Event Notification Report for September 7, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/03/1999 - 09/07/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36002 36018 36025 36079 36088 36104 36114 36121 36122 36123 36124 36125
36126 36127 36128 36129 36130 36131
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36002 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/06/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:20[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRAD ELLISON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MARK RING R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF A DOOR CONFIGURATION THAT DID NOT MEET THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA |
| FOR THE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN BASIS HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK |
| (HELB) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "During performance of monthly equipment walkdowns, it was discovered that a |
| door assumed to open as a vent path in the HELB analysis was jammed closed. |
| The door is one of two doors in a double door assembly. The analysis |
| assumes that both doors open in order for room pressurization to meet the |
| acceptance criteria for the structural analysis of the design basis HELB. |
| The door was returned to an operable configuration. The door was disabled |
| for 20 minutes from the time of discovery." |
| |
| The length of time the door was in this configuration prior to discovery is |
| not currently known. The units are not in any limiting conditions for |
| operation as a result of this issue. |
| |
| The door involved is door #182. It is an Auxiliary Building door on the |
| 735' level, and it goes to the Fuel Handling Area which is part of a special |
| vent zone. It is also an HELB analysis door. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| *** RETRACTION 1617 EDT on 9/3/99 FROM ANDREWS TO POERTNER *** |
| |
| Subsequent analysis and testing has demonstrated that the door would have |
| opened as necessary and this event notification is therefore retracted. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified. |
| |
| Notified R3DO (HILLS). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36018 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:46[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 08/10/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:00[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/04/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM McCLEERY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE OF 13 HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER SPRINKLER SYSTEMS TO MEET SYSTEM |
| OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS (24-Hour Report) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth: |
| |
| "On 08/10/99 at approximately 1600 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent |
| (PSS) was notified that 13 sprinkler systems associated with the High |
| Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) system were not capable of meeting system |
| operability requirements. This condition was discovered as a result of an |
| engineering review of individual sprinkler heads that had previously been |
| identified as exhibiting corrosion around the valve seat. The engineering |
| review was conducted following the discovery that similar corrosion problems |
| experienced at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant resulted in sprinkler |
| heads being unable to actuate at normal pressure. An initial screening of |
| PORTS sprinkler heads known to exhibit corrosion was conducted, and systems |
| where the potential for two or more adjacent heads to be corroded were |
| inspected. This identified 11 systems in the X-333 and 2 systems in the |
| X-326 that did not meet the sprinkler system operability requirement that no |
| two adjacent sprinkler heads be inoperable." |
| |
| "The PSS declared the affected sprinkler systems inoperable, and TSR |
| required actions were completed. Further inspections of sprinkler systems |
| are planned. This report will be updated if additional sprinkler systems |
| are determined to be inoperable." |
| |
| "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or |
| radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this |
| event." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the |
| onsite Department of Energy representative. |
| |
| *** UPDATE ON 08/19/99 AT 2327 FROM HALCOMB TO POERTNER *** |
| |
| During continuing walkdowns, HPFW system #398 was discovered with two or |
| more (3) adjacent sprinkler heads with mineral deposits. This HPFW |
| sprinkler was declared inoperable at 1038 hours and was repaired at 1407 |
| hours. |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1415 EDT ON 08/28/99 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The following information was provided as an update to this report: |
| |
| "During continuing walk downs of the HPFW system, systems 194, 196, 197, |
| 211, [and] 212 were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable |
| to meet system operability. Systems were made inoperable at 1452 on |
| 08/27/99. All sprinklers were repaired and system operability made at 0550 |
