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Event Notification Report for September 7, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           09/03/1999 - 09/07/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36002  36018  36025  36079  36088  36104  36114  36121  36122  36123  36124  36125 
36126  36127  36128  36129  36130  36131  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36002       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND           REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/06/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:20[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        08/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRAD ELLISON                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/03/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MARK RING            R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF A DOOR CONFIGURATION THAT DID NOT MEET THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA  |
| FOR THE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN BASIS HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK       |
| (HELB)                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "During performance of monthly equipment walkdowns, it was discovered that a |
| door assumed to open as a vent path in the HELB analysis was jammed closed.  |
| The door is one of two doors in a double door assembly.  The analysis        |
| assumes that both doors open in order for room pressurization to meet the    |
| acceptance criteria for the structural analysis of the design basis HELB.    |
| The door was returned to an operable configuration.  The door was disabled   |
| for 20 minutes from the time of discovery."                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The length of time the door was in this configuration prior to discovery is  |
| not currently known.  The units are not in any limiting conditions for       |
| operation as a result of this issue.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The door involved is door #182.  It is an Auxiliary Building door on the     |
| 735' level, and it goes to the Fuel Handling Area which is part of a special |
| vent zone.  It is also an HELB analysis door.                                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| *** RETRACTION 1617 EDT on 9/3/99 FROM ANDREWS TO POERTNER ***               |
|                                                                              |
| Subsequent analysis and testing has demonstrated that the door would have    |
| opened as necessary and this event notification is therefore retracted.      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Notified R3DO (HILLS).                                                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36018       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:46[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        08/10/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:00[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/04/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JIM McCLEERY                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii)    EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE OF 13 HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER SPRINKLER SYSTEMS TO MEET SYSTEM      |
| OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS  (24-Hour Report)                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:     |
|                                                                              |
| "On 08/10/99 at approximately 1600 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent     |
| (PSS) was notified that 13 sprinkler systems associated with the High        |
| Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) system were not capable of meeting system         |
| operability requirements.  This condition was discovered as a result of an   |
| engineering review of individual sprinkler heads that had previously been    |
| identified as exhibiting corrosion around the valve seat.  The engineering   |
| review was conducted following the discovery that similar corrosion problems |
| experienced at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant resulted in sprinkler     |
| heads being unable to actuate at normal pressure.  An initial screening of   |
| PORTS sprinkler heads known to exhibit corrosion was conducted, and systems  |
| where the potential for two or more adjacent heads to be corroded were       |
| inspected.  This identified 11 systems in the X-333 and 2 systems in the     |
| X-326 that did not meet the sprinkler system operability requirement that no |
| two adjacent sprinkler heads be inoperable."                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "The PSS declared the affected sprinkler systems inoperable, and TSR         |
| required actions were completed.  Further inspections of sprinkler systems   |
| are planned.  This report will be updated if additional sprinkler systems    |
| are determined to be inoperable."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or                      |
| radioactive/radiological contamination  exposure as a result of this         |
| event."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the      |
| onsite Department of Energy representative.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE ON 08/19/99 AT 2327 FROM HALCOMB TO POERTNER ***                  |
|                                                                              |
| During continuing walkdowns, HPFW system #398 was discovered with two or     |
| more (3) adjacent sprinkler heads with mineral deposits.  This HPFW          |
| sprinkler was declared inoperable at 1038 hours and was repaired at 1407     |
| hours.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1415 EDT ON 08/28/99 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO S. SANDIN * * *    |
|                                                                              |
| The following information was provided as an update to this report:          |
|                                                                              |
| "During continuing walk downs of the HPFW system, systems 194, 196, 197,     |
| 211, [and] 212 were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable   |
| to meet system operability.  Systems were made inoperable at 1452 on         |
| 08/27/99.  All sprinklers were repaired and system operability made at 0550  |
| [on] 08/26/99."                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC           |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone).          |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2337 ON 08/30/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *     |
