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Event Notification Report for September 3, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           09/02/1999 - 09/03/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35964  36018  36113  36114  36115  36116  36117  36118  36119  36120  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   35964       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  UNITED STATES AIR FORCE              |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/27/1999|
|LICENSEE:  UNITED STATES AIR FORCE              |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:58[EDT]|
|    CITY:  WASHINGTON DC            REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        07/26/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  DC |EVENT TIME:        10:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  42-23539-01AF         AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/02/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|                                                |BILL JONES           R4      |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLEY HAUGHNEY     NMSS    |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MAJOR HICKS                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAE1 20.2202(b)(1)       PERS OVEREXPOSURE      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| USAF PERSON INHALED DEPLETED URANIUM DUST                                    |
|                                                                              |
| THE USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE, BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, REPORTED THE        |
| FOLLOWING INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AT ROBINS AIR FORCE BASE, GEORGIA .        |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1000 ON 07/26/99, USAF PERSONNEL WERE PERFORMING MAINTENANCE ON A C-141   |
| CARGO AIRCRAFT AILERON.  A TECHNICIAN WAS FOUND USING A HAMMER AND CHISEL TO |
| REMOVE INSTALLED DEPLETED URANIUM COUNTERWEIGHTS FROM THE AILERON.  THIS     |
| PROCESS PRODUCED DUST AND DEBRIS WHICH WAS SCATTERED BY A NEARBY FAN.  THE   |
| TECHNICIAN USING A HAMMER AND CHISEL ON THE DEPLETED URANIUM WAS IN          |
| VIOLATION OF SEVERAL RULES.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| UPON DISCOVERY OF THIS ACTIVITY, THE TECHNICIAN WAS TOLD TO IMMEDIATELY STOP |
| WORK . THE AREA HAS BEEN SECURED AND DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES INITIATED.   |
| HEALTH PHYSICS SUPPORT HAS BEEN REQUESTED FROM BROOKS AIR FORCE BASE, SAN    |
| ANTONIO, TEXAS.  BIOASSAYS OF THE TECHNICIAN AND OTHER WORKERS IN THE AREA   |
| HAS BEEN INITIATED.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| CONTAMINATION LEVELS IN THE ROOM WHERE THE MAINTENANCE WAS BEING PERFORMED   |
| WERE FOUND TO BE ABOVE BACKGROUND (NUCLEAR RESEARCH CORPORATION MODEL        |
| ADM-300 DETECTOR WITH A PANCAKE PROBE WAS USED TO SURVEY THE AREA).  THE     |
| AREA OF CONTAMINATION HAS BEEN CONFINED TO THE BUILDING 180 MAINTENANCE      |
| BAY.                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| A FOLLOWUP REPORT BY THE USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE WILL BE MADE TO NRC     |
| REGION 4 BY 08/27/99.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE ON 9/2/99 FROM USAF (FAX) TO POERTNER ***                         |
|                                                                              |
| An Interim Report was submitted to Region 4.  A  follow-up or final report   |
| will be submitted by 9/28/99.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| HOO notified R4DO (Cain), R2DO (Landis), and NMSS (Hickey).                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36018       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:46[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        08/10/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:00[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/02/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JIM McCLEERY                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii)    EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE OF 13 HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER SPRINKLER SYSTEMS TO MEET SYSTEM      |
| OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS  (24-Hour Report)                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:     |
|                                                                              |
| "On 08/10/99 at approximately 1600 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent     |
| (PSS) was notified that 13 sprinkler systems associated with the High        |
| Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) system were not capable of meeting system         |
| operability requirements.  This condition was discovered as a result of an   |
| engineering review of individual sprinkler heads that had previously been    |
| identified as exhibiting corrosion around the valve seat.  The engineering   |
| review was conducted following the discovery that similar corrosion problems |
| experienced at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant resulted in sprinkler     |
| heads being unable to actuate at normal pressure.  An initial screening of   |
| PORTS sprinkler heads known to exhibit corrosion was conducted, and systems  |
| where the potential for two or more adjacent heads to be corroded were       |
| inspected.  This identified 11 systems in the X-333 and 2 systems in the     |
| X-326 that did not meet the sprinkler system operability requirement that no |
| two adjacent sprinkler heads be inoperable."                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "The PSS declared the affected sprinkler systems inoperable, and TSR         |
| required actions were completed.  Further inspections of sprinkler systems   |
| are planned.  This report will be updated if additional sprinkler systems    |
| are determined to be inoperable."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or                      |
| radioactive/radiological contamination  exposure as a result of this         |
| event."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the      |
| onsite Department of Energy representative.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE ON 8/19/99 AT 2327 FROM HALCOMB TO POERTNER ***                   |
|                                                                              |
| During continuing walkdowns, HPFW system #398 was discovered with two or     |
| more (3) adjacent sprinkler heads with mineral deposits.  This HPFW          |
| sprinkler was declared inoperable at 1038 hours and was repaired at 1407     |
| hours.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1415 EDT ON 8/28/99 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO S. SANDIN * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| The following information was provided as an update to this report:          |