| [on] 08/26/99." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2337 ON 08/30/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "During continuing walkdowns of the HPFW system, seven additional systems |
| were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable to meet system |
| operability. Six systems were in the X-333 and one in the X-330. These |
| systems were made inoperable starting at 1100 [on] 08/30/99 and repairs are |
| being performed at this time." |
| |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2305 ON 08/31/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Add seven HPFW systems from X-333 building." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO |
| (Pierson). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 0047 ON 09/02/99 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| "Add fourteen HPFW systems from X-333 building." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO |
| (Pierson). |
| |
| *** UPDATE 1438 EDT ON 09/03/99 FROM WILLIAMSON TO POERTNER *** |
| |
| "Add 5 HPFW systems from the X-333 and X-330 building." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO |
| (Hickey). |
| |
| ******************** UPDATE AT 0439 ON 09/03/99 FROM JEFF CASTLE TO TROCINE |
| ******************** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth: |
| |
| "[The] X-326, X-330, [and] X-333 HPFW sprinkler systems [were] all declared |
| inoperable based on [the] number of corroded sprinkler heads being |
| identified during ongoing building walkdowns." |
| |
| It was stated that the actions of the Technical Safety Requirement are being |
| met. These actions include smoke watch tours every 4 hours and controls on |
| hot work in the area. |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and Department of |
| Energy site representative. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO |
| (Hills and Madera) and NMSS EO (Pierson). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Hospital |Event Number: 36025 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999|
|LICENSEE: SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:11[EDT]|
| CITY: NORFOLK REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 08/06/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: VA |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |HAROLD GRAY R1 |
| |CHARLES OGLE R2 |
+------------------------------------------------+BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DOUGLAS BEATTY, RSO |DALE POWERS R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+KEVIN RAMSEY (fax) NMSS |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i) DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 REPORT - DEFECT IN A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPHY UNIT |
| |
| DOUGLAS BEATTY, RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER, THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED |
| IN KANATA, ONTARIO, CANADA, REPORTED THAT ON 08/06/99, AN Ir-192 SOURCE |
| CABLE ON A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPY UNIT, MODEL #12i, SERIAL #709, LOCATED AT |
| SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL IN NORFOLK, VA, FAILED TO RETRACT TO ITS SHIELDED |
| POSITION. THE SOURCE WAS MANUALLY RETURNED TO ITS SHIELDED POSITION BY A |
| THERATRONICS SERVICE TECHNICIAN ON 08/06/99. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE IS PERFORMING AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE |
| DEFECT AND PLANS TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE NRC. |
| |
| NOTE: REFER TO RELATED EVENT #35998. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1614 ON 08/13/99 BY JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| On 08/12/99, MDS Nordion, Kanata, Ontario, Canada, the parent company of |
| Theratronics International Limited, issued GammaMed User Bulletin #GMUB |
| 99-01 as follows: |
| |
| Subject: Notice of Incident - GammaMed High Dose Remote (HDR) Afterloader |
| Units |
| |
| Units Affected: GammaMed Models 12i and 12it HDR Afterloader Units operating |
| in the United States and Canada. |
| |
| We have recently been notified of four incidents involving GammaMed HDR |
| Afterloader Units in which the source cable became separated from the |
| driving mechanism. In each of these incidents, the source remained in an |
| exposed position, and required intervention to place the source into a |
| shielded position. |
| |
| We have investigated these incidents, and have concluded that the cause is |
| attributable to a specific lot of cable used by the source manufacturer in |
| the production of these sources. These sources have been installed only in |
| the United States and Canada. |
| |
| We strongly recommend that your institution suspend use of your GammaMed |
| Models 12i and 12it HDR Afterloader Unit until the source is replaced. We |
| are presently working with the source manufacturer to expedite replacement |
| of these sources. A representative of our service department will contact |
| you shortly to schedule a date for replacement of the source in your |
| GammaMed Unit. |
| |
| We, at MDS Nordion, believe that safety of the patient and hospital |
| personnel is of the utmost importance. We will strive to correct this |
| situation as soon as possible. |
| |
| For further information, please contact Dave Marquez, Manager, Installation |
| and Service, MDS Nordion. |
| |
| Note: Refer to Event #36027 for a related event. |
