Event Notification Report for September 23, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/22/1999 - 09/23/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
3622436225362193622036221362223621636217
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36224
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: RONE ENGINEERS
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: RONE ENGINEERS
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 11:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 11:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JOSEPH TAPIA (R4)
DON COOL (NMSS)
JOSEPH TAPIA (R4)
DON COOL (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE
"Another stolen Troxler Gauge Model 3401, Serial Number 9934, with two sources: 1) 7.8 mCi Cs-137, Serial Number 40-7404 and 2) 40 mCi AmBe-241, Serial Number 46-1316.
"Stolen Dallas, Texas, 09/23/99 at approximately 11:00 a.m. from Rone Engineers, 11234 Goodnight Lane, Dallas, Texas 75229, (817) 831-6211. Stolen from company pickup truck. Lock cut and chain and device removed from truck while driver/operator at lunch.
"Note: This is the 7th gauge stolen/missing in the Dallas/North Texas area since March 1999. Two more in the Houston area since October 1998. Posting notice to all Texas Licensees using MD gauges on BRC Website and in our Radiation Report (Winter Edition) concerning increased security needs for users of gauges."
"Another stolen Troxler Gauge Model 3401, Serial Number 9934, with two sources: 1) 7.8 mCi Cs-137, Serial Number 40-7404 and 2) 40 mCi AmBe-241, Serial Number 46-1316.
"Stolen Dallas, Texas, 09/23/99 at approximately 11:00 a.m. from Rone Engineers, 11234 Goodnight Lane, Dallas, Texas 75229, (817) 831-6211. Stolen from company pickup truck. Lock cut and chain and device removed from truck while driver/operator at lunch.
"Note: This is the 7th gauge stolen/missing in the Dallas/North Texas area since March 1999. Two more in the Houston area since October 1998. Posting notice to all Texas Licensees using MD gauges on BRC Website and in our Radiation Report (Winter Edition) concerning increased security needs for users of gauges."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36225
Rep Org: WESTVACO BLEACHBOARD DIVISION
Licensee: OHMART
Region: 2
City: COVINGTON State: VA
County:
License #: 45-01568-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAYMOND HUNDLEY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: OHMART
Region: 2
City: COVINGTON State: VA
County:
License #: 45-01568-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAYMOND HUNDLEY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) (NMSS)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) (NMSS)
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT - FAILURE, SOURCE SHUTTER STUCK OPEN
During the performance of the six month surveillances of sources, one source's shutter was discovered to be stuck open. The device is an Ohmart SH-F2-0, serial number 4612GK, with a sealed source of 1000 mCi of Cs-137. There is no indication of what the problem might be, no rust or apparent damage. The shutter mechanism could not be moved manually.
The manufacturer was contacted and they directed the licensee to lubricate the shutter and if that did not free up the shutter mechanism, they would send representatives to the site.
The device is used on the manufacturing line, it is a fixed installation. There is little or no safety implications to personnel as installed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1626 EDT ON 9/24/99 BY RAYMOND HUNDLEY TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The shutter mechanism was treated with lubricating oil and it was freed. The device is working properly. A written report will follow within 30 days.
R2DO (Thomas Decker) and NMSS (Kevin Ramsey) have been contacted.
During the performance of the six month surveillances of sources, one source's shutter was discovered to be stuck open. The device is an Ohmart SH-F2-0, serial number 4612GK, with a sealed source of 1000 mCi of Cs-137. There is no indication of what the problem might be, no rust or apparent damage. The shutter mechanism could not be moved manually.
The manufacturer was contacted and they directed the licensee to lubricate the shutter and if that did not free up the shutter mechanism, they would send representatives to the site.
The device is used on the manufacturing line, it is a fixed installation. There is little or no safety implications to personnel as installed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1626 EDT ON 9/24/99 BY RAYMOND HUNDLEY TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The shutter mechanism was treated with lubricating oil and it was freed. The device is working properly. A written report will follow within 30 days.
R2DO (Thomas Decker) and NMSS (Kevin Ramsey) have been contacted.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36219
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RAY SWAFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RAY SWAFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/23/1999
Notification Time: 18:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 16:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/1999
Notification Time: 18:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 16:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECURITY REPORT
Discovery of compromise of safeguards information, compensatory measures not fully implemented. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.
* * * UPDATE AT 1624 ON 09/30/99 BY RON DAVENPORT & RON LeCROY TO JOLLIFFE * * *
The licensee has determined that the compromise of safeguards information which occurred was not significant. Based on the safeguards event reporting guidance in NRC Regulatory Guide 5.62 and NRC Generic Letter 91-03, the licensee desires to retract this event. The licensee is downgrading this event to a loggable even.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R2DO Rudolph Bernhard.
