Event Notification Report for July 29, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/28/1999 - 07/29/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35792 35881 35891 35963 35967 35968 35969 35970
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 35792 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: U.S. AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/04/1999|
|LICENSEE: U.S. AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:34[EDT]|
| CITY: Washington D.C. REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 06/04/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: DC |EVENT TIME: 06:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 42-23539-01AF AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/28/1999|
| DOCKET: 03028641 |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |RONALD BELLAMY R1 |
| |KENNETH BARR R2 |
+------------------------------------------------+LINDA HOWELL R4 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MAJOR MITCH HICKS |FRED COMBS NMSS |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE |CHARLES MILLER IRO |
+------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL IRO |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|IBDB 30.50(b)(4)(ii) DAMAGED LNM/CONTAINER | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF TWO 500- �Ci STRONTIUM-90 SOURCES DUE TO A HELICOPTER CRASH IN |
| FAYETTEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA (24-HOUR REPORT) |
| |
| A representative from Bolling Air Force Base (located in Washington D.C.) |
| reported that a helicopter from Hurlburt Field (located in Mary Esther, |
| Florida) crashed at 2300 on 06/02/99 while performing a night training |
| exercise at Pope Air Force Base (located in Fayetteville, North Carolina). |
| Each helicopter blade contained an in-flight blade inspection system (IBIS) |
| source with 500 �Ci of Strontium-90, and it is currently believed that the |
| helicopter had four blades. Two of the four IBIS sources have been |
| identified and recovered by the pope Air Force Base Accident Response Team. |
| These devices have been bagged and will be checked for contamination. |
| Pending the completion of the crash investigation, the licensee plans to |
| search for the remaining IBIS sources with survey equipment. |
| |
| This event was reported to Bolling Air Force Base at 0630 on 06/04/99. |
| |
| Five individuals survived the crash, and there was one fatality. |
| |
| The limit referenced in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix C, for Strontium-90 is 0.1 |
| �Ci. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Region 4 Office. (Call the NRC |
| Operations Center for a licensee contact telephone number.) |
| |
| ***Update on 07/28/99 at 1215 ET by Major Hicks (USAF) taken by |
| MacKinnon*** |
| |
| All IBIS sources from the Helicopter crash were recovered as of 29 Jun 99. |
| R4DO (Bill Jones), R2DO (Haag) and NMSS (Scott Moore) notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35881 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/30/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:59[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 06/30/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:22[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY TODD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/28/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PAUL FREDRICKSON R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Certain accident scenarios could cause pressurization of Low Pressure |
| Injection and Rx Bldg Spray Systems - |
| |
| During investigation of a valve leak observed during a test on Unit 1, it |
| was discovered that there is a possibility that certain accident scenarios |
| could cause pressurization of certain portions of the Low Pressure Injection |
| (LPI) and Reactor Building Spray (RBS) Systems above values previously |
| evaluated. |
| |
| Specifically, following a small break LOCA, the LPI System is still taking |
| suction from the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) when the system is |
| aligned with the LPI Pump 'A' discharging to both injection headers through |
| the crossover piping in preparation for realigning suction to the Reactor |
| Building Emergency Sump. At this time, it is possible to pressurize the |
| suction piping of the idle LPI Pump 'B' and RBS Pump 'B'. This can occur |
| because the LPI Pump 'B' minimum flow recirculation line is connected |
| downstream of the pump discharge check valve or as a result of leakage |
| through the pump discharge check valve. A small amount of fluid would flow |
| through the recirculation line until the pressure in the pump suction piping |
| is equal to the pressure in the cross-connected LPI discharge headers. |
| (Procedural details would prevent this problem from affecting Train 'A'.) |
| |
| This pressure could be in excess of the capability of certain valve |
| operators to reposition process valves. Among the affected valves is #LP-20, |
