Event Notification Report for July 13, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/12/1999 - 07/13/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35819 35912 35913 35914 35915
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35819 |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:00[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 06/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:20[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL EMPEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JIMI YEROKUN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED AN NSS CABLE ROUTED THROUGH BOTH A SAFETY DIVISION I |
| & II CABLE TRAY |
| |
| "DURING PREPARATION OF EDCR [ENGINEERING DESIGN CHANGE REQUEST] 99-402, |
| DESIGN ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED A CABLE SEPARATION CONCERN CREATED BY EDCR |
| 95-407. EDCR 95-407 INSTALLED 'EGS' QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTIONS FOR A |
| NUMBER OF MOVs , THE CONNECTORS ARE INSTALLED IN JUNCTION BOXES IN CLOSE |
| PROXIMITY TO THE VALVES, FOR MOV 2-53A, WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH SEPARATION |
| DIVISION SII, THE NEW BOX IS LABELED 'B-1279SII.' CABLE 1729G, A NNS CABLE |
| WHICH SUPPORTS JET PUMP TOTAL FLOW LOGIC, PREVIOUSLY WAS ROUTED DIRECTLY TO |
| V2-53. EDCR 95-407 REROUTED C1729G THROUGH B-1279SII AND THE ASSOCIATED EGS |
| CONNECTOR. CABLE 1729G IS ROUTED THOUGH AN 'SI' CONTAINMENT PENETRATION AND |
| THE CIRCUIT CONTINUES VIA OTHER CABLE THROUGH "SI" TRAYS TO THE CONTROL |
| ROOM. |
| |
| "C1729G IS THEREFORE ROUTED IN AN 'SII' RACEWAY AND AN 'SI' RACEWAY WHICH IS |
| A VIOLATION OF VYS-027. |
| |
| "Operability Assessment |
| |
| "Electrical separation between redundant systems is maintained in order to |
| provide confidence that a single failure in one division does not impact the |
| safety function of the opposite division. For this installation, credible |
| failure of cable C1729G cannot impact the safety function of two divisions |
| or failure within one safety division cannot propagate to the other division |
| through C1729G. |
| |
| "Cable C1729G supplies valve position logic signals to Recirculation Pump |
| relays located in CRP 9-38. The relays are used to generate computer inputs |
| and alarms. The relay circuit is fused at 3 amps. |
| |
| "Credible failures consisting of short circuits or open circuits can |
| originate either in the SI raceway system, the SII raceway system or on |
| cable C1729G which is installed between Box B-1279SII (near V2-53A) and Box |
| B440SI (penetration X105A termination box). A failure within the division SI |
| raceway system may impact SI equipment but the failure would not propagate |
| from the SI raceway to the SII equipment through cable C1729G without |
| blowing the 3 amp fuse which protects the cable. In order for a failure to |
| propagate from the SI system to the SII system a damaging signal or voltage |
| must be impressed on C1729G within the SI system. That signal must then be |
| carried and transferred to the SII system within box B-1279SII. |
| |
| "Cable C1729G consists of a 4/C #14 Rockbestos FWIII control cable insulated |
| at 600 V. It [is] routed to box B440SI, the inboard penetration termination |
| box in a dedicated steel conduit. In the outboard box it connects to other |
| cables which are routed in '300' series trays. These trays are dedicated to |
| control circuits (120 V ac and 125 V dc or lower voltage). It is not |
| credible that a failure within the 300 series SI trays would impress a |
| signal or voltage on Cable C1729G which would cause damage to SII circuits |
| within box B-1279SII or other equipment within the SII system. Possible |
| voltages within the 300 series trays are 120 V ac or 125 V dc. The cable, |
| rated at 600 V, will not break down when exposed to the maximum credible |
| voltage. In addition the cable is protected by a 3 amp fuse which should |
| interrupt the circuit before any short circuit current could affect adjacent |
| cable. |
| |
| "Similar to the above, failure within the SII system would not affect the |
| equipment in the SI system and failure of cable C1729G within the drywell |
| will not affect both the SI and SII system. |
| |
| "Conclusion |
| |
| "The SI and SII electrical distribution systems are operable even though |
| C1729G is routed in B-1279SII and B440SI." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION 1344 7/12/1999 FROM JIM BROOKS TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "The VY FSAR Section 8.6.4 titled, 'Cable Installation and Separation |
| Criteria,' states that it provides a 'summary of the VYNPS Cable Separation |
| Criteria and cable installation criteria for redundant safety systems. . .' |
| Conditions in conflict with the general requirements documented in section |
| 8.6.4 or the detailed requirements contained within VY Specification 27, |
| 'Separation Criteria for RPS, ESF and Auxiliary Support Systems-Related |
| Electrical Equipment and Wiring' must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to |
| determine their acceptability in light of the related design bases. |
| |
| "As identified in the original ENS notification, the 'as-found' cabling |
| configuration was assessed by the VY engineering organization. The VY |
| engineering staff initial conclusion was confirmed. There was no credible |
| ESF single failure vulnerability present due to the cited non-conformance. |
| VY Regulatory Compliance further concluded that such a non-conformance does |
| not constitute operation outside of the design basis of the VY plant." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the |
| licensee. Notified R1DO (Trapp). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35912 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:16[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:46[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: O'MALLEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JIM TRAPP R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT HAD ISOLATION OF CONTAINMENT SAMPLE VALVES. |
