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Event Notification Report for September 23, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           09/22/1999 - 09/23/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36079  36113  36210  36211  36212  36213  36214  36215  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36079       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/27/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:48[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        08/27/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVE WALSH                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KATHLEEN MODES       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DEGRADATION (ONLY ONE OF FOUR PUMPS           |
| OPERABLE)                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "On 08/26/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at 100% power     |
| with the 'B' loop of emergency service water [(ESW)] out of service for      |
| scheduled maintenance.  During testing on the ESW system, with all ESW pumps |
| in service, it was identified that the 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps' discharge      |
| check valves were closed.  The ESW flow surveillance was performed, and the  |
| 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps failed to achieve the required flow and were declared  |
| inoperable.  Concurrently, the 'B' loop of ESW was returned to service.      |
| During the time the 'B' ESW loop was inoperable, the 'A' ESW pump was the    |
| only one operable ESW pump.  This constitutes a serious degradation of the   |
| plant in that it is a condition which is outside of design basis and,        |
| therefore, reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) requiring a 1-hour ENS    |
| notification."                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1453EDT ON 9/3/99 FROM GRANT FERNSLER TO S. SANDIN * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| "This Notification is a retraction of a previous ENS Notification made       |
| 8/27/99 (Event # 36079)."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Subsequent evaluation by Engineering has concluded that the plant had at    |
| least two Emergency Service                                                  |
| Water pumps capable of performing their specified safety function at all     |
| times.  As such, the plant was not                                           |
| in a condition outside of its design basis and the report previously made    |
| pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)                                             |
| is hereby retracted."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R1DO(Rogge).     |
|                                                                              |
| * * *UPDATE 0316EDT ON 09/23/99 FROM MIKE PEAL TAKEN BY MACKINNON* * *       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is Retracting the Retraction they called in on 09/03/99 at      |
| 1453EDT.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "On 09/22/99 at 2230, an Engineering evaluation concluded that the           |
| operability determination associated with the above stated event was not     |
| adequate, specifically relating to the potential for pump interaction to     |
| create low flow conditions. "                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "The Engineering evaluation was being performed in response to an anomaly    |
| identified on 09/20/99 during the run of 'D' Diesel Generator.  During the   |
| preparation of the operability statement for the 09/20/99 anomaly,           |
| engineering personnel realized that incorrect assumptions were used in the   |
| previous operability statement.  The 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps were declared     |
| inoperable at 2230 on 09/22/99.  Evaluation continues to determine if other  |
| combinations of equipment out of service times result in additional          |
| reportable conditions."  R1DO (Bob Summers) notified.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of the Retraction to the         |
| Retraction of this event by the licensee.                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36113       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:50[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        09/02/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/22/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KURT SISLER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii)    EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS   |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MICROFILTRATION SYSTEM pH PROBES OUT OF TOLERANCE                            |
|                                                                              |
| On 9/1/99 at 1300 hours, the plant shift superintendent was notified that a  |
| previously discovered X-705 Microfiltration System (MFS) pH probe out of     |
| tolerance condition likely existed during a time period when the MFS was in  |
| operation.  The out of tolerance condition was in a non-conservative         |
| direction and previously documented during a routine weekly surveillance on  |
| 6/4/99.  During the engineering evaluation, it was concluded at 1000 hours   |
| on 9/2/99, that the out of tolerance condition likely existed from           |
| approximately 5/28/99 to 6/4/99.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The out of tolerance condition affected 2 of the 3 probes (2 out of 3 logic  |
| required to activate the safety system).  The as found data for the 2 probes |
| indicated they would actuate at 6.70 pH and 6.63 pH, which is below the 7 pH |
| required setpoint.  A review of MFS operational history indicated that the   |
| MFS pH was maintained above a 7 pH during the time the probes are suspected  |
| to have been out of tolerance.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or                       |
| radioactive/radiological contamination.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified.                                |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1452EDT ON 9/2/99 FROM KURT SISLER TO S. SANDIN * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| The following is a portion of information provided as an update to include   |
| classification of the event as a 24-hour 91-01 Bulletin report:              |
|                                                                              |
| "Upon further review of [the] X-705 Microfiltration System pH probe failure, |
| it was determined to be reportable per NRC Bulletin 91-01 criteria.          |
|                                                                              |
| "Safety Significance:                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Two out of three safety system pH probes used in the microfiltration system |
| were found to be out of tolerance. The system relies on a two-out-of-three   |
| logic for system actuation. The probes read 7.30 and 7.37 for a buffer       |
| solution which had a pH of approximately 7.0 (depending on the temperature). |
| NCSA-0705_015.A10 takes credit for these pH probes in satisfying the double  |
| contingency principle.  Active engineered feature #5 states 'Microfiltration |
| effluent pH shutdown system will automatically stop the flow of microfilter  |
| permeate to the T-105 tank if pH<7.0 (with an allowable test tolerance of    |
| -0.2), by closing both isolation valves automatically.'  Since the probes    |
| were overestimating the pH, a pH of as low as approximately 6.70 could be    |
| present without an actuation of the system.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Contingency event B.4.2 credits the effluent pH shutdown system in          |