|                                                                              |
| "During continuing walk downs of the HPFW system, systems 194, 196, 197,     |
| 211, 212 were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable to meet |
| system operability.  Systems were made inoperable at 1452 on 8/27/99.  All   |
| sprinklers were repaired and system operability made at 0550 8/26/99."       |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC           |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone).          |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 2337 ON 8/30/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| "During continuing walkdowns of the HPFW system, seven additional systems    |
| were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable to meet system   |
| operability. Six systems were in the X-333 and one in the X-330. These       |
| systems were made inoperable starting at 1100 8/30/99 and repairs are being  |
| performed at this time."                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Piccone).                                 |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 2305 8/31/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *            |
|                                                                              |
| "Add seven HPFW systems from X-333 building." The NRC resident inspector has |
| been informed of this update.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Pierson).                                 |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 0047 EDT on  9/2/1999 FROM JIM McCLEERY  TO FANGIE JONES * * *  |
|                                                                              |
| "Add fourteen HPFW systems from X-333 building." The NRC resident inspector  |
| has been informed of this update.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Pierson).                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36113       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:50[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        09/02/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/02/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KURT SISLER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii)    EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS   |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MICROFILTRATION SYSTEM pH PROBES OUT OF TOLERANCE                            |
|                                                                              |
| On 9/1/99 at 1300 hours, the plant shift superintendent was notified that a  |
| previously discovered X-705 Microfiltration System (MFS) pH probe out of     |
| tolerance condition likely existed during a time period when the MFS was in  |
| operation.  The out of tolerance condition was in a non-conservative         |
| direction and previously documented during a routine weekly surveillance on  |
| 6/4/99.  During the engineering evaluation, it was concluded at 1000 hours   |
| on 9/2/99, that the out of tolerance condition likely existed from           |
| approximately 5/28/99 to 6/4/99.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The out of tolerance condition affected 2 of the 3 probes (2 out of 3 logic  |
| required to activate the safety system).  The as found data for the 2 probes |
| indicated they would actuate at 6.70 pH and 6.63 pH, which is below the 7 pH |
| required setpoint.  A review of MFS operational history indicated that the   |
| MFS pH was maintained above a 7 pH during the time the probes are suspected  |
| to have been out of tolerance.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or                       |
| radioactive/radiological contamination.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified.                                |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1452EDT ON 9/2/99 FROM KURT SISLER TO S. SANDIN * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| The following is a portion of information provided as an update to include   |
| classification of the event as a 24-hour 91-01 Bulletin report:              |
|                                                                              |
| "Upon further review of [the] X-705 Microfiltration System pH probe failure, |
| it was determined to be reportable per NRC Bulletin 91-01 criteria.          |
|                                                                              |
| "Safety Significance:                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Two out of three safety system pH probes used in the microfiltration system |
| were found to be out of tolerance. The system relies on a two-out-of-three   |
| logic for system actuation. The probes read 7.30 and 7.37 for a buffer       |
| solution which had a pH of approximately 7.0 (depending on the temperature). |
| NCSA-0705_015.A10 takes credit for these pH probes in satisfying the double  |
| contingency principle.  Active engineered feature #5 states 'Microfiltration |
| effluent pH shutdown system will automatically stop the flow of microfilter  |
| permeate to the T-105 tank if pH<7.0 (with an allowable test tolerance of    |
| -0.2), by closing both isolation valves automatically.'  Since the probes    |
| were overestimating the pH, a pH of as low as approximately 6.70 could be    |
| present without an actuation of the system.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Contingency event B.4.2 credits the effluent pH shutdown system in          |
| preventing dissolved uranium past the microfilters (to an unsafe geometry    |
| tank downstream).  Also credited is the unlikely event of solution with a    |
| low pH making it to the microfiltration modules due to the functioning of    |
| the pH adjustment system. Therefore, the out of tolerance condition in a     |
| non-conservative direction constitutes a loss of one criticality control in  |
| a double contingency system.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "The discussion for B.4.2 includes the following,  'Based on chemical        |
| reactions and calculations in POEF-340-98-113, it would require an extremely |
| low pH (in the range of approximately 4 to 5) before the resulting solution  |
| would pick up any appreciable amounts (i.e., milligrams per liter) of        |
| uranium. However, this level of uranium is well below the individually       |
| always safe concentration limit reported in GAT-225, Rev. 4, of 5000 ppm     |
| U-235 for 100% enriched solution.'  Based on the as-found tolerances, a pH   |
| of 6.70 would have caused the system to actuate. Therefore, this event has a |
| low safety significance.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Potential Criticality Pathways involved (Brief scenario(s) of how           |
| criticality could occur):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Event B.4.2.a credits the effluent pH shutdown system in preventing         |
| dissolved uranium past the microfilters (to an unsafe geometry tank          |
| downstream). Also credited is the unlikely event of solution with a low pH   |
