OF A SPILL OF APPROXIMATELY THREE OUNCES OF BIODEGRADABLE HYDRAULIC FLUID FROM A KELP HARVESTER INTO THE PACIFIC OCEAN.
THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER (EPA CASE #503190), THE CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES, AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR OF A SPILL OF APPROXIMATELY THREE OUNCES OF BIODEGRADABLE HYDRAULIC FLUID FROM A KELP HARVESTER INTO THE PACIFIC OCEAN.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36327
Facility: ALLIED-SIGNAL INC.
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: HUGH ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: HUGH ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 10/21/1999
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/1999
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
- PLANT FIRE WATER DELUGE SYSTEM LINE RUPTURED INSIDE THE PLANT -
A SIX INCH RECTIFIER 'A' & 'B' PLANT FIRE WATER DELUGE SYSTEM LINE RUPTURED INSIDE THE PLANT. THE LICENSEE ISOLATED THE RUPTURE AND PLANS TO POST A FIRE WATCH AND REPAIR/REPLACE THE RUPTURED SECTION OF LINE.
A SIX INCH RECTIFIER 'A' & 'B' PLANT FIRE WATER DELUGE SYSTEM LINE RUPTURED INSIDE THE PLANT. THE LICENSEE ISOLATED THE RUPTURE AND PLANS TO POST A FIRE WATCH AND REPAIR/REPLACE THE RUPTURED SECTION OF LINE.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36328
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 03:01 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 03:01 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE
On 10/21/ 1999 at 1500 hrs the Plant Shift Superintendent(PSS) was notified that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not being performed in the X-710 ES&H Analytical Labs. NCS Engineering, while performing an NCS Self Assessment, noticed an operation where samples were brought to a staging area "INSIDE" a room when they were logged in and verified. (NCSA-0710_025.AOO)
Requirement #1 of NCSA-071_25.AOO states in part; Samples in any room enriched to 1% or greater U-235, will be limited to one group of 30g U-235 per room. This will be ensured by maintaining a room inventory log of U-235 mass in labeled containers. Each log entry will consist of the U-235 mass value plus analytical uncertainty and will be:
a. made by a knowledgeable person "PRIOR" to bringing the samples into the room, and
b. verified by a second knowledgeable person "PRIOR" to bringing the samples into the room.
At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition were initiated and the area baundaried off.
The safety significance of the event is very low. The U-235 mass in material is being maintained less than 30 grams as required. This is more than a factor of 10 less than the always safe mass of 350 grams U-235. The samples were brought to a staging area inside the room where they were logged in and verified. After logging and verifying the samples were moved to the operational area of the room, where they could interact with other materials in the room.
Samples in any room enriched to 1% or greater U-235, with a concentration greater or equal to 500 ppm U-235, shall be limited to one group of 30 g U-235 per room. This shall be ensured by maintaining a room inventory log of U-235 mass in labeled containers. Each log entry shall consist of the U-235 mass value plus analytical uncertainty and shall be:
Mass is the only parameter controlled
The actual amount of material In the room is less than 30 grams U-235, at an enrichment of less than or equal to 100%. This value is obtained from sample data that was logged after the material was brought Into the room. This is approximately 4% of the worst case critical mass.
Verbatim compliance with both mass controls was lost because the material was supposed to be checked and verified prior to bringing the material into the room. The samples were brought to a staging area inside the room where they were logged in and verified. After logging and verifying the samples were moved to the operational area of the room, where they could interact with other materials in the room.
THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
The Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be notified.
On 10/21/ 1999 at 1500 hrs the Plant Shift Superintendent(PSS) was notified that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not being performed in the X-710 ES&H Analytical Labs. NCS Engineering, while performing an NCS Self Assessment, noticed an operation where samples were brought to a staging area "INSIDE" a room when they were logged in and verified. (NCSA-0710_025.AOO)
Requirement #1 of NCSA-071_25.AOO states in part; Samples in any room enriched to 1% or greater U-235, will be limited to one group of 30g U-235 per room. This will be ensured by maintaining a room inventory log of U-235 mass in labeled containers. Each log entry will consist of the U-235 mass value plus analytical uncertainty and will be:
a. made by a knowledgeable person "PRIOR" to bringing the samples into the room, and
b. verified by a second knowledgeable person "PRIOR" to bringing the samples into the room.
At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition were initiated and the area baundaried off.
The safety significance of the event is very low. The U-235 mass in material is being maintained less than 30 grams as required. This is more than a factor of 10 less than the always safe mass of 350 grams U-235. The samples were brought to a staging area inside the room where they were logged in and verified. After logging and verifying the samples were moved to the operational area of the room, where they could interact with other materials in the room.
Samples in any room enriched to 1% or greater U-235, with a concentration greater or equal to 500 ppm U-235, shall be limited to one group of 30 g U-235 per room. This shall be ensured by maintaining a room inventory log of U-235 mass in labeled containers. Each log entry shall consist of the U-235 mass value plus analytical uncertainty and shall be:
Mass is the only parameter controlled
The actual amount of material In the room is less than 30 grams U-235, at an enrichment of less than or equal to 100%. This value is obtained from sample data that was logged after the material was brought Into the room. This is approximately 4% of the worst case critical mass.
Verbatim compliance with both mass controls was lost because the material was supposed to be checked and verified prior to bringing the material into the room. The samples were brought to a staging area inside the room where they were logged in and verified. After logging and verifying the samples were moved to the operational area of the room, where they could interact with other materials in the room.
THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
The Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be notified.