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Event Notification Report for August 12, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           08/11/1999 - 08/12/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35943  36010  36014  36015  36016  36017  36018  36019  36020  36021  36022  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35943       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/21/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:48[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        07/21/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE VASELY                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       99       Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - SILICONE SEALANT NOT PROPERLY APPLIED TO SOME         |
| EQUIPMENT                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| During an engineering inspection of the condition of the sealant used to     |
| satisfy environmental qualification requirements, several components were    |
| found to have seal conditions that did not meet the Con Edison design        |
| specifications.  In each case it is believed that the degraded condition     |
| identified will not prevent the associated equipment from performing its     |
| intended safety functions and operability determinations are being completed |
| to document these conclusions. The specific problems identified are as       |
| follows:                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| - MSIV limit switches                                                        |
| - Auxiliary feedwater flow indication                                        |
| - Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps recirculation valves                |
| - City water backup solenoid valves and limit switches to motor driven       |
| auxiliary feedwater pumps.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| An inspection plan is being developed to determine the extent of this        |
| condition.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE ON 8/11/99 @ 1110 BY BALLETTA TO GOULD ***  RETRACTION            |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT SINCE FURTHER INVESTIGATION            |
| DETERMINED, THAT IN ALL CASES WHERE THE COMPONENTS' SEALANT WAS NOT WITHIN   |
| THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR THE LICENSEE'S DESIGN SPECIFICATION, THE         |
| COMPONENTS WERE OPERABLE AND CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THEIR RESPECTIVE SAFETY   |
| FUNCTIONS.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| THE REG 1 RDO(GRAY) WAS NOTIFIED.                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36010       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/10/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:49[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        08/09/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        11:30[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/12/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |DON COOL             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICK LARSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Operations personnel during a walkdown of the seal exhaust system discovered |
| that a nuclear criticality safety analysis (NCSA) requirement, maximum oil   |
| volume, could not be verified when an oil level was observed in the pumps    |
| separator's sight glass.  The pumps in question were used for the highly     |
| enriched uranium (HEU) program, and after it's suspension, prior to March    |
| 1997, the pumps were placed out of service.  Visible oil level in the sight  |
| glass without supporting documentation for oil capacity of these pumps       |
| constitutes a loss of one control (Volume) for double contingency.  The      |
| second control (Interaction) was maintained.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or                       |
| radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and DOE.                    |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE ON 8/12/99 @ 0130 BY SPAETH TO GOULD ***                          |
|                                                                              |
| WALKDOWNS OF SEAL EXHAUST PUMPS IN THE X-326 BUILDING REVEALED THAT SEVERAL  |
| OLD STYLE/OUT OF SERVICE PUMPS (KDH-80, DVD-8810) HAD INDICATION OF OIL IN   |
| THE SEPARATOR SITE GLASS, ABOVE THE LEVEL OF THE OVERFLOW.  THIS IS A LOSS   |
| OF ONE CONTROL (VOLUME) OF THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE.  THE SECOND     |
| CONTROL  (INTERACTION) REMAINS IN PLACE. THIS UPDATE IS BEING SUBMITTED TO   |
| IDENTIFY THE FACT THAT ADDITIONAL PUMPS WERE IDENTIFIED IN WHICH THE MAXIMUM |
| AMOUNT OF OIL COULD NOT BE VERIFIED.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND DOE WERE NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.            |
|                                                                              |
| REG 3 RDO(BURGESS) AND NMSS EO(HICKEY) WERE NOTIFIED.                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36014       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HARRIS                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:40[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        08/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:40[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PALMER                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES OGLE         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE LICENSEE ENTERED AN LCO ACTION STATEMENT DUE TO INCORRECT RADIATION      |
| MONITOR SETPOINTS.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| FOUR CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION RADIATION AREA MONITORS WERE          |
| DETERMINED TO HAVE A NON-CONSERVATIVE HIGH VALUE FOR BACKGROUND RADIATION    |
| LEVEL.  THIS RESULTS IN  A NON-CONSERVATIVE SETPOINT FOR THE CONTAINMENT     |
| VENTILATION ISOLATION FUNCTION.  THIS CONDITION ALSO PLACED THE PLANT IN AN  |
| LCO ACTION STATEMENT REQUIRING THEM TO ISOLATE NORMAL CONTAINMENT PURGE,     |
| WHICH THEY HAVE ALREADY DONE.  CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE TO RECALIBRATE THE  |
| SETPOINTS.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.                         |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1653 8/11/1999 FROM PALMER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *              |
|                                                                              |
| "This is a followup notification to our report made at 1040 this morning.    |
| The nonconservative setpoints for the containment ventilation isolation      |
| function from the four containment area radiation monitors has been          |
| corrected. The setpoints were corrected and the area radiation monitors      |
| declared operable at 1225 today. We are still investigating if this was an   |
| actual 'loss of a safety function'. Followup notification will be provided   |
| in the applicable 10 CFR 50.73 notification."                                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this update by the licensee.  |
| Notified R2DO (Ogle).                                                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36015       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALLAWAY                 REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:04[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        08/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:25[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVE NETERER                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DALE POWERS          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |ROBERT BENNEDICT     NRR     |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HEATER DRAIN LINE BREAK                           |
