Event Notification Report for September 03, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/02/1999 - 09/03/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
3612236123361243612536126
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36122
Rep Org: FOXBORO COMPANY
Licensee: FOXBORO COMPANY
Region: 1
City: FOXBORO State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GEORGE JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Licensee: FOXBORO COMPANY
Region: 1
City: FOXBORO State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GEORGE JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/03/1999
Notification Time: 14:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/03/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/1999
Notification Time: 14:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/03/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
DEFECTIVE RELAYS PROVIDED TO FOXBORO BY VENDOR
Foxboro Co., has identified a potential failure with N-2A0-L2C-R and/or 2A0-L2C-R Contact Output Isolator cards. The subject cards may contain N0152CK relays supplied by Communications Instruments Inc. which may have been manufactured utilizing a repair residual on the contact armature plate. As a result, relays utilizing this repair residual have contacts that may not return to their normal de-energized position when the relay is de-energized (a condition known as contact hang-up).
Extensive analysis performed on a number of relays confirmed that utilization of this repair residual prevented the return of the contact armature (and contacts) to the normally de-energized position when the relay coil was de-energized after an energization period of at least one hour. Further analysis performed by the supplier of the relay confirmed the presence of this repair residual as the root cause for the relay failures. The supplier has determined that during assembly of the relays, this unauthorized repair procedure may have been utilized on 5 to 6 percent of the relays manufactured since manufacturing week 9834. Utilization of the repair residual has been halted by the manufacturer of the relay.
***Update on 09/13/99 at 1325 ET by George Johnson taken by MacKinnon****
"Subsequent investigate analysis and an audit performed at the supplier's manufacturing facility, has determined that the utilization of Mylar repair residuals is present is present on relays displaying a manufacturer's date code of 9806 to 9933.
"As we were investigating the Mylar problem, we identified another potential defect of substandard solder joints. Relays that were supplied with substandard (poorly wetted) solder joints could lead to cracked, or in extreme cases, intermittent solder connections. This potential defect could present itself as an intermittent connection to the common relay contact. Foxboro has determined that relays manufactured between 9801 and 9936 could display this potential defect.
"Foxboro is taking immediate corrective action to rectify the situation and will notify all Nuclear Utilities that have purchased this product from Foxboro during the time period affected and provide replacement relays" R1DO (Neil Della Greca) and NRR (Vern Hodge) notified.
Foxboro Co., has identified a potential failure with N-2A0-L2C-R and/or 2A0-L2C-R Contact Output Isolator cards. The subject cards may contain N0152CK relays supplied by Communications Instruments Inc. which may have been manufactured utilizing a repair residual on the contact armature plate. As a result, relays utilizing this repair residual have contacts that may not return to their normal de-energized position when the relay is de-energized (a condition known as contact hang-up).
Extensive analysis performed on a number of relays confirmed that utilization of this repair residual prevented the return of the contact armature (and contacts) to the normally de-energized position when the relay coil was de-energized after an energization period of at least one hour. Further analysis performed by the supplier of the relay confirmed the presence of this repair residual as the root cause for the relay failures. The supplier has determined that during assembly of the relays, this unauthorized repair procedure may have been utilized on 5 to 6 percent of the relays manufactured since manufacturing week 9834. Utilization of the repair residual has been halted by the manufacturer of the relay.
***Update on 09/13/99 at 1325 ET by George Johnson taken by MacKinnon****
"Subsequent investigate analysis and an audit performed at the supplier's manufacturing facility, has determined that the utilization of Mylar repair residuals is present is present on relays displaying a manufacturer's date code of 9806 to 9933.
"As we were investigating the Mylar problem, we identified another potential defect of substandard solder joints. Relays that were supplied with substandard (poorly wetted) solder joints could lead to cracked, or in extreme cases, intermittent solder connections. This potential defect could present itself as an intermittent connection to the common relay contact. Foxboro has determined that relays manufactured between 9801 and 9936 could display this potential defect.
