Event Notification Report for September 3, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/02/1999 - 09/03/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35964 36018 36113 36114 36115 36116 36117 36118 36119 36120
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 35964 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: UNITED STATES AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/27/1999|
|LICENSEE: UNITED STATES AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:58[EDT]|
| CITY: WASHINGTON DC REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 07/26/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: DC |EVENT TIME: 10:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 42-23539-01AF AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/02/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |ROBERT HAAG R2 |
| |BILL JONES R4 |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLEY HAUGHNEY NMSS |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MAJOR HICKS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAE1 20.2202(b)(1) PERS OVEREXPOSURE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| USAF PERSON INHALED DEPLETED URANIUM DUST |
| |
| THE USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE, BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, REPORTED THE |
| FOLLOWING INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AT ROBINS AIR FORCE BASE, GEORGIA . |
| |
| AT 1000 ON 07/26/99, USAF PERSONNEL WERE PERFORMING MAINTENANCE ON A C-141 |
| CARGO AIRCRAFT AILERON. A TECHNICIAN WAS FOUND USING A HAMMER AND CHISEL TO |
| REMOVE INSTALLED DEPLETED URANIUM COUNTERWEIGHTS FROM THE AILERON. THIS |
| PROCESS PRODUCED DUST AND DEBRIS WHICH WAS SCATTERED BY A NEARBY FAN. THE |
| TECHNICIAN USING A HAMMER AND CHISEL ON THE DEPLETED URANIUM WAS IN |
| VIOLATION OF SEVERAL RULES. |
| |
| UPON DISCOVERY OF THIS ACTIVITY, THE TECHNICIAN WAS TOLD TO IMMEDIATELY STOP |
| WORK . THE AREA HAS BEEN SECURED AND DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES INITIATED. |
| HEALTH PHYSICS SUPPORT HAS BEEN REQUESTED FROM BROOKS AIR FORCE BASE, SAN |
| ANTONIO, TEXAS. BIOASSAYS OF THE TECHNICIAN AND OTHER WORKERS IN THE AREA |
| HAS BEEN INITIATED. |
| |
| CONTAMINATION LEVELS IN THE ROOM WHERE THE MAINTENANCE WAS BEING PERFORMED |
| WERE FOUND TO BE ABOVE BACKGROUND (NUCLEAR RESEARCH CORPORATION MODEL |
| ADM-300 DETECTOR WITH A PANCAKE PROBE WAS USED TO SURVEY THE AREA). THE |
| AREA OF CONTAMINATION HAS BEEN CONFINED TO THE BUILDING 180 MAINTENANCE |
| BAY. |
| |
| A FOLLOWUP REPORT BY THE USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE WILL BE MADE TO NRC |
| REGION 4 BY 08/27/99. |
| |
| *** UPDATE ON 9/2/99 FROM USAF (FAX) TO POERTNER *** |
| |
| An Interim Report was submitted to Region 4. A follow-up or final report |
| will be submitted by 9/28/99. |
| |
| HOO notified R4DO (Cain), R2DO (Landis), and NMSS (Hickey). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36018 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:46[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 08/10/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:00[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/02/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM McCLEERY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE OF 13 HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER SPRINKLER SYSTEMS TO MEET SYSTEM |
| OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS (24-Hour Report) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth: |
| |
| "On 08/10/99 at approximately 1600 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent |
| (PSS) was notified that 13 sprinkler systems associated with the High |
| Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) system were not capable of meeting system |
| operability requirements. This condition was discovered as a result of an |
| engineering review of individual sprinkler heads that had previously been |
| identified as exhibiting corrosion around the valve seat. The engineering |
| review was conducted following the discovery that similar corrosion problems |
| experienced at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant resulted in sprinkler |
| heads being unable to actuate at normal pressure. An initial screening of |
| PORTS sprinkler heads known to exhibit corrosion was conducted, and systems |
| where the potential for two or more adjacent heads to be corroded were |
| inspected. This identified 11 systems in the X-333 and 2 systems in the |
| X-326 that did not meet the sprinkler system operability requirement that no |
| two adjacent sprinkler heads be inoperable." |
| |
| "The PSS declared the affected sprinkler systems inoperable, and TSR |
| required actions were completed. Further inspections of sprinkler systems |
| are planned. This report will be updated if additional sprinkler systems |
| are determined to be inoperable." |
| |
| "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or |
| radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this |
| event." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the |
| onsite Department of Energy representative. |
| |
| *** UPDATE ON 8/19/99 AT 2327 FROM HALCOMB TO POERTNER *** |
| |
| During continuing walkdowns, HPFW system #398 was discovered with two or |
| more (3) adjacent sprinkler heads with mineral deposits. This HPFW |
| sprinkler was declared inoperable at 1038 hours and was repaired at 1407 |
| hours. |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1415 EDT ON 8/28/99 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The following information was provided as an update to this report: |
| |
| "During continuing walk downs of the HPFW system, systems 194, 196, 197, |