| making it to the microfiltration modules due to the functioning of the pH    |
| adjustment system. Both a failure in the pH shutdown system and the unlikely |
| event of a low pH following pH adjustment would have to occur for this       |
| scenario to take place.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Controlled parameters:                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "The prevention of acidic solutions from entering the microfiltration        |
| modules maintains the uranium in the filters in a favorable geometry, rather |
| than picking up uranium in addition to the safe batch being processed.       |
| Therefore, geometry is controlled.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material (include process    |
| limit and % worst case of critical mass):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "The operation is approved for 100% U-235; however, only USEC material       |
| (maximum 10% U-235 has been processed recently. The microfiltration process  |
| is controlled such that only a safe mass of U-235 is present in any          |
| unfavorable geometry. Operational information indicates that the pH was      |
| never less than 7.0 during the time the system was potentially out of        |
| calibration                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls(s) or control system(s) and description |
| of failures or deficiencies:                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Two out of three safety system pH probes used in the microfiltration system |
| were found to be out of tolerance. The system relies on a two-out-of-three   |
| logic for system actuation. The system is relied on to keep unmeasured       |
| quantities of uranium (from the microfilter modules) from entering an        |
| unfavorable geometry tank.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Therefore, the failure of the pH shutdown system (due to out of calibration |
| probes or any reason) is an analyzed condition."                             |
|                                                                              |
| The HOO notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS (Piccone).                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36114       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:21[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        09/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:36[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  D. COVEYOU                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/02/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       93       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RPS ACTUATION - REACTOR SCRAM                                                |
|                                                                              |
| At 1036 CDT on 9/2/99, Unit 1 received an RPS Automatic Actuation.  The      |
| actuation occurred due to low water level (12.5 inches, Level 3) resulting   |
| from a feedwater transient.  The lowest level noted was -10 inches on the    |
| wide range recorders.  No ECCS actuations occurred or were required during   |
| the transient.  All systems operated as designed except as described below:  |
| During the auxiliary power fast bus transfer the Unit 1 station air          |
| compressor surged and was subsequently restored, the 0C clean condensate     |
| pump tripped and the 0A clean condensate pump was started, the 1A and 1C     |
| circulating water pumps tripped, the 1B circulating water pump remained      |
| running, actions are being taken to restart the 1A circulating water pump    |
| and a delay is being encountered restoring the 345 KV ring bus due to        |
| difficulties in opening the main power transformer disconnects.              |
|                                                                              |
| All rods inserted and no safety relief valves lifted.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36115       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE           REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:44[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        09/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:43[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ANDREW WISNIEWSKI            |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/02/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |WILLIAM COOK         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ESF ACTUATION - PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) GROUP III        |
| ISOLATION                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| At 1143, on 9/2/99, the control room received a PCIS Group III isolation.  A |
| Group III isolation isolates all drywell atmospheric valves and reactor      |
| building ventilation.  Standby gas treatment started.  The cause of the      |
| isolation was the west refuel floor radiation monitor failing upscale.  The  |
| actuation is considered invalid.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| Local radiation readings were verified less than 1 mR/hr.  New fuel          |
| inspections will be secured prior to resetting the Group III isolation to    |
| allow reestablishing drywell to torus differential pressure which had been   |
| broken for vacuum breaker testing prior to the isolation.                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36116       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BYRON                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:02[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:17[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVEN RAMSEY                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/02/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |TAD MARSH            NRR     |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| At 1158 CDT, 9/2/99, the National Earthquake Information Center, Golden      |
| Colorado, reported that an earthquake occurred at 1117 CDT with an epicenter |
| approximately 30 miles from the site.  It was reported the earthquake        |
| occurred approximately 10 miles SSE of Dixon, Illinois at a magnitude of 3.5 |
| on the Richter scale.  Some minor tremors were felt by site personnel.       |
| There was no impact on plant operations.  Plant seismic instrumentation did  |
| not detect this event.  The instrumentation was tested and verified          |
| operable.  At approximately 1400 CDT a presentation was made to the local    |
| media to address questions they had.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident has been notified.                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36117       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:51[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GREG JANAK                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/02/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES CAIN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR REPORT - CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE VENTILATION SYSTEM MAKEUP UNIT TRAIN  |
