Event Notification Report for October 12, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/08/1999 - 10/12/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36012 36209 36273 36274 36275 36276 36277 36278 36279 36280 36281
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36012 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/10/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:23[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 08/10/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT POWERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/08/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO FUEL OIL LEAK |
| |
| "Abnormal readings from the lube oil analysis of the division 2 diesel |
| generator lead to further testing of its lube oil. Gas chromatography |
| analysis of the division 2 diesel generator lube oil showed a 5.7% fuel oil |
| dilution. Vendor recommendations were to not operate the diesel with greater |
| than 5.0% fuel oil dilution. The division 2 diesel generator was tagged out |
| for maintenance and declared inoperable on 8/9/99 at 1330 central time. |
| During maintenance of the division 2 diesel generator it was discovered that |
| the 12th cylinder of the 16 cylinder engine fuel injector return line |
| fitting was weeping fuel oil. |
| |
| "This notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR5072(b)(1)(ii)(B) as a |
| condition outside of the design basis of the plant because of the discovery |
| that the division 2 diesel generator has been incapable of performing its |
| design function (intended safety function) for an extended period of time |
| during operation." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the |
| licensee. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION 1803 10/8/1999 FROM ED TIEDEMANN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "This report is to retract the notification of 8/10/1999, based on further |
| evaluation by onsite engineering and licensing personnel, and offsite |
| resources. The engineering evaluation performed for this event determined |
| that the diesel generator would have fulfilled the design basis |
| requirements, even with the effects of fuel dilution in the lube oil. " |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified |
| R3DO (Jacobson). |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36209 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/21/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:41[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 09/10/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:40[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DARYL CLARK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/08/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ROGER LANKSBURY R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| -CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM INOP DUE TO FAILING ITS |
| SURVEILLANCE TEST- |
| |
| At 1440 CDT on 09/10/99, while performing the Control Room Emergency |
| Filtration (CREF) System monthly surveillance test, the system flow rate was |
| found to be 2317 scfm. The required tech spec flow rate is 2000 scfm +/- |
| 10%. The licensee declared the CREF System inoperable per Tech Spec 3.8.D |
| and entered a 7 day LCO. This event is being reported to the NRC in |
| accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D), a condition that prevented the |
| fulfillment of a safety function. |
| |
| The licensee declared the CREF System operable 40 minutes later after |
| adjusting the air flow. |
| |
| The licensee is continuing to evaluate the reportability of this issue. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION 2158 10/8/1999 FROM LECHMAIER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "This report is a retraction of the ENS call made on 9/21/99 concerning the |
| Control Room Emergency Filtration System. We have completed our evaluation |
| and have determined that the high flow rate condition found would not have |
| prevented the system from performing its intended function. Therefore, this |
| event is not reportable with respect to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii). |
| |
| "The system damper that was previously repositioned on 9/1/99 was the cause |
| of this high flow. This condition is prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| (LCO exceeded) and is reportable in accordance with |
| 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(I)(B)." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the |
| licensee. Notified R3DO (Jacobson). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36273 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS, PLC |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/08/1999|
|LICENSEE: BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS, PLC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:14[EDT]|
| CITY: REGION: |EVENT DATE: 08/19/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/08/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
| |BRIAN BONSER R2 |
+------------------------------------------------+JOHN JACOBSON R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: EUR ING MIKE R A SMITH |KRISS KENNEDY R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE |KEVIN RAMSEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE POTENTIAL FOR A CYLINDER |
| (MANUFACTURED BY STARVELEY'S LIMITED AND SUPPLIED BY BNFL TO USEC FOR |
| ENRICHMENT) TO BE OVERFILLED BECAUSE THE CERTIFIED WATER CAPACITY STAMPED ON |
| THE CYLINDER IS LESS THAN THE SPECIFIED MINIMUM CAPACITY |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Eur Ing Mike R. |
| A. Smith, MRA Smith BSc CEng MIES, Head of Magnox and Hex Business, British |
| Nuclear Fuels (BNFL), Fuel Business Group: |
| |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(ii) - Identification of the facility, the activity, or the |
| basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the U.S. |
| which fails to comply or contains a defect:] 48Y Cylinder no. 1122/0690 |
| containing 12,155.5 kg of UF6 supplied to [United States Enrichment |
| Corporation (USEC)] by BNFL Fuel for enrichment." |
| |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(iii) - Identification of the firm constructing the |
| facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains |
| a defect:] Cylinder manufactured by Staveley's Limited, Manchester, England |
| in 1978. |
| |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(iv) - Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the |
| safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure |
| to comply:] The certified water capacity stamped on the cylinder as part of |
| the name plate data is less than the minimum capacity specified in ANSI |
| N14.1, Table 1, standard cylinder data for a 48Y cylinder. [The] required |
| minimum capacity [is] 142.7 ft�[, and the] actual certified water capacity |
| [is] 4,019 kg; equivalent to 142.1 ft�. The cylinder, in its current |
| condition, represents no safety hazard since the actual contents of 2,155.5 |
| kg of UF6 still allows a cylinder ullage of 7.2%. The cylinder has the |
| potential to be overfilled if the normal maximum fill limit for a 48Y was |
| reached (12,501 kg of UF6 as specified in ANSI N14.1)." |
| |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(v) - The date on which the information of such defect or |
| failure to comply was obtained:] A memo was sent from USEC on 19 August |
| 1999, informing BNFL Fuel that they had noted the certified water capacity |
| was less than the ANSI-N14.1 minimum." |
| |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(vi) - In the case of a basic component which contains a |
| defect or fails to comply, the number and location of all such components in |
| use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or |
| activities subject to the regulations in this part:] Cylinder 1122/0690 is |
| one of a batch of 108 cylinders purchased from Staveleys in 1978. All other |
| 48Y Type Cylinders 1122/0600 to 1122/0707 inclusive, numbering 107, are |
| located on licensed sites in the UK." |
| |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(vii) - The corrective action which has been, is being, or |
| will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for |
| the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to |
| complete the action:] Having established that cylinder 1122/0690 is safe to |
| feed; it is proposed to discuss with USEC the possibility of proceeding with |
| the feed to their diffusion plant, as planned. Alternatively, should USEC |
| be unwilling to proceed then concession will be sought to transfer the |
| cylinder back to BNFL in the UK." |
| |
| "Once emptied, the cylinder will be removed from service to prevent any |
| possibility of a re-occurrence." |
| |
| "The Head of Site at BNFL Springfields has commissioned a Working Party, |
| which includes an independent senior engineer, independent senior operations |
| manager, and standards/surveillance engineers." |
| |
| "The Working Party: |
| a) Has already independently verified that there are no other under |
| capacity cylinders located in the U.S.; |
| b) Will independently verify whether or not any other BNFL cylinders are |
| under capacity; |
| c) In the event that the independent verification does reveal any further |
| such defective cylinders, will initiate appropriate action to remove such |
| cylinders from service; |
| d) Will monitor the implementation of any such actions through to |
| completion; |
| e) [Has] already examined and modified BNFL's cylinder filling procedures |
| to prevent an under capacity cylinder from being filled in the future; |
| [and] |
| f) [Is] in the process of reviewing our cylinder purchase specification to |
| prevent any further under capacity cylinders from being supplied." |
| |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(viii) - Any advice related to the defect or failure to |
| comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is |
| being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:] The UK Nuclear |
| Installations Inspectorate (NII) and Department of the Environment, |
| Transport, and Regions (DETR) have been advised of this notification." |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36274 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/08/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:44[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 10/08/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: THOMAS HOWARD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/08/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: UNU |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |TAD MARSH NRR |
|AAEC 50.72 (a) (1) (I) EMERGENCY DECLARED |CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| |MIKE TSCHILTZ EDO |
| |BURNICE CARR FEMA |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 24 Power Operation |24 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DECLARATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT VARIOUS AREAS OF |
| THE PLANT ARE INACCESSIBLE DUE TO A HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "[At 0905 on 10/08/99, an] Unusual Event [was] declared due to Cardox fire |
| system discharge ([carbon dioxide]) in [the Administration Building at |
| 0815]. Various levels of the plant are being considered inaccessible until |
| [oxygen] levels are verified [to be] satisfactory. [Carbon dioxide] venting |
| is in progress. [There is no] effect on plant operation at [the] present |
| time[, and no effect is currently] anticipated." |
| |
| "[The] preliminary cause of discharge of [carbon dioxide] appears to be a |
| switch malfunction. No fire was detected." |
| |
| The licensee stated that the Cardox fire system has both a 30-second siren |