|                                                                              |
| Operators manually tripped the reactor after receiving indication of a steam |
| leak in the turbine building. An 8" diameter line from the 'D' 1st stage     |
| reheater drain tank to the '6B' high pressure heater experienced a double    |
| ended guillotine break. All control rods inserted into the core following    |
| the trip, and all systems functioned as designed. The licensee reported that |
| the unit is currently stable in Hot Standby, and the steam leak has been     |
| isolated. No personnel injuries resulted from this event.                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36016       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:43[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        08/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:06[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN WEAVER                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INADVERTENT DIESEL GENERATOR START DURING TROUBLESHOOTING OF A SPEED CONTROL |
| PROBLEM                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "On 08/11/99 at 1006, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an inadvertent      |
| start of the Division I Diesel Generator during troubleshooting of a speed   |
| control problem.  This speed control problem had been experienced earlier    |
| when the Diesel no-load frequency could not be controlled from the control   |
| room when the Diesel was started for the monthly surveillance/PMT run.  The  |
| Division I Diesel has been inoperable since 0710 on 08/10/99 for preplanned  |
| maintenance."                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "The primary starting circuit relay 4X1 had already been diagnosed with high |
| resistance readings across shut contacts indicating that it needed           |
| replacement.  Further troubleshooting was desired to ensure the remainder of |
| the primary starting circuit was operating correctly prior to restarting the |
| Diesel.  The primary starting circuit relay 4X1 was removed from the circuit |
| and a test meter was placed on the coil inputs for the 4X1 relay to monitor  |
| coil voltage when the DS9 optical isolator receiver was actuated by a        |
| flashlight.  This action allowed testing of the optical isolator receiver    |
| board 'E' without inducing an engine start.  The fact that board 'A' DS11    |
| optical isolator receiver would also turn on was missed during the planning  |
| of the emergent work order.  The DS11 optical isolator activation caused a   |
| secondary start signal to be generated which initiated the inadvertent       |
| Diesel start."                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "This notification is being made per 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(ii) for 'any event or |
| condition that results in a manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered  |
| Safety Feature.'  Although the actuation was invalid, the actuation was not  |
| pre-planned, and the Diesel was not removed from service."                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36017       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:08[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        08/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:53[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEN TRUESDALE                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii)     DEGRAD COND DURING OP  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF A HISTORICAL CONDITION INVOLVING LOW DIESEL GENERATOR VOLTAGE   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee determined that voltage for the 'B' emergency diesel generator  |
| would not have met the technical specification criteria, and this rendered   |
| the 'B' emergency diesel generator inoperable approximately 32 days prior to |
| 08/05/99.  Although the voltage was discovered to be low during a test run   |
| of the 'B' emergency diesel generator on 08/05/99, it was thought to be      |
| acceptable (satisfactory) at the time of the test run.  However, subsequent  |
| engineering review determined that the voltage was in fact below the         |
| technical specification acceptance criteria.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee determined this event to be reportable at 1353 on 08/11/99.     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36018       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:46[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        08/10/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:00[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/11/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JIM McCLEERY                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii)    EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE OF 13 HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER SPRINKLER SYSTEMS TO MEET SYSTEM      |
| OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS  (24-Hour Report)                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:     |
|                                                                              |
| "On 08/10/99 at approximately 1600 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent     |
| (PSS) was notified that 13 sprinkler systems associated with the High        |
| Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) system were not capable of meeting system         |
| operability requirements.  This condition was discovered as a result of an   |
| engineering review of individual sprinkler heads that had previously been    |
| identified as exhibiting corrosion around the valve seat.  The engineering   |
| review was conducted following the discovery that similar corrosion problems |
| experienced at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant resulted in sprinkler     |
| heads being unable to actuate at normal pressure.  An initial screening of   |
| PORTS sprinkler heads known to exhibit corrosion was conducted, and systems  |
| where the potential for two or more adjacent heads to be corroded were       |
| inspected.  This identified 11 systems in the X-333 and 2 systems in the     |
| X-326 that did not meet the sprinkler system operability requirement that no |
| two adjacent sprinkler heads be inoperable."                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "The PSS declared the affected sprinkler systems inoperable, and TSR         |
| required actions were completed.  Further inspections of sprinkler systems   |
| are planned.  This report will be updated if additional sprinkler systems    |
| are determined to be inoperable."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or                      |
| radioactive/radiological contamination  exposure as a result of this         |
| event."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the      |
| onsite Department of Energy representative.                                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36019       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GINNA                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:12[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        08/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE MICKLOW                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT ONE OF SIX RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) PUMP ANCHOR BOLTS WAS  |