"Foxboro is taking immediate corrective action to rectify the situation and will notify all Nuclear Utilities that have purchased this product from Foxboro during the time period affected and provide replacement relays" R1DO (Neil Della Greca) and NRR (Vern Hodge) notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36123
Rep Org: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA INC
Licensee: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA INC
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHLEEN ROUGHAN (FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Licensee: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA INC
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHLEEN ROUGHAN (FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/03/1999
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/03/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/1999
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/03/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) (NMSS)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) (NMSS)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
AEA TECHNOLOGY MODEL 770 AND 771 TYPE B(U) RADIOISOTOPE TRANSPORT PACKAGES FAIL 30 FOOT DROP TEST AND SUBSEQUENT PUNCTURE TEST.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from AEA Technology:
"AEA Technology QSA Inc. is making an initial 2 day report under 10 CFR 21.21 for the Model 770 and
771 Type B(U) radioisotope transport packages for industrial radiography sources. The Model 771 is
authorized for the transport of 110 Curies of Co-60 and the model 770 is authorized for 500 Curies of Co-60, (Certificate of Compliance number 9148 and 9107 respectively)."
Background
"In accordance with NRC bulletin 97-02, AEA Technology is in the process of re-testing Type B packages.
As part of the re-testing effort we performed a thirty foot drop and subsequent puncture test on the model
770 in accordance with approved Test Plan 88."
"In the course of performing the 30 foot drop on a model 770 package, the carbon steel bolts securing the shipping plate were sheared off resulting in the plate coming off. With the shipping plate off, the puncture test was performed by targeting the lock assembly. As a result of this impact, the lock assembly bolts sheared off, causing the lock assembly to become detached and losing security of the source assembly. These test[s] were performed with the test unit at 70 Celsius."
"The model 771 is identical in construction to the model 770, the most significant difference is the weight of the shield. Therefore, we believe we would see the same failure with the 771. There is one model 770 package and five model 771 packages."
Discussion
"An internal evaluation was performed and determined that the failure occurred due to the following:"
"-The shipping plate fits into a boss over the lock assembly. There is a gap of approximately 1/2 inch between the shipping plate and the boss. The bolt hole through the shipping plate leaves approximately 1/32 inch clearance. As a result of the 30 foot drop test, the plate moved and sheared the bolts before contacting the boss. This caused the plate to be detached from the package."
"-In the subsequent puncture test, the steel billet impacted the locking assembly and caused the four bolts holding the lock assembly on to break. In addition two of the bolts securing the lock plate to the device were broken off."
"-As a result of this cumulative damage the lock assembly was detached from the device, allowing the source to move outward and become unsecured."
"As the mechanism for retaining the source was removed from the device, it was concluded that source securement was lost and could potentially result in radiation levels exceeding 1R/hour at one meter from the package creating a substantial safety hazard."
Corrective Actions
"We are evaluating potential changes to the package to minimize movement of the plate during impact such that it does not contact the bolts securing the plate to the package, prior to hitting the boss. As long as the plate remains attached to the package, a subsequent puncture test will not be able to impact on the locking assembly. Securing hardware and the shipping plates will also be upgraded to stainless steel."
Justification for Continued Use
"We do not believe there is any significant increase in risk to the general public as a result of this finding. This is based on the following:"
"-The 770 and 771 have been in use for more than 20 years (approximately 500 shipments) with no failures. There have been numerous occasions of these packages being impacted from forklifts etc, with no loss of structural or shielding integrity."
"-All of the 770 and 771 are owned by AEA Technology, QSA Inc. and as such are subjected to a routine quality control inspection prior to each shipment. This ensures that the packages are in good physical condition prior to transport."
"-The damage only occurred after a worst case orientation as described in Test Plan 88 and the subsequent puncture test. This specific set of conditions is extremely unlikely in real field use conditions."
"-All the normal conditions of transport were satisfactorily tested and met."
