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Event Notification Report for August 2, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           07/30/1999 - 08/02/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35790  35890  35958  35973  35974  35975  35976  35977  35978  35979  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35790       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/03/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:44[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        06/02/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:30[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/31/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |DON COOL             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  THOMAS WHITE                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i)     ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THREE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO CORRODED HEADS (24-hour   |
| report)                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "On 06/02/99 at 1630 CDT, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified  |
| that numerous sprinkler heads were corroded, affecting 16 sprinkler systems  |
| in C-337 and one system in C-333, such that the ability of the sprinklers to |
| flow sufficient water was called into question.  Subsequently, these         |
| sprinkler systems were declared inoperable, and TSR-required actions         |
| establishing roving fire patrols were initiated.  This deficiency was        |
| detected during scheduled system inspections conducted by Fire Protection    |
| personnel.  Currently, functionality of the sprinkler heads has not been     |
| fully evaluated by Fire Protection personnel, and the remaining cascade      |
| buildings are currently being inspected, and if necessary, this report will  |
| be updated to identify any additional areas.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under                  |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to     |
| function as designed."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.                  |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1022 ON 06/04/99 FROM CAGE TO TROCINE * * *                  |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkle heads on system D-1 in C-337 and two sprinkler heads on system |
| 27 in C-335 were identified to also be corroded.  These were identified to   |
| the PSS on 06/03/99 at 1600 CDT and 1601 CDT, respectively, and determined   |
| to require an update to this report by the PSS.                              |
|                                                                              |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under                  |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to     |
| function as designed."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update.  The   |
| NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Combs).        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2152 ON 06/17/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * *               |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "Three sprinkler heads on system C-15 and five sprinkler heads on system B-8 |
| in C-333 were identified to also be corroded.  The PSS was notified of this  |
| condition at 1300 CDT on 06/17/99 and determined that an update to this      |
| report was required."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under                  |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to     |
| function as designed."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update.  The   |
| NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera).                           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1440 6/18/1999 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system C-15 and one sprinkler head on system B-8 in  |
| C-333 were identified to have corrosion.  The PSS was notified of this       |
| condition at 1350 CDT on 06/18/99.  The area of the fire patrol for system   |
| C-15 was expanded to include the two heads identified as corroded.  The one  |
| head on system B-8 was in the area already being patrolled.  The PSS         |
| determined that an update to this report was required."                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update.  Notified R3DO  |
| (Madera).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1315 6/25/1999 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *              |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-8 and three sprinkler heads on system D-7   |
| in C-337 were identified to have corrosion.  The PSS was notified of the     |
| condition on system D-8 at 0125 CDT on 06/25/99 and at 1019 CDT on 06/25/99  |
| for system D-7.  Both systems were immediately declared inoperable and LCO   |
| fire patrol actions were implemented.  It was determined that an update to   |
| this report was required."                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update.  Notified R3DO  |
| (Jordan).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 2119 7/30/1999 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *                |
|                                                                              |
| "Five sprinkler heads and one sprinkler piping tee on C-337 system D-7 were  |
| identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of these corroded system  |
| parts and declared the system inoperable at 0931 CDT on 07/30/99.  LCO       |
| required fire patrols of the affected area were initiated.  The PSS          |
| determined that an update to this event report was required."                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update.  Notified R3DO  |
| (Wright).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1655 7/31/1999 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *               |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-1 were identified to have corrosion.  |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system  |
| inoperable at 1155 on 7/31/99. LCO required fire patrols of the affected     |
| area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this report was    |
| required."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO   |
