Event Notification Report for September 7, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 09/03/1999 - 09/07/1999 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 36002 36018 36025 36079 36088 36104 36114 36121 36122 36123 36124 36125 36126 36127 36128 36129 36130 36131 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36002 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/06/1999| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:20[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/06/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:30[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRAD ELLISON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MARK RING R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DISCOVERY OF A DOOR CONFIGURATION THAT DID NOT MEET THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA | | FOR THE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN BASIS HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK | | (HELB) | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "During performance of monthly equipment walkdowns, it was discovered that a | | door assumed to open as a vent path in the HELB analysis was jammed closed. | | The door is one of two doors in a double door assembly. The analysis | | assumes that both doors open in order for room pressurization to meet the | | acceptance criteria for the structural analysis of the design basis HELB. | | The door was returned to an operable configuration. The door was disabled | | for 20 minutes from the time of discovery." | | | | The length of time the door was in this configuration prior to discovery is | | not currently known. The units are not in any limiting conditions for | | operation as a result of this issue. | | | | The door involved is door #182. It is an Auxiliary Building door on the | | 735' level, and it goes to the Fuel Handling Area which is part of a special | | vent zone. It is also an HELB analysis door. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | | | | *** RETRACTION 1617 EDT on 9/3/99 FROM ANDREWS TO POERTNER *** | | | | Subsequent analysis and testing has demonstrated that the door would have | | opened as necessary and this event notification is therefore retracted. | | | | The NRC resident inspector will be notified. | | | | Notified R3DO (HILLS). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36018 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:46[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 08/10/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:00[EDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/04/1999| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE BURGESS R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM McCLEERY | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FAILURE OF 13 HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER SPRINKLER SYSTEMS TO MEET SYSTEM | | OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS (24-Hour Report) | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth: | | | | "On 08/10/99 at approximately 1600 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent | | (PSS) was notified that 13 sprinkler systems associated with the High | | Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) system were not capable of meeting system | | operability requirements. This condition was discovered as a result of an | | engineering review of individual sprinkler heads that had previously been | | identified as exhibiting corrosion around the valve seat. The engineering | | review was conducted following the discovery that similar corrosion problems | | experienced at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant resulted in sprinkler | | heads being unable to actuate at normal pressure. An initial screening of | | PORTS sprinkler heads known to exhibit corrosion was conducted, and systems | | where the potential for two or more adjacent heads to be corroded were | | inspected. This identified 11 systems in the X-333 and 2 systems in the | | X-326 that did not meet the sprinkler system operability requirement that no | | two adjacent sprinkler heads be inoperable." | | | | "The PSS declared the affected sprinkler systems inoperable, and TSR | | required actions were completed. Further inspections of sprinkler systems | | are planned. This report will be updated if additional sprinkler systems | | are determined to be inoperable." | | | | "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or | | radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this | | event." | | | | Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the | | onsite Department of Energy representative. | | | | *** UPDATE ON 08/19/99 AT 2327 FROM HALCOMB TO POERTNER *** | | | | During continuing walkdowns, HPFW system #398 was discovered with two or | | more (3) adjacent sprinkler heads with mineral deposits. This HPFW | | sprinkler was declared inoperable at 1038 hours and was repaired at 1407 | | hours. | | | | Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1415 EDT ON 08/28/99 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO S. SANDIN * * * | | | | The following information was provided as an update to this report: | | | | "During continuing walk downs of the HPFW system, systems 194, 196, 197, | | 211, [and] 212 were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable | | to meet system operability. Systems were made inoperable at 1452 on | | 08/27/99. All sprinklers were repaired and system operability made at 0550 | | [on] 08/26/99." | | | | Portsmouth personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC | | operations officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 2337 ON 08/30/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "During continuing walkdowns of the HPFW system, seven additional systems | | were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable to meet system | | operability. Six systems were in the X-333 and one in the X-330. These | | systems were made inoperable starting at 1100 [on] 08/30/99 and repairs are | | being performed at this time." | | | | The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Piccone). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 2305 ON 08/31/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "Add seven HPFW systems from X-333 building." | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth | | personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO | | (Pierson). | | | | * * * UPDATE 0047 ON 09/02/99 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO FANGIE JONES * * * | | | | "Add fourteen HPFW systems from X-333 building." | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth | | personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO | | (Pierson). | | | | *** UPDATE 1438 EDT ON 09/03/99 FROM WILLIAMSON TO POERTNER *** | | | | "Add 5 HPFW systems from the X-333 and X-330 building." | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth | | personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO | | (Hickey). | | | | ******************** UPDATE AT 0439 ON 09/03/99 FROM JEFF CASTLE TO TROCINE | | ******************** | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth: | | | | "[The] X-326, X-330, [and] X-333 HPFW sprinkler systems [were] all declared | | inoperable based on [the] number of corroded sprinkler heads being | | identified during ongoing building walkdowns." | | | | It was stated that the actions of the Technical Safety Requirement are being | | met. These actions include smoke watch tours every 4 hours and controls on | | hot work in the area. | | | | Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and Department of | | Energy site representative. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO | | (Hills and Madera) and NMSS EO (Pierson). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Hospital |Event Number: 36025 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999| |LICENSEE: SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:11[EDT]| | CITY: NORFOLK REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 08/06/1999| | COUNTY: STATE: VA |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]| |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |HAROLD GRAY R1 | | |CHARLES OGLE R2 | +------------------------------------------------+BRUCE BURGESS R3 | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DOUGLAS BEATTY, RSO |DALE POWERS R4 | | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE |JOHN HICKEY NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+KEVIN RAMSEY (fax) NMSS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i) DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PART 21 REPORT - DEFECT IN A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPHY UNIT | | | | DOUGLAS BEATTY, RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER, THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED | | IN KANATA, ONTARIO, CANADA, REPORTED THAT ON 08/06/99, AN Ir-192 SOURCE | | CABLE ON A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPY UNIT, MODEL #12i, SERIAL #709, LOCATED AT | | SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL IN NORFOLK, VA, FAILED TO RETRACT TO ITS SHIELDED | | POSITION. THE SOURCE WAS MANUALLY RETURNED TO ITS SHIELDED POSITION BY A | | THERATRONICS SERVICE TECHNICIAN ON 08/06/99. | | | | THE LICENSEE IS PERFORMING AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE | | DEFECT AND PLANS TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE NRC. | | | | NOTE: REFER TO RELATED EVENT #35998. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1614 ON 08/13/99 BY JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | On 08/12/99, MDS Nordion, Kanata, Ontario, Canada, the parent company of | | Theratronics International Limited, issued GammaMed User Bulletin #GMUB | | 99-01 as follows: | | | | Subject: Notice of Incident - GammaMed High Dose Remote (HDR) Afterloader | | Units | | | | Units Affected: GammaMed Models 12i and 12it HDR Afterloader Units operating | | in the United States and Canada. | | | | We have recently been notified of four incidents involving GammaMed HDR | | Afterloader Units in which the source cable became separated from the | | driving mechanism. In each of these incidents, the source remained in an | | exposed position, and required intervention to place the source into a | | shielded position. | | | | We have investigated these incidents, and have concluded that the cause is | | attributable to a specific lot of cable used by the source manufacturer in | | the production of these sources. These sources have been installed only in | | the United States and Canada. | | | | We strongly recommend that your institution suspend use of your GammaMed | | Models 12i and 12it HDR Afterloader Unit until the source is replaced. We | | are presently working with the source manufacturer to expedite replacement | | of these sources. A representative of our service department will contact | | you shortly to schedule a date for replacement of the source in your | | GammaMed Unit. | | | | We, at MDS