"Based on all of the above, we believe there is no increased risk in continuing the transport of these devices. We will be making the appropriate changes to the package and retest to demonstrate that the package will meet all of the Type B(U) package requirements. As stated earlier, AEA Technology owns all of these packages and can perform the required upgrade prior to shipment, once the changes are tested and approved."
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from AEA Technology:
"AEA Technology QSA Inc. is making an initial 2 day report under 10 CFR 21.21 for the Model 770 and
771 Type B(U) radioisotope transport packages for industrial radiography sources. The Model 771 is
authorized for the transport of 110 Curies of Co-60 and the model 770 is authorized for 500 Curies of Co-60, (Certificate of Compliance number 9148 and 9107 respectively)."
Background
"In accordance with NRC bulletin 97-02, AEA Technology is in the process of re-testing Type B packages.
As part of the re-testing effort we performed a thirty foot drop and subsequent puncture test on the model
770 in accordance with approved Test Plan 88."
"In the course of performing the 30 foot drop on a model 770 package, the carbon steel bolts securing the shipping plate were sheared off resulting in the plate coming off. With the shipping plate off, the puncture test was performed by targeting the lock assembly. As a result of this impact, the lock assembly bolts sheared off, causing the lock assembly to become detached and losing security of the source assembly. These test[s] were performed with the test unit at 70 Celsius."
"The model 771 is identical in construction to the model 770, the most significant difference is the weight of the shield. Therefore, we believe we would see the same failure with the 771. There is one model 770 package and five model 771 packages."
Discussion
"An internal evaluation was performed and determined that the failure occurred due to the following:"
"-The shipping plate fits into a boss over the lock assembly. There is a gap of approximately 1/2 inch between the shipping plate and the boss. The bolt hole through the shipping plate leaves approximately 1/32 inch clearance. As a result of the 30 foot drop test, the plate moved and sheared the bolts before contacting the boss. This caused the plate to be detached from the package."
"-In the subsequent puncture test, the steel billet impacted the locking assembly and caused the four bolts holding the lock assembly on to break. In addition two of the bolts securing the lock plate to the device were broken off."
"-As a result of this cumulative damage the lock assembly was detached from the device, allowing the source to move outward and become unsecured."
"As the mechanism for retaining the source was removed from the device, it was concluded that source securement was lost and could potentially result in radiation levels exceeding 1R/hour at one meter from the package creating a substantial safety hazard."
Corrective Actions
"We are evaluating potential changes to the package to minimize movement of the plate during impact such that it does not contact the bolts securing the plate to the package, prior to hitting the boss. As long as the plate remains attached to the package, a subsequent puncture test will not be able to impact on the locking assembly. Securing hardware and the shipping plates will also be upgraded to stainless steel."
Justification for Continued Use
"We do not believe there is any significant increase in risk to the general public as a result of this finding. This is based on the following:"
"-The 770 and 771 have been in use for more than 20 years (approximately 500 shipments) with no failures. There have been numerous occasions of these packages being impacted from forklifts etc, with no loss of structural or shielding integrity."
"-All of the 770 and 771 are owned by AEA Technology, QSA Inc. and as such are subjected to a routine quality control inspection prior to each shipment. This ensures that the packages are in good physical condition prior to transport."
"-The damage only occurred after a worst case orientation as described in Test Plan 88 and the subsequent puncture test. This specific set of conditions is extremely unlikely in real field use conditions."
"-All the normal conditions of transport were satisfactorily tested and met."
"Based on all of the above, we believe there is no increased risk in continuing the transport of these devices. We will be making the appropriate changes to the package and retest to demonstrate that the package will meet all of the Type B(U) package requirements. As stated earlier, AEA Technology owns all of these packages and can perform the required upgrade prior to shipment, once the changes are tested and approved."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36124
Facility: WASHINGTON NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL KELLER
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL KELLER
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/03/1999
Notification Time: 19:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/03/1999
Event Time: 15:39 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/1999
Notification Time: 19:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/03/1999
Event Time: 15:39 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 78 | Power Operation | 78 | Power Operation |
Safeguards system degradation related to detection, immediate compensatory measures were not taken upon discovery, but was taken in a relatively short period of time. The NRC resident inspector will be notified.
Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.
Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36125
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Region: 4
City: State: UT
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JULIE FELICE
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Licensee: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Region: 4
City: State: UT
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JULIE FELICE
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/03/1999
Notification Time: 20:22 [ET]
Event Date: 09/03/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/1999
Notification Time: 20:22 [ET]
Event Date: 09/03/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
LEAKING DETECTOR CELL
Utah State University received a package from Shimadzu Scientific Instruments containing a detector cell. The licensee performed a wipe test on the cell after receipt. Initial survey results were acceptable but elevated. Subsequent wipe tests indicated greater than .005 microcuries. The detector cell contained 10 millicuries of Nickel - 63. The detector cell was repackaged and returned to the manufacturer.
Utah State University received a package from Shimadzu Scientific Instruments containing a detector cell. The licensee performed a wipe test on the cell after receipt. Initial survey results were acceptable but elevated. Subsequent wipe tests indicated greater than .005 microcuries. The detector cell contained 10 millicuries of Nickel - 63. The detector cell was repackaged and returned to the manufacturer.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36126
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MARTY MCADORY
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MARTY MCADORY
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/03/1999
Notification Time: 21:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/03/1999
Event Time: 18:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/1999
Notification Time: 21:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/03/1999
Event Time: 18:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE SPILL
While transporting a 400-gallon container of sodium hypochlorite, the container was dropped off the forklift. Approximately 325 gallons was spilled in the parking lot south west of the plant. The spill was contained with none reaching any waterways. The solution is 12% sodium hypochlorite. The Hazmat Incident Commander was dispatched; and the chemistry, environmental, safety, and plant services departments were notified. The National Response Center has been notified. Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and Claiborne County Emergency Planning District will be notified. A contractor has been contacted to clean up the spill and should arrive at midnight on 09/03/99. Oxygen and chlorine samples are being taken. No oxygen deficiencies or atmospheric chlorine has been observed.
The NRC resident inspector will be notified by the licensee.
****************** UPDATE AT 0532 EDT ON 09/04/99 FROM MARTY McADORY TO TROCINE ******************
The licensee stated that the contractor arrived and is currently in the final stages of cleanup operations.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Harrell).
****************** UPDATE AT 0629 EDT ON 09/04/99 FROM MARTY McADORY TO TROCINE ******************
The control room was recently notified that the cleanup operations have been completed. It is estimated that approximately 15 cubic yards of material was placed in one roll-off dumpster by the contractor.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Harrell).
While transporting a 400-gallon container of sodium hypochlorite, the container was dropped off the forklift. Approximately 325 gallons was spilled in the parking lot south west of the plant. The spill was contained with none reaching any waterways. The solution is 12% sodium hypochlorite. The Hazmat Incident Commander was dispatched; and the chemistry, environmental, safety, and plant services departments were notified. The National Response Center has been notified. Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and Claiborne County Emergency Planning District will be notified. A contractor has been contacted to clean up the spill and should arrive at midnight on 09/03/99. Oxygen and chlorine samples are being taken. No oxygen deficiencies or atmospheric chlorine has been observed.
The NRC resident inspector will be notified by the licensee.
****************** UPDATE AT 0532 EDT ON 09/04/99 FROM MARTY McADORY TO TROCINE ******************
The licensee stated that the contractor arrived and is currently in the final stages of cleanup operations.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Harrell).
****************** UPDATE AT 0629 EDT ON 09/04/99 FROM MARTY McADORY TO TROCINE ******************
The control room was recently notified that the cleanup operations have been completed. It is estimated that approximately 15 cubic yards of material was placed in one roll-off dumpster by the contractor.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Harrell).