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Event Notification Report for July 13, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           07/12/1999 - 07/13/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35819  35912  35913  35914  35915  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35819       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE           REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:00[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        06/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:20[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MICHAEL EMPEY                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JIMI YEROKUN         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED AN NSS CABLE ROUTED THROUGH BOTH A SAFETY DIVISION I  |
| & II CABLE TRAY                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "DURING PREPARATION OF EDCR [ENGINEERING DESIGN CHANGE REQUEST] 99-402,      |
| DESIGN ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED A CABLE SEPARATION CONCERN CREATED BY EDCR     |
| 95-407.  EDCR 95-407 INSTALLED 'EGS'  QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTIONS FOR A     |
| NUMBER OF MOVs , THE CONNECTORS ARE INSTALLED IN JUNCTION BOXES IN CLOSE     |
| PROXIMITY TO THE VALVES, FOR MOV 2-53A, WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH SEPARATION  |
| DIVISION SII, THE NEW BOX IS LABELED 'B-1279SII.'  CABLE 1729G, A NNS CABLE  |
| WHICH SUPPORTS JET PUMP TOTAL FLOW LOGIC, PREVIOUSLY WAS ROUTED DIRECTLY TO  |
| V2-53.  EDCR 95-407 REROUTED C1729G THROUGH B-1279SII AND THE ASSOCIATED EGS |
| CONNECTOR.  CABLE 1729G IS ROUTED THOUGH AN 'SI' CONTAINMENT PENETRATION AND |
| THE CIRCUIT CONTINUES VIA OTHER CABLE THROUGH "SI" TRAYS TO THE CONTROL      |
| ROOM.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "C1729G IS THEREFORE ROUTED IN AN 'SII' RACEWAY AND AN 'SI' RACEWAY WHICH IS |
| A VIOLATION OF VYS-027.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Operability Assessment                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Electrical separation between redundant systems is maintained in order to   |
| provide confidence that a single failure in one division does not impact the |
| safety function of the opposite division. For this installation, credible    |
| failure of cable C1729G cannot impact the safety function of two divisions   |
| or failure within one safety division cannot propagate to the other division |
| through C1729G.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Cable C1729G supplies valve position logic signals to Recirculation Pump    |
| relays located in CRP 9-38. The relays are used to generate computer inputs  |
| and alarms. The relay circuit is fused at 3 amps.                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Credible failures consisting of short circuits or open circuits can         |
| originate either in the SI raceway system, the SII raceway system or on      |
| cable C1729G which is installed between Box B-1279SII (near V2-53A) and Box  |
| B440SI (penetration X105A termination box). A failure within the division SI |
| raceway system may impact SI equipment but the failure would not propagate   |
| from the SI raceway to the SII equipment through cable C1729G without        |
| blowing the 3 amp fuse which protects the cable. In order for a failure to   |
| propagate from the SI system to the SII system a damaging signal or voltage  |
| must be impressed on C1729G within the SI system. That signal must then be   |
| carried and transferred to the SII system within box B-1279SII.              |
|                                                                              |
| "Cable C1729G consists of a 4/C #14 Rockbestos FWIII control cable insulated |
| at 600 V. It  [is] routed to box B440SI, the inboard penetration termination |
| box in a dedicated steel conduit. In the outboard box it connects to other   |
| cables which are routed in '300' series trays. These trays are dedicated to  |
| control circuits (120 V ac and 125 V dc or lower voltage). It is not         |
| credible that a failure within the 300 series SI trays would impress a       |
| signal or voltage on Cable C1729G which would cause damage to SII circuits   |
| within box B-1279SII or other equipment within the SII system. Possible      |
| voltages within the 300 series trays are 120 V ac or 125 V dc. The cable,    |
| rated at 600 V, will not break down when exposed to the maximum credible     |
| voltage. In addition the cable is protected by a 3 amp fuse which should     |
| interrupt the circuit before any short circuit current could affect adjacent |
| cable.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Similar to the above, failure within the SII system would not affect the    |
| equipment in the SI system and failure of cable C1729G within the drywell    |
| will not affect both the SI and SII system.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Conclusion                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The SI and SII electrical distribution systems are operable even though     |
| C1729G is routed in B-1279SII and B440SI."                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION 1344 7/12/1999 FROM JIM BROOKS TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *      |
|                                                                              |
| "The VY FSAR Section 8.6.4 titled, 'Cable Installation and Separation        |
| Criteria,' states that it provides a 'summary of the VYNPS Cable Separation  |
| Criteria and cable installation criteria for redundant safety systems. . .'  |
| Conditions in conflict with the general requirements documented in section   |
| 8.6.4 or the detailed requirements contained within VY Specification 27,     |
| 'Separation Criteria for RPS, ESF and Auxiliary Support Systems-Related      |
| Electrical Equipment and Wiring' must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to |
| determine their acceptability in light of the related design bases.          |
|                                                                              |
| "As identified in the original ENS notification, the 'as-found' cabling      |
| configuration was assessed by the VY engineering organization. The VY        |
| engineering staff initial conclusion was confirmed. There was no credible    |
| ESF single failure vulnerability present due to the cited non-conformance.   |
| VY Regulatory Compliance further concluded that such a non-conformance does  |
| not constitute operation outside of the design basis of the VY plant."       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the       |
| licensee. Notified R1DO (Trapp).                                             |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35912       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:16[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        07/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:46[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  O'MALLEY                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JIM TRAPP            R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT HAD ISOLATION OF CONTAINMENT SAMPLE VALVES.                            |
|                                                                              |
| CONTAINMENT SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVES "SV-057-233", "SV-057-283" AND           |
| "SV-057-291" ISOLATED INADVERTENTLY DUE TO A BLOWN FUSE IN THE ISOLATION     |
