Event Notification Report for July 1, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           06/30/1999 - 07/01/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35811  35862  35880  35881  35882  35883  35884  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35811       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GINNA                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:56[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        05/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:35[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MCCOY                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/30/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN CARUSO          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BOTH DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE                                   |
|                                                                              |
| During the review (on 6/10/99 @ 1330) of an event in which the "A"  Diesel   |
| Generator (D/G) output breaker failed to close during periodic testing, it   |
| was discovered that the plant had operated for a period of time with both    |
| required D/Gs inoperable.  Based on the identified failure mode, the  "A"    |
| D/G breaker was in an inoperable state since the last time it was tripped.   |
| This occurred following the performance of periodic testing on 5/11/99 @     |
| 1148.  On 5/11/99 @ 1334, the  "B"  D/G was declared inoperable for the      |
| performance of periodic testing, which resulted in both D/Gs being           |
| inoperable and the plant entering a 3.0.3 TS LCO action statement.           |
| Therefore, during the periodic testing of the "B"  D/G, there would have     |
| been an inability to automatically respond to an event coincident with a     |
| loss of offsite power.  The "B" D/G was immediately returned to service      |
| following the test.  The "A" D/G was restored to operable status on 6/9/99.  |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1519 ON 6/30/99 BY DOUG PETERSEN TO JOLLIFFE * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has concluded that the date and time of inoperability is when   |
| the "A" D/G output breaker to safeguards bus #14 failed to close (1007 on    |
| 6/8/99).  The "A" D/G was declared operable on 6/9/99, and the time of       |
| inoperability is within the allowable LCO time frame. Therefore, no          |
| reportable event occurred and the licensee desires to retract this event.    |
|                                                                              |
| During troubleshooting, the breaker was successfully closed at the bus       |
| cubicle more than 20 times on 6/8/99 and 6/9/99 without any adjustment of    |
| the breaker and without another failure.  The apparent cause of the breaker  |
| failure is attributed to a slight misalignment of the tripper bar on the     |
| breaker.  However, potential effects of bus vibration, temperature,          |
| lubrication drying, and the randomness of the breaker failure does not       |
| provide firm evidence of the specific time the breaker became inoperable.    |
| There is no firm evidence to believe the discrepancy existed prior to        |
| 6/8/99.  Therefore, in accordance with the industry guidance provided in     |
| NUREG-1022, Revision 1, it should be assumed the discrepancy occurred at the |
| time of its discovery.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Larry Doerflein.                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   35862       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING           |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/25/1999|
|LICENSEE:  ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:34[EDT]|
|    CITY:  WINDSOR                  REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        06/25/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CT |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/30/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |GLENN MEYER          R1      |
|                                                |VERN HODGE (via fax) NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  IAN RICKARD                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10CFR PART 21 REPORT REGARDING ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 4KV VACUUM         |
| BREAKERS                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is excerpted from a facsimile received in the NRC         |
| Operations Center:                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "The defect concerns ABB 1200A 4KV Vacuum Breakers delivered to Baltimore    |
| Gas and Electric Company's (BG&E's) Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant       |
| (CCNPP).  Specifically, the defect concerns the breaker performing a trip    |
| free operation when a close signal is received by the breaker.  This defect  |
| results in the breaker failing to remain in the closed position.  The defect |
| could lead to non-conservative failure of not starting certain plant         |
| equipment upon demand such as an Emergency Core Cooling Pump."               |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1613 ON 06/30/99 BY VIRGIL PAGGEN TO JOLLIFFE * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| The above 10CFR Part 21 Report was submitted to the NRC via ABB Combustion   |
| Engineering Letter #LD-99-035, dated 06/25/99.  The following is an update   |
| to the above 10CFR Part 21 Report via ABB Combustion Engineering Letter      |
| #LD-99-039, dated 06/30/99, Same Subject.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The activity for which this report is being filed is the use of ABB 1200A    |
| 4KV Vacuum Breakers in an application where the breaker is normally open and |
| must close on demand.  This defect applies only to BG&E's CCNPP.             |
|                                                                              |
| The defect identified is associated with the use of the ABB 1200A 4KV Vacuum |
| Breaker only in applications where the breaker must close on demand.  The    |
| defect was detected during site testing of the breaker during installation   |
| into CCNPP.  During this test, a close signal was applied to the breaker and |
| the breaker tripped free (i.e., failed to remain in the closed position).    |
|                                                                              |
| These breakers are intended for both normally open and normally closed       |
| operation.  In some applications, the breaker must close upon demand.  This  |
| may be for electrical distribution applications or component control         |