|                                                                              |
| "During continuing walkdowns of the HPFW system, seven additional systems    |
| were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable to meet system   |
| operability. Six systems were in the X-333 and one in the X-330. These       |
| systems were made inoperable starting at 1100 [on] 08/30/99 and repairs are  |
| being performed at this time."                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Piccone).  |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2305 ON 08/31/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *     |
|                                                                              |
| "Add seven HPFW systems from X-333 building."                                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth    |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO |
| (Pierson).                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 0047 ON 09/02/99 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO FANGIE JONES * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| "Add fourteen HPFW systems from X-333 building."                             |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth    |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO |
| (Pierson).                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE 1438 EDT ON 09/03/99 FROM WILLIAMSON TO POERTNER ***              |
|                                                                              |
| "Add 5 HPFW systems from the X-333 and X-330 building."                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth    |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO |
| (Hickey).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| ******************** UPDATE AT 0439 ON 09/03/99 FROM JEFF CASTLE TO TROCINE  |
| ********************                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:     |
|                                                                              |
| "[The] X-326, X-330, [and] X-333 HPFW sprinkler systems [were] all declared  |
| inoperable based on [the] number of corroded sprinkler heads being           |
| identified during ongoing building walkdowns."                               |
|                                                                              |
| It was stated that the actions of the Technical Safety Requirement are being |
| met.  These actions include smoke watch tours every 4 hours and controls on  |
| hot work in the area.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and Department of   |
| Energy site representative.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO    |
| (Hills and Madera) and NMSS EO (Pierson).                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Hospital                                         |Event Number:   36025       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999|
|LICENSEE:  SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:11[EDT]|
|    CITY:  NORFOLK                  REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        08/06/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  VA |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/03/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|                                                |CHARLES OGLE         R2      |
+------------------------------------------------+BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DOUGLAS BEATTY, RSO          |DALE POWERS          R4      |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+KEVIN RAMSEY (fax)   NMSS    |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i)      DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 REPORT - DEFECT IN A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPHY UNIT                    |
|                                                                              |
| DOUGLAS BEATTY, RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER, THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED |
| IN KANATA, ONTARIO, CANADA, REPORTED THAT ON 08/06/99, AN Ir-192 SOURCE      |
| CABLE ON A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPY UNIT, MODEL #12i, SERIAL #709, LOCATED AT  |
| SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL IN NORFOLK, VA, FAILED TO RETRACT TO ITS SHIELDED   |
| POSITION.  THE SOURCE WAS MANUALLY RETURNED TO ITS SHIELDED POSITION BY A    |
| THERATRONICS SERVICE TECHNICIAN ON 08/06/99.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE IS PERFORMING AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE    |
| DEFECT AND PLANS TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE NRC.                      |
|                                                                              |
| NOTE:  REFER TO RELATED EVENT #35998.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1614 ON 08/13/99 BY JOLLIFFE * * *                           |
|                                                                              |
| On 08/12/99, MDS Nordion, Kanata, Ontario, Canada, the parent company of     |
| Theratronics International Limited, issued GammaMed User Bulletin #GMUB      |
| 99-01 as follows:                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Subject: Notice of Incident - GammaMed High Dose Remote (HDR) Afterloader    |
| Units                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Units Affected: GammaMed Models 12i and 12it HDR Afterloader Units operating |
| in the United States and Canada.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| We have recently been notified of four incidents involving GammaMed HDR      |
| Afterloader Units in which the source cable became separated from the        |
| driving mechanism.  In each of these incidents, the source remained in an    |
| exposed position, and required intervention to place the source into a       |
| shielded position.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| We have investigated these incidents, and have concluded that the cause is   |
| attributable to a specific lot of cable used by the source manufacturer in   |
| the production of these sources.  These sources have been installed only in  |
| the United States and Canada.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| We strongly recommend that your institution suspend use of your GammaMed     |
| Models 12i and 12it HDR Afterloader Unit until the source is replaced.  We   |
| are presently working with the source manufacturer to expedite replacement   |
| of these sources.  A representative of our service department will contact   |
| you shortly to schedule a date for replacement of the source in your         |