| |
| *** UPDATE AT 1600 EDT on 9/3/99 BY POERTNER *** |
| |
| Theratronics International Limited submitted a 30 day report of notification |
| of defect to the NRC regarding the source cable wires used in GammaMed |
| brachytherapy High Dose Rate Afterloader devices. |
| |
| Notified NMSS (PIERSON) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36079 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/27/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:48[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 08/27/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 06:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVE WALSH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KATHLEEN MODES R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DEGRADATION (ONLY ONE OF FOUR PUMPS |
| OPERABLE) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "On 08/26/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at 100% power |
| with the 'B' loop of emergency service water [(ESW)] out of service for |
| scheduled maintenance. During testing on the ESW system, with all ESW pumps |
| in service, it was identified that the 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps' discharge |
| check valves were closed. The ESW flow surveillance was performed, and the |
| 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps failed to achieve the required flow and were declared |
| inoperable. Concurrently, the 'B' loop of ESW was returned to service. |
| During the time the 'B' ESW loop was inoperable, the 'A' ESW pump was the |
| only one operable ESW pump. This constitutes a serious degradation of the |
| plant in that it is a condition which is outside of design basis and, |
| therefore, reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) requiring a 1-hour ENS |
| notification." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1453EDT ON 9/3/99 FROM GRANT FERNSLER TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| "This Notification is a retraction of a previous ENS Notification made |
| 8/27/99 (Event # 36079)." |
| |
| "Subsequent evaluation by Engineering has concluded that the plant had at |
| least two Emergency Service |
| Water pumps capable of performing their specified safety function at all |
| times. As such, the plant was not |
| in a condition outside of its design basis and the report previously made |
| pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii) |
| is hereby retracted." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Rogge). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36088 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: STATE OF MISSISSIPPI |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/30/1999|
|LICENSEE: BOND PAVING COMPANY, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:09[EDT]|
| CITY: GULFPORT REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 08/30/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: MS |EVENT TIME: 08:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: MS638-01 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |SCOTT SPARKS R2 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT NELSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF A TROXLER GAUGE STOLEN FROM BOND PAVING COMPANY, |
| INC., LOCATED IN GULFPORT, MISSISSIPPI |
| |
| At approximately 0800 CDT on 08/30/99, Bond Paving Company, Inc. (located in |
| Gulfport, Mississippi) notified the State of Mississippi, Division of |
| Radiological Health, of a stolen Troxler gauge. Apparently, the gauge |
| (which was inside its storage container) was stolen some time over the |
| weekend along with a truck and some computer equipment. The gauge (model |
| number 3440, serial number 28210) contained 8 mCi of cesium-137 (serial |
| number 750-2160) and 40 mCi of americium-241/beryllium (serial number |
| 47-2489). |
| |
| The licensee notified the local police department. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a state contact telephone number and |
| the address of the licensee.) |
| |
| *** UPDATE FROM NELSON TO POERTNER AT 1436 EDT ON 9/3/99 *** |
| |
| Troxler gauge was found approximately 1/2 mile from the location from which |
| it was stolen. |
| |
| NOTIFIED R2DO (LANDIS), NMSS (HICKEY). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36104 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/31/1999|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:01[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/31/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DENNIS CORNAX |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/04/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN ROGGE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |ED GOODWIN NRR |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |FRANK CONGEL IRO |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP WITH COMPLICATIONS |
| |
| An automatic reactor trip/turbine trip occurred due to an overtemperature |
| differential temperature (OTdT) trip signal. The licensee was replacing |
| Channel 3 pressurizer low pressure trip bistables when a spurious OTdT trip |
| signal occurred on Channel 4, completing the 2/4 logic. Following the trip, |
| control rod K-2 of Control Bank D had an indicated position of 14.4 steps |
| out from fully inserted. All other control rods are fully inserted. |
| |
