Event Notification Report for September 23, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/22/1999 - 09/23/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36079 36113 36210 36211 36212 36213 36214 36215
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36079 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/27/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:48[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 08/27/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 06:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVE WALSH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KATHLEEN MODES R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DEGRADATION (ONLY ONE OF FOUR PUMPS |
| OPERABLE) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "On 08/26/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at 100% power |
| with the 'B' loop of emergency service water [(ESW)] out of service for |
| scheduled maintenance. During testing on the ESW system, with all ESW pumps |
| in service, it was identified that the 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps' discharge |
| check valves were closed. The ESW flow surveillance was performed, and the |
| 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps failed to achieve the required flow and were declared |
| inoperable. Concurrently, the 'B' loop of ESW was returned to service. |
| During the time the 'B' ESW loop was inoperable, the 'A' ESW pump was the |
| only one operable ESW pump. This constitutes a serious degradation of the |
| plant in that it is a condition which is outside of design basis and, |
| therefore, reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) requiring a 1-hour ENS |
| notification." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1453EDT ON 9/3/99 FROM GRANT FERNSLER TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| "This Notification is a retraction of a previous ENS Notification made |
| 8/27/99 (Event # 36079)." |
| |
| "Subsequent evaluation by Engineering has concluded that the plant had at |
| least two Emergency Service |
| Water pumps capable of performing their specified safety function at all |
| times. As such, the plant was not |
| in a condition outside of its design basis and the report previously made |
| pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii) |
| is hereby retracted." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Rogge). |
| |
| * * *UPDATE 0316EDT ON 09/23/99 FROM MIKE PEAL TAKEN BY MACKINNON* * * |
| |
| The licensee is Retracting the Retraction they called in on 09/03/99 at |
| 1453EDT. |
| |
| "On 09/22/99 at 2230, an Engineering evaluation concluded that the |
| operability determination associated with the above stated event was not |
| adequate, specifically relating to the potential for pump interaction to |
| create low flow conditions. " |
| |
| "The Engineering evaluation was being performed in response to an anomaly |
| identified on 09/20/99 during the run of 'D' Diesel Generator. During the |
| preparation of the operability statement for the 09/20/99 anomaly, |
| engineering personnel realized that incorrect assumptions were used in the |
| previous operability statement. The 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps were declared |
| inoperable at 2230 on 09/22/99. Evaluation continues to determine if other |
| combinations of equipment out of service times result in additional |
| reportable conditions." R1DO (Bob Summers) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of the Retraction to the |
| Retraction of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36113 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:50[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/02/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/22/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |DAVID HILLS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KURT SISLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MICROFILTRATION SYSTEM pH PROBES OUT OF TOLERANCE |
| |
| On 9/1/99 at 1300 hours, the plant shift superintendent was notified that a |
| previously discovered X-705 Microfiltration System (MFS) pH probe out of |
| tolerance condition likely existed during a time period when the MFS was in |
| operation. The out of tolerance condition was in a non-conservative |
| direction and previously documented during a routine weekly surveillance on |
| 6/4/99. During the engineering evaluation, it was concluded at 1000 hours |
| on 9/2/99, that the out of tolerance condition likely existed from |
| approximately 5/28/99 to 6/4/99. |
| |
| The out of tolerance condition affected 2 of the 3 probes (2 out of 3 logic |
| required to activate the safety system). The as found data for the 2 probes |
| indicated they would actuate at 6.70 pH and 6.63 pH, which is below the 7 pH |
| required setpoint. A review of MFS operational history indicated that the |
| MFS pH was maintained above a 7 pH during the time the probes are suspected |
| to have been out of tolerance. |
| |
| There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or |
| radioactive/radiological contamination. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1452EDT ON 9/2/99 FROM KURT SISLER TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The following is a portion of information provided as an update to include |
| classification of the event as a 24-hour 91-01 Bulletin report: |
| |
| "Upon further review of [the] X-705 Microfiltration System pH probe failure, |
| it was determined to be reportable per NRC Bulletin 91-01 criteria. |
| |
| "Safety Significance: |
| |
| "Two out of three safety system pH probes used in the microfiltration system |
| were found to be out of tolerance. The system relies on a two-out-of-three |
| logic for system actuation. The probes read 7.30 and 7.37 for a buffer |
| solution which had a pH of approximately 7.0 (depending on the temperature). |
| NCSA-0705_015.A10 takes credit for these pH probes in satisfying the double |
| contingency principle. Active engineered feature #5 states 'Microfiltration |
| effluent pH shutdown system will automatically stop the flow of microfilter |
| permeate to the T-105 tank if pH<7.0 (with an allowable test tolerance of |
| -0.2), by closing both isolation valves automatically.' Since the probes |
| were overestimating the pH, a pH of as low as approximately 6.70 could be |
| present without an actuation of the system. |
| |
| "Contingency event B.4.2 credits the effluent pH shutdown system in |
| preventing dissolved uranium past the microfilters (to an unsafe geometry |