| MISSING                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "During [an] engineering walkdown of [the] 'B' RHR pump, it was determined   |
| that  (1) corner anchor bolt was missing out of a total of (6) anchor bolts. |
| Preliminary analysis indicates that [the] existing anchorage configuration   |
| cannot be seismically qualified."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The unit is in a 72-hour limiting condition for operation as a result of     |
| this issue.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36020       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WOLF CREEK               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  KS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:34[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        08/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:33[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID CLARIDGE               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DALE POWERS          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VCT OUTLET VALVES DO NOT MEET 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX R SEPARATION REQUIREMENT   |
|                                                                              |
| The volume control tank (VCT) outlet valves (BG-LCV-1112B and C) are located |
| approximately 42" apart, and are not separated by a three hour rated fire    |
| barrier. A postulated fire in this area could prevent these valves from      |
| being closed. The valves are normally open to provide a suction source for   |
| the centrifugal charging pumps. The postulated fire could prevent the VCT    |
| from being isolated from the CCP suction, permitting the hydrogen cover gas  |
| in the VCT to enter the suction of the CCPs, damaging the pumps and causing  |
| the loss of high head safety injection. In addition, the VCT level           |
| transmitters associated with the above mentioned valves are not separated by |
| a fire barrier, and are less than 20 feet apart. A postulated fire could     |
| damage both level transmitters, preventing the VCT from isolating upon low   |
| level.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee considers this condition to be outside the design basis of the  |
| plant for fire protection of safe shutdown components. A continuous fire     |
| watch has been posted, and, in the event of a fire, actions will be taken to |
| isolate the VCT. If these actions are not successful, the boric acid         |
| transfer pump will be started to provide a water source to the CCPs to       |
| prevent hydrogen intrusion into the CCP suction. The licensee is currently   |
| working to find a permanent solution to this condition.                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36021       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/11/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:51[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        08/11/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        13:50[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/11/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEVIN BEASLEY                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i)     ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GASEOUS DIFFUSION REPORT - UF6 DETECTION SYSTEM RENDERED INOPERABLE          |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1350, on 8/11/99. maintenance personnel were in the process of           |
| completing repairs to valves in the C-333-A feed facility. During this work, |
| a pressure indicator was bumped by the maintenance personnel causing a       |
| spark, which shorted out the fuse to the #1 North and South autoclaves power |
| supply. The power supply, for the local autoclave area audible and visual    |
| alarms for the UF6 Release Detection System are fed from the #1 autoclaves   |
| control power. Due to the loss of control power to the #1 autoclaves, the    |
| UF6 Release Detection System was rendered inoperable. At the time of this    |
| incident, the C-333-A facility was in an operational mode in which the UF6   |
| Release Detection System was required to be operable. Limiting Conditions    |
| for Operation (LCO) required actions were put in place until power could be  |
| restored. Power was restored, and the UF6 Release Detection was operable at  |
| 1715 on 8/11/98.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under                  |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to     |
| function as designed."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36022       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:30[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        08/11/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        12:35[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/12/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SPAETH                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE                                              |
|                                                                              |
| On 8/11/99 at 1235 hrs the Plant Shift Superintendent(PSS) was notified that |
| a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not being       |
| maintained in the X-333 process building.  NCS Engineering, while performing |
| a Pre-implementation walkdown of an NCSA, noticed a depression in the floor  |
| around a building column (X-333 operating floor) that is greater than 1.5    |
| inches deep (approx. 1.75 to 2 inches).   A 12-position rack for storing     |
| small diameter uranium bearing containers is located directly above the      |
| depression. (NCSA-PLANT025)                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Requirement #10 of NCSA-PLANT025.A01 states in part, "Storage areas shall    |
| not be located over equipment or spaces that could confine a spill to a      |
| depth of greater than 1.5 inches.  In the event of a spill or a loss of      |
| container integrity, the depression in the floor (a violation of requirement |
| #10) could result in an unfavorable geometry."                               |
|                                                                              |
| At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent the requirements for an   |
| NCS anomalous condition were initiated and the area bounded off.             |
|                                                                              |
| Safety significance of the event is low and the diked area would have to be  |
| full of uranium at optimum moderated conditions for criticality to be        |
| possible.  Geometry was the controlled parameter that was lost.  The mass of |
| material (uranium solution with a max allowed enrichment of 10%) is not      |
| controlled therefore more than a safe mass could be in the containers.       |
|                                                                              |
| Corrective action was to remove all small containers from the storage area   |
| and reestablish NCS compliance.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or                       |
| radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The DOE Representative will be notified.                                     |
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