Event Notification Report for July 29, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           07/28/1999 - 07/29/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35792  35881  35891  35963  35967  35968  35969  35970  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   35792       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  U.S. AIR FORCE                       |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/04/1999|
|LICENSEE:  U.S. AIR FORCE                       |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:34[EDT]|
|    CITY:  Washington D.C.          REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        06/04/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  DC |EVENT TIME:        06:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  42-23539-01AF         AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/28/1999|
|  DOCKET:  03028641                             |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |RONALD BELLAMY       R1      |
|                                                |KENNETH BARR         R2      |
+------------------------------------------------+LINDA HOWELL         R4      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MAJOR MITCH HICKS            |FRED COMBS           NMSS    |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
+------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|IBDB 30.50(b)(4)(ii)     DAMAGED LNM/CONTAINER  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF TWO 500- �Ci STRONTIUM-90 SOURCES DUE TO A HELICOPTER CRASH IN       |
| FAYETTEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA (24-HOUR REPORT)                                |
|                                                                              |
| A representative from Bolling Air Force Base (located in Washington D.C.)    |
| reported that a helicopter from Hurlburt Field (located in Mary Esther,      |
| Florida) crashed at 2300 on 06/02/99 while performing a night training       |
| exercise at Pope Air Force Base (located in Fayetteville, North Carolina).   |
| Each helicopter blade contained an in-flight blade inspection system (IBIS)  |
| source with 500 �Ci of Strontium-90, and it is currently believed that the   |
| helicopter had four blades.  Two of the four IBIS sources have been          |
| identified and recovered by the pope Air Force Base Accident Response Team.  |
| These devices have been bagged and will be checked for contamination.        |
| Pending the completion of the crash investigation, the licensee plans to     |
| search for the remaining IBIS sources with survey equipment.                 |
|                                                                              |
| This event was reported to Bolling Air Force Base at 0630 on 06/04/99.       |
|                                                                              |
| Five individuals survived the crash, and there was one fatality.             |
|                                                                              |
| The limit referenced in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix C, for Strontium-90 is 0.1  |
| �Ci.                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Region 4 Office.  (Call the NRC         |
| Operations Center for a licensee contact telephone number.)                  |
|                                                                              |
| ***Update on 07/28/99 at 1215 ET by Major Hicks (USAF) taken by              |
| MacKinnon***                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| All IBIS sources from the Helicopter crash were recovered as of 29 Jun 99.   |
| R4DO (Bill Jones), R2DO (Haag) and NMSS (Scott Moore) notified.              |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35881       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/30/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] [3]               STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:59[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE:        06/30/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:22[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RANDY TODD                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/28/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PAUL FREDRICKSON     R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Certain accident scenarios could cause pressurization of Low Pressure      |
| Injection and Rx Bldg Spray Systems -                                        |
|                                                                              |
| During investigation of a valve leak observed during a test on Unit 1, it    |
| was discovered that there is a possibility that certain accident scenarios   |
| could cause pressurization of certain portions of the Low Pressure Injection |
| (LPI) and Reactor Building Spray (RBS) Systems above values previously       |
| evaluated.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Specifically, following a small break LOCA, the LPI System is still taking   |
| suction from the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) when the system is        |
| aligned with the LPI Pump 'A' discharging to both injection headers through  |
| the crossover piping in preparation for realigning suction to the Reactor    |
| Building Emergency Sump.  At this time, it is possible to pressurize the     |
| suction piping of the idle LPI Pump 'B' and RBS Pump 'B'.  This can occur    |
| because the LPI Pump 'B' minimum flow recirculation line is connected        |
| downstream of the pump discharge check valve or as a result of leakage       |
| through the pump discharge check valve.  A small amount of fluid would flow  |
| through the recirculation line until the pressure in the pump suction piping |
| is equal to the pressure in the cross-connected LPI discharge headers.       |
| (Procedural details would prevent this problem from affecting Train 'A'.)    |