| GammaMed Unit.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| We, at MDS Nordion, believe that safety of the patient and hospital          |
| personnel is of the utmost importance.  We will strive to correct this       |
| situation as soon as possible.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| For further information, please contact Dave Marquez, Manager, Installation  |
| and Service, MDS Nordion.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Note:  Refer to Event #36027 for a related event.                            |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE AT 1600 EDT on 9/3/99 BY POERTNER ***                             |
|                                                                              |
| Theratronics International Limited submitted a 30 day report of notification |
| of defect to the NRC regarding the source cable wires used in GammaMed       |
| brachytherapy High Dose Rate Afterloader devices.                            |
|                                                                              |
| Notified NMSS (PIERSON)                                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36079       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/27/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:48[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        08/27/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVE WALSH                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/03/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KATHLEEN MODES       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DEGRADATION (ONLY ONE OF FOUR PUMPS           |
| OPERABLE)                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "On 08/26/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at 100% power     |
| with the 'B' loop of emergency service water [(ESW)] out of service for      |
| scheduled maintenance.  During testing on the ESW system, with all ESW pumps |
| in service, it was identified that the 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps' discharge      |
| check valves were closed.  The ESW flow surveillance was performed, and the  |
| 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps failed to achieve the required flow and were declared  |
| inoperable.  Concurrently, the 'B' loop of ESW was returned to service.      |
| During the time the 'B' ESW loop was inoperable, the 'A' ESW pump was the    |
| only one operable ESW pump.  This constitutes a serious degradation of the   |
| plant in that it is a condition which is outside of design basis and,        |
| therefore, reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) requiring a 1-hour ENS    |
| notification."                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1453EDT ON 9/3/99 FROM GRANT FERNSLER TO S. SANDIN * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| "This Notification is a retraction of a previous ENS Notification made       |
| 8/27/99 (Event # 36079)."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Subsequent evaluation by Engineering has concluded that the plant had at    |
| least two Emergency Service                                                  |
| Water pumps capable of performing their specified safety function at all     |
| times.  As such, the plant was not                                           |
| in a condition outside of its design basis and the report previously made    |
| pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)                                             |
| is hereby retracted."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R1DO(Rogge).     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36088       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  STATE OF MISSISSIPPI                 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/30/1999|
|LICENSEE:  BOND PAVING COMPANY, INC.            |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:09[EDT]|
|    CITY:  GULFPORT                 REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        08/30/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MS |EVENT TIME:        08:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  MS638-01              AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/03/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |SCOTT SPARKS         R2      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT NELSON                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF A TROXLER GAUGE STOLEN FROM BOND PAVING COMPANY,   |
| INC., LOCATED IN GULFPORT, MISSISSIPPI                                       |
|                                                                              |
| At approximately 0800 CDT on 08/30/99, Bond Paving Company, Inc. (located in |
| Gulfport, Mississippi) notified the State of Mississippi, Division of        |
| Radiological Health, of a stolen Troxler gauge.  Apparently, the gauge       |
| (which was inside its storage container) was stolen some time over the       |
| weekend along with a truck and some computer equipment.  The gauge (model    |
| number 3440, serial number 28210) contained 8 mCi of cesium-137 (serial      |
| number 750-2160) and 40 mCi of americium-241/beryllium (serial number        |
| 47-2489).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the local police department.                           |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a state contact telephone number and    |
| the address of the licensee.)                                                |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE FROM NELSON TO POERTNER AT 1436 EDT ON 9/3/99 ***                 |
|                                                                              |
| Troxler gauge was found approximately 1/2 mile from the location from which  |
| it was stolen.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| NOTIFIED R2DO (LANDIS), NMSS (HICKEY).                                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36104       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/31/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:01[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        08/31/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DENNIS CORNAX                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/04/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN ROGGE           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |ED GOODWIN           NRR     |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP WITH COMPLICATIONS                                    |
|                                                                              |
| An automatic reactor trip/turbine trip occurred due to an overtemperature    |
| differential temperature (OTdT) trip signal. The licensee was replacing      |