| the RB Emergency Sump Train 'B' isolation valve. |
| |
| When nearing depletion of the BWST inventory, the Emergency Operating |
| Procedure calls for opening both RB Emergency Sump isolation valves (#LP-19 |
| on Train 'A' and #LP-20 on Train 'B'). |
| |
| It was also recognized that #LP-19, in the redundant flow path, must be |
| considered vulnerable to a random single failure. |
| |
| Therefore, at 1722 on 06/30/99, Oconee Site Managers concluded that #LP-20 |
| must be considered inoperable for use in this specific system configuration. |
| This configuration is only used during certain small break LOCAs which |
| require that the LPI and High Pressure Injection (HPI) Systems be placed in |
| the "piggy-back" configuration where the LPI pumps supply flow to the HPI |
| pump suctions. In addition, this failure scenario only applies to the |
| limited spectrum of small breaks that do not result in initiation of Reactor |
| Building Spray. |
| |
| Because this inoperablity only affects the HPI-LPI "piggy-back" Train 'B' |
| flow path, the operating units (Units 2 & 3) entered Tech Spec 3.5.2, |
| Condition C, which has a 72 hour action statement. The main corrective |
| action is implementation of a system alignment change which will create a |
| vent path to the Reactor Building using the Reactor Building Spray Train 'B' |
| piping. This will prevent the possibility of pressurizing the piping at |
| #LP-20 and eliminate the potential for this problem. The procedure changes |
| are in progress and the implementation is expected to occur on night shift |
| tonight (06/30/99). In addition, operators on shift will receive awareness |
| training on the new configuration as it is implemented. Corresponding |
| changes to the Emergency Operating Procedure |
| will be implemented prior to exiting the Tech Spec 3.5.2.C action statement. |
| Affected Periodic Test, Maintenance, and Instrument Procedures have been |
| placed on administrative hold until they can be revised. |
| |
| Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) in a Refueling Outage |
| preparing to enter Mode 4. These alignment changes will be incorporated on |
| Unit 1, as appropriate, during plant start-up. |
| |
| The analysis of this issue is continuing, and the potential exists that |
| further analysis or testing may allow retraction |
| of this notification. If not, further details will be provided in the LER |
| that will be submitted to the NRC. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| ***Retraction on 07/28/99 at 1651 by James V. Weast taken by MacKinnon*** |
| |
| After further investigation and analysis, Duke Energy determined that the |
| Reactor Building (RB) Emergency Sump Train "B" isolation valve (LP-20) for |
| all three units could have opened on demand, therefore being operable for |
| the accident scenarios for which operability was suspect. Therefore, this |
| event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72. R2DO (Haag) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35891 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/02/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:13[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVE WALSH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/28/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Emergency safeguards system transformer radiator bottom oil drain valves |
| found closed - |
| |
| At 1500 on 07/01/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 was in Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) |
| and Unit 2 was at 100% power, when the licensee identified that the radiator |
| bottom drain valves were closed on two of the four emergency safeguards |
| system (ESS) transformers. Each transformer provides the preferred offsite |
| power to one load group and alternate offsite power to another. The two |
| affected transformers provided backup to each other. The drain valves allow |
| oil circulation though the transformer finned coolers. The drain valves |
| were opened and the ESS transformers are currently operable. |
| |
| Per the Susquehanna Tech Spec 3.8.1 Basis, the AC electrical power |
| distribution system is designed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50, |
| Appendix A, GDC 17, which requires the AC electrical power system to provide |
| independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to ESF |
| systems. The class 1E AC distribution system is divided into redundant load |
| groups, so the loss of any one group does not prevent minimum safety |
| functions from being performed. Each load group has connections to two |
| preferred offsite power supplies and a single emergency diesel generator |
| (EDG) in order to meet this requirement. |
| |
| Licensee evaluation of the effects of the drain valves being closed is in |
| progress. Initial evaluation has determined that in this configuration, |
| these transformers would have been able to perform their design function for |