| applications (e.g., start an Emergency Core Cooling pump).  Demands can be   |
| automated (e.g., by ESFAS) or based on manual operator demands.  If the      |
| breaker does not remain closed when demanded (i.e., trips free), the safety  |
| function cannot be performed.  This breaker is intended for use in multiple  |
| redundant safety divisions. Multiple redundant divisions could be affected   |
| by this defect.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The defect applies only to ABB 1200A 4KV Vacuum Breakers delivered to CCNPP. |
| Thirty-seven (37) of these breakers were delivered to CCNPP.   ABB           |
| Combustion Engineering understands that several of these breakers have been  |
| installed at CCNPP, however, none are installed in any application that      |
| requires a close on demand function.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Larry Doerflein and NRR Vern    |
| Hodge (via fax).                                                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35880       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEABROOK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/30/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:50[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        06/30/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DANA MORRELL                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/30/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN   R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR REPORT - DEAD SEAL FOUND                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the National Marine Fisheries and the NRC Resident     |
| Inspector that they discovered a dead seal in the plant intake structure     |
| during a routine inspection.                                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35881       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/30/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] [3]               STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:59[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE:        06/30/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:22[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RANDY TODD                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/30/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PAUL FREDRICKSON     R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Certain accident scenarios could cause pressurization of Low Pressure      |
| Injection and Rx Bldg Spray Systems -                                        |
|                                                                              |
| During investigation of a valve leak observed during a test on Unit 1, it    |
| was discovered that there is a possibility that certain accident scenarios   |
| could cause pressurization of certain portions of the Low Pressure Injection |
| (LPI) and Reactor Building Spray (RBS) Systems above values previously       |
| evaluated.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Specifically, following a small break LOCA, the LPI System is still taking   |
| suction from the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) when the system is        |
| aligned with the LPI Pump 'A' discharging to both injection headers through  |
| the crossover piping in preparation for realigning suction to the Reactor    |
| Building Emergency Sump.  At this time, it is possible to pressurize the     |
| suction piping of the idle LPI Pump 'B' and RBS Pump 'B'.  This can occur    |
| because the LPI Pump 'B' minimum flow recirculation line is connected        |
| downstream of the pump discharge check valve or as a result of leakage       |
| through the pump discharge check valve.  A small amount of fluid would flow  |
| through the recirculation line until the pressure in the pump suction piping |
| is equal to the pressure in the cross-connected LPI discharge headers.       |
| (Procedural details would prevent this problem from affecting Train 'A'.)    |
|                                                                              |
| This pressure could be in excess of the capability of certain valve          |
| operators to reposition process valves. Among the affected valves is #LP-20, |
| the RB Emergency Sump Train 'B' isolation valve.                             |
|                                                                              |
| When nearing depletion of the BWST inventory, the Emergency Operating        |
| Procedure calls for opening both RB Emergency Sump isolation valves (#LP-19  |
| on Train 'A' and #LP-20 on Train 'B').                                       |
|                                                                              |
| It was also recognized that #LP-19, in the redundant flow path, must be      |
| considered vulnerable to a random single failure.                            |
|                                                                              |
| Therefore, at 1722 on 06/30/99, Oconee Site Managers concluded that #LP-20   |
| must be considered inoperable for use in this specific system configuration. |
| This configuration is only used during certain small break LOCAs which       |
| require that the LPI and High Pressure Injection (HPI) Systems be placed in  |
| the "piggy-back" configuration where the LPI pumps supply flow to the HPI    |
| pump suctions.  In addition, this failure scenario only applies to the       |
| limited spectrum of small breaks that do not result in initiation of Reactor |
| Building Spray.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Because this inoperablity only affects the HPI-LPI "piggy-back" Train 'B'    |
| flow path, the operating units (Units 2 & 3) entered Tech Spec 3.5.2,        |
| Condition C, which has a 72 hour action statement.  The main corrective      |
| action is implementation of a system alignment change which will create a    |
| vent path to the Reactor Building using the Reactor Building Spray Train 'B' |
| piping.  This will prevent the possibility of pressurizing the piping at     |
| #LP-20 and eliminate the potential for this problem.  The procedure changes  |
| are in progress and the implementation is expected to occur on night shift   |
| tonight (06/30/99).  In addition, operators on shift will receive awareness  |
| training on the new configuration as it is implemented.  Corresponding       |
| changes to the Emergency Operating Procedure                                 |
| will be implemented prior to exiting the Tech Spec 3.5.2.C action statement. |
| Affected Periodic Test, Maintenance, and Instrument Procedures have been     |
| placed on administrative hold until they can be revised.                     |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) in a Refueling Outage          |