| tank downstream). Also credited is the unlikely event of solution with a |
| low pH making it to the microfiltration modules due to the functioning of |
| the pH adjustment system. Therefore, the out of tolerance condition in a |
| non-conservative direction constitutes a loss of one criticality control in |
| a double contingency system. |
| |
| "The discussion for B.4.2 includes the following, 'Based on chemical |
| reactions and calculations in POEF-340-98-113, it would require an extremely |
| low pH (in the range of approximately 4 to 5) before the resulting solution |
| would pick up any appreciable amounts (i.e., milligrams per liter) of |
| uranium. However, this level of uranium is well below the individually |
| always safe concentration limit reported in GAT-225, Rev. 4, of 5000 ppm |
| U-235 for 100% enriched solution.' Based on the as-found tolerances, a pH |
| of 6.70 would have caused the system to actuate. Therefore, this event has a |
| low safety significance. |
| |
| "Potential Criticality Pathways involved (Brief scenario(s) of how |
| criticality could occur): |
| |
| "Event B.4.2.a credits the effluent pH shutdown system in preventing |
| dissolved uranium past the microfilters (to an unsafe geometry tank |
| downstream). Also credited is the unlikely event of solution with a low pH |
| making it to the microfiltration modules due to the functioning of the pH |
| adjustment system. Both a failure in the pH shutdown system and the unlikely |
| event of a low pH following pH adjustment would have to occur for this |
| scenario to take place. |
| |
| "Controlled parameters: |
| |
| "The prevention of acidic solutions from entering the microfiltration |
| modules maintains the uranium in the filters in a favorable geometry, rather |
| than picking up uranium in addition to the safe batch being processed. |
| Therefore, geometry is controlled. |
| |
| "Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material (include process |
| limit and % worst case of critical mass): |
| |
| "The operation is approved for 100% U-235; however, only USEC material |
| (maximum 10% U-235 has been processed recently. The microfiltration process |
| is controlled such that only a safe mass of U-235 is present in any |
| unfavorable geometry. Operational information indicates that the pH was |
| never less than 7.0 during the time the system was potentially out of |
| calibration |
| |
| "Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls(s) or control system(s) and description |
| of failures or deficiencies: |
| |
| "Two out of three safety system pH probes used in the microfiltration system |
| were found to be out of tolerance. The system relies on a two-out-of-three |
| logic for system actuation. The system is relied on to keep unmeasured |
| quantities of uranium (from the microfilter modules) from entering an |
| unfavorable geometry tank. |
| |
| "Therefore, the failure of the pH shutdown system (due to out of calibration |
| probes or any reason) is an analyzed condition." |
| |
| The HOO notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS (Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2257 ON 09//22/99 BY JOE HALCOMB TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| A MORE DETAILED REVIEW OF THE pH PROBE OPERATING HISTORY AND AS-FOUND |
| CALIBRATIONS WAS CONDUCTED TO FURTHER ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A HIGH |
| DELTA pH CONDITION. THIS REVIEW REVEALED THAT THE DELTA pH BETWEEN THE |
| THREE pH PROBES IS NOT AN INDICATOR THAT THE PROBES ARE OUT OF TOLERANCE. |
| THE REVIEW NOTED THAT THERE IS NO CORRELATION BETWEEN THE DELTA pH AND |
| AS-FOUND CALIBRATION RESULTS. BASED ON THIS FINDING, THE ORIGINAL BASIS FOR |
| DETERMINING THAT THE JUNE 4 OUT-OF-TOLERANCE CONDITION WAS A REPORTABLE |
| EVENT IS NO LONGER VALID. THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW |
| ARE DOCUMENTED IN EVAL-PS-1999-0567, REV 0. |
| |
| BASED ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION, THIS EVENT NOTIFICATION, (PTS-1999-074), |
| SHOULD BE RETRACTED. |
| |
| PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
| |
| THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO ROGER LANKSBURY AND NMSS EO |
| JOHN SURMEIER. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36210 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FERMI REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/1999|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:17[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:25[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SANJEEV ARAB |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/22/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ROGER LANKSBURY R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN DAVIDSON, IAT NMSS |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |JOE GIITTER IRO |
| |JIM LYONS, EO NRR |
| |R. ROSANO, IAT NRR |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 97 Power Operation |97 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ACTUAL INTRODUCTION OF CONTRABAND INTO A PROTECTED AREA. CONTRABAND |
| DISCOVERED BY VISITING WORKERS. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON |
| DISCOVERY. MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF NOTIFIED. |
| |
| NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT. |
| |
| SEE HOO LOG BOOK FOR FURTHER DETAILS. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36211 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:40[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:08[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: THOMAS O'MEARA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/22/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ROBERT SUMMERS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |JIM LYONS NRR |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER |
| |
| Planned maintenance was being performed on the feeder breaker to non-vital |
| Motor Control Center # 116. While the feeder breaker was being worked on, |
| Motor Control Centers # 116 and # 106 were tied together through one tie |
| breaker. The amps limits for the tie breaker were misinterpret in the |
| procedure and the feeder breaker that was supplying Motor Control Centers # |
| 116 and # 106 tripped on overcurrent (The operators that performed the |
| evolution verified that each Motor Control Center was less than 500 amps but |
| the total for both Motor Control Centers was greater than 500 amps). The |
| normal feeder tripped open on the feed that was supplying both Motor Control |
| Centers. The loss of power to the Motor Control Centers caused a loss of |