| (Wright).                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35890       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE           REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/02/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:58[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        07/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:34[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE EMPY                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/30/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN   R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - PRIMARY CONTAINMENT COULD BE OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS UNDER CERTAIN        |
| CONDITIONS -                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| During validation of the Vermont Yankee (VY) Containment Pressurization      |
| System Design Basis Document, the licensee determined that a design analysis |
| which envelopes the design operating conditions of the torus and drywell     |
| does not exist.  Specifically, no design analysis exists which verifies the  |
| ability of the torus-to-drywell and torus-to-reactor building vacuum         |
| breakers to limit depressurization of the containment to less than the       |
| design basis value of - 2 psig (22A1265, Rev. 1).                            |
|                                                                              |
| The specific event in question involves the effects of an inadvertent        |
| drywell spray actuation occurring during conditions when the torus water is  |
| at a minimum temperature 50F (VYAPF 0150.03).                               |
|                                                                              |
| Present design evaluations (VYC-236, Rev 0, "Torus-Reactor Building Vacuum   |
| Breaker Conditions" and VYC-315, Rev 0, "Primary Containment Vacuum")        |
| calculated the resulting torus and containment pressure caused by            |
| inadvertent spray actuation, but used a spray water temperature of 83.7F.   |
| These analyses concluded that vacuum breaker operation was not necessary to  |
| ensure that the containment remained within its external design pressure.    |
| These analyses evaluated this event at normal operating conditions (100F    |
| torus water temperature, 33F service water temperature, and 165F drywell   |
| temperature).  No evaluation has been performed for temperatures below these |
| values.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The General Electric design basis for the VY vacuum breaker sizing is based  |
| on an evaluation for Monticello. This evaluation assumed a minimum spray     |
| water temperature of 50F and assumed that all vacuum breakers operated      |
| within one second.  The VY vacuum breaker design differs from this design    |
| assumption in that operation of the torus-to-reactor building vacuum         |
| breakers requires the opening of air operated valves (AOVs) #SB-16-19-11A &  |
| B as part of the vacuum breaker operation.  These AOVs require more than 5   |
| seconds to operate (VYOPF 4115.01, 03/23/99).  As a result, it cannot be     |
| assured that the vacuum breaker system will function adequately to prevent   |
| the containment from exceeding its design basis external design pressure for |
| low spray water temperature conditions.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| A plant operability evaluation, based on the information included in         |
| VYC-315, Rev 0, has concluded that a minimum drywell spray water temperature |
| of 70F would be required to approach the design basis containment external  |
| pressure limit of - 2.0 psig without effective vacuum breaker operation.  In |
| order to achieve this low spray water temperature, a combination of low      |
| torus water temperature and/or low service water temperature would be        |
| required to exist.  Current operating conditions indicate that the torus     |
| water temperature is being maintained at ~80F and has been maintained at    |
| this temperature during the months of May and June, 1999.  The current       |
| service water temperature of 79F ensures that, in the event of an           |
| inadvertent drywell spray event, spray water temperature will not be lower   |
| than 70F.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| This 79F service water temperature corresponds to the maximum 20 year       |
| average for river water temperature.  Based on this temperature, river water |
| temperature would not be anticipated to decrease below 70F until            |
| mid-to-late September, 1999.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Based on the current high service water temperature, in combination with     |
| existing torus water temperature, this condition does not effect the         |
| operability of the primary containment or the operability of the primary     |
| containment vacuum breakers.  There is no operability concern providing the  |
| torus water temperature remains above 70F and river water temperature       |
| remains above 33F.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The license plans to immediately issue standing orders to plant operators    |
| regarding this situation and to perform necessary design analyses prior to   |
| September, 1999.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0956 ON 07/30/99 BY SORTWELL TO WEAVER * * *                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is retracting this event report based on the following          |
| explanation:                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| GE Design Specification #22A2753 sizes the torus-to-reactor building vacuum  |
| breakers to cope with an inadvertent containment spray initiation.  This     |
| specification is not part of VY's current licensing basis.  Rather, this     |
| specification provides guidance to be applied when determining the size of   |
| the subject vacuum breakers. The postulated scenario (the inadvertent spray  |
| initiation) requires multiple operator errors. The VY plant design basis     |
| requires that the licensee postulate any SINGLE failure, including single    |
| operator errors.  Scenarios that assume multiple operator errors are beyond  |
| the design basis of the VY plant.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| At the time of the original ENS notification, VY had in place, analyses      |
| supporting containment spray operations.  Those analyses demonstrated that   |
| the actuation of containment sprays, consistent with VY plant procedures,    |
| would have effects consistent with the design basis of the plant.            |
| Additionally, at the time of discovery, VY had in place, calculations that   |
| bounded the inadvertent spray scenario under the plant conditions present.   |
|                                                                              |