Discovery of compromise of safeguards information, compensatory measures not fully implemented. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.
* * * UPDATE AT 1624 ON 09/30/99 BY RON DAVENPORT & RON LeCROY TO JOLLIFFE * * *
The licensee has determined that the compromise of safeguards information which occurred was not significant. Based on the safeguards event reporting guidance in NRC Regulatory Guide 5.62 and NRC Generic Letter 91-03, the licensee desires to retract this event. The licensee is downgrading this event to a loggable even.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R2DO Rudolph Bernhard.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36220
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PHIL CHASE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PHIL CHASE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/23/1999
Notification Time: 20:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 20:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
JOHN HANNON (NRR)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
DAN RISHE (FEMA)
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
JOHN HANNON (NRR)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
DAN RISHE (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANT ENTERED AN UNUSUAL EVENT - TOXIC GAS DETECTED IN UNIT 2 TURBINE ENCLOSURE
An Unusual Event was declared at 2000 EDT due to readings of 65 ppm hydrogen sulfide (HS) and 115 ppm carbon monoxide (CO) in the Unit 2 Turbine Enclosure.
The oncoming shift reported the smell of rotten eggs when they arrived on site. Inspection around the site determined the only place toxic gas was detectable was in the Unit 2 Turbine Enclosure. There were no detectable levels of any toxic gas existing anywhere else around the plant. Inspections are on going around the plant. The Unit 2 Turbine Enclosure has been evacuated after an inspection for a source of the gasses.
The licensee isolated the control room by manually initiating chlorine isolation as a precaution at 1922 EDT, this is an Engineered Safety Feature activation and reportable as a 4-hour notification.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state/local government agencies.
* * * UPDATE AT 2321 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY TOM DOUGHERTY TO JOHN MacKINNON * * *
The site de-escalated from the Unusual Event at 2312 EDT. The toxic gas levels were verified to be nominal 0% in all areas inside and outside the power block. The source of the toxic gas is still unknown and under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state/local government agencies. The R1DO (Robert Summers), NRR EO (John Hannon), IRO Manager (Charles Miller), and FEMA (Cegielski) have been informed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1429 EDT ON 9/24/99 BY STAN GAMBLE TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee submitted a written summary of the event as a follow-up per their procedure guidance for NUREG-0654. The source of the gas is still unknown, but the investigation continues. The summary was sent to NRC Region 1.
R1DO (Robert Summers) and NRR (Tad Marsh)
An Unusual Event was declared at 2000 EDT due to readings of 65 ppm hydrogen sulfide (HS) and 115 ppm carbon monoxide (CO) in the Unit 2 Turbine Enclosure.
The oncoming shift reported the smell of rotten eggs when they arrived on site. Inspection around the site determined the only place toxic gas was detectable was in the Unit 2 Turbine Enclosure. There were no detectable levels of any toxic gas existing anywhere else around the plant. Inspections are on going around the plant. The Unit 2 Turbine Enclosure has been evacuated after an inspection for a source of the gasses.
The licensee isolated the control room by manually initiating chlorine isolation as a precaution at 1922 EDT, this is an Engineered Safety Feature activation and reportable as a 4-hour notification.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state/local government agencies.
* * * UPDATE AT 2321 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY TOM DOUGHERTY TO JOHN MacKINNON * * *
The site de-escalated from the Unusual Event at 2312 EDT. The toxic gas levels were verified to be nominal 0% in all areas inside and outside the power block. The source of the toxic gas is still unknown and under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state/local government agencies. The R1DO (Robert Summers), NRR EO (John Hannon), IRO Manager (Charles Miller), and FEMA (Cegielski) have been informed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1429 EDT ON 9/24/99 BY STAN GAMBLE TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee submitted a written summary of the event as a follow-up per their procedure guidance for NUREG-0654. The source of the gas is still unknown, but the investigation continues. The summary was sent to NRC Region 1.
R1DO (Robert Summers) and NRR (Tad Marsh)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36221
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE WILSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE WILSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 02:13 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 17:52 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 02:13 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 17:52 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOSEPH TAPIA (R4)
JOSEPH TAPIA (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
A TRANSFER IN OFFSITE POWER SOURCES CAUSED THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP TO AUTOMATICALLY START AND DISCHARGE WATER INTO THE STEAM GENERATORS.
During restoration of relaying in the 500 kV switchyard an actuation caused the opening of the PCB breakers (Main Generator Breakers) supplying Unit 1 from Auxiliary Power System). Unit 1 power automatically transferred to the Start-Up power supply. The momentary loss of power during the transfer caused the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to start from an ESF actuation signal (12 kV Buses) and discharge into the Main Steam Generators.
