Event Notification Report for July 1, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/30/1999 - 07/01/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35811 35862 35880 35881 35882 35883 35884
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35811 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: GINNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:56[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:35[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MCCOY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/30/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN CARUSO R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BOTH DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| During the review (on 6/10/99 @ 1330) of an event in which the "A" Diesel |
| Generator (D/G) output breaker failed to close during periodic testing, it |
| was discovered that the plant had operated for a period of time with both |
| required D/Gs inoperable. Based on the identified failure mode, the "A" |
| D/G breaker was in an inoperable state since the last time it was tripped. |
| This occurred following the performance of periodic testing on 5/11/99 @ |
| 1148. On 5/11/99 @ 1334, the "B" D/G was declared inoperable for the |
| performance of periodic testing, which resulted in both D/Gs being |
| inoperable and the plant entering a 3.0.3 TS LCO action statement. |
| Therefore, during the periodic testing of the "B" D/G, there would have |
| been an inability to automatically respond to an event coincident with a |
| loss of offsite power. The "B" D/G was immediately returned to service |
| following the test. The "A" D/G was restored to operable status on 6/9/99. |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1519 ON 6/30/99 BY DOUG PETERSEN TO JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| The licensee has concluded that the date and time of inoperability is when |
| the "A" D/G output breaker to safeguards bus #14 failed to close (1007 on |
| 6/8/99). The "A" D/G was declared operable on 6/9/99, and the time of |
| inoperability is within the allowable LCO time frame. Therefore, no |
| reportable event occurred and the licensee desires to retract this event. |
| |
| During troubleshooting, the breaker was successfully closed at the bus |
| cubicle more than 20 times on 6/8/99 and 6/9/99 without any adjustment of |
| the breaker and without another failure. The apparent cause of the breaker |
| failure is attributed to a slight misalignment of the tripper bar on the |
| breaker. However, potential effects of bus vibration, temperature, |
| lubrication drying, and the randomness of the breaker failure does not |
| provide firm evidence of the specific time the breaker became inoperable. |
| There is no firm evidence to believe the discrepancy existed prior to |
| 6/8/99. Therefore, in accordance with the industry guidance provided in |
| NUREG-1022, Revision 1, it should be assumed the discrepancy occurred at the |
| time of its discovery. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Larry Doerflein. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 35862 |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/25/1999|
|LICENSEE: ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:34[EDT]|
| CITY: WINDSOR REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 06/25/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: CT |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/30/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GLENN MEYER R1 |
| |VERN HODGE (via fax) NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: IAN RICKARD | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 10CFR PART 21 REPORT REGARDING ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 4KV VACUUM |
| BREAKERS |
| |
| The following text is excerpted from a facsimile received in the NRC |
| Operations Center: |
| |
| "The defect concerns ABB 1200A 4KV Vacuum Breakers delivered to Baltimore |
| Gas and Electric Company's (BG&E's) Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant |
| (CCNPP). Specifically, the defect concerns the breaker performing a trip |
| free operation when a close signal is received by the breaker. This defect |
| results in the breaker failing to remain in the closed position. The defect |
| could lead to non-conservative failure of not starting certain plant |
| equipment upon demand such as an Emergency Core Cooling Pump." |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1613 ON 06/30/99 BY VIRGIL PAGGEN TO JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| The above 10CFR Part 21 Report was submitted to the NRC via ABB Combustion |
| Engineering Letter #LD-99-035, dated 06/25/99. The following is an update |
| to the above 10CFR Part 21 Report via ABB Combustion Engineering Letter |
| #LD-99-039, dated 06/30/99, Same Subject. |
| |
| The activity for which this report is being filed is the use of ABB 1200A |
| 4KV Vacuum Breakers in an application where the breaker is normally open and |
| must close on demand. This defect applies only to BG&E's CCNPP. |
| |
| The defect identified is associated with the use of the ABB 1200A 4KV Vacuum |
| Breaker only in applications where the breaker must close on demand. The |
| defect was detected during site testing of the breaker during installation |
| into CCNPP. During this test, a close signal was applied to the breaker and |
| the breaker tripped free (i.e., failed to remain in the closed position). |
| |
| These breakers are intended for both normally open and normally closed |