| Channel 3 pressurizer low pressure trip bistables when a spurious OTdT trip  |
| signal occurred on Channel 4, completing the 2/4 logic. Following the trip,  |
| control rod K-2 of Control Bank D had an indicated position of 14.4 steps    |
| out from fully inserted. All other control rods are fully inserted.          |
|                                                                              |
| Following the trip, 480 VAC bus 6A received an undervoltage trip signal,     |
| causing buses 2A, 3A, 5A, and 6A to transfer to their associated emergency   |
| diesel generators (EDGs) (22, 21, and 23, respectively). Buses 2A, 3A, and   |
| 5A are currently being supplied by the EDGs; however, the output breaker for |
| EDG 23 tripped upon loading to bus 6A, which remains deenergized. Operators  |
| manually started the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump due to the loss |
| of control power to one of the motor driven AFW pumps caused by the loss of  |
| bus 6A.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The unit is currently stable in hot standby. The licensee is currently       |
| troubleshooting bus 6A in anticipation of restoring power. The NRC resident  |
| inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.                   |
|                                                                              |
| HOO Note:  See Event #36107.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE 1415 EDT ON 9/4/99 FROM SANTINI TO POERTNER ***                   |
|                                                                              |
| Following the reactor trip on 8/31/99 and subsequent loss of power to 480v   |
| bus 6A, Technical Specification 3.0.1 had been entered since safeguards bus  |
| 6A was de-energized and the RCS temperature was greater than 350 degrees     |
| Fahrenheit (degf).  During the trouble shooting phase of this event, 23      |
| Service Water Pump (SWP) on the essential SW header was tagged out.  21 and  |
| 22 essential header SWPs were operable.  This resulted in a period of time   |
| of approximately 15 hours (1430 on 8/31 to approximately 0530 on 9/1) where  |
| 23 SWP was inoperable.  Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.F.1.b specifies     |
| that one essential service water pump may be inoperable for a period not to  |
| exceed 12 hours.  Following the allowable period of 12 hours, 6 hours are    |
| allowed to place the plant in hot shutdown and following the 6 hours to hot  |
| shutdown, the plant shall be cooled below 350 degf using normal operating    |
| procedures.  The 15 hours during which the 23 SWP was inoperable exceeded    |
| the 12 hour time limit.  Since the plant was already in hot shutdown due to  |
| a reactor trip, the 6 hour time period to reach hot shutdown was not         |
| applicable.  The plant cool down to less than 350 degf started at 0430 on    |
| 9/1/99.  However, since TS 3.3.F.1.b specifies 12 hours and then a cool down |
| to less than 350 degf for this circumstance, it is more restrictive and      |
| requires that the cool down should have started 2 hours earlier at 0230 on   |
| 9/1/99.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident will be notified. Notified R1DO (ROGGE).                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36114       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:21[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        09/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:36[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  D. COVEYOU                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/03/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       93       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RPS ACTUATION - REACTOR SCRAM                                                |
|                                                                              |
| At 1036 CDT on 9/2/99, Unit 1 received an RPS Automatic Actuation.  The      |
| actuation occurred due to low water level (12.5 inches, Level 3) resulting   |
| from a feedwater transient.  The lowest level noted was -10 inches on the    |
| wide range recorders.  No ECCS actuations occurred or were required during   |
| the transient.  All systems operated as designed except as described below:  |
| During the auxiliary power fast bus transfer the Unit 1 station air          |
| compressor surged and was subsequently restored, the 0C clean condensate     |
| pump tripped and the 0A clean condensate pump was started, the 1A and 1C     |
| circulating water pumps tripped, the 1B circulating water pump remained      |
| running, actions are being taken to restart the 1A circulating water pump    |
| and a delay is being encountered restoring the 345 kV ring bus due to        |
| difficulties in opening the main power transformer disconnects.              |
|                                                                              |
| All rods inserted and no safety relief valves lifted.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified.                                |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE 1610 EDT on 9/3/99 FROM COVEYOU TO POERTNER ***                   |
|                                                                              |
| The 1A and 1C circulation water pump trips are understood and restoration is |
| in progress. The Main Power Transformer disconnects have been                |
| adjusted/repaired and the 345 kV ring bus was restored at 1005 CDT September |
| 3, 1999. The root cause for the event was a personnel error.  A non-licensed |
| operator inappropriately restored the feedwater hydraulic control oil switch |
| alignment to normal for the inservice loop, resulting in the feedwater       |
| transient that caused the low-level scram. Corrective actions are in         |
| progress and will be included in the 30 day written License Event Report per |
| 10CFR50.73.  Preparations are being made for Unit 1 start up late today,     |
| September 3, 1999.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified.                                |
|                                                                              |
| Notified R3DO (HILLS).                                                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   36121       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE          |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999|
|LICENSEE:  USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:51[EDT]|
|    CITY:  ELGIN AF BASE            REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        08/06/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  FL |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  42-23539-01AF         AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/03/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|                                                |CHARLES CAIN         R4      |