Reactor Coolant Temperature decreased approximately 7 degrees F due to the operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Tave no load is 547 degrees F). The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump operated for approximately 18 minutes before it was secured. A Reactor Operator immediately closed the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater discharge valve(s) to secure auxiliary feedwater to the Steam Generators, so there was very little discharge of auxiliary feedwater into the Steam Generators. Reactor Coolant System cooldown was mainly due to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine using the steam from the Steam Generators for its motive force.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.
During restoration of relaying in the 500 kV switchyard an actuation caused the opening of the PCB breakers (Main Generator Breakers) supplying Unit 1 from Auxiliary Power System). Unit 1 power automatically transferred to the Start-Up power supply. The momentary loss of power during the transfer caused the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to start from an ESF actuation signal (12 kV Buses) and discharge into the Main Steam Generators.
Reactor Coolant Temperature decreased approximately 7 degrees F due to the operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Tave no load is 547 degrees F). The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump operated for approximately 18 minutes before it was secured. A Reactor Operator immediately closed the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater discharge valve(s) to secure auxiliary feedwater to the Steam Generators, so there was very little discharge of auxiliary feedwater into the Steam Generators. Reactor Coolant System cooldown was mainly due to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine using the steam from the Steam Generators for its motive force.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.
Hospital
Event Number: 36222
Rep Org: HINES VA HOSPITAL
Licensee: HINES VA HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: MAYWOOD State: IL
County:
License #: 12-01087-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: L CASE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: HINES VA HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: MAYWOOD State: IL
County:
License #: 12-01087-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: L CASE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 11:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 12:36 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 11:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 12:36 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
PATIENT'S ESOPHAGUS WAS RADIATED IN 11 DIFFERENT POSITIONS BUT IT WAS LATER DISCOVERED THAT THE AFTERLOADER WAS INITIALLY OFF BY 60 MILLIMETER AT THE START OF THE TREATMENT.
A patient was placed in the wrong site for radioactive treatment of his esophagus using a GammaMedIIi (afterloader). The patient's site was initially off by 60 millimeters when the afterloader started treatment of 11 positions of the patients esophagus. The patient received 5 grays to 11 positions in his esophagus but each one of the doses was off from the correct area to be irradiated by 60 millimeters. The patient's physician was notified and the patient will be informed in writing within 15 days of the error. The caller stated that the patient was not harmed by being irradiated in the incorrect areas of his esophagus. The patient is scheduled for a second treatment and during his next treatment the correct areas will be irradiated for a total dose of 5 grays times 2 fractions to 11 the positions that were not treated in the first treatment because of the 60 millimeter error. The GammaMedIIi contains a 10 curie iridium-192 source.
A patient was placed in the wrong site for radioactive treatment of his esophagus using a GammaMedIIi (afterloader). The patient's site was initially off by 60 millimeters when the afterloader started treatment of 11 positions of the patients esophagus. The patient received 5 grays to 11 positions in his esophagus but each one of the doses was off from the correct area to be irradiated by 60 millimeters. The patient's physician was notified and the patient will be informed in writing within 15 days of the error. The caller stated that the patient was not harmed by being irradiated in the incorrect areas of his esophagus. The patient is scheduled for a second treatment and during his next treatment the correct areas will be irradiated for a total dose of 5 grays times 2 fractions to 11 the positions that were not treated in the first treatment because of the 60 millimeter error. The GammaMedIIi contains a 10 curie iridium-192 source.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36216
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/23/1999
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 15:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/1999
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 15:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii) - DEGRAD COND DURING OP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii) - DEGRAD COND DURING OP
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LICENSEE IDENTIFIED AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE BY THE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE
"Oconee is currently conducting a special project to review and validate the Oconee Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP). Part of this project includes an assessment of procedural guidance to address design basis single failure scenarios. This assessment has accordingly identified that the way the EOP is written may
not be adequate to effectively mitigate certain single failure scenarios associated with the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) and High Pressure Injection (HPI) systems.
"The specific issue found to date is a Small Break LOCA with a failure of one of the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) isolation valves to close. If Reactor Building pressure is less than approximately 12 PSIG, during the time that the Emergency Sump suction valves are opened, calculations predict that the BWST will continue to drain until voids are drawn into the LPI and HPI Pumps. Either air voids or significantly decreased available NPSH could adversely affect pump performance. Although the EOP provides compensatory guidance to locally close a manual valve, the engineering evaluation concluded that the guidance did not assure that action could be completed within the required time frame.
"Because the LPI and HPI systems are required to perform their intended safety function with a single failure, Oconee concluded at 1536 hours today that this EOP adequacy issue placed Oconee in a condition outside its design basis and is therefore reportable.