| preparing to enter Mode 4.  These alignment changes will be incorporated on  |
| Unit 1, as appropriate, during plant start-up.                               |
|                                                                              |
| The analysis of this issue is continuing, and the potential exists that      |
| further analysis or testing may allow retraction                             |
| of this notification.  If not, further details will be provided in the LER   |
| that will be submitted to the NRC.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Transportation                                   |Event Number:   35882       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/30/1999|
|LICENSEE:  SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP            |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:00[EDT]|
|    CITY:  NASHVILLE                REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        06/30/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  TN |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/30/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |PAUL FREDRICKSON     R2      |
|                                                |LINDA HOWELL         R4      |
+------------------------------------------------+SUSAN SHANKMAN       NMSS    |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SCOTT LANGFORD               |DON COOL             NMSS    |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii)   LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - OVERDUE SHIPMENT OF MEDICAL RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS (IODINE-131) -            |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1630 ON 06/25/99, A PACKAGE OF MEDICAL RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS (0.9          |
| MILLICURIES OF IODINE-131) WAS SHIPPED BY CAR/TRUCK VIA ASSOCIATED COURIERS  |
| FROM SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP, ST LOUIS, MO TO SYNCOR, NASHVILLE, TN.  THE  |
| SHIPMENT WAS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN NASHVILLE AT 1200 ON 06/26/99.  THE      |
| SHIPMENT IS OVERDUE.  ASSOCIATED COURIERS IS ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE THE        |
| PACKAGE.  MR LANGFORD PLANS TO NOTIFY THE STATE OF TN.                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   35883       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  QUEST X TECHNOLOGIES, GUAM           |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/30/1999|
|LICENSEE:  QUEST X TECHNOLOGIES, GUAM           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:13[EDT]|
|    CITY:  GUAM                     REGION:     |EVENT DATE:        06/30/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:     |EVENT TIME:             [EST]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/30/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |LINDA HOWELL         R4      |
|                                                |SUSAN SHANKMAN       NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+EPA (BY FAX)                 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CUMMINGS & HICKMAN           |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - PACKAGE OF IRIDIUM - 192 WITHOUT SHIPPING PAPERS LOCATED IN GUAM -         |
|                                                                              |
| TOM BIRKAMEYER, CHIEF OF SAFETY, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, GUAM AIRPORT,         |
| RECEIVED A PACKAGE OF IRIDIUM - 192 ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO AND STORED IT IN    |
| THE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AREA AT THE AIRPORT IN GUAM.  THE SHIPPING PAPERS    |
| ARE NOT AVAILABLE AND THE SHIPPER AND RECEIVER ARE UNKNOWN.                  |
|                                                                              |
| RECENTLY, PERSONNEL AT QUEST X TECHNOLOGIES (JAHA CUMMINGS & WALT HICKMAN)   |
| TOOK POSSESSION OF THE PACKAGE AND PLACED IT IN A LOCKED STORAGE SHED IN     |
| GUAM.  THE PACKAGE IS A SMALL DRUM, TYPE 'A' PACKAGE WITH THE FOLLOWING      |
| PARTIALLY OBSCURED MARKINGS:  RADIATION SYMBOL, RADIOACTIVE YELLOW 3, SOLID  |
| FORM, UN-2982 (NUMBER MAY BE INCORRECT), AND "ENGLAND".  QUEST PERSONNEL     |
| MEASURED THE PACKAGE WITH A GM SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND OBTAINED MAXIMUM        |
| READINGS OF 0.2 MR/HR AT THE SURFACE OF THE PACKAGE.                         |
|                                                                              |
| QUEST PERSONNEL CALLED THE NRC TO REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT TO DO WITH    |
| THE PACKAGE.                                                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35884       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/01/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:56[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        07/01/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:08[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  R. PEAL                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/01/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN   R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ACCS 50.72(b)(1)(iv)     ECCS INJECTION         |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ECCS INJECTION, RPS ACTUATION, AND ESF ACTUATION.                            |
|                                                                              |
| Susquehanna Unit 1 experienced a Reactor Scram due to a neutron monitoring   |
| upscale trip signal.  Preliminary indication is that the 'C' outboard MSIV   |
| went closed, causing the high neutron flux that tripped the reactor.  The    |
| other three steam lines experienced high steam flow resulting in the closure |
| of all the steam line isolation valves.   As a result of the Reactor Scram   |
| with MSIV closure, water level dropped to approximately minus 46 inches on   |
| wide range level instrumentation.  Level was restored to 35 inches using     |
| high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling    |
| (RCIC).  Reactor pressure peaked at 1048 psig prior to the scram.  All       |
| control rods inserted and safety relief valves were cycled to control        |
| pressure.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee entered a 12 hour to cold shutdown LCO at 02:51 EDT due to      |
| suppression pool temperature exceeding 120 degrees.  Suppression pool        |
| temperature is presently 134 degrees.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector.                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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