| preventing dissolved uranium past the microfilters (to an unsafe geometry    |
| tank downstream).  Also credited is the unlikely event of solution with a    |
| low pH making it to the microfiltration modules due to the functioning of    |
| the pH adjustment system. Therefore, the out of tolerance condition in a     |
| non-conservative direction constitutes a loss of one criticality control in  |
| a double contingency system.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "The discussion for B.4.2 includes the following,  'Based on chemical        |
| reactions and calculations in POEF-340-98-113, it would require an extremely |
| low pH (in the range of approximately 4 to 5) before the resulting solution  |
| would pick up any appreciable amounts (i.e., milligrams per liter) of        |
| uranium. However, this level of uranium is well below the individually       |
| always safe concentration limit reported in GAT-225, Rev. 4, of 5000 ppm     |
| U-235 for 100% enriched solution.'  Based on the as-found tolerances, a pH   |
| of 6.70 would have caused the system to actuate. Therefore, this event has a |
| low safety significance.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Potential Criticality Pathways involved (Brief scenario(s) of how           |
| criticality could occur):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Event B.4.2.a credits the effluent pH shutdown system in preventing         |
| dissolved uranium past the microfilters (to an unsafe geometry tank          |
| downstream). Also credited is the unlikely event of solution with a low pH   |
| making it to the microfiltration modules due to the functioning of the pH    |
| adjustment system. Both a failure in the pH shutdown system and the unlikely |
| event of a low pH following pH adjustment would have to occur for this       |
| scenario to take place.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Controlled parameters:                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "The prevention of acidic solutions from entering the microfiltration        |
| modules maintains the uranium in the filters in a favorable geometry, rather |
| than picking up uranium in addition to the safe batch being processed.       |
| Therefore, geometry is controlled.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material (include process    |
| limit and % worst case of critical mass):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "The operation is approved for 100% U-235; however, only USEC material       |
| (maximum 10% U-235 has been processed recently. The microfiltration process  |
| is controlled such that only a safe mass of U-235 is present in any          |
| unfavorable geometry. Operational information indicates that the pH was      |
| never less than 7.0 during the time the system was potentially out of        |
| calibration                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls(s) or control system(s) and description |
| of failures or deficiencies:                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Two out of three safety system pH probes used in the microfiltration system |
| were found to be out of tolerance. The system relies on a two-out-of-three   |
| logic for system actuation. The system is relied on to keep unmeasured       |
| quantities of uranium (from the microfilter modules) from entering an        |
| unfavorable geometry tank.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Therefore, the failure of the pH shutdown system (due to out of calibration |
| probes or any reason) is an analyzed condition."                             |
|                                                                              |
| The HOO notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS (Piccone).                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2257 ON 09//22/99 BY JOE HALCOMB TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * *     |
|                                                                              |
| A MORE DETAILED REVIEW OF THE pH PROBE OPERATING HISTORY AND AS-FOUND        |
| CALIBRATIONS WAS CONDUCTED TO FURTHER ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A HIGH      |
| DELTA pH CONDITION.  THIS REVIEW REVEALED THAT THE DELTA pH BETWEEN THE      |
| THREE pH PROBES IS NOT AN INDICATOR THAT THE PROBES ARE OUT OF TOLERANCE.    |
| THE REVIEW NOTED THAT THERE IS NO CORRELATION BETWEEN THE DELTA pH AND       |
| AS-FOUND CALIBRATION RESULTS.  BASED ON THIS FINDING, THE ORIGINAL BASIS FOR |
| DETERMINING THAT THE JUNE 4 OUT-OF-TOLERANCE CONDITION WAS A REPORTABLE      |
| EVENT IS NO LONGER VALID.  THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW                        |
| ARE DOCUMENTED IN EVAL-PS-1999-0567, REV 0.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| BASED ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION, THIS EVENT NOTIFICATION, (PTS-1999-074),     |
| SHOULD BE RETRACTED.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                    |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO ROGER LANKSBURY AND NMSS EO     |
| JOHN SURMEIER.                                                               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36210       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FERMI                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:17[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:25[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SANJEEV ARAB                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/22/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JOHN DAVIDSON, IAT   NMSS    |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |JOE GIITTER          IRO     |
|                                                |JIM LYONS, EO        NRR     |
|                                                |R. ROSANO, IAT       NRR     |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       97       Power Operation  |97       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ACTUAL INTRODUCTION OF  CONTRABAND INTO A PROTECTED AREA.  CONTRABAND        |
| DISCOVERED BY VISITING WORKERS.  IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON  |
| DISCOVERY.  MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF NOTIFIED.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT.       |
|                                                                              |
| SEE HOO LOG BOOK FOR FURTHER DETAILS.                                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36211       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS           REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:40[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:08[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  THOMAS O'MEARA               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/22/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROBERT SUMMERS       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JIM LYONS            NRR     |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER             |
|                                                                              |
| Planned maintenance was being performed on the feeder breaker to non-vital   |
| Motor Control Center # 116. While the feeder breaker was being worked on,    |
| Motor Control Centers # 116 and # 106 were tied together through one tie     |
| breaker.  The amps limits for the tie breaker were misinterpret in the       |
| procedure and the feeder breaker that was  supplying Motor Control Centers # |
| 116 and # 106 tripped on overcurrent (The operators that performed the       |
| evolution verified that each Motor Control Center was less than 500 amps but |