| Following the trip, 480 VAC bus 6A received an undervoltage trip signal, |
| causing buses 2A, 3A, 5A, and 6A to transfer to their associated emergency |
| diesel generators (EDGs) (22, 21, and 23, respectively). Buses 2A, 3A, and |
| 5A are currently being supplied by the EDGs; however, the output breaker for |
| EDG 23 tripped upon loading to bus 6A, which remains deenergized. Operators |
| manually started the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump due to the loss |
| of control power to one of the motor driven AFW pumps caused by the loss of |
| bus 6A. |
| |
| The unit is currently stable in hot standby. The licensee is currently |
| troubleshooting bus 6A in anticipation of restoring power. The NRC resident |
| inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| HOO Note: See Event #36107. |
| |
| *** UPDATE 1415 EDT ON 9/4/99 FROM SANTINI TO POERTNER *** |
| |
| Following the reactor trip on 8/31/99 and subsequent loss of power to 480v |
| bus 6A, Technical Specification 3.0.1 had been entered since safeguards bus |
| 6A was de-energized and the RCS temperature was greater than 350 degrees |
| Fahrenheit (degf). During the trouble shooting phase of this event, 23 |
| Service Water Pump (SWP) on the essential SW header was tagged out. 21 and |
| 22 essential header SWPs were operable. This resulted in a period of time |
| of approximately 15 hours (1430 on 8/31 to approximately 0530 on 9/1) where |
| 23 SWP was inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.F.1.b specifies |
| that one essential service water pump may be inoperable for a period not to |
| exceed 12 hours. Following the allowable period of 12 hours, 6 hours are |
| allowed to place the plant in hot shutdown and following the 6 hours to hot |
| shutdown, the plant shall be cooled below 350 degf using normal operating |
| procedures. The 15 hours during which the 23 SWP was inoperable exceeded |
| the 12 hour time limit. Since the plant was already in hot shutdown due to |
| a reactor trip, the 6 hour time period to reach hot shutdown was not |
| applicable. The plant cool down to less than 350 degf started at 0430 on |
| 9/1/99. However, since TS 3.3.F.1.b specifies 12 hours and then a cool down |
| to less than 350 degf for this circumstance, it is more restrictive and |
| requires that the cool down should have started 2 hours earlier at 0230 on |
| 9/1/99. |
| |
| The NRC resident will be notified. Notified R1DO (ROGGE). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36114 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:21[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 09/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:36[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: D. COVEYOU |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 93 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RPS ACTUATION - REACTOR SCRAM |
| |
| At 1036 CDT on 9/2/99, Unit 1 received an RPS Automatic Actuation. The |
| actuation occurred due to low water level (12.5 inches, Level 3) resulting |
| from a feedwater transient. The lowest level noted was -10 inches on the |
| wide range recorders. No ECCS actuations occurred or were required during |
| the transient. All systems operated as designed except as described below: |
| During the auxiliary power fast bus transfer the Unit 1 station air |
| compressor surged and was subsequently restored, the 0C clean condensate |
| pump tripped and the 0A clean condensate pump was started, the 1A and 1C |
| circulating water pumps tripped, the 1B circulating water pump remained |
| running, actions are being taken to restart the 1A circulating water pump |
| and a delay is being encountered restoring the 345 kV ring bus due to |
| difficulties in opening the main power transformer disconnects. |
| |
| All rods inserted and no safety relief valves lifted. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
| |
| *** UPDATE 1610 EDT on 9/3/99 FROM COVEYOU TO POERTNER *** |
| |
| The 1A and 1C circulation water pump trips are understood and restoration is |
| in progress. The Main Power Transformer disconnects have been |
| adjusted/repaired and the 345 kV ring bus was restored at 1005 CDT September |
| 3, 1999. The root cause for the event was a personnel error. A non-licensed |
| operator inappropriately restored the feedwater hydraulic control oil switch |
| alignment to normal for the inservice loop, resulting in the feedwater |
| transient that caused the low-level scram. Corrective actions are in |
| progress and will be included in the 30 day written License Event Report per |
| 10CFR50.73. Preparations are being made for Unit 1 start up late today, |
| September 3, 1999. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
| |
| Notified R3DO (HILLS). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 36121 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999|
|LICENSEE: USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:51[EDT]|
| CITY: ELGIN AF BASE REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 08/06/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: FL |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 42-23539-01AF AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
| |CHARLES CAIN R4 |