+------------------------------------------------+JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JULIE COLEMAN                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TWO SEALED SOURCES CONTAINING LESS THAN 4 MICROCURIES EACH OF AMERICIUM-241  |
| MISSING                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| On 6 August 1999 at 1200 EST, Eglin AFB, FL notified Air Force Medical       |
| Operations Agency/Office of the Surgeon General (AFMOA/SGOR) of the          |
| suspected loss of a Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night |
| (LANTIRN) target pod. The LANTIRN pod contains two sealed sources with less  |
| than 4 microcuries of Americium-241 each.  This was reported  under an       |
| incident report on the Loss of USAF Radioactive Material under Florida       |
| Permit # FL-30314-02/00AFP.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The Laser Transmitter (LTR) is a removable subassembly housed in a nose      |
| assembly; internally contains the permitted radioactive source (Americium);  |
| when installed, it is completely covered by an access panel.  The next       |
| higher assembly is the Nose Equipment Support Assembly (NESA), which is the  |
| forward section of a LANTIRN targeting pod.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| A NESA was shipped to a contractor owned depot for testing and upon arrival  |
| it was determined that the LTR was missing.  It was not physically checked   |
| installed before it was shipped as the access panel was not removed.  The    |
| LTR that was supposed to be in the NESA shipped was found installed in a     |
| different NESA.  Further investigation determined that there was a different |
| LTR actually unaccounted for.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The last known time that the missing LTR was accounted for was in the June   |
| 1999, semi-annual  inventory.  A search was conducted, including tracking    |
| down all NESAs that had been shipped to depot for repair.  The LTR is        |
| unaccounted for and it has been flagged by depot in the supply system.  If   |
| it turns up, it will be returned to the proper site.                         |
|                                                                              |
| Corrective actions have been implemented to prevent reoccurrence of a loss   |
| of control including an itemized checklist to ensure a LTR is not installed  |
| in a NESA prior to shipment, monthly inventories versus semi-annual, and all |
| LTR transactions are recorded in the Americium inventory.                    |
|                                                                              |
| A copy of the report was sent to NRC Region 4 (Gains).                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36122       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  FOXBORO COMPANY                      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999|
|LICENSEE:  FOXBORO COMPANY                      |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:00[EDT]|
|    CITY:  FOXBORO                  REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        09/03/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MA |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/03/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |VERN HODGE (FAX)     NRR     |
|                                                |TAD MARSH            NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GEORGE JOHNSON               |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DEFECTIVE RELAYS  PROVIDED TO FOXBORO BY VENDOR                              |
|                                                                              |
| Foxboro Co., has identified a potential failure with N-2A0-L2C-R and/or      |
| 2A0-L2C-R Contact Output Isolator cards.  The subject cards may contain      |
| N0152CK relays supplied by Communications Instruments Inc. which may have    |
| been manufactured utilizing a repair residual on the contact armature plate. |
| As a result, relays utilizing this repair residual have contacts that may    |
| not return to their normal de-energized position when the relay is           |
| de-energized (a condition known as contact hang-up).                         |
|                                                                              |
| Extensive analysis performed on a number of relays confirmed that            |
| utilization of this repair residual prevented the return of the contact      |
| armature (and contacts) to the normally de-energized position when the relay |
| coil was de-energized after an energization period of at least one hour.     |
| Further analysis performed by the supplier of the relay confirmed the        |
| presence of this repair residual as the root cause for the relay failures.   |
| The supplier has determined that during assembly of the relays, this         |
| unauthorized repair procedure may have been utilized on 5 to 6 percent of    |
| the relays manufactured since manufacturing week 9834.  Utilization of the   |
| repair residual has been halted by the manufacturer of the relay.            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36123       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA INC               |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999|
|LICENSEE:  AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA INC               |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:25[EDT]|
|    CITY:  BURLINGTON               REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        09/03/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MA |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/03/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX)   NMSS    |
|                                                |ROBERT PIERSON       NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CATHLEEN ROUGHAN (FAX)       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AEA TECHNOLOGY MODEL 770 AND 771 TYPE B(U) RADIOISOTOPE TRANSPORT PACKAGES   |
| FAIL 30 FOOT DROP TEST AND SUBSEQUENT PUNCTURE TEST.                         |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from AEA             |
| Technology:                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "AEA Technology QSA Inc. is making an initial 2 day report under 10 CFR      |
| 21.21 for the Model 770 and                                                  |
| 771 Type B(U) radioisotope transport packages for industrial radiography     |
| sources. The Model 771 is                                                    |