| an indeterminate period of time. Pending further evaluation, this report is |
| being provided based on conservative interpretation of the existing guidance |
| in that due to the absence of design analysis for this scenario, it could |
| represent a condition that is potentially outside of design basis, therefore |
| reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B). |
| |
| The licensee currently believes that this condition was not safety |
| significant because Susquehanna is designed for a DBA LOCA/LOOP with a |
| single failure which they believe is more limiting. At no time were any ESS |
| buses deenergized due to this condition and the condition was promptly |
| corrected and does not currently exist. The EDGs would have been available |
| to power the subject buses had the transformers failed. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| ***Retraction on 07/28/99 at 1145 ET from Mike Peal taken by MacKinnon*** |
| |
| Upon completion of an engineering evaluation, the Emergency Safeguards |
| System transformers would have performed as designed for the duration of any |
| postulated accident condition. Based on this evaluation the condition |
| described in the above event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72 or 50.73. |
| R1DO (John MacKinnon). |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified the event retraction. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35963 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/27/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:25[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/27/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PETE GARDNER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/28/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) PUMP RECEIVED A START SIGNAL DURING A |
| SURVEILLANCE TEST. |
| |
| AT 1145 ON 07/27/99, DURING PERFORMANCE OF A SURVEILLANCE TEST FOR REMOTE |
| SHUTDOWN PANEL OPERABILITY (ST-2-088-321-2), THE "2A" RHR PUMP RECEIVED A |
| START SIGNAL. AT THE TIME, CONTROL OF THE PUMP HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE |
| REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL. THE PUMP START WAS UNEXPECTED AND THUS, IS BEING |
| REPORTED AS AN ESF ACTUATION UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF LIMERICK REPORTABILITY |
| MANUAL (F-02). THE TRANSFER SWITCH WAS BEING CLEANED AND CYCLED DURING THE |
| PUMP START AND AT THIS TIME IT IS BELIEVED THAT A CONTACT HAD INADVERTENTLY |
| MADE UP. THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT IS BEING INVESTIGATED AND THE "2A" RHR PUMP |
| AND THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL HAVE CONSERVATIVELY BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| UNTIL THE INVESTIGATION IS COMPLETE. THE RHR PUMP WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE |
| AFTER RETURNING CONTROL POWER VIA THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN TRANSFER SWITCH. |
| |
| ALL OTHER EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ARE FULLY OPERABLE, IF NEEDED. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
| |
| |
| ***RETRACTION ON 07/28/99 AT 1137 ET BY STAN T. GAMBLE TAKEN BY |
| MACKINNON*** |
| |
| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE TESTING (ST-2-088-321-2) WAS BEING |
| CONDUCTED AT THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL (RSP). A FLUKE 8050A MULTIMETER (DVM) |
| WAS INSTALLED IN THE CONTROL CIRCUIT TO DETERMINE THE CONDITION OF |
| HANDSWITCH CONTACTS. THE TEST DIRECTED PLACING THE CONTROL TRANSFER SWITCH |
| IN THE "NORMAL" POSITION PRIOR TO REMOVING THE DVM FROM THE CIRCUIT. THE |
| "2A" RHR PUMP 4KV BREAKER CLOSED WHEN THE TRANSFER SWITCH WAS MOVED FROM |
| "EMERGENCY" TO "NORMAL" DUE TO THE DVM EFFECTIVELY JUMPERING THE CONTROL |
| CIRCUIT PUMP START CONTACTS. THE "2A" RHR PUMP RAN ON MINIMUM FLOW FOR |
| APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN MINUTES WHILE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED TO SUPPORT THE |
| INVESTIGATION. THE PUMP WAS THEN SECURED BY MAIN CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS. |
| |
| THE BASIS FOR THIS RETRACTION IS THAT A SINGLE COMPONENT ACTUATION OCCURRED |
| IN A COMPLEX SYSTEM. THE RHR PUMP ALONE COULD NOT HAVE MITIGATED THE |
| CONSEQUENCES OF A SIGNIFICANT EVENT. VALVE ALIGNMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO |
| SUPPORT COMPLETION OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION. VALVE LOGIC WAS NOT AFFECTED BY |
| THE DVM INSTALLATION. THEREFORE, THIS EVENT IS NOT REPORTABLE PER THE |
| GUIDANCE OF NUREG-1022, REV. 1. R1DO (JOHN KINNEMAN) NOTIFIED. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT RETRACTION. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 35967 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: NORTH CAROLINA DIV. OF RAD PROT. |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/28/1999|
|LICENSEE: CP&L |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:32[EDT]|