| and flashing red lights prior to the discharge of carbon dioxide in order to |
| allow personnel to evacuate the affected areas. There were no injuries |
| reported, and carbon dioxide venting is currently in progress. The |
| Administration Building and some adjacent areas of the turbine building were |
| affected. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector as well as state and local |
| agencies. The licensee also plans to issue a media/press release. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1219 10/8/1999 FROM MATTESON TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| The Unusual Event was terminated at 1210 EDT. The NRC resident inspector has |
| been informed. Notified R1DO (Kinneman), NRR (Marsh), IRO (Miller), FEMA |
| (Carr). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36275 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/08/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:17[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/08/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:10[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CALVIN WARD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/08/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRIAN BONSER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REQUIRED BY NPDES PERMIT |
| |
| The licensee contacted the Florida Department of Environmental Protection |
| (DEP) regarding the discharge of effluent to the Atlantic Ocean. The site |
| settling ponds were pumped down due to high water levels caused by recent |
| rain. The site National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) |
| permit requires that the licensee contact the state DEP regarding this |
| discharge. No release limits were exceeded. The NRC resident inspector has |
| been informed of this notification by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36276 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/08/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:13[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/08/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RUSS GUMBERT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/08/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii) DEGRAD COND DURING OP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R ISSUE REGARDING CABLE SEPARATION |
| |
| The following is text of a (rather lengthy) facsimile submitted by the |
| licensee: |
| |
| "1. Description of Condition |
| |
| "During a review of the Salem Post-fire Safe Shutdown Analysis a concern was |
| identified with the cable routing of the pressurizer PORV and block valves. |
| The cable for each PORV and its associated block valve is routed in the same |
| cable tray inside the containment. The pressurizer PORVs and block valves |
| are considered a high/low pressure interface point for 10CFR50 Appendix R |
| analysis. Therefore each PORV block valve combination is considered as |
| redundant components that require proper separation in accordance with |
| Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to prevent hot shorts, open circuits, or |
| shorts to ground from causing spurious operation of these valves. |
| |
| "In the event of a postulated fire inside containment a block valve could |
| lose power; since this valve is in the open position it would not be able to |
| be closed. A hot short could also cause the PORV to spuriously open. These |
| two occurrences together would result in the loss of Reactor Coolant System |
| (RCS) inventory control. This condition does not satisfy the 10CFR50 |
| Appendix R performance goal of inventory control for post-fire Safe Shutdown |
| (SSD). |
| |
| "A second similar concern exists with the PORVs and block valves for |
| Alternate Shutdown (ASD) capability. ASD is implemented in the event of a |
| fire in the Control Room, Relay Room or the ceiling of the 460V Switchgear |
| room. A fire in the above areas could lead to the spurious operation of the |
| PORVs. Operators implement the ASD methodology in accordance with procedures |
| S1(2).OP-AB.CR-0002. Spurious operation of the PORV could occur prior to the |
| operators reaching the step in the ASD to operate the local switch for the |
| block valve and close the block valve. In the current procedure, it takes |
| approximately 20 minutes to reach the step to operate the transfer switch |
| for the block valve. Prior to closing the block valve, there would be a loss |
| of RCS inventory control due to the spurious operation of the PORV. |
| |
| "2. Impact Statement |
| |
| "For design basis accident mitigation (UFSAR Chapter 15), the PORV and block |
| valves are not impacted and remain operable. Currently, the PORV and block |
| valve configuration does not meet the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R and |
| therefore is outside the design basis of the plant for Appendix R. This item |
| is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72. |
| |
| "The inadvertent opening of the PORV and block valve would result in RCS |
| depressurization. For the block valve and PORV to open the following needs |
| to occur: |
| |
| "* an external or internal "hot short" of the PORV solenoid DC control |
| circuitry which causes the energization of the solenoid, coincident with the |
| complete loss of the power supply cable to the PORV block valve, which |
| prevents remote operation (closure) of the block valve, is a very low |
| probability event. |
| |
| "* The control cables have external insulation, with an armored shield, |
| with multiple individual insulated conductors within the shield. In order |
| for the internal hot short to occur, the external fire would have to burn |
| through the cable external jacket, and shielding, and then selectively |
| affect specific DC conductors within the cable to enable conductors of the |
| correct polarity to come in contact in such a manner to energize the |
