Event Notification Report for September 16, 1999

STATE OF VIRGINIA NOTIFIED OF ONGOING UNTREATED SEWAGE RELEASE DUE TO FLOODING CAUSED BY HURRICANE FLOYD

"At 0910 hours, the Virginia Department of Emergency Services was notified that the Surry Power Station Sewage Treatment Plant had become flooded due to the heavy rain from Hurricane Floyd. This resulted in untreated sewage being diverted to the James River. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(vi)."

The sewage release is ongoing due to the continuing rain. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

TEMPORARY LOSS OF POWER TO THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER DUE TO WINDS ASSOCIATED WITH HURRICANE FLOYD (Refer to event #36184 for a similar event.)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"High winds and rain caused a loss of power to [the] Unit 1 Training Center which provides power to the [Technical] Support Center (TSC) [at 1320 EDT. This also caused] a loss of assessment capability from the [TSC]. Assessment capability [was] still available from the main control room and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Power was restored [to the TSC] at 1337 [EDT]."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) STARTS AND LOADING TO SHUTDOWN BOARD 2A-A DUE TO BREAKER TRIP ON GROUND OVERCURRENT.

A blackout of the Unit 2 2A-A Shutdown Board (SDBD) resulted in the start of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 EDGs as designed. The 2A-A SDBD was reenergized through its respective EDG. The blackout occurred when a ground overcurrent condition caused the loss of the normal feeder to the 2A-A SDBD. In addition, the following Unit 2 ESF equipment sequenced on when the 2A-A SDBD energized: 2A motor driven aux feedwater pump, 2A centrifugal charging pump, 2A component cooling system pump, and the KA emergency raw cooling water pump.

Maintenance efforts are in progress to determine the cause of this event. Pending initial troubleshooting, current plans are to energize the 2A-A SDBD from its alternate power source. This action will permit the EDGs and the ESF equipment started as a result of this event to be returned to a standby condition.

The NRC Resident has been notified.

53 OF 63 EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE DUE TO POWER OUTAGES.

At 1434 EDT on 9/16/99, early warning siren polling identified that 53 early warning sirens were inoperable due to power outages caused by Hurricane Floyd. This represents a greater than 25% early warning siren unavailability. 6 of the 53 sirens did not respond while the remaining 47 indicated no AC power available.

At 1100 EDT on 9/16/99, siren polling had indicated 5 sirens were inoperable. During the time Hurricane Floyd was passing through the area, an additional 6 sirens alarmed due to low battery voltage.

Line crews are working to restore power to the affected areas.

The NRC Resident has been notified.

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF A SEVERE WEATHER GUIDE AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE FLOYD (Refer the event #36178 for related information.)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"PSEG Nuclear has issued a press release detailing preparations made and actions currently being taken related to the Hurricane Floyd storm system. The Hope Creek Generating Station is currently operating under severe weather guidelines due to a Tropical Storm Warning that has been issued by the National Weather Service. To prepare for the storm, PSEG Nuclear has implemented its Severe Weather Guide. This procedure outlines PSEG Nuclear's response in severe weather and ensures the correct resources are in place -- people and equipment -- for any situation. The major precautionary actions currently taking place include:"

"Manning of the Emergency Response Facilities as a precautionary measure for consistent communications
related to the storm, both within the company and with the states of New Jersey and Delaware. Facilities will
remain staffed through the storm's duration."

"Active monitoring of changing weather conditions."

"Securing of all objects and equipment."

"Employee's that may be needed on site to augment the emergency response teams are also available on
site and will remain through the storm's duration."

"All employee's not needed for response to Hurricane Floyd have been released from site."

"PSEG Nuclear will exit the Severe Weather Guide and stand down the Emergency Response organization after the storm has passed and any needed storm recovery actions have been completed."

"Hope Creek is currently at 100% power. The 'D' low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system is inoperable due to planned maintenance. The 'D' LPCI system is available. All other safety-related equipment is operable."

In addition to issuing a press release, the licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The licensee also plans to notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF A SEVERE WEATHER GUIDE AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE FLOYD (Refer the event #36177 for related information.)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"PSEG Nuclear has issued a press release detailing preparations made and actions currently being taken related to the Hurricane Floyd storm system. The Salem Generating Stations are currently operating under severe weather guidelines due to a tropical storm warning that has been issued by the National Weather Service. To prepare for the storm, PSEG Nuclear has implemented its Severe Weather Guide. This procedure outlines PSEG Nuclear's response in severe weather and ensures the correct resources are in place -- people and equipment -- for any situation. The major precautionary actions currently taking place include:

"Manning of the Emergency Response Facility tics as a precautionary measure for consistent
communications related to the storm, both within the company and with the states of New Jersey and
Delaware. Facilities will remain staffed through the storm's duration.

"Active monitoring of changing weather conditions.

"Securing of all objects and equipment.

"Employee's that truly be needed on site to augment the emergency response teams are also available on
site and will remain through the storm's duration.