| the total for both Motor Control Centers was greater than 500 amps). The     |
| normal feeder tripped open on the feed that was supplying both Motor Control |
| Centers.  The loss of power to the Motor Control Centers caused a loss of    |
| control oil to both Main Feedwater Pumps and a loss of oil to the Main       |
| Condenser air removal pumps.  The loss of both Main Feedwater pumps caused a |
| loss of feedwater to the both Steam Generators. Both Motor Driven Auxiliary  |
| Feedwater Pumps and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump started. The |
| licensee manually tripped the reactor before the reactor would have          |
| automatically tripped on low Steam Generator Water Level.  All rods fully    |
| inserted into the core. The loss of the oil pumps to the Main Condenser air  |
| removal pumps caused a loss of condenser vacuum.  The Main Steam Isolation   |
| Valves were closed due to the loss of condenser vacuum.  At the present      |
| time, the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and the Steam Generator     |
| Atmospheric valves are maintaining the plant in Hot Standby.  The licensee   |
| said that they have a very small Steam Generator tube leak on Unit 1, but    |
| there is no detectable release.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are   |
| fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable. The licensee        |
| notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Calvert County of the reactor trip.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36212       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON            REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:48[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:32[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DICK LUCKETT                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/22/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOSEPH TAPIA         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |TAD MARSH            NRR     |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - AUTO REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKING THE UNIT 1 500 |
| KV LINE -                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| At 0932 PDT on 09/22/99, lightning struck the Unit 1 500 kV line in the      |
| plant switchyard causing the unit output breakers to trip open and caused a  |
| full load rejection.  The Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped from 100%     |
| power due to an overtemperature differential temperature (OTdT) trip signal. |
| All control rods inserted completely.  A pressurizer power operated relief   |
| valve lifted, as expected, and immediately reseated.  Steam is being dumped  |
| to the main condenser.  The auxiliary feedwater system auto started, as      |
| expected.  Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby).  Offsite power remained |
| available throughout this event.  There were no personnel injuries.  Plant   |
| personnel are walking the plant down for any damage.  The lighting strike    |
| had minimal impact on Unit 2 which remained at 100% power.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36213       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:56[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEN GRACIA                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/22/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROBERT SUMMERS       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - EDG ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANELS INOPERABLE DUE TO UNISOLATED CIRCUIT -       |
|                                                                              |
| At 1730 on 09/22/99, the emergency diesel generator (EDG) alternate shutdown |
| (ASD) panels were declared inoperable based upon engineering evaluation.  A  |
| circuit for wattmeter indication from the EDGs in the main control room is   |
| not isolated by the ASD panels.  This places the ASD panels for the EDGs     |
| outside the plant design basis.  In case of a fire in the cable spreading    |
| room, this circuit being energized could affect EDG operation during         |
| performance of ASD from outside the main control room.                       |
|                                                                              |
| Short term corrective action is to revise procedure(s) to have operators     |
| isolate the affected relays when needed.  Long term corrective action is     |
| being evaluated.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to notify state   |
| officials.                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36214       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  TEXAS BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL    |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/1999|
|LICENSEE:  TEAM CONSULTANTS                     |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:00[EDT]|
|    CITY:  DALLAS                   REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        09/20/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  TX |EVENT TIME:        12:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  L04012 (TX)           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/22/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |JOSEPH TAPIA         R4      |
|                                                |JOHN SURMEIER        NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HELEN WATKINS, TBRC          |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Troxler moisture density gauge stolen from company parking facility -      |
|                                                                              |
| On 09/20/99, Texas licensee, Team Consultants, Dallas, TX, notified Texas    |
| Bureau of Radiation Control (TBRC) that a Troxler moisture density gauge,    |
| #3411B, was stolen on 09/20/99 from the back of a pickup truck that was      |
| parked in the licensee's parking facility.  Reportedly, the gauge was locked |
| and left unattended for only 10 minutes.  The licensee notified the local    |
| police and the Dallas Fire Department.  TBRC is obtaining additional         |
| information and investigating this theft.  [TBRC Incident #7511].            |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a contact telephone number.)            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36215       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:13[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:55[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  McLAUGHLIN                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       90       Power Operation  |90       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DIVISION 3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR TRIPPED ON OVER SPEED DURING MONTHLY   |
| SURVEILLANCE TESTING.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| While performing monthly surveillance start of the High Pressure Core Spray  |
| system Emergency Diesel Generator, the Diesel automatically tripped off on   |
| an overspeed signal.  The diesel does not appear to have been damaged but    |
| remains shutdown and unavailable for on-going investigation of the failure.  |
| The High Pressure Core Spray system is inoperable but available from normal  |
| power source only. The failure mechanism is being investigated and           |
| corrective actions will be performed.   The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling   |
| pump and all other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are also fully operable.   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
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