Event Notification Report for September 21, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/20/1999 - 09/21/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36091 36197 36201 36202 36203
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36091 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/31/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:21[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 08/30/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:22[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/21/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHARLES CAIN R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE OF A SINGLE TRAIN SYSTEM THAT IS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE |
| CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT |
| |
| On 8/30/99 at 2222 while performing maintenance on SW-MOV-650MV, Reactor |
| Equipment Cooling (REC) heat exchanger "A" Service Water (SW) Outlet Valve, |
| SW-MOV-650MV was manually opened while disconnecting Limit Switches. The |
| valve was opened to a point that allowed 2475 Gallons Per Minute (GPM) of |
| service water flow thru the "A" REC heat exchanger. Service water flow |
| greater than 1200 GPM thru the "A" REC heat exchanger results in the "A" |
| Service Water subsystem being inoperable (LCO 3.7.2) which requires |
| restoration of the "A" Service Water subsystem within 30 days. LCO 3.8.1 |
| was entered for Diesel Generator 1 (DG1) because it was declared inoperable |
| due to the Service Water being inoperable. The Control Room Emergency |
| Filtration System (CREFS), which is a single train system, was aligned to a |
| bus that would be powered from DG1 in the event of an accident. This |
| condition resulted in CREFS also being declared inoperable (LCO 3.7.4) |
| |
| When the increased flow though the "A" REC heat exchanger was discovered by |
| a Control Room Operator, the Valve Technicians performing the maintenance |
| were instructed to manually close SW-MOV-650MV until Service Water flow |
| through the "A" REC Heat Exchanger was reduced below 1200 GPM, which was |
| completed at 2238. All of the previously mentioned LCO's were also exited at |
| this time. |
| |
| At the time this event occurred both sources of offsite power were available |
| and DG2 was determined to not be affected by this condition. |
| |
| The Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| |
| *** UPDATE ON 9/21/99 @ 0259 BY GREEN TO GOULD *** EVENT RETRACTION |
| |
| SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION HAS DETERMINED THAT D/G#1 WAS ALWAYS CAPABLE OF |
| PERFORMING ITS SAFETY FUNCTION DURING THE EVENT. THEREFORE, CREFS REMAINED |
| OPERABLE AND THIS EVENT IS BEING RETRACTED. |
| |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36197 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:29[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/18/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN SELL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/20/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GARY SHEAR R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RESPONSE TO NRC BULLETIN 80-24 REGARDING LEAKAGE OF SERVICE WATER INTO |
| REACTOR CONTAINMENTS (24-HOUR REPORT) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "At 0100 [CDT] on 09/18/99, a pin hole leak was identified on the 'A' Unit 1 |
| containment fan cooler. The unit had been in a 72-hour [limiting condition |
| for operation (LCO)] for partial blockage of this cooler by zebra mussels. |
| The leak was discovered during treatment for the zebra mussels. The LCO |
| expires at 1035 [CDT] on 09/19/99. The plan is presently to isolate the |
| leaking tube section and restore the cooler as operable but degraded." |
| |
| There was nothing unusual or not understood and all systems functioned as |
| required. The licensee stated that there are four containment fan coolers |
| per unit. The licensee also stated the NRC Bulletin 80-24 has been |
| superceded but that they are still committed to the provisions of this |
| bulletin. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1345 ON 09/20/99 FROM JOHN SELL TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| Upon further review of this event, the licensee determined that only leakage |
| greater than 1 GPM should be reportable to the NRC and that reporting this |
| event to the NRC was a conservative action. The 1 GPM value is consistent |
| with Point Beach Tech Spec requirements for evaluation of RCS leakage. The |
| pinhole leak did not meet this criteria. Thus, the licensee desires to |
| retract this event. The 72 hour LCO for the 'A' Unit 1 containment fan |
| cooler was exited at 2140 CDT on 09/18/99. The fan cooler remains operable |
| but degraded. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations |
| Officer notified the R3DO Roger Lanksbury. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36201 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/20/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:59[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/20/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:09[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHISM |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/20/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 M/R Y 4 Startup |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY SCRAMMED AT 4% POWER. |
| |
| While in mode 2 at approximately 450 psig during unit 2 startup, an |
| automatic group 1 (MSIV's, steam line drain and reactor sample valves) |
| isolation occurred. The main steam line isolation caused reactor pressure to |
| rise. The licensee inserted control rods and stabilized reactor pressure at |
| approximately 950 psig. After verifying that the automatic isolation signal |
| had cleared, the licensee equalized around and reopened the MSIV's in order |
| to restart a reactor feed pump and restore RPV level control. When feed flow |
| was restored, a rapid power rise was observed prompting the licensee to |
| insert a manual reactor scram. All control rods fully inserted as expected, |
| and no ECCS actuation occurred or safety relief valves lifted. The licensee |
| took conservative action to insert a manual scram. |
| |
| The systems affected by the automatic isolations were returned to service. |
| Unit 2 is currently in hot shutdown. The licensee has formed an event |
| investigation team for this event. The cause of the automatic isolation has |
| not been positively determined, but it appears the isolation occurred when |
| the licensee was draining the condenser pressure sensing lines for the |
| pressure transmitters resulting in a Group 1 isolation on low condenser |
| vacuum in accordance with 0GP-02, APPROACH TO CRITICALITY AND PRESSURIZATION |
| OF THE REACTOR. |
| |
| The Resident Inspector was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36202 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/20/1999|
| UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:53[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/20/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:35[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CAMERON CAMPBELL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/20/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ROBERT SUMMERS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|3 N Y 82 Power Operation |82 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Channel 'B' manual half scram signal received due to an electrical short |
| in the reactor protection system logic - |
| |
| A channel 'B' manual half scram signal was received during modification |
| installation when drilling activities inadvertently contacted a wire in the |
| reactor protection system (RPS) logic. The shorted wire resulted in a blown |
| fuse which deenergized power to the channel 'B' manual half scram logic. |
| The outboard scram discharge volume vent valves and drain valve shut per |
| design on receipt of the channel 'B' manual half scram signal. |
| |
| The damaged RPS wire has been repaired and the fuse has been replaced. The |
| channel 'B' manual half scram signal has been reset and the outboard scram |
| discharge volume vent valves and drain valve have been reopened per station |
| procedures by 1638. The channel 'B' manual half scram signal and subsequent |
| reset had no impact on plant operation. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36203 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: THREE MILE ISLAND REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/21/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:56[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/21/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BOYER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/21/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ROBERT SUMMERS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AMED 50.72(b)(2)(v) OFFSITE MEDICAL | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INJURED PERSON TRANSPORTED OFFSITE. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE TRANSPORTED AN INDIVIDUAL WHO INJURED HIS LOWER BACK WHILE |
| WORKING INSIDE CONTAINMENT ON THE UPPER MANWAY TO THE HERSHEY MEDICAL |
| CENTER. HE MAY HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATED, SO HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HEALTH |
| PHYSICS PERSONNEL TO THE HOSPITAL. |
| |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED |
| |
| *** UPDATE ON 9/21/99 @ 0209 BY BOYER TO GOULD *** |
| |
| THE INDIVIDUAL WAS NOT CONTAMINATED, HOWEVER, HIS CLOTHING WAS AND IT IS |
| BEING RETURNED TO THE SITE. |
| |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. |
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