|                                                                              |
| This pressure could be in excess of the capability of certain valve          |
| operators to reposition process valves. Among the affected valves is #LP-20, |
| the RB Emergency Sump Train 'B' isolation valve.                             |
|                                                                              |
| When nearing depletion of the BWST inventory, the Emergency Operating        |
| Procedure calls for opening both RB Emergency Sump isolation valves (#LP-19  |
| on Train 'A' and #LP-20 on Train 'B').                                       |
|                                                                              |
| It was also recognized that #LP-19, in the redundant flow path, must be      |
| considered vulnerable to a random single failure.                            |
|                                                                              |
| Therefore, at 1722 on 06/30/99, Oconee Site Managers concluded that #LP-20   |
| must be considered inoperable for use in this specific system configuration. |
| This configuration is only used during certain small break LOCAs which       |
| require that the LPI and High Pressure Injection (HPI) Systems be placed in  |
| the "piggy-back" configuration where the LPI pumps supply flow to the HPI    |
| pump suctions.  In addition, this failure scenario only applies to the       |
| limited spectrum of small breaks that do not result in initiation of Reactor |
| Building Spray.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Because this inoperablity only affects the HPI-LPI "piggy-back" Train 'B'    |
| flow path, the operating units (Units 2 & 3) entered Tech Spec 3.5.2,        |
| Condition C, which has a 72 hour action statement.  The main corrective      |
| action is implementation of a system alignment change which will create a    |
| vent path to the Reactor Building using the Reactor Building Spray Train 'B' |
| piping.  This will prevent the possibility of pressurizing the piping at     |
| #LP-20 and eliminate the potential for this problem.  The procedure changes  |
| are in progress and the implementation is expected to occur on night shift   |
| tonight (06/30/99).  In addition, operators on shift will receive awareness  |
| training on the new configuration as it is implemented.  Corresponding       |
| changes to the Emergency Operating Procedure                                 |
| will be implemented prior to exiting the Tech Spec 3.5.2.C action statement. |
| Affected Periodic Test, Maintenance, and Instrument Procedures have been     |
| placed on administrative hold until they can be revised.                     |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) in a Refueling Outage          |
| preparing to enter Mode 4.  These alignment changes will be incorporated on  |
| Unit 1, as appropriate, during plant start-up.                               |
|                                                                              |
| The analysis of this issue is continuing, and the potential exists that      |
| further analysis or testing may allow retraction                             |
| of this notification.  If not, further details will be provided in the LER   |
| that will be submitted to the NRC.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| ***Retraction on 07/28/99 at 1651 by James V. Weast taken by MacKinnon***    |
|                                                                              |
| After further investigation and analysis, Duke Energy determined that the    |
| Reactor Building (RB) Emergency Sump Train "B" isolation valve (LP-20) for   |
| all three units could have opened on demand, therefore being operable for    |
| the accident scenarios for which operability was suspect.  Therefore, this   |
| event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72. R2DO (Haag) notified.                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35891       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/02/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:13[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        07/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVE WALSH                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/28/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN   R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Emergency safeguards system transformer radiator bottom oil drain valves   |
| found closed -                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| At 1500 on 07/01/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 was in Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown)   |
| and Unit 2 was at 100% power, when the licensee identified that the radiator |
| bottom drain valves were closed on two of the four emergency safeguards      |
| system (ESS) transformers.  Each transformer provides the preferred offsite  |
| power to one load group and alternate offsite power to another.  The two     |
| affected transformers provided backup to each other.  The drain valves allow |
| oil circulation though the transformer finned coolers.  The drain valves     |
| were opened and the ESS transformers are currently operable.                 |
|                                                                              |
| Per the Susquehanna Tech Spec 3.8.1 Basis, the AC electrical power           |
| distribution system is designed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50,         |
| Appendix A, GDC 17, which requires the AC electrical power system to provide |
| independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to ESF    |
| systems.  The class 1E AC distribution system is divided into redundant load |
| groups, so the loss of any one group does not prevent minimum safety         |
| functions from being performed.  Each load group has connections to two      |
| preferred offsite power supplies and a single emergency diesel generator     |