Nordion, believe that safety of the patient and hospital | | personnel is of the utmost importance. We will strive to correct this | | situation as soon as possible. | | | | For further information, please contact Dave Marquez, Manager, Installation | | and Service, MDS Nordion. | | | | Note: Refer to Event #36027 for a related event. | | | | *** UPDATE AT 1600 EDT on 9/3/99 BY POERTNER *** | | | | Theratronics International Limited submitted a 30 day report of notification | | of defect to the NRC regarding the source cable wires used in GammaMed | | brachytherapy High Dose Rate Afterloader devices. | | | | Notified NMSS (PIERSON) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36079 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/27/1999| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:48[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 08/27/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 06:00[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVE WALSH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KATHLEEN MODES R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DEGRADATION (ONLY ONE OF FOUR PUMPS | | OPERABLE) | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "On 08/26/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at 100% power | | with the 'B' loop of emergency service water [(ESW)] out of service for | | scheduled maintenance. During testing on the ESW system, with all ESW pumps | | in service, it was identified that the 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps' discharge | | check valves were closed. The ESW flow surveillance was performed, and the | | 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps failed to achieve the required flow and were declared | | inoperable. Concurrently, the 'B' loop of ESW was returned to service. | | During the time the 'B' ESW loop was inoperable, the 'A' ESW pump was the | | only one operable ESW pump. This constitutes a serious degradation of the | | plant in that it is a condition which is outside of design basis and, | | therefore, reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) requiring a 1-hour ENS | | notification." | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | | | | * * * UPDATE 1453EDT ON 9/3/99 FROM GRANT FERNSLER TO S. SANDIN * * * | | | | "This Notification is a retraction of a previous ENS Notification made | | 8/27/99 (Event # 36079)." | | | | "Subsequent evaluation by Engineering has concluded that the plant had at | | least two Emergency Service | | Water pumps capable of performing their specified safety function at all | | times. As such, the plant was not | | in a condition outside of its design basis and the report previously made | | pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii) | | is hereby retracted." | | | | The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Rogge). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 36088 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: STATE OF MISSISSIPPI |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/30/1999| |LICENSEE: BOND PAVING COMPANY, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:09[EDT]| | CITY: GULFPORT REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 08/30/1999| | COUNTY: STATE: MS |EVENT TIME: 08:00[CDT]| |LICENSE#: MS638-01 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |SCOTT SPARKS R2 | | |JOHN HICKEY NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT NELSON | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF A TROXLER GAUGE STOLEN FROM BOND PAVING COMPANY, | | INC., LOCATED IN GULFPORT, MISSISSIPPI | | | | At approximately 0800 CDT on 08/30/99, Bond Paving Company, Inc. (located in | | Gulfport, Mississippi) notified the State of Mississippi, Division of | | Radiological Health, of a stolen Troxler gauge. Apparently, the gauge | | (which was inside its storage container) was stolen some time over the | | weekend along with a truck and some computer equipment. The gauge (model | | number 3440, serial number 28210) contained 8 mCi of cesium-137 (serial | | number 750-2160) and 40 mCi of americium-241/beryllium (serial number | | 47-2489). | | | | The licensee notified the local police department. | | | | (Call the NRC operations officer for a state contact telephone number and | | the address of the licensee.) | | | | *** UPDATE FROM NELSON TO POERTNER AT 1436 EDT ON 9/3/99 *** | | | | Troxler gauge was found approximately 1/2 mile from the location from which | | it was stolen. | | | | NOTIFIED R2DO (LANDIS), NMSS (HICKEY). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36104 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/31/1999| | UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:01[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/31/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:30[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DENNIS CORNAX |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/04/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN ROGGE R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: |ED GOODWIN NRR | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |FRANK CONGEL IRO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP WITH COMPLICATIONS | | | | An automatic reactor trip/turbine trip occurred due to an overtemperature | | differential temperature (OTdT) trip signal. The licensee was replacing | | Channel 3 pressurizer low pressure trip bistables when a spurious OTdT trip | | signal occurred on Channel 4, completing the 2/4 logic. Following the trip, | | control