Event Notification Report for June 23, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/22/1999 - 06/23/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
35852358533585435855
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35852
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM DOUGHERTY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM DOUGHERTY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 06/23/1999
Notification Time: 06:18 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/1999
Event Time: 04:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/1999
Notification Time: 06:18 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/1999
Event Time: 04:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
GLENN MEYER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI FAILED DURING A START TEST
The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system failed to start during surveillance testing. At the time of the failure, HPCI was inoperable for planned maintenance on the governor controller for the turbine control valve. The nature of the failure was the turbine control valve did not open in response to an initiation signal. The cause of this failure is under investigation, it is unknown at this time if the failure was due to the maintenance or existed prior to the maintenance.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system failed to start during surveillance testing. At the time of the failure, HPCI was inoperable for planned maintenance on the governor controller for the turbine control valve. The nature of the failure was the turbine control valve did not open in response to an initiation signal. The cause of this failure is under investigation, it is unknown at this time if the failure was due to the maintenance or existed prior to the maintenance.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35853
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: FLYNN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: FLYNN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 06/23/1999
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/1999
Event Time: 11:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/1999
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/1999
Event Time: 11:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
AL BELISLE (R2)
AL BELISLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED AFTER FOUR RODS FELL INTO THE CORE.
SHUTDOWN BANK "B" GROUP 1 CONTROL RODS (4 RODS) FELL INTO THE CORE WITH THE CAUSE BEING UNKNOWN. THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED AND ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED AND NO INJECTION OCCURRED. THEY DID HAVE TWO SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVES TO LIFT AND RESEAT ON THE FEEDWATER HEATERS. THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT IS BEING INVESTIGATED BY I&C TECHNICIANS. THEN UNIT IS BEING MAINTAINED IN MODE 3 AND NO ABNORMAL CONDITIONS WERE NOTED.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.
SHUTDOWN BANK "B" GROUP 1 CONTROL RODS (4 RODS) FELL INTO THE CORE WITH THE CAUSE BEING UNKNOWN. THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED AND ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED AND NO INJECTION OCCURRED. THEY DID HAVE TWO SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVES TO LIFT AND RESEAT ON THE FEEDWATER HEATERS. THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT IS BEING INVESTIGATED BY I&C TECHNICIANS. THEN UNIT IS BEING MAINTAINED IN MODE 3 AND NO ABNORMAL CONDITIONS WERE NOTED.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35854
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 06/23/1999
Notification Time: 19:37 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/1999
Notification Time: 19:37 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
4 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE
PLANT SHIFT SUPERINTENDENTS OFFICE WAS NOTIFIED BY THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY(NCS) STAFF THAT A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL(NCSA) WAS NOT BEING MAINTAINED IN THE X-744H STORAGE WAREHOUSE. NCSA-PLANT048 COVERS CONTAMINATED METALS. VALVES AND THE OTHER CASCADE EQUIPMENT WERE BEING STORED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT HAD LESS THAN 15 GRAMS U-235, BECAUSE THE DESCRIPTION OF THE OPERATION WHICH STATES " IN THE CASE OF CONTAMINATED EQUIPMENT SENT TO PORTSMOUTH FROM PADUCAH, OR OAK RIDGE OR ANY OTHER FACILITY, NON- DESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS INFORMATION VERIFYING THAT THERE IS LESS THAN 15GM U-235 IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO ACCEPTANCE." THUS THE VALVES WERE HANDLED UTILIZING 15 GRAMS U-235 PER PIECE FOR TRANSPORT AND BATCHING CONSIDERATIONS.
ALL VALVES IN QUESTION HAD BEEN IN STORAGE FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME(YEARS), AND IT WAS ASSUMED THAT THE EQUIPMENT STORED IN X-744H MET THE ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS. THE VALVES WERE ANALYZED USING NON-DESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS MEASUREMENTS TO VERIFY THEY MET THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR DECONTAMINATION IN THE DRY ICE BLASTER(REF. NCSA-PLANT081). MEASUREMENTS IDENTIFIED HIGHER U-235 ENRICHMENT AND MASS THAN WAS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED WITH AVAILABLE HISTORICAL DATA. BY THE TIME THE DATA HAD BEEN INTERPRETED, SEVERAL COMPONENTS HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE BUILDING AND STAGED FOR TRANSPORT. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE VALVES HAD BEEN STAGED IN COMPLIANCE WITH NCSA-PLANT048, EVEN IN LIGHT OF THE HIGHER MASSES IDENTIFIED. IN RESPONDING TO THAT CONCERN, ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 15 GRAM U-235 PER PIECE OF EQUIPMENT CAME UP. IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT OPERATIONS IN X-744H WOULD BE HALTED PENDING FULL DETERMINATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH NCSA-PLANT048.