| (EDG) in order to meet this requirement.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Licensee evaluation of the effects of the drain valves being closed is in    |
| progress.  Initial evaluation has determined that in this configuration,     |
| these transformers would have been able to perform their design function for |
| an indeterminate period of time.  Pending further evaluation, this report is |
| being provided based on conservative interpretation of the existing guidance |
| in that due to the absence of design analysis for this scenario, it could    |
| represent a condition that is potentially outside of design basis, therefore |
| reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B).                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee currently believes that this condition was not safety           |
| significant because Susquehanna is designed for a DBA LOCA/LOOP with a       |
| single failure which they believe is more limiting.  At no time were any ESS |
| buses deenergized due to this condition and the condition was promptly       |
| corrected and does not currently exist.  The EDGs would have been available  |
| to power the subject buses had the transformers failed.                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| ***Retraction on 07/28/99 at 1145 ET from Mike Peal taken by MacKinnon***    |
|                                                                              |
| Upon completion of an engineering evaluation, the Emergency Safeguards       |
| System transformers would have performed as designed for the duration of any |
| postulated accident condition.  Based on this evaluation the condition       |
| described in the above event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72 or 50.73.    |
| R1DO (John MacKinnon).                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified the event retraction.                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35963       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/27/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:25[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        07/27/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PETE GARDNER                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/28/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) PUMP RECEIVED A START SIGNAL DURING A            |
| SURVEILLANCE TEST.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1145 ON 07/27/99, DURING PERFORMANCE OF A SURVEILLANCE TEST FOR REMOTE    |
| SHUTDOWN PANEL OPERABILITY (ST-2-088-321-2), THE "2A" RHR PUMP RECEIVED A    |
| START SIGNAL.  AT THE TIME, CONTROL OF THE PUMP HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE  |
| REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL.  THE PUMP START WAS UNEXPECTED AND THUS, IS BEING     |
| REPORTED AS AN ESF ACTUATION UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF LIMERICK REPORTABILITY    |
| MANUAL (F-02).  THE TRANSFER SWITCH WAS BEING CLEANED AND CYCLED DURING THE  |
| PUMP START AND AT THIS TIME IT IS BELIEVED THAT A CONTACT HAD INADVERTENTLY  |
| MADE UP.  THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT IS BEING INVESTIGATED AND THE "2A" RHR PUMP |
| AND THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL HAVE CONSERVATIVELY BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE   |
| UNTIL THE INVESTIGATION IS COMPLETE.  THE RHR PUMP WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE  |
| AFTER RETURNING CONTROL POWER VIA THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN TRANSFER SWITCH.       |
|                                                                              |
| ALL OTHER EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ARE FULLY OPERABLE, IF NEEDED.      |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| ***RETRACTION ON 07/28/99 AT 1137 ET BY STAN T. GAMBLE TAKEN BY              |
| MACKINNON***                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE TESTING (ST-2-088-321-2) WAS BEING      |
| CONDUCTED AT THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL (RSP). A FLUKE 8050A MULTIMETER (DVM) |
| WAS INSTALLED IN THE CONTROL CIRCUIT TO DETERMINE THE CONDITION OF           |
| HANDSWITCH CONTACTS.  THE TEST DIRECTED PLACING THE CONTROL TRANSFER SWITCH  |
| IN THE "NORMAL" POSITION PRIOR TO REMOVING THE DVM FROM THE CIRCUIT.  THE    |
| "2A" RHR PUMP 4KV BREAKER CLOSED WHEN THE TRANSFER SWITCH WAS MOVED FROM     |
| "EMERGENCY" TO "NORMAL" DUE TO THE DVM EFFECTIVELY JUMPERING THE CONTROL     |
| CIRCUIT PUMP START CONTACTS.  THE "2A" RHR PUMP RAN ON MINIMUM FLOW FOR      |
| APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN MINUTES WHILE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED TO SUPPORT THE  |
| INVESTIGATION.   THE PUMP WAS THEN SECURED BY MAIN CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS.   |
|                                                                              |
| THE BASIS FOR THIS RETRACTION IS THAT A SINGLE COMPONENT ACTUATION OCCURRED  |
| IN A COMPLEX SYSTEM.  THE RHR PUMP ALONE COULD NOT HAVE MITIGATED THE        |
| CONSEQUENCES OF A SIGNIFICANT EVENT.  VALVE ALIGNMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO   |
| SUPPORT COMPLETION OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION.  VALVE LOGIC WAS NOT AFFECTED BY  |
| THE DVM INSTALLATION.  THEREFORE,  THIS EVENT IS NOT REPORTABLE PER THE      |
| GUIDANCE OF NUREG-1022, REV. 1.  R1DO (JOHN KINNEMAN) NOTIFIED.              |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT RETRACTION.            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   35967       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  NORTH CAROLINA DIV. OF RAD PROT.     |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/28/1999|
|LICENSEE:  CP&L                                 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:32[EDT]|