| 211, 212 were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable to meet |
| system operability. Systems were made inoperable at 1452 on 8/27/99. All |
| sprinklers were repaired and system operability made at 0550 8/26/99." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 2337 ON 8/30/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "During continuing walkdowns of the HPFW system, seven additional systems |
| were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable to meet system |
| operability. Six systems were in the X-333 and one in the X-330. These |
| systems were made inoperable starting at 1100 8/30/99 and repairs are being |
| performed at this time." |
| |
| Notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 2305 8/31/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Add seven HPFW systems from X-333 building." The NRC resident inspector has |
| been informed of this update. |
| |
| Notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Pierson). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 0047 EDT on 9/2/1999 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| "Add fourteen HPFW systems from X-333 building." The NRC resident inspector |
| has been informed of this update. |
| |
| Notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Pierson). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36113 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:50[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/02/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/02/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |DAVID HILLS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KURT SISLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MICROFILTRATION SYSTEM pH PROBES OUT OF TOLERANCE |
| |
| On 9/1/99 at 1300 hours, the plant shift superintendent was notified that a |
| previously discovered X-705 Microfiltration System (MFS) pH probe out of |
| tolerance condition likely existed during a time period when the MFS was in |
| operation. The out of tolerance condition was in a non-conservative |
| direction and previously documented during a routine weekly surveillance on |
| 6/4/99. During the engineering evaluation, it was concluded at 1000 hours |
| on 9/2/99, that the out of tolerance condition likely existed from |
| approximately 5/28/99 to 6/4/99. |
| |
| The out of tolerance condition affected 2 of the 3 probes (2 out of 3 logic |
| required to activate the safety system). The as found data for the 2 probes |
| indicated they would actuate at 6.70 pH and 6.63 pH, which is below the 7 pH |
| required setpoint. A review of MFS operational history indicated that the |
| MFS pH was maintained above a 7 pH during the time the probes are suspected |
| to have been out of tolerance. |
| |
| There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or |
| radioactive/radiological contamination. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1452EDT ON 9/2/99 FROM KURT SISLER TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The following is a portion of information provided as an update to include |
| classification of the event as a 24-hour 91-01 Bulletin report: |
| |
| "Upon further review of [the] X-705 Microfiltration System pH probe failure, |
| it was determined to be reportable per NRC Bulletin 91-01 criteria. |
| |
| "Safety Significance: |
| |
| "Two out of three safety system pH probes used in the microfiltration system |
| were found to be out of tolerance. The system relies on a two-out-of-three |
| logic for system actuation. The probes read 7.30 and 7.37 for a buffer |
| solution which had a pH of approximately 7.0 (depending on the temperature). |
| NCSA-0705_015.A10 takes credit for these pH probes in satisfying the double |
| contingency principle. Active engineered feature #5 states 'Microfiltration |
| effluent pH shutdown system will automatically stop the flow of microfilter |
| permeate to the T-105 tank if pH<7.0 (with an allowable test tolerance of |
| -0.2), by closing both isolation valves automatically.' Since the probes |
| were overestimating the pH, a pH of as low as approximately 6.70 could be |
| present without an actuation of the system. |
| |
| "Contingency event B.4.2 credits the effluent pH shutdown system in |
| preventing dissolved uranium past the microfilters (to an unsafe geometry |
| tank downstream). Also credited is the unlikely event of solution with a |
| low pH making it to the microfiltration modules due to the functioning of |
| the pH adjustment system. Therefore, the out of tolerance condition in a |
| non-conservative direction constitutes a loss of one criticality control in |
| a double contingency system. |
| |
| "The discussion for B.4.2 includes the following, 'Based on chemical |
| reactions and calculations in POEF-340-98-113, it would require an extremely |
| low pH (in the range of approximately 4 to 5) before the resulting solution |
| would pick up any appreciable amounts (i.e., milligrams per liter) of |
| uranium. However, this level of uranium is well below the individually |
| always safe concentration limit reported in GAT-225, Rev. 4, of 5000 ppm |
| U-235 for 100% enriched solution.' Based on the as-found tolerances, a pH |
| of 6.70 would have caused the system to actuate. Therefore, this event has a |
| low safety significance. |
| |
| "Potential Criticality Pathways involved (Brief scenario(s) of how |
| criticality could occur): |
| |
| "Event B.4.2.a credits the effluent pH shutdown system in preventing |
| dissolved uranium past the microfilters (to an unsafe geometry tank |
| downstream). Also credited is the unlikely event of solution with a low pH |
| making it to the microfiltration modules due to the functioning of the pH |
| adjustment system. Both a failure in the pH shutdown system and the unlikely |