+------------------------------------------------+JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JULIE COLEMAN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TWO SEALED SOURCES CONTAINING LESS THAN 4 MICROCURIES EACH OF AMERICIUM-241 |
| MISSING |
| |
| On 6 August 1999 at 1200 EST, Eglin AFB, FL notified Air Force Medical |
| Operations Agency/Office of the Surgeon General (AFMOA/SGOR) of the |
| suspected loss of a Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night |
| (LANTIRN) target pod. The LANTIRN pod contains two sealed sources with less |
| than 4 microcuries of Americium-241 each. This was reported under an |
| incident report on the Loss of USAF Radioactive Material under Florida |
| Permit # FL-30314-02/00AFP. |
| |
| The Laser Transmitter (LTR) is a removable subassembly housed in a nose |
| assembly; internally contains the permitted radioactive source (Americium); |
| when installed, it is completely covered by an access panel. The next |
| higher assembly is the Nose Equipment Support Assembly (NESA), which is the |
| forward section of a LANTIRN targeting pod. |
| |
| A NESA was shipped to a contractor owned depot for testing and upon arrival |
| it was determined that the LTR was missing. It was not physically checked |
| installed before it was shipped as the access panel was not removed. The |
| LTR that was supposed to be in the NESA shipped was found installed in a |
| different NESA. Further investigation determined that there was a different |
| LTR actually unaccounted for. |
| |
| The last known time that the missing LTR was accounted for was in the June |
| 1999, semi-annual inventory. A search was conducted, including tracking |
| down all NESAs that had been shipped to depot for repair. The LTR is |
| unaccounted for and it has been flagged by depot in the supply system. If |
| it turns up, it will be returned to the proper site. |
| |
| Corrective actions have been implemented to prevent reoccurrence of a loss |
| of control including an itemized checklist to ensure a LTR is not installed |
| in a NESA prior to shipment, monthly inventories versus semi-annual, and all |
| LTR transactions are recorded in the Americium inventory. |
| |
| A copy of the report was sent to NRC Region 4 (Gains). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36122 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: FOXBORO COMPANY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999|
|LICENSEE: FOXBORO COMPANY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:00[EDT]|
| CITY: FOXBORO REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 09/03/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: MA |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |VERN HODGE (FAX) NRR |
| |TAD MARSH NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GEORGE JOHNSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DEFECTIVE RELAYS PROVIDED TO FOXBORO BY VENDOR |
| |
| Foxboro Co., has identified a potential failure with N-2A0-L2C-R and/or |
| 2A0-L2C-R Contact Output Isolator cards. The subject cards may contain |
| N0152CK relays supplied by Communications Instruments Inc. which may have |
| been manufactured utilizing a repair residual on the contact armature plate. |
| As a result, relays utilizing this repair residual have contacts that may |
| not return to their normal de-energized position when the relay is |
| de-energized (a condition known as contact hang-up). |
| |
| Extensive analysis performed on a number of relays confirmed that |
| utilization of this repair residual prevented the return of the contact |
| armature (and contacts) to the normally de-energized position when the relay |
| coil was de-energized after an energization period of at least one hour. |
| Further analysis performed by the supplier of the relay confirmed the |
| presence of this repair residual as the root cause for the relay failures. |
| The supplier has determined that during assembly of the relays, this |
| unauthorized repair procedure may have been utilized on 5 to 6 percent of |
| the relays manufactured since manufacturing week 9834. Utilization of the |
| repair residual has been halted by the manufacturer of the relay. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36123 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA INC |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999|
|LICENSEE: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:25[EDT]|
| CITY: BURLINGTON REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 09/03/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: MA |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) NMSS |
| |ROBERT PIERSON NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CATHLEEN ROUGHAN (FAX) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AEA TECHNOLOGY MODEL 770 AND 771 TYPE B(U) RADIOISOTOPE TRANSPORT PACKAGES |
| FAIL 30 FOOT DROP TEST AND SUBSEQUENT PUNCTURE TEST. |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from AEA |
| Technology: |
| |
| "AEA Technology QSA Inc. is making an initial 2 day report under 10 CFR |
| 21.21 for the Model 770 and |
| 771 Type B(U) radioisotope transport packages for industrial radiography |
| sources. The Model 771 is |
| authorized for the transport of 110 Curies of Co-60 and the model 770 is |
| authorized for 500 Curies of Co-60, (Certificate of Compliance number 9148 |
| and 9107 respectively)." |
| |
| Background |
| |