HOWEVER, BASED ON A REVIEW OF AVAILABLE HISTORICAL DATA PERFORMED BY THE BUILDING MANAGEMENT, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH NCSA-PLANT048 CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED FOR A LARGE PORTION OF THE LEGACY EQUIPMENT STORED IN X-744H. IN ADDITION, NO PROCEDURE COULD BE IDENTIFIED WITH WHICH THE EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN HANDLED WHICH INCORPORATED THE REQUIREMENTS OF NCSA-PLANT048.
THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED ALONG WITH THE DOE REPRESENTATIVE.
PLANT SHIFT SUPERINTENDENTS OFFICE WAS NOTIFIED BY THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY(NCS) STAFF THAT A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL(NCSA) WAS NOT BEING MAINTAINED IN THE X-744H STORAGE WAREHOUSE. NCSA-PLANT048 COVERS CONTAMINATED METALS. VALVES AND THE OTHER CASCADE EQUIPMENT WERE BEING STORED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT HAD LESS THAN 15 GRAMS U-235, BECAUSE THE DESCRIPTION OF THE OPERATION WHICH STATES " IN THE CASE OF CONTAMINATED EQUIPMENT SENT TO PORTSMOUTH FROM PADUCAH, OR OAK RIDGE OR ANY OTHER FACILITY, NON- DESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS INFORMATION VERIFYING THAT THERE IS LESS THAN 15GM U-235 IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO ACCEPTANCE." THUS THE VALVES WERE HANDLED UTILIZING 15 GRAMS U-235 PER PIECE FOR TRANSPORT AND BATCHING CONSIDERATIONS.
ALL VALVES IN QUESTION HAD BEEN IN STORAGE FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME(YEARS), AND IT WAS ASSUMED THAT THE EQUIPMENT STORED IN X-744H MET THE ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS. THE VALVES WERE ANALYZED USING NON-DESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS MEASUREMENTS TO VERIFY THEY MET THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR DECONTAMINATION IN THE DRY ICE BLASTER(REF. NCSA-PLANT081). MEASUREMENTS IDENTIFIED HIGHER U-235 ENRICHMENT AND MASS THAN WAS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED WITH AVAILABLE HISTORICAL DATA. BY THE TIME THE DATA HAD BEEN INTERPRETED, SEVERAL COMPONENTS HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE BUILDING AND STAGED FOR TRANSPORT. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE VALVES HAD BEEN STAGED IN COMPLIANCE WITH NCSA-PLANT048, EVEN IN LIGHT OF THE HIGHER MASSES IDENTIFIED. IN RESPONDING TO THAT CONCERN, ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 15 GRAM U-235 PER PIECE OF EQUIPMENT CAME UP. IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT OPERATIONS IN X-744H WOULD BE HALTED PENDING FULL DETERMINATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH NCSA-PLANT048.
HOWEVER, BASED ON A REVIEW OF AVAILABLE HISTORICAL DATA PERFORMED BY THE BUILDING MANAGEMENT, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH NCSA-PLANT048 CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED FOR A LARGE PORTION OF THE LEGACY EQUIPMENT STORED IN X-744H. IN ADDITION, NO PROCEDURE COULD BE IDENTIFIED WITH WHICH THE EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN HANDLED WHICH INCORPORATED THE REQUIREMENTS OF NCSA-PLANT048.
THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED ALONG WITH THE DOE REPRESENTATIVE.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35855
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MATT MAURER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MATT MAURER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 06/24/1999
Notification Time: 05:18 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/1999
Event Time: 20:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/1999
Notification Time: 05:18 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/1999
Event Time: 20:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
24 HOUR REPORT - SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATION
"At 2050 CDT on 6/23/99, C-333A Autoclave Position 1 North received a High Autoclave Steam Pressure Alarm while in Technical Specification Requirement mode 5. The Autoclave Steam Pressure Control System is required to be operable while in mode 5 per LCO 2.2,3.3. An Increase in autoclave steam pressure was observed by the Autoclave Steam Pressure Control System and the system isolated the steam from the autoclave as designed. The autoclave was placed in mode 2 and the cause of the safety system actuation is being investigated."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"At 2050 CDT on 6/23/99, C-333A Autoclave Position 1 North received a High Autoclave Steam Pressure Alarm while in Technical Specification Requirement mode 5. The Autoclave Steam Pressure Control System is required to be operable while in mode 5 per LCO 2.2,3.3. An Increase in autoclave steam pressure was observed by the Autoclave Steam Pressure Control System and the system isolated the steam from the autoclave as designed. The autoclave was placed in mode 2 and the cause of the safety system actuation is being investigated."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.