| More recently, an analysis was performed to quantify the possible effect of  |
| an inadvertent initiation of containment spray under the off-normal          |
| conditions identified in the GE design specification, including the assumed  |
| multiple operator errors.  The analysis assumes initial plant conditions     |
| that are conservative.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Using this approach, it was determined that an inadvertent initiation of     |
| containment sprays could, if unmitigated, achieve the drywell design         |
| pressure differential of 2 psid (drywell external pressure greater than      |
| internal pressure) approximately 20 seconds after initiation.                |
|                                                                              |
| The subject vacuum breakers would be fully open approximately 13 seconds     |
| into the postulated event.  Either one of the two sets of vacuum breakers    |
| has adequate capacity to limit the pressure transient to less than 2 psid.   |
|                                                                              |
| Therefore, this event is being retracted.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the NRC operations      |
| officer notified the R1DO (Kinneman).                                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35958       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/25/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:32[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        07/25/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:21[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WILLIAMS                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/30/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PATRICK HILAND       R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A)  UNANALYZED COND OP     |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       87       Power Operation  |87       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT ENTERED TECH SPEC 3.2.3 LCO ACTION STATEMENT                           |
|                                                                              |
| AT 2021 CDT ON 07/25/99, THE "1B21-N500" PRESSURE TRANSMITTER INDICATION     |
| DROPPED FROM 1000 PSIG TO INDICATED 600 PSIG REACTOR PRESSURE.  THIS         |
| TRANSMITTER IS THE PRIMARY PRESSURE TRANSMITTER TO THE ELECTROHYDRAULIC      |
| CONTROL (EHC) SYSTEM.  DUE TO THIS CHANGE IN PRESSURE INDICATION, THE BACKUP |
| TRANSMITTER TOOK CONTROL.  IN THIS LINEUP (BACKUP TRANSMITTER IN CONTROL OF  |
| THE EHC SYSTEM), THERE IS NO OTHER BACKUP TRANSMITTER AVAILABLE AND          |
| PROCEDURE "LOA-EH-101" STATES THAT THIS CONDITION IS AN UNANALYZED CONDITION |
| AND THE PLANT IS TO ENTER TS 3.2.3.  TS 3.2.3 REQUIRES THE REACTOR TO BE     |
| <25% POWER WITHIN 4 HOURS.  THIS CONDITION WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE AN       |
| UNANALYZED CONDITION UNTIL 2045 CDT ON 07/25/99 UTILIZING THE ABOVE          |
| PROCEDURE AND THE UFSAR.  THE PROBLEM WITH THE TRANSMITTER IS BEING          |
| INVESTIGATED TO DETERMINE WHY IT DOES NOT INDICATE 1000 PSIG.                |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                         |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION AT 2253 ON 07/29/99 FROM GRANWALD TO STRANSKY * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| "It was subsequently determined from a detailed evaluation that was          |
| performed in May, 1999, which clearly shows that operation with a pressure   |
| regulator out of service at LaSalle is bounded by the thermal limits         |
| calculated for the slow closure of one or more turbine control valves        |
| (TCVs).  The use of the thermal limits reported in the LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle  |
| 8 Core Operating Limits Report for the slow closure of one or more TCVs for  |
| operations with a pressure regulator out of service does not result in       |
| operation of the plant in an unanalyzed condition.  The thermal limits were  |
| adjusted to be in line with the TCV slow closure analysis and plant thermal  |
| limits were declared operable and Tech Spec 3.2.3 exited within 4 hours.     |
| Therefore, LaSalle Unit 1 was not in an unanalyzed condition as reported in  |
| Event No. 35958."                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector and the NRC Operations   |
| Officer notified the R3DO Wright.                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35973       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/30/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:02[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        07/29/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:16[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ANTHONY PETRELLI             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/30/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD  |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Check valve #2CSH*V16 on the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System pump     |
| suction from the suppression pool is not in the inservice testing program    |
| plan for reverse flow testing.  A preliminary review indicates that this     |
| check valve should be reverse-flow tested.  The HPCS System was declared     |
| inoperable and Unit 2 entered a 14 day LCO.  Steps are being taken to retest |
| the valve.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35974       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DRESDEN                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/30/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] [3]                STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:01[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3           |EVENT DATE:        07/30/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:50[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN SAMPSON                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/30/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       89       Power Operation  |89       Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       89       Power Operation  |89       Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.            |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY THAT ON   |
| 07/29/99, STATION COOLING WATER EFFLUENT EXCEEDED DISCHARGE EFFLUENT         |
| TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35975       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/30/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:24[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        07/30/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        19:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVE NOYES                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/30/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A)  UNANALYZED COND OP     |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SALT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM EXCEEDED MAXIMUM DESIGN TEMPERATURE                |
|                                                                              |
| The 'A' train of the salt service water system was declared inoperable when  |
| the intake structure temperature exceeded the maximum design temperature of  |
| 105F.  The highest actual temperature reached was 106F, which occurred for |
| approximately 15 minutes, until operators were able to reduce the            |
| temperature by realigning the salt service water system.  The current intake |
| structure temperature is 100F.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35976       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK                REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/31/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:22[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        07/31/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:41[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  J. REINSBURROW               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/31/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION ISOLATION                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "On 7/31/99 at 11:41 during change out of the Brunswick site chlorine tank   |
| car an isolation of the control building ventilation system occurred. Two    |
| chlorine detectors actuated at the Service Water building adjacent to the    |
| chlorine tank car. These detectors isolate the control building ventilation  |
| system on detection of chlorine. The control building ventilation system     |
| components functioned as designed.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "The evolution in progress during the isolation was the disconnection of the |
| spent chlorine tank car. Personnel in the area of the tank car with portable |
| chlorine detection equipment did not detect the presence of chlorine gas.    |
| Subsequent inspections of areas adjacent to the tank car did not identify    |
| chlorine gas with portable monitors."                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The chlorine detectors were reset, and the ventilation system was restored   |
| to its normal lineup. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this   |
| event by the licensee.                                                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35977       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/01/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:43[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        08/01/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:20[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT KIRCHNER              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/01/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       0        Startup          |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DURING STARTUP                                       |
|                                                                              |
| An automatic reactor scram occurred due to spurious level spikes of          |
| intermediate range monitor (IRM) neutron detector channels 12, 15 and 16. At |
| the time of the event, the unit was critical, but just below the point of    |
| adding heat. All control rods inserted following the scram.                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported that the spurious IRM spikes occurred when the         |
| selector switch for IRM channel 11 was rotated from range 2 to range 3. The  |
| licensee is currently investigating the cause of this event. The NRC         |
| resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35978       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/01/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:38[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        08/01/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  AL DEES                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/01/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AENS 50.72(b)(1)(v)      ENS INOPERABLE         |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       98       Power Operation  |98       Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       98       Power Operation  |98       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF NOAA RADIO                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| NOAA radio communications were lost for 22 minutes due to a problem offsite. |
| The radio has been restored to operation.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has notified the state and local government agencies and will   |
| notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35979       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WATERFORD                REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/01/1999|
|    UNIT:  [3] [] []                 STATE:  LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:45[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] CE                               |EVENT DATE:        08/01/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:49[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID LITOLFF                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/01/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BILL JONES           R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)   PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3     M/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF CONTROLLED BLEEDOFF FLOW TO RCP 2B        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee performed a manual reactor trip due to the loss of Reactor      |
| Coolant Pump (RCP) 2B seal controlled bleedoff flow.  The loss of seal       |
| coolant flow resulted in a high seal temperature which requires tripping the |
| reactor by procedure.  RCP 2B was secured immediately following the reactor  |
| trip.  The plant is in Hot Standby and stable.  The loss of seal controlled  |
| bleedoff flow is under investigation.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+