| event of a low pH following pH adjustment would have to occur for this |
| scenario to take place. |
| |
| "Controlled parameters: |
| |
| "The prevention of acidic solutions from entering the microfiltration |
| modules maintains the uranium in the filters in a favorable geometry, rather |
| than picking up uranium in addition to the safe batch being processed. |
| Therefore, geometry is controlled. |
| |
| "Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material (include process |
| limit and % worst case of critical mass): |
| |
| "The operation is approved for 100% U-235; however, only USEC material |
| (maximum 10% U-235 has been processed recently. The microfiltration process |
| is controlled such that only a safe mass of U-235 is present in any |
| unfavorable geometry. Operational information indicates that the pH was |
| never less than 7.0 during the time the system was potentially out of |
| calibration |
| |
| "Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls(s) or control system(s) and description |
| of failures or deficiencies: |
| |
| "Two out of three safety system pH probes used in the microfiltration system |
| were found to be out of tolerance. The system relies on a two-out-of-three |
| logic for system actuation. The system is relied on to keep unmeasured |
| quantities of uranium (from the microfilter modules) from entering an |
| unfavorable geometry tank. |
| |
| "Therefore, the failure of the pH shutdown system (due to out of calibration |
| probes or any reason) is an analyzed condition." |
| |
| The HOO notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS (Piccone). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36114 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:21[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 09/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:36[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: D. COVEYOU |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/02/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 93 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RPS ACTUATION - REACTOR SCRAM |
| |
| At 1036 CDT on 9/2/99, Unit 1 received an RPS Automatic Actuation. The |
| actuation occurred due to low water level (12.5 inches, Level 3) resulting |
| from a feedwater transient. The lowest level noted was -10 inches on the |
| wide range recorders. No ECCS actuations occurred or were required during |
| the transient. All systems operated as designed except as described below: |
| During the auxiliary power fast bus transfer the Unit 1 station air |
| compressor surged and was subsequently restored, the 0C clean condensate |
| pump tripped and the 0A clean condensate pump was started, the 1A and 1C |
| circulating water pumps tripped, the 1B circulating water pump remained |
| running, actions are being taken to restart the 1A circulating water pump |
| and a delay is being encountered restoring the 345 KV ring bus due to |
| difficulties in opening the main power transformer disconnects. |
| |
| All rods inserted and no safety relief valves lifted. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36115 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:44[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:43[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ANDREW WISNIEWSKI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/02/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WILLIAM COOK R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ESF ACTUATION - PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) GROUP III |
| ISOLATION |
| |
| At 1143, on 9/2/99, the control room received a PCIS Group III isolation. A |
| Group III isolation isolates all drywell atmospheric valves and reactor |
| building ventilation. Standby gas treatment started. The cause of the |
| isolation was the west refuel floor radiation monitor failing upscale. The |
| actuation is considered invalid. |
| |
| Local radiation readings were verified less than 1 mR/hr. New fuel |
| inspections will be secured prior to resetting the Group III isolation to |
| allow reestablishing drywell to torus differential pressure which had been |
| broken for vacuum breaker testing prior to the isolation. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36116 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BYRON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:02[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:17[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVEN RAMSEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/02/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |TAD MARSH NRR |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
| |
| At 1158 CDT, 9/2/99, the National Earthquake Information Center, Golden |
| Colorado, reported that an earthquake occurred at 1117 CDT with an epicenter |
| approximately 30 miles from the site. It was reported the earthquake |
| occurred approximately 10 miles SSE of Dixon, Illinois at a magnitude of 3.5 |
| on the Richter scale. Some minor tremors were felt by site personnel. |
| There was no impact on plant operations. Plant seismic instrumentation did |
| not detect this event. The instrumentation was tested and verified |
| operable. At approximately 1400 CDT a presentation was made to the local |
| media to address questions they had. |
| |
| The NRC resident has been notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36117 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:51[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG JANAK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/02/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHARLES CAIN R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR REPORT - CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE VENTILATION SYSTEM MAKEUP UNIT TRAIN |