| control oil to both Main Feedwater Pumps and a loss of oil to the Main |
| Condenser air removal pumps. The loss of both Main Feedwater pumps caused a |
| loss of feedwater to the both Steam Generators. Both Motor Driven Auxiliary |
| Feedwater Pumps and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump started. The |
| licensee manually tripped the reactor before the reactor would have |
| automatically tripped on low Steam Generator Water Level. All rods fully |
| inserted into the core. The loss of the oil pumps to the Main Condenser air |
| removal pumps caused a loss of condenser vacuum. The Main Steam Isolation |
| Valves were closed due to the loss of condenser vacuum. At the present |
| time, the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and the Steam Generator |
| Atmospheric valves are maintaining the plant in Hot Standby. The licensee |
| said that they have a very small Steam Generator tube leak on Unit 1, but |
| there is no detectable release. |
| |
| All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are |
| fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable. The licensee |
| notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Calvert County of the reactor trip. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36212 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:48[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:32[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DICK LUCKETT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/22/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOSEPH TAPIA R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |TAD MARSH NRR |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - AUTO REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKING THE UNIT 1 500 |
| KV LINE - |
| |
| At 0932 PDT on 09/22/99, lightning struck the Unit 1 500 kV line in the |
| plant switchyard causing the unit output breakers to trip open and caused a |
| full load rejection. The Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped from 100% |
| power due to an overtemperature differential temperature (OTdT) trip signal. |
| All control rods inserted completely. A pressurizer power operated relief |
| valve lifted, as expected, and immediately reseated. Steam is being dumped |
| to the main condenser. The auxiliary feedwater system auto started, as |
| expected. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Offsite power remained |
| available throughout this event. There were no personnel injuries. Plant |
| personnel are walking the plant down for any damage. The lighting strike |
| had minimal impact on Unit 2 which remained at 100% power. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36213 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:56[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEN GRACIA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/22/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ROBERT SUMMERS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - EDG ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANELS INOPERABLE DUE TO UNISOLATED CIRCUIT - |
| |
| At 1730 on 09/22/99, the emergency diesel generator (EDG) alternate shutdown |
| (ASD) panels were declared inoperable based upon engineering evaluation. A |
| circuit for wattmeter indication from the EDGs in the main control room is |
| not isolated by the ASD panels. This places the ASD panels for the EDGs |
| outside the plant design basis. In case of a fire in the cable spreading |
| room, this circuit being energized could affect EDG operation during |
| performance of ASD from outside the main control room. |
| |
| Short term corrective action is to revise procedure(s) to have operators |
| isolate the affected relays when needed. Long term corrective action is |
| being evaluated. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to notify state |
| officials. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36214 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: TEXAS BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/1999|
|LICENSEE: TEAM CONSULTANTS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:00[EDT]|
| CITY: DALLAS REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/20/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: TX |EVENT TIME: 12:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: L04012 (TX) AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/22/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |JOSEPH TAPIA R4 |
| |JOHN SURMEIER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HELEN WATKINS, TBRC | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Troxler moisture density gauge stolen from company parking facility - |
| |
| On 09/20/99, Texas licensee, Team Consultants, Dallas, TX, notified Texas |
| Bureau of Radiation Control (TBRC) that a Troxler moisture density gauge, |
| #3411B, was stolen on 09/20/99 from the back of a pickup truck that was |
| parked in the licensee's parking facility. Reportedly, the gauge was locked |
| and left unattended for only 10 minutes. The licensee notified the local |
| police and the Dallas Fire Department. TBRC is obtaining additional |
| information and investigating this theft. [TBRC Incident #7511]. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a contact telephone number.) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36215 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:13[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:55[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: McLAUGHLIN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ROGER LANKSBURY R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 90 Power Operation |90 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DIVISION 3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR TRIPPED ON OVER SPEED DURING MONTHLY |
| SURVEILLANCE TESTING. |
| |
| While performing monthly surveillance start of the High Pressure Core Spray |
| system Emergency Diesel Generator, the Diesel automatically tripped off on |
| an overspeed signal. The diesel does not appear to have been damaged but |
| remains shutdown and unavailable for on-going investigation of the failure. |
| The High Pressure Core Spray system is inoperable but available from normal |
| power source only. The failure mechanism is being investigated and |
| corrective actions will be performed. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling |
| pump and all other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are also fully operable. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021