| authorized for the transport of 110 Curies of Co-60 and the model 770 is     |
| authorized for 500 Curies of Co-60, (Certificate of Compliance number 9148   |
| and 9107 respectively)."                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Background                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "In accordance with NRC bulletin 97-02, AEA Technology is in the process of  |
| re-testing Type B packages.                                                  |
| As part of the re-testing effort we performed a thirty foot drop and         |
| subsequent puncture test on the model                                        |
| 770 in accordance with approved Test Plan 88."                               |
|                                                                              |
| "In the course of performing the 30 foot drop on a model 770 package, the    |
| carbon steel bolts securing the shipping plate were sheared off resulting in |
| the plate coming off. With the shipping plate off, the puncture test was     |
| performed by targeting the lock assembly. As a result of this impact, the    |
| lock assembly bolts sheared off, causing the lock assembly to become         |
| detached and losing security of the source assembly. These test[s] were      |
| performed with the test unit at 70 Celsius."                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "The model 771 is identical in construction to the model 770, the most       |
| significant difference is the weight of the shield. Therefore, we believe we |
| would see the same failure with the 771. There is one model 770 package and  |
| five model 771 packages."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Discussion                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "An internal evaluation was performed and determined that the failure        |
| occurred due to the following:"                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "-The shipping plate fits into a boss over the lock assembly. There is a gap |
| of approximately 1/2 inch between the shipping plate and the boss. The bolt  |
| hole through the shipping plate leaves approximately 1/32 inch clearance.    |
| As a result of the 30 foot drop test, the plate moved and sheared the bolts  |
| before contacting the boss. This caused the plate to be detached from the    |
| package."                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "-In the subsequent puncture test, the steel billet impacted the locking     |
| assembly and caused the four bolts holding the lock assembly on to break. In |
| addition two of the bolts securing the lock plate to the device were broken  |
| off."                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "-As a result of this cumulative damage the lock assembly was detached from  |
| the device, allowing the source to move outward and become unsecured."       |
|                                                                              |
| "As the mechanism for retaining the source was removed from the device, it   |
| was concluded that source securement was lost and could potentially result   |
| in radiation levels exceeding 1R/hour at one meter from the package creating |
| a substantial safety hazard."                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Corrective Actions                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "We are evaluating potential changes to the package to minimize movement of  |
| the plate during impact such that it does not contact the bolts securing the |
| plate to the package, prior to hitting the boss. As long as the plate        |
| remains attached to the package, a subsequent puncture test will not be able |
| to impact on the locking assembly. Securing hardware and the shipping plates |
| will also be upgraded to stainless steel."                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Justification for Continued Use                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "We do not believe there is any significant increase in risk to the general  |
| public as a result of this finding. This is based on the following:"         |
|                                                                              |
| "-The 770 and 771 have been in use for more than 20 years (approximately 500 |
| shipments) with no failures. There have been numerous occasions of these     |
| packages being impacted from forklifts etc, with no loss of structural or    |
| shielding integrity."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "-All of the 770 and 771 are owned by AEA Technology, QSA Inc. and as such   |
| are subjected to a routine quality control inspection prior to each          |
| shipment. This ensures that the packages are in good physical condition      |
| prior to transport."                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "-The damage only occurred after a  worst case orientation as described in   |
| Test Plan 88 and the subsequent puncture test. This specific set of          |
| conditions is extremely unlikely in real field use conditions."              |
|                                                                              |
| "-All the normal conditions of transport were satisfactorily tested and      |
| met."                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Based on all of the above, we believe there is no increased risk in         |
| continuing the transport of these devices. We will be making the appropriate |
| changes to the package and retest to demonstrate that the package will meet  |
| all of the Type B(U) package requirements. As stated earlier, AEA Technology |
| owns all of these packages and can perform the required upgrade prior to     |
| shipment, once the changes are tested and approved."                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36124       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WASHINGTON NUCLEAR       REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:39[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-5                             |EVENT DATE:        09/03/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:39[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MICHAEL KELLER               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/03/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PHIL HARRELL         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       78       Power Operation  |78       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Safeguards system degradation related to detection, immediate compensatory   |
| measures were not taken upon discovery, but was taken in a relatively short  |
| period of time.  The NRC resident inspector will be notified.                |