| 'C' INOPERABLE                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| South Texas Project made the following notification per NPF-076, Section     |
| 2G:                                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Carbon samples obtained from control room envelope ventilation system makeup |
| unit train 'C' failed laboratory tests.  The Technical Specification         |
| 4.7.7.c.2 limit of 1% for methyl iodine penetration was exceeded.  The as    |
| found  methyl iodine penetration results were 2.87%.  This results in the    |
| train 'C'  control room envelope system being inoperable since the time that |
| the carbon samples were obtained on August 23, 1999 at 0940 CDT.  This       |
| results in the system being inoperable for greater than 7 days which is a    |
| violation of Technical Specification 3.7.7 action a.  The sample results     |
| were obtained on September 1, 1999 at 0935 CDT.                              |
|                                                                              |
| The charcoal adsorber banks for train 'C' control room envelope system have  |
| been replaced and testing is in progress to verify system operability.       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36118       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WOLF CREEK               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  KS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:13[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        09/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DANIEL BOWERS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/02/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES CAIN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ACCIDENT MITIGATION                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| On 3/15/99 and 4/29/99, surveillance test STS AE-001, Main Feedwater         |
| Isolation Valve Accumulator Discharge Test, was performed using a digital    |
| temperature indicator that was subsequently found to be out of calibration.  |
| The surveillance test ensures the nitrogen precharge is sufficient to close  |
| the main feedwater isolation valves.  With the out of calibration            |
| temperature indication the nitrogen precharge may not have been adequate to  |
| close the valves.  The surveillance test is performed monthly and has        |
| subsequently been performed using calibrated instruments.  The feedwater     |
| isolation valves are currently operable.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified.                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36119       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:51[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/01/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        19:49[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN MILLIFF                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/02/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES CAIN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LICENSEE 24 HOUR REPORT FOR VIOLATION OF OPERATING LICENSE NPF-80 (2G)       |
| Section 2.C(2)                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| Steam generator level channel L-0549 failed on 9/1/99 at 1529 CDT placing    |
| the unit in a one hour Limiting Condition for Operation per Technical        |
| Specifications.  Action 20 of TS 3.3.2.6.d was entered and the channel       |
| bistables were tripped.  It was determined the cause of the level channel    |
| failure could be manifested in the solid state protection system.  At 1949   |
| CDT the bistables were untripped to verify the operability of the solid      |
| state protection system.  Unit 2 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 for   |
| this condition.  The input relay to the 'S' logic train for steam generator  |
| level channel L-0549 was determined to be the cause of the failed channel.   |
| Action 9 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.21 and action 22 of Technical      |
| Specification 3.3.2.6.b were entered at 2017 CDT to replace the failed       |
| relay.  The relay was replaced and steam generator level channel L-0549 was  |
| declared operable at 2055 CDT.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36120       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/02/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:02[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        09/02/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        12:57[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/02/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |ROBERT PIERSON       NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE UNDERWOOD               |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i)     ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS   |                             |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii)    EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS   |                             |
|OCBC 76.120(c)(2)(iii)   REDUNDANT EQUIP INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR REPORT - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE                                    |
|                                                                              |
| At 1257 CDT on 9/2/99, during performance of a proceduralized simulated      |
| power failure test, the main breaker to the Unit 2 battery room tripped.  In |
| addition, the transformer secondary breakers on all four auxiliary           |
| substations tripped due to undervoltage relay action.  As a result of the    |
| loss of power to the four auxiliary substations, three plant air compressors |
| on-line in the C-335 air plant were deenergized.  The unplanned loss of the  |
| C-335 air compressors caused the on-line plant air compressor capacity to    |
| drop to 6500 SCFM which is below the 10,250 SCFM required to ensure plant    |
| Criticality Accident Alarm  System (CAAS) audibility.  CAAS detectability    |
| was not affected.  CAAS TSR LCO actions for inaudibility were initiated for  |
| affected facilities C-310, C-331, C-333, C-333A, C-335, C-337, C-337A,       |
| C-360, C-400, and C-409.  The plant air capacity was restored to above       |
| 10,250 SCFM at 1300 hours by placing standby air compressors in service.     |
| The CAAS was declared operable at 1312 hours and the LCOs were exited.       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is still investigating the cause of the event.                  |
|                                                                              |
| This event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as a event in which         |
| equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed.  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+