"All Employee's not needed for response to hurricane Floyd have been released from site.

"PSEG Nuclear will exit the Severe Weather Guide and stand down the Emergency Response Organization after the storm has passed and any needed storm recovery actions have been completed.

"Salem Unit 1 is currently at 75% power. Salem Unit 1 is at this reduced power level for an end of life coastdown. No major equipment is out of service and no shutdown technical specification action statements are in effect.

"Salem Unit 2 is currently at 100% power. No major equipment is out of service and no shutdown technical specification action statements are in effect."

In addition to issuing a press release, the licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

INOPERABLE SIRENS (22 OUT OF APPROXIMATELY 96) DUE TO POWER OUTAGES ASSOCIATED WITH HURRICANE FLOYD

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"High winds and heavy rains from tropical storm Floyd have caused widespread power outages in the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Emergency Planning Zone."

"As a result of the power outages, portions of the off-site notification system have been rendered inoperable."

"Currently, a total of 22 sirens are inoperable: 0 in Chester County, 3 in Cecil County, 7 in Harford County, 11 in York County, and 1 in Lancaster County."

"The off-site notification system will continue to be monitored periodically during the duration of this event. Sirens that do not return to full operability will be visited and repaired as necessary."

The licensee stated that the off-site notification system contains approximately 96 sirens.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

22 OF 165 EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE DUE TO POWER OUTAGES.

High winds and heavy rains from Tropical Storm Floyd have caused widespread power outages in the Limerick Generating Station Emergency Planning Zone.

As a result of the power outages, portions of the off-site notification system have been rendered inoperable.

Currently, a total of 49 sirens are inoperable: 9 in Berks County, 24 in Chester County, and 16 in Montgomery County.

The off-site notification system will continue to be monitored periodically during the duration of this event. Sirens that do not return to full operability will be visited and repaired as necessary.

The Licensee stated that the off-site notification system contains 165 sirens.

The NRC Resident has been notified.

DEVIATION FROM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE BREACHED) DUE TO REPORT OF A TORNADO

At 1829 hours, a funnel cloud was reported in the area of the Perry plant. The licensee entered Off-normal Procedure ZZZ-1, High Winds or Tornadoes. The procedure requires that the control room boundary be breached and makes the control room emergency recirc system inoperable. The control room boundary was breached at 1850 hours, and the plant entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 which requires that steps be initiated within 1 hour to shut the unit down and that the unit be in the Startup Mode within the following 7 hours. The licensee stated that they expected to reestablish the control room envelope within approximately 20 minutes.

The NRC Resident has been notified.

*** UPDATE AT 2227 EDT ON 9/16/99 FROM KIDDER TO POERTNER ***

Further Licensee review has determined that this event was not a 1 hour Report required by 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(i)(B) but was reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - Accident Mitigation.

When the control room boundary was breached the unit entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3 Action D which required entry into TS 3.0.3. The control room boundary was restored at 1927 hours. The initiation of a plant shutdown was not necessary and as a result no reactivity changes were made.

The event resulted in a loss of safety function due to a breach of the control room boundary.

The NRC Resident has been notified.

Notified R3DO (SHEAR).

LOSS of 34 of 71 EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO A POWER OUTAGE RELATED TO HURRICANE FLOYD (Refer to event #36183 for a related event at Hope Creek.)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"At approximately 1820, [the licensee] was informed that [the] Salem County 911 Center lost primary power at 1746[, and the] backup diesel generator did not respond. The loss of power resulted in the inability to activate 34 of 71 emergency sirens for Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations. [The] Salem County 911 Center contacted the affected emergency planning zone municipalities to implement temporary radiological notification to the public."

"At approximately 1848, power was restored to the Salem County 911 Center. With this action, 32 of the 34 inoperable sirens were restored. At this time, 68 of 71 sirens are operable. [The reportable action level is greater than 17 sirens out of service for greater than 1 hour.]"

"Salem Unit 1 is at 75% power for a scheduled end of life coastdown. There are no active shutdown technical specification action statements in effect, and no major equipment is out of service."

"Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power. There are no active shutdown technical specification action statements in effect, and no major equipment is out of service."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

LOSS of 34 of 71 EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO A POWER OUTAGE RELATED TO HURRICANE FLOYD (Refer to event #36182 for a related event at Salem.)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"At approximately 1820, [the licensee] was informed that [the] Salem County 911 Center lost primary power at 1746[, and the] backup diesel generator did not respond. The loss of power resulted in the inability to activate 34 of 71 emergency sirens for Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations. [The] Salem County 911 Center contacted the affected emergency planning zone municipalities to implement temporary radiological notification to the public."

"At approximately 1848, power was restored to the Salem County 911 Center. With this action, 32 of the 34 inoperable sirens were restored. At this time, 68 of 71 sirens are operable. [The reportable action level is greater than 17 sirens out of service for greater than 1 hour.]"