|                                                                              |
| Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36125       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999|
|LICENSEE:  UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL   |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:22[EDT]|
|    CITY:                           REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        09/03/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  UT |EVENT TIME:             [MDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/03/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |PHIL HARRELL         R4      |
|                                                |ROBERT PIERSON       NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JULIE FELICE                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LEAKING DETECTOR CELL                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Utah State University received a package from Shimadzu Scientific            |
| Instruments containing a detector cell.  The licensee performed a wipe test  |
| on the cell after receipt.  Initial survey results were acceptable but       |
| elevated.  Subsequent wipe tests indicated greater than .005 microcuries.    |
| The detector cell contained 10 millicuries of Nickel - 63.  The detector     |
| cell was repackaged and returned to the manufacturer.                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36126       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GRAND GULF               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:42[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        09/03/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:12[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARTY MCADORY                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/04/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PHIL HARRELL         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE SPILL                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| While transporting a 400-gallon container of sodium hypochlorite, the        |
| container was dropped off the forklift.  Approximately 325 gallons was       |
| spilled in the parking lot south west of the plant.  The spill was contained |
| with none reaching any waterways.  The solution is 12% sodium hypochlorite.  |
| The Hazmat Incident Commander was dispatched; and the chemistry,             |
| environmental, safety, and plant services departments were notified.  The    |
| National Response Center has been notified.  Mississippi Department of       |
| Environmental Quality, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and          |
| Claiborne County Emergency Planning District will be notified.  A contractor |
| has been contacted to clean up the spill and should arrive at midnight on    |
| 09/03/99.  Oxygen and chlorine  samples are being taken.  No oxygen          |
| deficiencies or atmospheric chlorine has been observed.                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified by the licensee.                 |
|                                                                              |
| ****************** UPDATE AT 0532 EDT ON 09/04/99 FROM MARTY McADORY TO      |
| TROCINE ******************                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the contractor arrived and is currently in the      |
| final stages of cleanup operations.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R4DO (Harrell).                                         |
|                                                                              |
| ****************** UPDATE AT 0629 EDT ON 09/04/99 FROM MARTY McADORY TO      |
| TROCINE ******************                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The control room was recently notified that the cleanup operations have been |
| completed.  It is estimated that approximately 15 cubic yards of material    |
| was placed in one roll-off dumpster by the contractor.                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R4DO (Harrell).                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36127       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NORTH ANNA               REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/04/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:53[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/04/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  VICKY HARTE                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/04/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       88       Power Operation  |88       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DEGRADED SAFEGUARDS AREA EXHAUST SYSTEM DUE TO MISSING DAMPER SEALS.         |
|                                                                              |
| On 9/4/99, at 1600, it was discovered that a damper associated with the      |
| Auxiliary Building General Exhaust Ventilation System was degraded due to    |
| missing damper seals. This damper is located on the inlet of the Auxiliary   |
| Building Charcoal Filter Bank which is a common filter used to filter        |
| various area exhaust streams when required. The Safeguards Area Exhaust      |
| system automatically aligns to the common filter bank on a Containment       |
| Depressurization Actuation System signal to ensure filtration of any ECCS    |
| and ESF component leakage in the Safeguards Area atmosphere that may develop |
| from a Large Break LOCA. The degraded damper in the Auxiliary Building       |
| General Area Exhaust System had the potential to cause a flow path that      |
| could have resulted in a portion of the Safeguards Area Exhaust flow to      |
| bypass the Charcoal Filter prior to release to the Environment. The          |
| potential bypass flow path would still be monitored by the Radiation         |
| Monitoring System. The area can be manually aligned to the charcoal filters. |
| The bypass flow path would be considered a degradation of the Ventilation    |
| System to the extent that the fulfillment of the safety function of the      |
| Safeguards Area Exhaust System may have been adversely affected. Action      |
| taken during the troubleshooting of ventilation flow eliminated the bypass   |
| flow path. Administrative controls have been established to prevent          |
| unfiltered release of the Safeguards Area Exhaust System during accident     |