| "In accordance with NRC bulletin 97-02, AEA Technology is in the process of |
| re-testing Type B packages. |
| As part of the re-testing effort we performed a thirty foot drop and |
| subsequent puncture test on the model |
| 770 in accordance with approved Test Plan 88." |
| |
| "In the course of performing the 30 foot drop on a model 770 package, the |
| carbon steel bolts securing the shipping plate were sheared off resulting in |
| the plate coming off. With the shipping plate off, the puncture test was |
| performed by targeting the lock assembly. As a result of this impact, the |
| lock assembly bolts sheared off, causing the lock assembly to become |
| detached and losing security of the source assembly. These test[s] were |
| performed with the test unit at 70 Celsius." |
| |
| "The model 771 is identical in construction to the model 770, the most |
| significant difference is the weight of the shield. Therefore, we believe we |
| would see the same failure with the 771. There is one model 770 package and |
| five model 771 packages." |
| |
| Discussion |
| |
| "An internal evaluation was performed and determined that the failure |
| occurred due to the following:" |
| |
| "-The shipping plate fits into a boss over the lock assembly. There is a gap |
| of approximately 1/2 inch between the shipping plate and the boss. The bolt |
| hole through the shipping plate leaves approximately 1/32 inch clearance. |
| As a result of the 30 foot drop test, the plate moved and sheared the bolts |
| before contacting the boss. This caused the plate to be detached from the |
| package." |
| |
| "-In the subsequent puncture test, the steel billet impacted the locking |
| assembly and caused the four bolts holding the lock assembly on to break. In |
| addition two of the bolts securing the lock plate to the device were broken |
| off." |
| |
| "-As a result of this cumulative damage the lock assembly was detached from |
| the device, allowing the source to move outward and become unsecured." |
| |
| "As the mechanism for retaining the source was removed from the device, it |
| was concluded that source securement was lost and could potentially result |
| in radiation levels exceeding 1R/hour at one meter from the package creating |
| a substantial safety hazard." |
| |
| Corrective Actions |
| |
| "We are evaluating potential changes to the package to minimize movement of |
| the plate during impact such that it does not contact the bolts securing the |
| plate to the package, prior to hitting the boss. As long as the plate |
| remains attached to the package, a subsequent puncture test will not be able |
| to impact on the locking assembly. Securing hardware and the shipping plates |
| will also be upgraded to stainless steel." |
| |
| Justification for Continued Use |
| |
| "We do not believe there is any significant increase in risk to the general |
| public as a result of this finding. This is based on the following:" |
| |
| "-The 770 and 771 have been in use for more than 20 years (approximately 500 |
| shipments) with no failures. There have been numerous occasions of these |
| packages being impacted from forklifts etc, with no loss of structural or |
| shielding integrity." |
| |
| "-All of the 770 and 771 are owned by AEA Technology, QSA Inc. and as such |
| are subjected to a routine quality control inspection prior to each |
| shipment. This ensures that the packages are in good physical condition |
| prior to transport." |
| |
| "-The damage only occurred after a worst case orientation as described in |
| Test Plan 88 and the subsequent puncture test. This specific set of |
| conditions is extremely unlikely in real field use conditions." |
| |
| "-All the normal conditions of transport were satisfactorily tested and |
| met." |
| |
| "Based on all of the above, we believe there is no increased risk in |
| continuing the transport of these devices. We will be making the appropriate |
| changes to the package and retest to demonstrate that the package will meet |
| all of the Type B(U) package requirements. As stated earlier, AEA Technology |
| owns all of these packages and can perform the required upgrade prior to |
| shipment, once the changes are tested and approved." |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36124 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WASHINGTON NUCLEAR REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:39[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 09/03/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:39[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL KELLER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PHIL HARRELL R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 78 Power Operation |78 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Safeguards system degradation related to detection, immediate compensatory |
| measures were not taken upon discovery, but was taken in a relatively short |
| period of time. The NRC resident inspector will be notified. |
| |
| Refer to the HOO Log for additional details. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36125 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999|
|LICENSEE: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:22[EDT]|
| CITY: REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/03/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: UT |EVENT TIME: [MDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |PHIL HARRELL R4 |