"Hope Creek is currently at 100% power. The 'D' low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system is inoperable due to planned maintenance. The 'D' LPCI system is available. All other safety-related equipment is operable."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

LOSS OF POWER TO THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER DUE TO HIGH WINDS AND RAIN ASSOCIATED WITH HURRICANE FLOYD (Refer to event #36173 for a similar event)

High winds and rain have caused a loss of power to the Unit 1 training center which houses the Peach Bottom Technical Support Center (TSC). The loss of power has resulted in a loss of assessment capability from the TSC. Assessment capability is still available from the main control room and the emergency operations facility. Power restoration efforts are in progress.

The NRC Resident has been notified.


***UPDATE on 09/16/99 at 2354ET by Kovalchick taken by MacKinnon***

Power was restored to the TSC at 2238 ET. NRC REG1 IRC (Cowgill), & R1DO (Niel Della Greca) notified

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.

PARTIAL LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIREN CAPABILITY DURING HURRICANE FLOYD

"[Operations was] informed by Brunswick Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel that 13 emergency warning offsite sirens have failed as a result of Hurricane Floyd.

"[The initial safety significance evaluation characterized the significance of the loss of the sirens as] minimal. Backup alert measures are in place. Local agencies have been notified.

"[Corrective action(s) include a] complete investigation into the cause of the failure and complete required repairs."

The thirteen [13] sirens are located primarily on the beach and on Bald Head Island and Boiling Spring Lake in Brunswick county. There are an additional seventeen [17] operable sirens currently available in Brunswick county and five [5] more in New Hanover county. The loss of the 13 sirens was related to loss of power as detected by an external operability check performed by a computer. The licensee will not initiate repairs until the storm passes.

The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 0510EDT ON 9/16/99 VIA FAX TO S. SANDIN * * *

Thirty-two [32] of the thirty-five [35] sirens are out-of-service. See event #36163 for additional information. Notified R2 IRC (Reyes).

PARTIAL LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIREN CAPABILITY DURING HURRICANE FLOYD

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"The Plant was operating at 100% power when 22 Warning Sirens became inoperable due to loss of power. The counties of Chatham, Harnett, and Wake are each affected. Wind speeds in these areas are higher than normal due to the effects of hurricane Floyd. One additional Warning Siren in Wake County was previously inoperable due to failing its periodic test. Repairs will be made when wind speed subsides."

Harris has a total of 81 sirens of which 22 represents slightly greater than 25%. Residents living within 5 miles of the site have tone alert radios as a backup.

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector and plans to inform state/local agencies.

******************** UPDATE AT 1558 ON 09/17/99 FROM GARY WARD TO LEIGH TROCINE ********************

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"As of 1400 on [09/17/99], 67 of 81 warning sirens are operable. Operable sirens are available in each of the four surrounding counties. Additionally, alternative compensatory measures, such as tone alert radios and route alerting are in place for public notification in the event of an actual emergency."

"Harris nuclear plant is now below the threshold for normal reporting of inoperable sirens. Power restoration [to the remaining sirens] will continue throughout the weekend."

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R2DO (Christensen).

- Secondary containment integrity lost due to a hatch cover being removed during maintenance activities -

At 0115 on 09/16/99, Limerick Generating Station Unit 2 experienced a loss of secondary containment integrity. At the time of the event, the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System was in service. The Reactor Enclosure HVAC System was not in service due to maintenance activities. The SBGT System was unable to maintain reactor enclosure pressure greater than 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge per technical specifications due to a hatch cover being removed for maintenance inspection activities. This event could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive materials or mitigate the consequences of an accident. The hatch cover was reinstalled properly by 0126, and the SBGT System was able to draw a vacuum on the reactor enclosure area greater than 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge.

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.

* * * RETRACTION AT 0828 ON 09/28/1999 FROM GAMBLE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

"This is a retraction of a notification made on 09/16/99 at 0434 hours, (event #36171). This event was reported as a loss of safety function under requirement 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D).

"Unit 2 Reactor Enclosure HVAC was secured to perform an internal ductwork inspection. SGTS was in service maintaining negative pressure in the Reactor Enclosure. An inspection hatch located outside of secondary containment was removed to perform the internal inspection. This created an unplanned breach of secondary containment. Unit 2 Reactor Enclosure pressure increased but remained negative. The hatch was replaced, and integrity was restored within 11 minutes.

"The basis for this retraction is that the safety analysis assumes drawdown of the Reactor Enclosure will take 930 seconds post accident. T.S. 4.6.5.1.1.c.1 surveillance drawdown of the Reactor Enclosure must be completed within 916 seconds (15.26 minutes). Test results indicate drawdown is complete within 2.5 minutes. The sum of the hatch removal time (11 minutes) plus drawdown time (2.5 minutes) totals 13.5 minutes. This is less than the 15.26 minute requirement for establishing rated negative pressure in the Reactor Enclosure. The safety function of mitigating the consequences of an accident was maintained. Therefore, this event is not reportable per the guidance of NUREG-1022, Rev 1."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Silk).