| 'C' INOPERABLE |
| |
| South Texas Project made the following notification per NPF-076, Section |
| 2G: |
| |
| Carbon samples obtained from control room envelope ventilation system makeup |
| unit train 'C' failed laboratory tests. The Technical Specification |
| 4.7.7.c.2 limit of 1% for methyl iodine penetration was exceeded. The as |
| found methyl iodine penetration results were 2.87%. This results in the |
| train 'C' control room envelope system being inoperable since the time that |
| the carbon samples were obtained on August 23, 1999 at 0940 CDT. This |
| results in the system being inoperable for greater than 7 days which is a |
| violation of Technical Specification 3.7.7 action a. The sample results |
| were obtained on September 1, 1999 at 0935 CDT. |
| |
| The charcoal adsorber banks for train 'C' control room envelope system have |
| been replaced and testing is in progress to verify system operability. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36118 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WOLF CREEK REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: KS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:13[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DANIEL BOWERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/02/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHARLES CAIN R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
| |
| On 3/15/99 and 4/29/99, surveillance test STS AE-001, Main Feedwater |
| Isolation Valve Accumulator Discharge Test, was performed using a digital |
| temperature indicator that was subsequently found to be out of calibration. |
| The surveillance test ensures the nitrogen precharge is sufficient to close |
| the main feedwater isolation valves. With the out of calibration |
| temperature indication the nitrogen precharge may not have been adequate to |
| close the valves. The surveillance test is performed monthly and has |
| subsequently been performed using calibrated instruments. The feedwater |
| isolation valves are currently operable. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36119 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:51[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/01/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:49[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN MILLIFF |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/02/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHARLES CAIN R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LICENSEE 24 HOUR REPORT FOR VIOLATION OF OPERATING LICENSE NPF-80 (2G) |
| Section 2.C(2) |
| |
| Steam generator level channel L-0549 failed on 9/1/99 at 1529 CDT placing |
| the unit in a one hour Limiting Condition for Operation per Technical |
| Specifications. Action 20 of TS 3.3.2.6.d was entered and the channel |
| bistables were tripped. It was determined the cause of the level channel |
| failure could be manifested in the solid state protection system. At 1949 |
| CDT the bistables were untripped to verify the operability of the solid |
| state protection system. Unit 2 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 for |
| this condition. The input relay to the 'S' logic train for steam generator |
| level channel L-0549 was determined to be the cause of the failed channel. |
| Action 9 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.21 and action 22 of Technical |
| Specification 3.3.2.6.b were entered at 2017 CDT to replace the failed |
| relay. The relay was replaced and steam generator level channel L-0549 was |
| declared operable at 2055 CDT. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36120 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:02[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/02/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 12:57[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/02/1999|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |DAVID HILLS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |ROBERT PIERSON NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE UNDERWOOD | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i) ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS | |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
|OCBC 76.120(c)(2)(iii) REDUNDANT EQUIP INOP | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR REPORT - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE |
| |
| At 1257 CDT on 9/2/99, during performance of a proceduralized simulated |
| power failure test, the main breaker to the Unit 2 battery room tripped. In |
| addition, the transformer secondary breakers on all four auxiliary |
| substations tripped due to undervoltage relay action. As a result of the |
| loss of power to the four auxiliary substations, three plant air compressors |
| on-line in the C-335 air plant were deenergized. The unplanned loss of the |
| C-335 air compressors caused the on-line plant air compressor capacity to |
| drop to 6500 SCFM which is below the 10,250 SCFM required to ensure plant |
| Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) audibility. CAAS detectability |
| was not affected. CAAS TSR LCO actions for inaudibility were initiated for |
| affected facilities C-310, C-331, C-333, C-333A, C-335, C-337, C-337A, |
| C-360, C-400, and C-409. The plant air capacity was restored to above |
| 10,250 SCFM at 1300 hours by placing standby air compressors in service. |
| The CAAS was declared operable at 1312 hours and the LCOs were exited. |
| |
| The licensee is still investigating the cause of the event. |
| |
| This event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as a event in which |
| equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021