| |ROBERT PIERSON NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JULIE FELICE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LEAKING DETECTOR CELL |
| |
| Utah State University received a package from Shimadzu Scientific |
| Instruments containing a detector cell. The licensee performed a wipe test |
| on the cell after receipt. Initial survey results were acceptable but |
| elevated. Subsequent wipe tests indicated greater than .005 microcuries. |
| The detector cell contained 10 millicuries of Nickel - 63. The detector |
| cell was repackaged and returned to the manufacturer. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36126 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GRAND GULF REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:42[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 09/03/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:12[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARTY MCADORY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/04/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PHIL HARRELL R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE SPILL |
| |
| While transporting a 400-gallon container of sodium hypochlorite, the |
| container was dropped off the forklift. Approximately 325 gallons was |
| spilled in the parking lot south west of the plant. The spill was contained |
| with none reaching any waterways. The solution is 12% sodium hypochlorite. |
| The Hazmat Incident Commander was dispatched; and the chemistry, |
| environmental, safety, and plant services departments were notified. The |
| National Response Center has been notified. Mississippi Department of |
| Environmental Quality, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and |
| Claiborne County Emergency Planning District will be notified. A contractor |
| has been contacted to clean up the spill and should arrive at midnight on |
| 09/03/99. Oxygen and chlorine samples are being taken. No oxygen |
| deficiencies or atmospheric chlorine has been observed. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified by the licensee. |
| |
| ****************** UPDATE AT 0532 EDT ON 09/04/99 FROM MARTY McADORY TO |
| TROCINE ****************** |
| |
| The licensee stated that the contractor arrived and is currently in the |
| final stages of cleanup operations. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R4DO (Harrell). |
| |
| ****************** UPDATE AT 0629 EDT ON 09/04/99 FROM MARTY McADORY TO |
| TROCINE ****************** |
| |
| The control room was recently notified that the cleanup operations have been |
| completed. It is estimated that approximately 15 cubic yards of material |
| was placed in one roll-off dumpster by the contractor. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R4DO (Harrell). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36127 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NORTH ANNA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/04/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:53[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/04/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: VICKY HARTE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/04/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 88 Power Operation |88 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DEGRADED SAFEGUARDS AREA EXHAUST SYSTEM DUE TO MISSING DAMPER SEALS. |
| |
| On 9/4/99, at 1600, it was discovered that a damper associated with the |
| Auxiliary Building General Exhaust Ventilation System was degraded due to |
| missing damper seals. This damper is located on the inlet of the Auxiliary |
| Building Charcoal Filter Bank which is a common filter used to filter |
| various area exhaust streams when required. The Safeguards Area Exhaust |
| system automatically aligns to the common filter bank on a Containment |
| Depressurization Actuation System signal to ensure filtration of any ECCS |
| and ESF component leakage in the Safeguards Area atmosphere that may develop |
| from a Large Break LOCA. The degraded damper in the Auxiliary Building |
| General Area Exhaust System had the potential to cause a flow path that |
| could have resulted in a portion of the Safeguards Area Exhaust flow to |
| bypass the Charcoal Filter prior to release to the Environment. The |
| potential bypass flow path would still be monitored by the Radiation |
| Monitoring System. The area can be manually aligned to the charcoal filters. |
| The bypass flow path would be considered a degradation of the Ventilation |
| System to the extent that the fulfillment of the safety function of the |
| Safeguards Area Exhaust System may have been adversely affected. Action |
| taken during the troubleshooting of ventilation flow eliminated the bypass |
| flow path. Administrative controls have been established to prevent |
| unfiltered release of the Safeguards Area Exhaust System during accident |
| conditions. |
| |
| Maintenance is in progress to repair the damper. |
| |