rod K-2 of Control Bank D had an indicated position of 14.4 steps | | out from fully inserted. All other control rods are fully inserted. | | | | Following the trip, 480 VAC bus 6A received an undervoltage trip signal, | | causing buses 2A, 3A, 5A, and 6A to transfer to their associated emergency | | diesel generators (EDGs) (22, 21, and 23, respectively). Buses 2A, 3A, and | | 5A are currently being supplied by the EDGs; however, the output breaker for | | EDG 23 tripped upon loading to bus 6A, which remains deenergized. Operators | | manually started the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump due to the loss | | of control power to one of the motor driven AFW pumps caused by the loss of | | bus 6A. | | | | The unit is currently stable in hot standby. The licensee is currently | | troubleshooting bus 6A in anticipation of restoring power. The NRC resident | | inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. | | | | HOO Note: See Event #36107. | | | | *** UPDATE 1415 EDT ON 9/4/99 FROM SANTINI TO POERTNER *** | | | | Following the reactor trip on 8/31/99 and subsequent loss of power to 480v | | bus 6A, Technical Specification 3.0.1 had been entered since safeguards bus | | 6A was de-energized and the RCS temperature was greater than 350 degrees | | Fahrenheit (degf). During the trouble shooting phase of this event, 23 | | Service Water Pump (SWP) on the essential SW header was tagged out. 21 and | | 22 essential header SWPs were operable. This resulted in a period of time | | of approximately 15 hours (1430 on 8/31 to approximately 0530 on 9/1) where | | 23 SWP was inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.F.1.b specifies | | that one essential service water pump may be inoperable for a period not to | | exceed 12 hours. Following the allowable period of 12 hours, 6 hours are | | allowed to place the plant in hot shutdown and following the 6 hours to hot | | shutdown, the plant shall be cooled below 350 degf using normal operating | | procedures. The 15 hours during which the 23 SWP was inoperable exceeded | | the 12 hour time limit. Since the plant was already in hot shutdown due to | | a reactor trip, the 6 hour time period to reach hot shutdown was not | | applicable. The plant cool down to less than 350 degf started at 0430 on | | 9/1/99. However, since TS 3.3.F.1.b specifies 12 hours and then a cool down | | to less than 350 degf for this circumstance, it is more restrictive and | | requires that the cool down should have started 2 hours earlier at 0230 on | | 9/1/99. | | | | The NRC resident will be notified. Notified R1DO (ROGGE). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36114 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: LASALLE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:21[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 09/02/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:36[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: D. COVEYOU |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAVID HILLS R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 A/R Y 93 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | RPS ACTUATION - REACTOR SCRAM | | | | At 1036 CDT on 9/2/99, Unit 1 received an RPS Automatic Actuation. The | | actuation occurred due to low water level (12.5 inches, Level 3) resulting | | from a feedwater transient. The lowest level noted was -10 inches on the | | wide range recorders. No ECCS actuations occurred or were required during | | the transient. All systems operated as designed except as described below: | | During the auxiliary power fast bus transfer the Unit 1 station air | | compressor surged and was subsequently restored, the 0C clean condensate | | pump tripped and the 0A clean condensate pump was started, the 1A and 1C | | circulating water pumps tripped, the 1B circulating water pump remained | | running, actions are being taken to restart the 1A circulating water pump | | and a delay is being encountered restoring the 345 kV ring bus due to | | difficulties in opening the main power transformer disconnects. | | | | All rods inserted and no safety relief valves lifted. | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been notified. | | | | *** UPDATE 1610 EDT on 9/3/99 FROM COVEYOU TO POERTNER *** | | | | The 1A and 1C circulation water pump trips are understood and restoration is | | in progress. The Main Power Transformer disconnects have been | | adjusted/repaired and the 345 kV ring bus was restored at 1005 CDT September | | 3, 1999. The root cause for the event was a personnel error. A non-licensed | | operator inappropriately restored the feedwater hydraulic control oil switch | | alignment to normal for the inservice loop, resulting in the feedwater | | transient that caused the low-level scram. Corrective actions are in | | progress and will be included in the 30 day written License Event Report per | | 10CFR50.73. Preparations are being made for Unit 1 start up late today, | | September 3, 1999. | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been notified. | | | | Notified R3DO (HILLS). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 36121 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999| |LICENSEE: USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:51[EDT]| | CITY: ELGIN AF BASE REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 08/06/1999| | COUNTY: STATE: FL |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]| |LICENSE#: 42-23539-01AF AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |KERRY LANDIS R2 | | |CHARLES CAIN R4 | +------------------------------------------------+JOHN HICKEY NMSS | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JULIE COLEMAN | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TWO SEALED SOURCES CONTAINING LESS THAN 4 MICROCURIES EACH OF AMERICIUM-241 | | MISSING | | | | On 6 August 1999 at 1200 EST, Eglin AFB, FL notified Air Force Medical | | Operations Agency/Office of the Surgeon General (AFMOA/SGOR) of the | | suspected loss of a Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night | | (LANTIRN) target pod. The LANTIRN pod contains two sealed sources with less | | than 4 microcuries of Americium-241 each. This was reported under an | | incident report on the Loss of USAF Radioactive Material under Florida | | Permit # FL-30314-02/00AFP. | | | | The Laser Transmitter (LTR) is a removable subassembly housed in a nose | | assembly; internally contains the permitted radioactive source (Americium); | | when installed, it is completely covered by an access panel. The next | | higher assembly is the Nose Equipment Support Assembly (NESA), which is the | | forward section of a LANTIRN targeting pod. | | | | A NESA was shipped to a contractor owned depot for testing and upon arrival | | it was determined that the LTR was missing. It was not physically checked | | installed before it was shipped as the access panel was not removed. The | | LTR that was supposed to be in the NESA shipped was found installed in a | | different NESA. Further investigation determined that there was a different | | LTR actually unaccounted for. | | | | The last known time that the missing LTR was accounted for was in the June | | 1999, semi-annual inventory. A search was conducted, including tracking | | down all NESAs that had been shipped to depot for repair. The LTR is | | unaccounted for and it has been flagged by depot in the supply system. If | | it turns up, it will be returned to the proper site. | | | | Corrective actions have been implemented to prevent reoccurrence of a loss | | of control including an itemized checklist to ensure a LTR is not installed | | in a NESA prior to shipment, monthly inventories versus semi-annual, and all | | LTR transactions are recorded in the Americium inventory. | | | | A copy of the report was sent to NRC Region 4 (Gains). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 36122 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: FOXBORO COMPANY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999| |LICENSEE: FOXBORO COMPANY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:00[EDT]| | CITY: FOXBORO REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 09/03/1999| | COUNTY: STATE: MA |EVENT TIME: [EDT]| |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |VERN HODGE (FAX) NRR | | |TAD MARSH NRR | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: GEORGE JOHNSON | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DEFECTIVE RELAYS PROVIDED TO FOXBORO BY VENDOR | | | | Foxboro Co., has identified a potential failure with N-2A0-L2C-R and/or | | 2A0-L2C-R Contact Output Isolator cards. The subject cards may contain | | N0152CK relays supplied by Communications Instruments Inc. which may have | | been manufactured utilizing a repair residual on the contact armature plate. | | As a result, relays utilizing this repair residual have contacts that may | | not return to their normal de-energized position when the relay is | | de-energized (a condition known as contact hang-up). | | | | Extensive analysis performed on a number of relays confirmed that | | utilization of this repair residual prevented the return of the contact | | armature (and contacts) to the normally de-energized position when the relay | | coil was de-energized after an energization period of at least one hour. | | Further analysis performed by the supplier of the relay confirmed the | | presence of this repair residual as the root cause for the relay failures. | | The supplier has determined that during assembly of the relays, this | | unauthorized repair procedure may have been utilized on 5 to 6 percent of | | the relays manufactured since manufacturing week 9834. Utilization of the | | repair residual has been halted by the manufacturer of the relay. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 36123 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA INC |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999| |LICENSEE: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:25[EDT]| | CITY: BURLINGTON REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 09/03/1999| | COUNTY: STATE: MA |EVENT TIME: [EDT]| |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) NMSS | | |ROBERT PIERSON NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: CATHLEEN ROUGHAN (FAX) | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AEA TECHNOLOGY MODEL 770 AND 771 TYPE B(U) RADIOISOTOPE TRANSPORT PACKAGES | | FAIL 30 FOOT DROP TEST AND SUBSEQUENT PUNCTURE TEST. | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from AEA | | Technology: | | | | "AEA Technology QSA Inc. is making an initial 2 day report under 10 CFR | | 21.21 for the Model 770 and | | 771 Type B(U) radioisotope transport packages for industrial radiography | | sources. The Model 771 is | | authorized for the transport of 110 Curies of Co-60 and the model 770 is | | authorized for 500 Curies of Co-60, (Certificate of Compliance number 9148 | | and 9107 respectively)." | | | | Background | | | | "In accordance with NRC bulletin 97-02, AEA Technology is in the process of | | re-testing Type