|    CITY:  ARDEN                    REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        07/28/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NC |EVENT TIME:        09:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  0110218-2             AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/28/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|                                                |SCOTT MOORE          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LEE COX                      |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| A fixed level gauge containing 2 mCi of Ra-226 was buried in ruble when the  |
| coal silo it was attached to collapsed.  This event occurred at CP&L's       |
| Asheville Plant in Arden, NC.  The licensee has done a preliminary survey    |
| and identified the approximate location of the source.    The licensee has   |
| developed a recovery plan and did not require any assistance from the state. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Hospital                                         |Event Number:   35968       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  ST. CLARES HOSPITAL/DOVER            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/28/1999|
|LICENSEE:  ST. CLARES HOSPITAL/DOVER            |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:25[EDT]|
|    CITY:  DOVER                    REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        04/27/1998|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NJ |EVENT TIME:        10:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  29-13746-02           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/28/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|                                                |SCOTT MOORE          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOSEPH BARBIERI              |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOST I-125 SEEDS                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| This event report was prompted by an NRC inspection and occurred on 4/27/98. |
| After performing a procedure to implant I-125 seeds into a patient, it was   |
| noted that three seeds remained in the apparatus used to insert the seeds.   |
| These seeds were washed down a drain when the apparatus was cleaned and were |
| not recoverable.                                                             |
| The activity of each seed was 0.71 mCi.                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35969       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE                 REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/28/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:03[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        07/28/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:19[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RISTE                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/28/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v)      EMERGENCY SIREN INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       98       Power Operation  |98       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ALL EMERGENCY SIRENS IN KEWAUNEE COUNTY ARE INOPERABLE  DUE TO FAILED RADIO  |
| REPEATER.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1419 CT THE LICENSEE WAS NOTIFIED OF A FAILURE WHICH OCCURRED AT 1300 CT  |
| OF THEIR EMERGENCY SIREN SYSTEM.  THIS FAILURE WAS CAUSED BY A RADIO         |
| REPEATER MALFUNCTIONING PREVENTING REMOTE ACTUATION OF ALL 13 KEWAUNEE       |
| COUNTY SIRENS, WHICH LEAVES AN AREA CONTAINING 55% OF THE EPZ POPULATION NOT |
| COVERED.  A REPAIR CREW HAS BEEN CALLED OUT WITH AN ESTIMATED REPAIR TIME OF |
| 2 HOURS.  THE LOCAL COUNTY WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS PROBLEM.                     |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   35970       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  JL SHEPHERD & ASSOCIATES             |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/28/1999|
|LICENSEE:  JL SHEPHERD & ASSOCIATES             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:17[EDT]|
|    CITY:  SAN FERNANDO             REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        07/26/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CA |EVENT TIME:        00:00[PDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/28/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |BILL JONES           R4      |
|                                                |VERN HODGES, FAX     NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  J.L. SHEPHARD                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i)      DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PACKAGE APPEARED NOT TO BE CONSTRUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DESIGN             |
| CERTIFICATE.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| J.L. SHEPHERD AND ASSOCIATES HAS A USNRC APPROVED QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM  |
| FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES, NUMBER 0122, REVISION 5, EXPIRATION DATE  |
| 01/31/2001.   J. L. SHEPHERD & ASSOCIATES  RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OF          |
| NONCOMPLIANCE OF ONE OF THEIR PACKAGES FROM THE ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL BOARD  |
| (AECB), OTTAWA, ONTARIO, CANADA BY LETTER ON JULY 26, 1999.                  |
|                                                                              |
| J. L. SHEPHERD & ASSOCIATES IMMEDIATELY REMOVED ALL THESE TYPES OF PACKAGES  |
| FROM SERVICE ON JULY 27, 1999 AND WILL NOT USE THEM FOR TRANSPORTATION OF    |
| RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL UNTIL THE QUESTION OF NONCOMPLIANCE HAS BEEN RESOLVED.  |
|                                                                              |
| A WRITTEN REPORT ON THE NONCOMPLIANCE WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE USNRC WITHIN  |
| 30 DAYS OF THIS NOTIFICATION.                                                |
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