| operation. In some applications, the breaker must close upon demand. This |
| may be for electrical distribution applications or component control |
| applications (e.g., start an Emergency Core Cooling pump). Demands can be |
| automated (e.g., by ESFAS) or based on manual operator demands. If the |
| breaker does not remain closed when demanded (i.e., trips free), the safety |
| function cannot be performed. This breaker is intended for use in multiple |
| redundant safety divisions. Multiple redundant divisions could be affected |
| by this defect. |
| |
| The defect applies only to ABB 1200A 4KV Vacuum Breakers delivered to CCNPP. |
| Thirty-seven (37) of these breakers were delivered to CCNPP. ABB |
| Combustion Engineering understands that several of these breakers have been |
| installed at CCNPP, however, none are installed in any application that |
| requires a close on demand function. |
| |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Larry Doerflein and NRR Vern |
| Hodge (via fax). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35880 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEABROOK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/30/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:50[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/30/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DANA MORRELL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/30/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR REPORT - DEAD SEAL FOUND |
| |
| The licensee notified the National Marine Fisheries and the NRC Resident |
| Inspector that they discovered a dead seal in the plant intake structure |
| during a routine inspection. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35881 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/30/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:59[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 06/30/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:22[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY TODD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/30/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PAUL FREDRICKSON R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Certain accident scenarios could cause pressurization of Low Pressure |
| Injection and Rx Bldg Spray Systems - |
| |
| During investigation of a valve leak observed during a test on Unit 1, it |
| was discovered that there is a possibility that certain accident scenarios |
| could cause pressurization of certain portions of the Low Pressure Injection |
| (LPI) and Reactor Building Spray (RBS) Systems above values previously |
| evaluated. |
| |
| Specifically, following a small break LOCA, the LPI System is still taking |
| suction from the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) when the system is |
| aligned with the LPI Pump 'A' discharging to both injection headers through |
| the crossover piping in preparation for realigning suction to the Reactor |
| Building Emergency Sump. At this time, it is possible to pressurize the |
| suction piping of the idle LPI Pump 'B' and RBS Pump 'B'. This can occur |
| because the LPI Pump 'B' minimum flow recirculation line is connected |
| downstream of the pump discharge check valve or as a result of leakage |
| through the pump discharge check valve. A small amount of fluid would flow |
| through the recirculation line until the pressure in the pump suction piping |
| is equal to the pressure in the cross-connected LPI discharge headers. |
| (Procedural details would prevent this problem from affecting Train 'A'.) |
| |
| This pressure could be in excess of the capability of certain valve |
| operators to reposition process valves. Among the affected valves is #LP-20, |
| the RB Emergency Sump Train 'B' isolation valve. |
| |
| When nearing depletion of the BWST inventory, the Emergency Operating |
| Procedure calls for opening both RB Emergency Sump isolation valves (#LP-19 |
| on Train 'A' and #LP-20 on Train 'B'). |
| |
| It was also recognized that #LP-19, in the redundant flow path, must be |
| considered vulnerable to a random single failure. |
| |
| Therefore, at 1722 on 06/30/99, Oconee Site Managers concluded that #LP-20 |
| must be considered inoperable for use in this specific system configuration. |
| This configuration is only used during certain small break LOCAs which |
| require that the LPI and High Pressure Injection (HPI) Systems be placed in |
| the "piggy-back" configuration where the LPI pumps supply flow to the HPI |
| pump suctions. In addition, this failure scenario only applies to the |
| limited spectrum of small breaks that do not result in initiation of Reactor |
| Building Spray. |
| |
| Because this inoperablity only affects the HPI-LPI "piggy-back" Train 'B' |
| flow path, the operating units (Units 2 & 3) entered Tech Spec 3.5.2, |
| Condition C, which has a 72 hour action statement. The main corrective |
| action is implementation of a system alignment change which will create a |
| vent path to the Reactor Building using the Reactor Building Spray Train 'B' |
| piping. This will prevent the possibility of pressurizing the piping at |
| #LP-20 and eliminate the potential for this problem. The procedure changes |
| are in progress and the implementation is expected to occur on night shift |
| tonight (06/30/99). In addition, operators on shift will receive awareness |
| training on the new configuration as it is implemented. Corresponding |
| changes to the Emergency Operating Procedure |