| |
| CONTAINMENT SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVES "SV-057-233", "SV-057-283" AND |
| "SV-057-291" ISOLATED INADVERTENTLY DUE TO A BLOWN FUSE IN THE ISOLATION |
| LOGIC. THE FUSE WAS REPLACED AND THE ISOLATION LOGIC WAS RESET WITHIN 3 |
| HOURS 21 MINS. AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSE OF THE BLOWN FUSE IS |
| ONGOING. |
| |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Research Reactor |Event Number: 35913 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: UNIV OF WISCONSIN |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/1999|
| RXTYPE: 1000 KW TRIGA (CONVERSION) |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:45[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: |EVENT DATE: 07/12/1999|
| |EVENT TIME: 09:26[CDT]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/1999|
| CITY: MADISON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: SAUK STATE: WI |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: R-74 AGREEMENT: N |RONALD GARDNER R3 |
| DOCKET: 05000156 | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: R. J. CASHWELL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NCFR NON CFR REPORT REQMNT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SOLENOID FAILED TO RELEASE AIR PRESSURE FOLLOWING REACTOR PULSE |
| |
| The licensee reported that, following a pulse of the reactor, the transient |
| control rod failed to reinsert into the core within 15 seconds, as required |
| by the Technical Specifications. The licensee determined that the solenoid |
| valve for this control rod had become mechanically bound by foreign material |
| (dried grease) within the valve. The licensee has cleaned and successfully |
| tested the solenoid valve. |
| |
| The licensee made this report in accordance with their Technical |
| Specifications as a "failure of a safety system component that could render |
| the system incapable of performing the safety function." |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 35914 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: TN DIV of RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/1999|
|LICENSEE: ALLIED TECHNOLOGY GROUP |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:13[EDT]|
| CITY: OAK RIDGE REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 07/07/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: TN |EVENT TIME: 15:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: R-73020 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/12/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MARK LESSER R2 |
| |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DEBRA SHULTS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FIRE AT ALLIED TECHNOLOGY GROUP (ATG) |
| |
| On 7/7/99 a small fire occurred at the ATG Bear Creek Rd. facility. Fire |
| alarms were activated and indicated that the fire had occurred in the upper |
| area of the main building. The entire building was evacuated. There was no |
| visible flame or smoke. The event occurred while contractors were |
| installing shielding, and the licensee believes that the cutting, grinding |
| and welding may have contributed the necessary ignition source. The |
| licensee also identified that the cutting/grinding/welding violated |
| procedure requirements in that it was performed within 30 feet of the |
| filter housing. There was no evidence of building or personnel |
| contamination. |
| |
| Inspection of a process filter indicated that a fire had occurred on a |
| roughing filter just prior to the HEPA. The bank where the fire occurred is |
| a process filter, in that it vents into the main and final filter bank. The |
| housing was cleaned and the roughing filter replaced. |
| |
| The main filter bank was inspected and the intermediate filter was torn and |
| loaded with debris. The main bank was cleaned and the filter was replaced. |
| This condition did not appear to be a result of the fire. |
| |
| Stack samples revealed no evidence of a release above normal levels. |
| Personnel surveys, which included nasal swipes, indicated no contamination. |
| |
| All work involving grinding, cutting, and welding has been stopped until the |
| contractors can be retrained. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 35915 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: IDAHO NAT. ENG & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/1999|
|LICENSEE: IDAHO NAT. ENG & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:55[EDT]|
| CITY: REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 07/12/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: ID |EVENT TIME: 21:33[MDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/13/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |BLAIR SPITZBERG R4 |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BROWN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY DECLARED AN ALERT |
| DUE TO LOSS OF OFF SITE POWER AND A DIESEL FAILURE. |
| |
| THE LABORATORY REPORTED THAT THEY HAD A LOSS OF COMMERCIAL POWER DUE TO A |
| FIRE IN THE ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION. THERE WAS ALSO A FAILURE OF THE DIESEL |
| GENERATOR. THIS CLASSIFICATION IS A DOE TYPE ALERT AND NOT A NRC TYPE |
| ALERT. THE LABORATORY DOES HAVE TMI FUEL ON SITE, BUT IT IS NOT AFFECTED BY |
| THIS ALERT. |
| |
| *** UPDATE ON 7/13/99 @ 0045 BY BROWN TO GOULD *** |
| |
| THEY UPGRADED TO A DOE TYPE SITE AREA EMERGENCY DUE TO THE LOSS OF POWER |
| WITH THE FAILURE TO START OF ONE STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR AND THE FAILURE OF |
| ONE OPERATING STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR. THIS SITE AREA IS ALSO A DOE |
| GENERATED CLASSIFICATION AND NOT A NRC GENERATED CLASSIFICATION. |
| |
| **** UPDATE ON 7/13/99 @ 0356 FROM GARCIA TO GOULD **** |
| |
| OFF SITE POWER RESTORED AT 0140 AND EVENT WAS TERMINATED AT THAT TIME. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021