B packages. | | As part of the re-testing effort we performed a thirty foot drop and | | subsequent puncture test on the model | | 770 in accordance with approved Test Plan 88." | | | | "In the course of performing the 30 foot drop on a model 770 package, the | | carbon steel bolts securing the shipping plate were sheared off resulting in | | the plate coming off. With the shipping plate off, the puncture test was | | performed by targeting the lock assembly. As a result of this impact, the | | lock assembly bolts sheared off, causing the lock assembly to become | | detached and losing security of the source assembly. These test[s] were | | performed with the test unit at 70 Celsius." | | | | "The model 771 is identical in construction to the model 770, the most | | significant difference is the weight of the shield. Therefore, we believe we | | would see the same failure with the 771. There is one model 770 package and | | five model 771 packages." | | | | Discussion | | | | "An internal evaluation was performed and determined that the failure | | occurred due to the following:" | | | | "-The shipping plate fits into a boss over the lock assembly. There is a gap | | of approximately 1/2 inch between the shipping plate and the boss. The bolt | | hole through the shipping plate leaves approximately 1/32 inch clearance. | | As a result of the 30 foot drop test, the plate moved and sheared the bolts | | before contacting the boss. This caused the plate to be detached from the | | package." | | | | "-In the subsequent puncture test, the steel billet impacted the locking | | assembly and caused the four bolts holding the lock assembly on to break. In | | addition two of the bolts securing the lock plate to the device were broken | | off." | | | | "-As a result of this cumulative damage the lock assembly was detached from | | the device, allowing the source to move outward and become unsecured." | | | | "As the mechanism for retaining the source was removed from the device, it | | was concluded that source securement was lost and could potentially result | | in radiation levels exceeding 1R/hour at one meter from the package creating | | a substantial safety hazard." | | | | Corrective Actions | | | | "We are evaluating potential changes to the package to minimize movement of | | the plate during impact such that it does not contact the bolts securing the | | plate to the package, prior to hitting the boss. As long as the plate | | remains attached to the package, a subsequent puncture test will not be able | | to impact on the locking assembly. Securing hardware and the shipping plates | | will also be upgraded to stainless steel." | | | | Justification for Continued Use | | | | "We do not believe there is any significant increase in risk to the general | | public as a result of this finding. This is based on the following:" | | | | "-The 770 and 771 have been in use for more than 20 years (approximately 500 | | shipments) with no failures. There have been numerous occasions of these | | packages being impacted from forklifts etc, with no loss of structural or | | shielding integrity." | | | | "-All of the 770 and 771 are owned by AEA Technology, QSA Inc. and as such | | are subjected to a routine quality control inspection prior to each | | shipment. This ensures that the packages are in good physical condition | | prior to transport." | | | | "-The damage only occurred after a worst case orientation as described in | | Test Plan 88 and the subsequent puncture test. This specific set of | | conditions is extremely unlikely in real field use conditions." | | | | "-All the normal conditions of transport were satisfactorily tested and | | met." | | | | "Based on all of the above, we believe there is no increased risk in | | continuing the transport of these devices. We will be making the appropriate | | changes to the package and retest to demonstrate that the package will meet | | all of the Type B(U) package requirements. As stated earlier, AEA Technology | | owns all of these packages and can perform the required upgrade prior to | | shipment, once the changes are tested and approved." | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36124 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: WASHINGTON NUCLEAR REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999| | UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:39[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 09/03/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:39[PDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL KELLER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PHIL HARRELL R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |2 N Y 78 Power Operation |78 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Safeguards system degradation related to detection, immediate compensatory | | measures were not taken upon discovery, but was taken in a relatively short | | period of time. The NRC resident inspector will be notified. | | | | Refer to the HOO Log for additional details. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 36125 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999| |LICENSEE: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:22[EDT]| | CITY: REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/03/1999| | COUNTY: STATE: UT |EVENT TIME: [MDT]| |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |PHIL HARRELL R4 | | |ROBERT PIERSON NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JULIE FELICE | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LEAKING DETECTOR CELL | | | | Utah State University received a package from Shimadzu Scientific | | Instruments containing a detector cell. The licensee performed a wipe test | | on the cell after receipt. Initial survey results were acceptable but | | elevated. Subsequent wipe tests indicated greater than .005 microcuries. | | The detector cell contained 10 millicuries of Nickel - 63. The detector | | cell was repackaged and returned to the manufacturer. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36126 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: GRAND GULF REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:42[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 09/03/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:12[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARTY MCADORY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/04/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PHIL HARRELL R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE SPILL | | | | While transporting a 400-gallon container of sodium hypochlorite, the | | container was dropped off the forklift. Approximately 325 gallons was | | spilled in the parking lot south west of the plant. The spill was contained | | with none reaching any waterways. The solution is 12% sodium hypochlorite. | | The Hazmat Incident Commander was dispatched; and the chemistry, | | environmental, safety, and plant services departments were notified. The | | National Response Center has been notified. Mississippi Department of | | Environmental Quality, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and | | Claiborne County Emergency Planning District will be notified. A contractor | | has been contacted to clean up the spill and should arrive at midnight on | | 09/03/99. Oxygen and chlorine samples are being taken. No oxygen | | deficiencies or atmospheric chlorine has been observed. | | | | The NRC resident inspector will be notified by the licensee. | | | | ****************** UPDATE AT 0532 EDT ON 09/04/99 FROM MARTY McADORY TO | | TROCINE ****************** | | | | The licensee stated that the contractor arrived and is currently in the | | final stages of cleanup operations. | | | | The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations | | officer notified the R4DO (Harrell). | | | | ****************** UPDATE AT 0629 EDT ON 09/04/99 FROM MARTY McADORY TO | | TROCINE ****************** | | | | The control room was recently notified that the cleanup operations have been | | completed. It is estimated that approximately 15 cubic yards of material | | was placed in one roll-off dumpster by the contractor. | | | | The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations | | officer notified the R4DO (Harrell). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36127 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: NORTH ANNA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/04/1999| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:53[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/04/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:00[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: VICKY HARTE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/04/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N Y 88 Power Operation |88 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DEGRADED SAFEGUARDS AREA EXHAUST SYSTEM DUE TO MISSING DAMPER SEALS. | | | | On 9/4/99, at 1600, it was discovered that a damper associated with the | | Auxiliary Building General Exhaust Ventilation System was degraded due to | | missing damper seals. This damper is located on the inlet of the Auxiliary | | Building Charcoal Filter Bank which is a common filter used to filter | | various area exhaust streams when required. The Safeguards Area Exhaust | | system automatically aligns to the common filter bank on a Containment | | Depressurization Actuation System signal to ensure filtration of any ECCS | | and ESF component leakage in the Safeguards Area atmosphere that may develop | | from a Large Break LOCA. The degraded damper in the Auxiliary Building | | General Area Exhaust System had the potential to cause a flow path that | | could have resulted in a portion of the Safeguards Area Exhaust flow to | | bypass the Charcoal Filter prior to release to the Environment. The | | potential bypass flow path would still be monitored by the Radiation | | Monitoring System. The area can be manually aligned to the charcoal filters. | | The bypass flow path would be considered a degradation of the Ventilation | | System to the extent that the fulfillment of the safety function of the | | Safeguards Area Exhaust System may have been adversely affected. Action | | taken during the troubleshooting of ventilation flow eliminated the bypass | | flow path. Administrative controls have been established to prevent | | unfiltered release of the Safeguards Area Exhaust System during accident | | conditions. | | | | Maintenance is in progress to repair the damper. | | | | The NRC resident has been notified. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36128 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/05/1999| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:03[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/05/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:00[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE BRINKMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/05/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN ROGGE R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N Y 85 Power Operation |84 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO HIGH ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TEMPERATURES | | | | The unit's ultimate heat sink is Long Island Sound, and the technical | | specifications require the licensee to monitor service water temperatures | | every 6 hours. The licensee monitors these temperatures every 3 hours. The | | 0600 reading taken in a switchgear cooling room (the hottest point) | | indicated a service water temperature of 77�F, which was 2�F above the | | ultimate heat sink limit specified in the technical specifications. As a | | result, an investigation was initiated to determine whether or not this was | | an instrument problem. Temperatures measured at the intake structure (in | | the bay) remained in the low 70s. At 0700, the licensee determined that the | | high service water temperature readings were not an instrument problem, and | | a technical specification required shutdown was initiated at 0710. (With | | the ultimate heat sink inoperable, Technical Specification 3.7.11 required | | the unit to be placed in Hot Standby within 6 hours or Cold Shutdown within | | 30 hours.) Service water temperature was under 75�F at 0721, and the | | technical specification required shutdown was exited. | | | | The licensee stated that the affect on the plant was negligible. Current | | weather conditions are hot and humid, and it is expected to cloud up this | | afternoon. The cause of the high service water temperature readings is | | currently under investigation. | | | | Prior to discovery of this issue, the licensee was holding the unit at 85% | | power to clean mussels out of the circulating water bays. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the applicable state | | and local officials. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36129 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/1999| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:25[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 09/06/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:00[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE MERRILL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/06/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PLANNED OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF A DEAD SEA TURTLE IN THE | | INTAKE CANAL | | | | At 0200, the licensee recovered a dead sea turtle from the plant's intake | | canal. In accordance with the licensee's marine turtle permit, the land | | utilization department plans to notify the Department of Environmental | | Protection's Bureau of Protected Species within 12 hours. | | | | The licensee also plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36130 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: TURKEY POINT REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/1999| | UNIT: [3] [4] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:25[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/06/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:35[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: SAM SHAFER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/06/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |4 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY DUE TO POWER LINE BLOCKING MAIN PLANT | | ACCESS. | | | | "LOSS OF OFFSITE RESPONSE CAPABILITY. REPORTS RECEIVED OF ENERGIZED POWER | | LINE FELL ACROSS MAIN PLANT ACCESS ROAD TO PLANT SITE. PLANT ACCESS | | RESTORED AT 1820 EDT ON 9/6/99." | | | | THE CONTROL ROOM WAS NOTIFIED AT 1735 EDT OF THE LINE BLOCKING ACCESS TO THE | | SITE. TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION (T&D) REPORTED THAT THE FELLED LINE WAS | | REMOVED AT 1820 EDT. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36131 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:08[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/06/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:22[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MATTHEW MORGAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/06/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN ROGGE R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNIT 1 WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FROM 100% POWER AFTER RECEIVING MAIN GENERATOR | | FIELD ALARMS | | | | "BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION (BVPS) UNIT ONE PERFORMED A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP | | DUE TO RECEIVING MAIN GENERATOR FIELD ALARMS. MAIN GENERATOR POWER FACTOR | | WAS OBSERVED TO BE SWINGING PRIOR TO THE TRIP. | | | | "UNIT ONE IS CURRENTLY STABLE IN MODE 3. NO OTHER PROBLEMS OCCURRED DURING | | THE EVENT. THE AUXILIARY FEED PUMPS AUTOMATICALLY STARTED AS EXPECTED DUE | | TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL AFTER THE REACTOR TRIP. | | | | "THE CAUSE OF THE MAIN GENERATOR PROBLEM IS NOT YET KNOWN. AN EVENT | | RESPONSE TEAM IS BEING FORMED TO INVESTIGATE THE PROBLEM." | | | | ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED FOLLOWING THE REACTOR TRIP. NO PRIMARY OR | | SECONDARY SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVES LIFTED. UNIT 1 IS PRESENTLY STABLE IN | | MODE 3 WITH DECAY HEAT BEING REJECTED TO THE MAIN CONDENSER . THE UNIT 1 | | EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS ARE AVAILABLE IF NEEDED. PRELIMINARY INDICATION | | IS THAT THE MAIN GENERATOR EXCITER VOLTAGE MALFUNCTIONED. UNIT 2 WAS | | UNAFFECTED. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021