| will be implemented prior to exiting the Tech Spec 3.5.2.C action statement. |
| Affected Periodic Test, Maintenance, and Instrument Procedures have been |
| placed on administrative hold until they can be revised. |
| |
| Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) in a Refueling Outage |
| preparing to enter Mode 4. These alignment changes will be incorporated on |
| Unit 1, as appropriate, during plant start-up. |
| |
| The analysis of this issue is continuing, and the potential exists that |
| further analysis or testing may allow retraction |
| of this notification. If not, further details will be provided in the LER |
| that will be submitted to the NRC. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Transportation |Event Number: 35882 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/30/1999|
|LICENSEE: SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:00[EDT]|
| CITY: NASHVILLE REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 06/30/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: TN |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/30/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |PAUL FREDRICKSON R2 |
| |LINDA HOWELL R4 |
+------------------------------------------------+SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SCOTT LANGFORD |DON COOL NMSS |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - OVERDUE SHIPMENT OF MEDICAL RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS (IODINE-131) - |
| |
| AT 1630 ON 06/25/99, A PACKAGE OF MEDICAL RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS (0.9 |
| MILLICURIES OF IODINE-131) WAS SHIPPED BY CAR/TRUCK VIA ASSOCIATED COURIERS |
| FROM SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP, ST LOUIS, MO TO SYNCOR, NASHVILLE, TN. THE |
| SHIPMENT WAS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN NASHVILLE AT 1200 ON 06/26/99. THE |
| SHIPMENT IS OVERDUE. ASSOCIATED COURIERS IS ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE THE |
| PACKAGE. MR LANGFORD PLANS TO NOTIFY THE STATE OF TN. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 35883 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: QUEST X TECHNOLOGIES, GUAM |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/30/1999|
|LICENSEE: QUEST X TECHNOLOGIES, GUAM |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:13[EDT]|
| CITY: GUAM REGION: |EVENT DATE: 06/30/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/30/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LINDA HOWELL R4 |
| |SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+EPA (BY FAX) |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CUMMINGS & HICKMAN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - PACKAGE OF IRIDIUM - 192 WITHOUT SHIPPING PAPERS LOCATED IN GUAM - |
| |
| TOM BIRKAMEYER, CHIEF OF SAFETY, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, GUAM AIRPORT, |
| RECEIVED A PACKAGE OF IRIDIUM - 192 ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO AND STORED IT IN |
| THE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AREA AT THE AIRPORT IN GUAM. THE SHIPPING PAPERS |
| ARE NOT AVAILABLE AND THE SHIPPER AND RECEIVER ARE UNKNOWN. |
| |
| RECENTLY, PERSONNEL AT QUEST X TECHNOLOGIES (JAHA CUMMINGS & WALT HICKMAN) |
| TOOK POSSESSION OF THE PACKAGE AND PLACED IT IN A LOCKED STORAGE SHED IN |
| GUAM. THE PACKAGE IS A SMALL DRUM, TYPE 'A' PACKAGE WITH THE FOLLOWING |
| PARTIALLY OBSCURED MARKINGS: RADIATION SYMBOL, RADIOACTIVE YELLOW 3, SOLID |
| FORM, UN-2982 (NUMBER MAY BE INCORRECT), AND "ENGLAND". QUEST PERSONNEL |
| MEASURED THE PACKAGE WITH A GM SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND OBTAINED MAXIMUM |
| READINGS OF 0.2 MR/HR AT THE SURFACE OF THE PACKAGE. |
| |
| QUEST PERSONNEL CALLED THE NRC TO REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT TO DO WITH |
| THE PACKAGE. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35884 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/01/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:56[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/01/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:08[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: R. PEAL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/01/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ACCS 50.72(b)(1)(iv) ECCS INJECTION | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ECCS INJECTION, RPS ACTUATION, AND ESF ACTUATION. |
| |
| Susquehanna Unit 1 experienced a Reactor Scram due to a neutron monitoring |
| upscale trip signal. Preliminary indication is that the 'C' outboard MSIV |
| went closed, causing the high neutron flux that tripped the reactor. The |
| other three steam lines experienced high steam flow resulting in the closure |
| of all the steam line isolation valves. As a result of the Reactor Scram |
| with MSIV closure, water level dropped to approximately minus 46 inches on |
| wide range level instrumentation. Level was restored to 35 inches using |
| high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling |
| (RCIC). Reactor pressure peaked at 1048 psig prior to the scram. All |
| control rods inserted and safety relief valves were cycled to control |
| pressure. |
| |
| The licensee entered a 12 hour to cold shutdown LCO at 02:51 EDT due to |
| suppression pool temperature exceeding 120 degrees. Suppression pool |
| temperature is presently 134 degrees. |
| |
| The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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