| LOGIC.  THE FUSE WAS REPLACED AND THE ISOLATION LOGIC WAS RESET WITHIN 3     |
| HOURS 21 MINS.  AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSE OF THE BLOWN FUSE IS         |
| ONGOING.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED.                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Research Reactor                                 |Event Number:   35913       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: UNIV OF WISCONSIN                    |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/1999|
|   RXTYPE: 1000 KW TRIGA (CONVERSION)           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:45[EDT]|
| COMMENTS:                                      |EVENT DATE:        07/12/1999|
|                                                |EVENT TIME:        09:26[CDT]|
|                                                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/12/1999|
|    CITY:  MADISON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  SAUK                      STATE:  WI |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  R-74                  AGREEMENT:  N  |RONALD GARDNER       R3      |
|  DOCKET:  05000156                             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  R. J. CASHWELL               |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NCFR                     NON CFR REPORT REQMNT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SOLENOID FAILED TO RELEASE AIR PRESSURE FOLLOWING REACTOR PULSE              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported that, following a pulse of the reactor, the transient  |
| control rod failed to reinsert into the core within 15 seconds, as required  |
| by the Technical Specifications.  The licensee determined that the solenoid  |
| valve for this control rod had become mechanically bound by foreign material |
| (dried grease) within the valve. The licensee has cleaned and successfully   |
| tested the solenoid valve.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee made this report in accordance with their Technical             |
| Specifications as a "failure of a safety system component that could render  |
| the system incapable of performing the safety function."                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   35914       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  TN DIV of RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH        |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/1999|
|LICENSEE:  ALLIED TECHNOLOGY GROUP              |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:13[EDT]|
|    CITY:  OAK RIDGE                REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        07/07/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  TN |EVENT TIME:        15:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  R-73020               AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/12/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |MARK LESSER          R2      |
|                                                |DON COOL             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DEBRA SHULTS                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FIRE AT ALLIED TECHNOLOGY GROUP (ATG)                                        |
|                                                                              |
| On 7/7/99 a small fire occurred at the ATG Bear Creek Rd. facility.   Fire   |
| alarms were activated and indicated that the fire had occurred in the upper  |
| area of the main building.  The entire building was evacuated.  There was no |
| visible flame or smoke.  The event occurred while contractors were           |
| installing shielding, and the licensee believes that the cutting, grinding   |
| and welding may have contributed the necessary ignition source.   The        |
| licensee also identified that the cutting/grinding/welding violated          |
| procedure requirements in that it was performed within 30 feet of  the       |
| filter housing.  There was no evidence of building or personnel              |
| contamination.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| Inspection of a process filter indicated that a fire had occurred on a       |
| roughing filter just prior to the HEPA.  The bank where the fire occurred is |
| a process filter, in that it vents into the main and final filter bank.  The |
| housing was cleaned and the roughing filter replaced.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The main filter bank was inspected and the intermediate filter  was torn and |
| loaded with debris.  The main bank was cleaned and the filter was replaced.  |
| This condition did not appear to be a result of the fire.                    |
|                                                                              |
| Stack samples revealed no evidence of a release above normal levels.         |
| Personnel surveys, which included nasal swipes, indicated no contamination.  |
|                                                                              |
| All work involving grinding, cutting, and welding has been stopped until the |
| contractors can be retrained.                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   35915       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  IDAHO NAT. ENG & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/1999|
|LICENSEE:  IDAHO NAT. ENG & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB   |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:55[EDT]|
|    CITY:                           REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        07/12/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  ID |EVENT TIME:        21:33[MDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/13/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |BLAIR SPITZBERG      R4      |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BROWN                        |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY DECLARED AN ALERT  |
| DUE TO LOSS OF OFF SITE POWER AND A DIESEL FAILURE.                          |
|                                                                              |
| THE LABORATORY REPORTED THAT THEY HAD A LOSS OF COMMERCIAL POWER DUE TO A    |
| FIRE IN THE ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION.  THERE WAS ALSO A FAILURE OF THE DIESEL   |
| GENERATOR.  THIS CLASSIFICATION IS A DOE TYPE ALERT AND NOT A NRC TYPE       |
| ALERT.  THE LABORATORY DOES HAVE TMI FUEL ON SITE, BUT IT IS NOT AFFECTED BY |
| THIS ALERT.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE ON 7/13/99 @ 0045 BY BROWN TO GOULD ***                           |
|                                                                              |
| THEY UPGRADED TO A DOE TYPE SITE AREA EMERGENCY DUE TO THE LOSS OF POWER     |
| WITH THE FAILURE TO START OF ONE STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR AND THE FAILURE OF |
| ONE OPERATING STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR.  THIS SITE AREA IS ALSO A DOE        |
| GENERATED CLASSIFICATION AND NOT A NRC GENERATED CLASSIFICATION.             |
|                                                                              |
| ****  UPDATE ON 7/13/99 @ 0356 FROM GARCIA TO GOULD  ****                    |
|                                                                              |
| OFF SITE POWER RESTORED AT 0140 AND EVENT WAS TERMINATED AT THAT TIME.       |
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