| CITY: ARDEN REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 07/28/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: NC |EVENT TIME: 09:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 0110218-2 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/28/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |ROBERT HAAG R2 |
| |SCOTT MOORE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LEE COX | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| A fixed level gauge containing 2 mCi of Ra-226 was buried in ruble when the |
| coal silo it was attached to collapsed. This event occurred at CP&L's |
| Asheville Plant in Arden, NC. The licensee has done a preliminary survey |
| and identified the approximate location of the source. The licensee has |
| developed a recovery plan and did not require any assistance from the state. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Hospital |Event Number: 35968 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: ST. CLARES HOSPITAL/DOVER |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/28/1999|
|LICENSEE: ST. CLARES HOSPITAL/DOVER |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:25[EDT]|
| CITY: DOVER REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 04/27/1998|
| COUNTY: STATE: NJ |EVENT TIME: 10:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 29-13746-02 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/28/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
| |SCOTT MOORE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOSEPH BARBIERI | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOST I-125 SEEDS |
| |
| This event report was prompted by an NRC inspection and occurred on 4/27/98. |
| After performing a procedure to implant I-125 seeds into a patient, it was |
| noted that three seeds remained in the apparatus used to insert the seeds. |
| These seeds were washed down a drain when the apparatus was cleaned and were |
| not recoverable. |
| The activity of each seed was 0.71 mCi. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35969 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/28/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:03[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/28/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:19[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RISTE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/28/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v) EMERGENCY SIREN INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 98 Power Operation |98 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ALL EMERGENCY SIRENS IN KEWAUNEE COUNTY ARE INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILED RADIO |
| REPEATER. |
| |
| AT 1419 CT THE LICENSEE WAS NOTIFIED OF A FAILURE WHICH OCCURRED AT 1300 CT |
| OF THEIR EMERGENCY SIREN SYSTEM. THIS FAILURE WAS CAUSED BY A RADIO |
| REPEATER MALFUNCTIONING PREVENTING REMOTE ACTUATION OF ALL 13 KEWAUNEE |
| COUNTY SIRENS, WHICH LEAVES AN AREA CONTAINING 55% OF THE EPZ POPULATION NOT |
| COVERED. A REPAIR CREW HAS BEEN CALLED OUT WITH AN ESTIMATED REPAIR TIME OF |
| 2 HOURS. THE LOCAL COUNTY WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS PROBLEM. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 35970 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: JL SHEPHERD & ASSOCIATES |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/28/1999|
|LICENSEE: JL SHEPHERD & ASSOCIATES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:17[EDT]|
| CITY: SAN FERNANDO REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 07/26/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: 00:00[PDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/28/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |BILL JONES R4 |
| |VERN HODGES, FAX NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: J.L. SHEPHARD | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i) DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PACKAGE APPEARED NOT TO BE CONSTRUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DESIGN |
| CERTIFICATE. |
| |
| J.L. SHEPHERD AND ASSOCIATES HAS A USNRC APPROVED QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM |
| FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES, NUMBER 0122, REVISION 5, EXPIRATION DATE |
| 01/31/2001. J. L. SHEPHERD & ASSOCIATES RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OF |
| NONCOMPLIANCE OF ONE OF THEIR PACKAGES FROM THE ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL BOARD |
| (AECB), OTTAWA, ONTARIO, CANADA BY LETTER ON JULY 26, 1999. |
| |
| J. L. SHEPHERD & ASSOCIATES IMMEDIATELY REMOVED ALL THESE TYPES OF PACKAGES |
| FROM SERVICE ON JULY 27, 1999 AND WILL NOT USE THEM FOR TRANSPORTATION OF |
| RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL UNTIL THE QUESTION OF NONCOMPLIANCE HAS BEEN RESOLVED. |
| |
| A WRITTEN REPORT ON THE NONCOMPLIANCE WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE USNRC WITHIN |
| 30 DAYS OF THIS NOTIFICATION. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021