"This is a procedural adequacy issue that does not affect current operability. No event has occurred, no equipment has been declared inoperable, and no Tech Spec action statements have been entered due to this issue. Interim guidance will be provided to the Operators for this deficiency. Additionally, prompt corrective actions are underway to implement formal procedural changes.
"The review is continuing. An LER will be submitted to address the details of the current issue and any similar reportable deficiencies associated with this review found prior to the LER submittal."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Oconee is currently conducting a special project to review and validate the Oconee Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP). Part of this project includes an assessment of procedural guidance to address design basis single failure scenarios. This assessment has accordingly identified that the way the EOP is written may
not be adequate to effectively mitigate certain single failure scenarios associated with the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) and High Pressure Injection (HPI) systems.
"The specific issue found to date is a Small Break LOCA with a failure of one of the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) isolation valves to close. If Reactor Building pressure is less than approximately 12 PSIG, during the time that the Emergency Sump suction valves are opened, calculations predict that the BWST will continue to drain until voids are drawn into the LPI and HPI Pumps. Either air voids or significantly decreased available NPSH could adversely affect pump performance. Although the EOP provides compensatory guidance to locally close a manual valve, the engineering evaluation concluded that the guidance did not assure that action could be completed within the required time frame.
"Because the LPI and HPI systems are required to perform their intended safety function with a single failure, Oconee concluded at 1536 hours today that this EOP adequacy issue placed Oconee in a condition outside its design basis and is therefore reportable.
"This is a procedural adequacy issue that does not affect current operability. No event has occurred, no equipment has been declared inoperable, and no Tech Spec action statements have been entered due to this issue. Interim guidance will be provided to the Operators for this deficiency. Additionally, prompt corrective actions are underway to implement formal procedural changes.
"The review is continuing. An LER will be submitted to address the details of the current issue and any similar reportable deficiencies associated with this review found prior to the LER submittal."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36217
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: SENJEEV ARAB
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: SENJEEV ARAB
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/23/1999
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 13:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/1999
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/1999
Event Time: 13:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 91 | Power Operation |
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VALVE FAILED THE LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING
"On 09/22/99 at 1345 a primary containment valve T4803F601, [Drywell] DW Inlet Isolation Valve, failed the Local Leakage Rate Testing (LLRT) , measured leakage rate exceeded the limit of 0.05 La when pressurized to Pa. Immediate action was to enter Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.8, Drywell and Suppression Chamber Purge System, action 'b', and declare T4803F601 valve inoperable and effected penetration was isolated by closing and deactivating the valves T4800F407, DW Air Inlet Isolation valve and T4800F408, DW Nitrogen Inlet Isolation valve in accordance with TS 3.6.3 action 'a' which was completed at 1447 on 09/22/99.
"T4803F601 is a supply purge valve with resilient seal (24 inch), TS 3.6.1.8 action 'b' gives 24 hrs to restore the
valve to operable status or be in hot shutdown in next 12 hrs and cold shutdown in next 24 hrs. The reason for valve T4803F601 failing LLRT is likely due to seal failure.
"Plant shutdown commenced at 1600 on 09/23/99 in order to meet TS 3.6.1.8 action 'b'."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1825 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY SENJEEV ARAB TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee has received approval of Notice of Enforcement Discretion from NRC/NRR and the shutdown has been terminated. Power will be restored to 97%. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Roger Lanksbury) has been notified.
"On 09/22/99 at 1345 a primary containment valve T4803F601, [Drywell] DW Inlet Isolation Valve, failed the Local Leakage Rate Testing (LLRT) , measured leakage rate exceeded the limit of 0.05 La when pressurized to Pa. Immediate action was to enter Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.8, Drywell and Suppression Chamber Purge System, action 'b', and declare T4803F601 valve inoperable and effected penetration was isolated by closing and deactivating the valves T4800F407, DW Air Inlet Isolation valve and T4800F408, DW Nitrogen Inlet Isolation valve in accordance with TS 3.6.3 action 'a' which was completed at 1447 on 09/22/99.
"T4803F601 is a supply purge valve with resilient seal (24 inch), TS 3.6.1.8 action 'b' gives 24 hrs to restore the
valve to operable status or be in hot shutdown in next 12 hrs and cold shutdown in next 24 hrs. The reason for valve T4803F601 failing LLRT is likely due to seal failure.
"Plant shutdown commenced at 1600 on 09/23/99 in order to meet TS 3.6.1.8 action 'b'."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1825 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY SENJEEV ARAB TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee has received approval of Notice of Enforcement Discretion from NRC/NRR and the shutdown has been terminated. Power will be restored to 97%. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Roger Lanksbury) has been notified.