| The NRC resident has been notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36128 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/05/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:03[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE BRINKMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN ROGGE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 85 Power Operation |84 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO HIGH ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TEMPERATURES |
| |
| The unit's ultimate heat sink is Long Island Sound, and the technical |
| specifications require the licensee to monitor service water temperatures |
| every 6 hours. The licensee monitors these temperatures every 3 hours. The |
| 0600 reading taken in a switchgear cooling room (the hottest point) |
| indicated a service water temperature of 77�F, which was 2�F above the |
| ultimate heat sink limit specified in the technical specifications. As a |
| result, an investigation was initiated to determine whether or not this was |
| an instrument problem. Temperatures measured at the intake structure (in |
| the bay) remained in the low 70s. At 0700, the licensee determined that the |
| high service water temperature readings were not an instrument problem, and |
| a technical specification required shutdown was initiated at 0710. (With |
| the ultimate heat sink inoperable, Technical Specification 3.7.11 required |
| the unit to be placed in Hot Standby within 6 hours or Cold Shutdown within |
| 30 hours.) Service water temperature was under 75�F at 0721, and the |
| technical specification required shutdown was exited. |
| |
| The licensee stated that the affect on the plant was negligible. Current |
| weather conditions are hot and humid, and it is expected to cloud up this |
| afternoon. The cause of the high service water temperature readings is |
| currently under investigation. |
| |
| Prior to discovery of this issue, the licensee was holding the unit at 85% |
| power to clean mussels out of the circulating water bays. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the applicable state |
| and local officials. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36129 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:25[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 09/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE MERRILL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/06/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANNED OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF A DEAD SEA TURTLE IN THE |
| INTAKE CANAL |
| |
| At 0200, the licensee recovered a dead sea turtle from the plant's intake |
| canal. In accordance with the licensee's marine turtle permit, the land |
| utilization department plans to notify the Department of Environmental |
| Protection's Bureau of Protected Species within 12 hours. |
| |
| The licensee also plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36130 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: TURKEY POINT REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/1999|
| UNIT: [3] [4] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:25[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:35[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SAM SHAFER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/06/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|4 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY DUE TO POWER LINE BLOCKING MAIN PLANT |
| ACCESS. |
| |
| "LOSS OF OFFSITE RESPONSE CAPABILITY. REPORTS RECEIVED OF ENERGIZED POWER |
| LINE FELL ACROSS MAIN PLANT ACCESS ROAD TO PLANT SITE. PLANT ACCESS |
| RESTORED AT 1820 EDT ON 9/6/99." |
| |
| THE CONTROL ROOM WAS NOTIFIED AT 1735 EDT OF THE LINE BLOCKING ACCESS TO THE |
| SITE. TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION (T&D) REPORTED THAT THE FELLED LINE WAS |
| REMOVED AT 1820 EDT. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36131 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:08[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:22[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MATTHEW MORGAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/06/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN ROGGE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FROM 100% POWER AFTER RECEIVING MAIN GENERATOR |
| FIELD ALARMS |
| |
| "BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION (BVPS) UNIT ONE PERFORMED A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP |
| DUE TO RECEIVING MAIN GENERATOR FIELD ALARMS. MAIN GENERATOR POWER FACTOR |
| WAS OBSERVED TO BE SWINGING PRIOR TO THE TRIP. |
| |
| "UNIT ONE IS CURRENTLY STABLE IN MODE 3. NO OTHER PROBLEMS OCCURRED DURING |
| THE EVENT. THE AUXILIARY FEED PUMPS AUTOMATICALLY STARTED AS EXPECTED DUE |
| TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL AFTER THE REACTOR TRIP. |
| |
| "THE CAUSE OF THE MAIN GENERATOR PROBLEM IS NOT YET KNOWN. AN EVENT |
| RESPONSE TEAM IS BEING FORMED TO INVESTIGATE THE PROBLEM." |
| |
| ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED FOLLOWING THE REACTOR TRIP. NO PRIMARY OR |
| SECONDARY SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVES LIFTED. UNIT 1 IS PRESENTLY STABLE IN |
| MODE 3 WITH DECAY HEAT BEING REJECTED TO THE MAIN CONDENSER . THE UNIT 1 |
| EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS ARE AVAILABLE IF NEEDED. PRELIMINARY INDICATION |
| IS THAT THE MAIN GENERATOR EXCITER VOLTAGE MALFUNCTIONED. UNIT 2 WAS |
| UNAFFECTED. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021