| conditions.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Maintenance is in progress to repair the damper.                             |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident has been notified.                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36128       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/05/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:03[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        09/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE BRINKMAN               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/05/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN ROGGE           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)   PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       85       Power Operation  |84       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO HIGH ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TEMPERATURES      |
|                                                                              |
| The unit's ultimate heat sink is Long Island Sound, and the technical        |
| specifications require the licensee to monitor service water temperatures    |
| every 6 hours.  The licensee monitors these temperatures every 3 hours.  The |
| 0600 reading taken in a switchgear cooling room (the hottest point)          |
| indicated a service water temperature of 77F, which was 2F above the       |
| ultimate heat sink limit specified in the technical specifications.  As a    |
| result, an investigation was initiated to determine whether or not this was  |
| an instrument problem.  Temperatures measured at the intake structure (in    |
| the bay) remained in the low 70s.  At 0700, the licensee determined that the |
| high service water temperature readings were not an instrument problem, and  |
| a technical specification required shutdown was initiated at 0710.  (With    |
| the ultimate heat sink inoperable, Technical Specification 3.7.11 required   |
| the unit to be placed in Hot Standby within 6 hours or Cold Shutdown within  |
| 30 hours.)  Service water temperature was under 75F at 0721, and the        |
| technical specification required shutdown was exited.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the affect on the plant was negligible.  Current    |
| weather conditions are hot and humid, and it is expected to cloud up this    |
| afternoon.  The cause of the high service water temperature readings is      |
| currently under investigation.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| Prior to discovery of this issue, the licensee was holding the unit at 85%   |
| power to clean mussels out of the circulating water bays.                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the applicable state    |
| and local officials.                                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36129       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE              REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:25[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        09/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE MERRILL                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/06/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANNED OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF A DEAD SEA TURTLE IN THE    |
| INTAKE CANAL                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| At 0200, the licensee recovered a dead sea turtle from the plant's intake    |
| canal.  In accordance with the licensee's marine turtle permit, the land     |
| utilization department plans to notify the Department of Environmental       |
| Protection's Bureau of Protected Species within 12 hours.                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee also plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36130       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: TURKEY POINT             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/1999|
|    UNIT:  [3] [4] []                STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:25[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:35[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SAM SHAFER                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/06/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v)      OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|4     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY DUE TO POWER LINE BLOCKING MAIN PLANT  |
| ACCESS.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "LOSS OF OFFSITE RESPONSE CAPABILITY.  REPORTS RECEIVED OF ENERGIZED POWER   |
| LINE FELL ACROSS MAIN PLANT ACCESS ROAD TO PLANT SITE.  PLANT ACCESS         |
| RESTORED AT 1820 EDT ON 9/6/99."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| THE CONTROL ROOM WAS NOTIFIED AT 1735 EDT OF THE LINE BLOCKING ACCESS TO THE |
| SITE.  TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION (T&D) REPORTED THAT THE FELLED LINE WAS   |
| REMOVED AT 1820 EDT.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36131       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY            REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:08[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:22[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MATTHEW MORGAN               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/06/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN ROGGE           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FROM 100% POWER AFTER RECEIVING MAIN GENERATOR   |
| FIELD ALARMS                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION (BVPS) UNIT ONE PERFORMED A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP |
| DUE TO RECEIVING MAIN GENERATOR FIELD ALARMS.  MAIN GENERATOR POWER FACTOR   |
| WAS OBSERVED TO BE SWINGING PRIOR TO THE TRIP.                               |
|                                                                              |
| "UNIT ONE IS CURRENTLY STABLE IN MODE 3.  NO OTHER PROBLEMS OCCURRED DURING  |
| THE EVENT.  THE AUXILIARY FEED PUMPS AUTOMATICALLY STARTED AS EXPECTED DUE   |
| TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL AFTER THE REACTOR TRIP.                         |
|                                                                              |
| "THE CAUSE OF THE MAIN GENERATOR PROBLEM IS NOT YET KNOWN.  AN EVENT         |
| RESPONSE TEAM IS BEING FORMED TO INVESTIGATE THE PROBLEM."                   |
|                                                                              |
| ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED FOLLOWING THE REACTOR TRIP.  NO PRIMARY OR   |
| SECONDARY SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVES LIFTED.   UNIT 1 IS PRESENTLY STABLE IN    |
| MODE 3 WITH DECAY HEAT BEING REJECTED TO THE MAIN CONDENSER .  THE UNIT 1    |
| EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS ARE AVAILABLE IF NEEDED.  PRELIMINARY INDICATION |
| IS THAT THE MAIN GENERATOR EXCITER VOLTAGE MALFUNCTIONED.  UNIT 2 WAS        |
| UNAFFECTED.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+