| solenoid valve and open the PORV. The same external fire would also have to |
| damage the power supply to the block valve to preclude operation, as stated |
| above. |
| |
| "* In order for the external hot short to occur, another cable in the |
| same raceway system, which is also of a shielded construction, would have to |
| have one of its internal conductors affected by the external fire affect the |
| conductors of the PORV control circuit, which is contained in its own |
| shielded cable. This is an even more unlikely scenario. |
| |
| "The probability of a fire, of a magnitude that would cause the above to |
| occur inside containment is extremely low for the following reasons. |
| |
| "* The main source of combustion inside containment is the oil in the |
| RCP motor. However, the RCP motor is not in the vicinity of the affected |
| cable trays. The RCP motor is equipped with detection and suppression |
| system. An oil collection system is provided in the event of the leakage. |
| |
| "* The introduction of transient combustible materials into the |
| containment is extremely remote due to limited containment access during |
| operation. |
| |
| "* The RCP motor oil level has a low-level alarm in the control room. |
| Any inadvertent oil loss would be detected and corrected early. This reduces |
| the probability of lire due to the oil leakage. |
| |
| "* The cables in the affected cable tray are made up of |
| self-extinguishing cable material. This will minimize fire propagation along |
| the cables. |
| |
| "* Containment volume is large. The probability of a plume to occur to |
| affect the cable trays is extremely low. |
| |
| "* A qualitative risk assessment shows that the probability of fire |
| inside containment, in the area of concern, is extremely low. |
| |
| "3. Cause of Occurrence |
| |
| "The above concerns were not properly evaluated during development of the |
| safe shutdown analysis. |
| |
| "4. Immediate Corrective Actions |
| |
| "* Establish appropriate compensatory measures for the Alternate |
| Shutdown Area in accordance with the fire protection program. |
| |
| "* A containment loose debris inspection is performed following each |
| containment entry during Modes 1-4. |
| |
| "* Following any containment entry, a walkdown will be performed to |
| ensure that there are no combustible loads in the vicinity of the affected |
| cable trays. |
| |
| "* Ensure operating shifts are alerted that spurious operation of the |
| PORVs may be caused by a fire inside containment. |
| |
| "* Additional corrective actions are being evaluated and will be |
| implemented as necessary. |
| |
| "5. Long Term Corrective Actions |
| |
| "* Prior to startup from the next refueling outage, evaluate potential |
| plant modifications and/or licensing/design basis changes. Actions will be |
| implemented as required to address the PORV and block valve spurious |
| operation concern." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the |
| licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36277 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SURRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/09/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:13[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/09/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:41[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LISA HILBERT-SEMMES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/09/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRIAN BONSER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN ZWOLINSKI NRR |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION |CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |96 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EDGs START AND LOAD DUE TO LOSS OF ONE RESERVE STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER |
| |
| "At 1241 hours, with Surry Power Station Unit 1 and Unit 2 at 100% reactor |
| power, a loss of 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) occurred due |
| to a fire on one of the leads. The #1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) auto |
| started due to an undervoltage signal on the Unit 1 'H' emergency bus and |
| re-energized the Unit 1 'H' emergency bus. Also, the #3 EDG auto started due |
| to an undervoltage signal on the Unit 2 'J' emergency bus and re-energized |
| the Unit 2 'J' emergency bus. The fire team reported that the fire was out |
| at 1243. Unit 1 remained at 100% power. Unit 2 decreased to 96% power due to |
| a perturbation on the semi-vital bus when the 'J' emergency bus was |
| de-energized then re-energized by the #3 EDG. The unit was returned to 100% |
| power at 1400 when all unit conditions were verified stable. All equipment |
| performed as expected during the event and there were no unexplained |
| occurrences other than the loss of 'C' RSST which is under investigation. |
| |
| "No adverse radiological consequences resulted from this event. There were |
| no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel |
| injuries or contamination events. |
| |
| "Unit 1 is currently at 100% power and 845 MWe with #1 EDG supplying the 'H' |
| emergency bus. |
| |
| "Unit 2 is currently at 100% power and 855 MWe with #3 EDG supplying the 'J' |
| emergency bus. |
| |
| "This event was initially determined to be not reportable based on the EDG |
| auto start signal being due to an undervoltage signal and not a valid ESF |
| signal. Upon further review of Tech Specs and NUREG 1022, it was determined |
| at 2015 that the EDG auto starts due to an under voltage signal were |
| reportable as an ESF actuation." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| This is event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Research Reactor |Event Number: 36278 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: STATE UNIV OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/10/1999|
| RXTYPE: 2000 KW PULSTAR |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:48[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: |EVENT DATE: 10/09/1999|
| |EVENT TIME: 22:00[EDT]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/10/1999|
| CITY: BUFFALO REGION: 1 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: ERIE STATE: NY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: R-77 AGREEMENT: Y |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
| DOCKET: 05000057 | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK ADAMS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| COURTESY CALL DUE TO POWER OUTAGE |
| |
| The licensee reported that a transformer failure resulted in a power outage |
| to the reactor facility. The emergency diesel generator started, but was |
| manually stopped due to poor operating performance. Partial power has been |
| restored from another building. The licensee anticipates that replacement of |
| the transformer could take from three to six weeks. This facility has been |
| shut down since 1994. The only required equipment affected by the outage are |
| gaseous radiation monitors, which have an allowed outage time of 10 days. |
| |
| The caller made this report because of possible press interest in the event. |
| The local media monitors campus radio transmissions, and the caller |
| speculated that transmissions regarding the event could be interpreted by |
| the media as a serious event. The licensee may make a press release. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36279 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FERMI REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/11/1999|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:07[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 10/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:59[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: COSEO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/11/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN JACOBSON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 97 Power Operation |97 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VARIOUS SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO LOSS OF COOLING |
| TO THE BATTERY CHARGER ROOM . |
| |
| Following startup of the Division 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water |
| (RHRSW) pumps, it was observed that the Division 2 Emergency Equipment |
| Service Water (EESW) pump was rotating backwards. Division 2 RHRSW flow was |
| normal at greater than 9000 gpm. The Division 2 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) |
| service water systems discharge into a common header that can be routed to |
| the Division 2 UHS cooling tower fans or directly to the reservoir. This |
| indicates that the Division 2 EESW pump discharge check valve is not fully |
| closed. The Division 2 EESW pump control was placed in OFF/RESET (normally |
| in AUTO) at 0959 hrs on 10/11/99. The pump discharge valve was closed to |
| isolate the flow path and Division 2 EESW has been declared inoperable. This |
| results in Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) being |
| inoperable. Division 2 EECW provides cooling to the High Pressure Coolant |
| Injection (HPCI) pump area cooler during accident conditions. Therefore, the |
| HPCI system was declared inoperable(14 day LCO) at 0959 on 10/11/99. HPCI |
| remains in standby lineup ready for automatic initiation. The Div 2 EECW |
| also provides cooling to the battery charger room. With the batteries |
| inoperable they are in an 18 hr LCO. |
| |
| The check valve internals have been inspected and preliminary findings |
| indicate that all parts are intact. The failure of the valve appears to be |
| caused by a worn disc pin in the valve. Necessary repairs are in progress. |
| |
| The Resident Inspector was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36280 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/11/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:56[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:14[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HASTINGS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/11/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN JACOBSON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FIRE BARRIER WALL NOT MEETING THE LICENSEE'S REQUIRED APPENDIX "R" DESIGN |
| BASIS. |
| |
| IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A WALL SEGMENT SEPARATING THE CONTROL ROOM FROM THE |
| CABLE SPREADING ROOM PROVIDES ONLY A 1.5 HOUR FIRE BARRIER INSTEAD OF THE 3 |
| HOUR FIRE BARRIER REQUIRED BY THE LICENSEE'S APPENDIX "R" DESIGN |
| COMMITMENTS. THIS PLACES THE WALL SEGMENT OUTSIDE APPENDIX "R" DESIGN |
| BASIS. HOURLY FIRE WATCHES ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS WALL WERE ALREADY IN PLACE |
| PRIOR TO THIS DISCOVERY AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE PROBLEM IS RESOLVED. |
| |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36281 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALO VERDE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/11/1999|
| UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:10[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:40[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STROUD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/11/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KRISS KENNEDY R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|HFIT 26.73 FITNESS FOR DUTY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
| | |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTRABAND MATERIAL REPORTED AS A FITNESS-FOR-DUTY ISSUE |
| |
| CONTRABAND MATERIAL FOUND IN THE VITAL AREA. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY |
| MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. |
| |
| CONTACT THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021