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Event Notification Report for June 16, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           06/15/1999 - 06/16/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35752  35823  35824  35825  35826  35827  35828  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35752       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FERMI                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/21/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:02[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        05/21/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:14[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE MAREK                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/15/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       15       Power Operation  |15       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 hour License Condition 2.C.(9) report concerning non-compliance with the  |
| approved fire protection program.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| During a design calculation review, plant engineering department personnel   |
| discovered that cable routing for safety/relief valve (SRV) 'G' is not in    |
| compliance with Appendix R design assumptions for cable separation.  The SRV |
| is used in the dedicated shutdown procedure to control reactor pressure and  |
| to depressurize the plant so that a cold shutdown condition can be achieved  |
| within 10 hours after plant shutdown (UFSAR commitment).  An hourly fire     |
| watch has been established in the affected zone, pending an evaluation by    |
| engineering department personnel.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event notification by   |
| the licensee.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1454 EDT ON 6/15/99 BY PATRICK FALLON TO WILLIAM POERTNER |
| * * *                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Further review determined that the previously reported cable routing of     |
| associated circuits for SRV 'G' being different than the Appendix R design   |
| assumptions, would not have affected the ability of SRV 'G' to function as   |
| assumed in the Dedicated Shutdown Procedure.  Although the associated        |
| circuits were routed through fire zones where use of the Dedicated Shutdown  |
| Procedure was required, the fuses for the associated circuits were           |
| appropriately coordinated such that fire induced multiple high impedance     |
| faults would not have prevented operation of SRV 'G' as assumed in the       |
| procedure.  Therefore, the existing configuration is in compliance with the  |
| approved Fermi 2 fire protection program as required by License Condition    |
| 2.C.(9).  Accordingly, the previous notification made in accordance with     |
| License Condition 2.F is withdrawn."                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  HOO notified R3DO (JOHN   |
| MADERA).                                                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35823       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/15/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:02[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        06/14/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        17:56[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/16/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |FRED COMBS           NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERIC SPAETH                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN  REPORT INVOLVING NCSA VIOLATION                  |
|                                                                              |
| "On 6/14/99 at 1756, the Plant Shift Superintendent's office was notified by |
| operations personnel that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) was   |
| not being maintained in the X-333 process building.  Operations personnel    |
| discovered that a converter classified as UH (uncomplicated handling) being  |
| stored on the cell floor had a cover missing from an opening. The NCSA for   |
| this operation, PLANT062.A00, has a requirement which states in part,        |
| 'Openings/penetrations shall be covered to minimize the potential for        |
| moderator collection and moist air exposure.'                                |
|                                                                              |
| "The Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) staff determined that this incident    |
| caused a loss of control such that only one double contingency control       |
| remained in place."                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Operations personnel will inform the DOE Site Representative and has         |
| informed the NRC Resident Inspector.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0402 BY SPAETH, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *                        |
|                                                                              |
| On 6/15/99, at 1123 while continuing an NCS walkdown, an additional NCSA     |
| non-compliance was discovered.  A Recycle Cooler stored on the cell floor    |
| had a cover missing from an opening. The Recycle Cooler is classified as UH. |
| Compliance was restored within four hours.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The HOO notified the RDO  |
| (Madera); NMSS EO (Piccone).                                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35824       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GINNA                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/15/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:45[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        06/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        03:56[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ANTHONY ROGENSKI             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/15/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JIMI YEROKUN         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VALID RADIATION ALARM IN AUXILIARY BUILDING CAUSED BY MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY.  |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "WHILE DRAINING CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) HOLDUP TANK (HUT)  |
| 'A' WHICH WAS ISOLATED, THE LICENSEE NOTICED THE AUXILIARY BUILDING          |
| PARTICULATE AND GAS MONITORS INCREASING.  OPERATORS CLOSED THE DRAIN VALVE   |
| AND THE RADIATION MONITORS CONTINUED TO INCREASE.  THE GAS MONITOR TRIPPED   |
| AND GAVE AN AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION ISOLATION."                       |
|                                                                              |
| THE CVCS HUT IS NORMALLY MAINTAINED CLOSED WITH A NITROGEN OVERPRESSURE.     |
| RADIATION MONITORS R13 AND R14 INSTALLED ON THE AUXILIARY BUILDING           |
| VENTILATION EXHAUST BOTH SHOWED INCREASING COUNTS.  THE R14 MONITOR          |
| INCREASED TO 2755 CORRECTED COUNTS PER MIN (CCPM) EXCEEDING THE ALARM        |
| SETPOINT OF 2250 RESULTING IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION ISOLATION.  |
| THE R13 INCREASED TO 1283 CCPM WELL BELOW THE ALARM SETPOINT OF 3000.   THE  |
| LICENSEE SUBSEQUENTLY RESTORED VENTILATION AND RESET THE ISOLATION SIGNAL.   |
| THERE WAS NO RADIATION RELEASE OFFSITE.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35825       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK                     REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/15/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:13[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        06/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT MAGLAJANG             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/15/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|2     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN ALARM NOT TESTED DURING CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.       |
|                                                                              |
| The following is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:        |
|                                                                              |
| "The function of the Source Range Channels is to provide detection and       |
| indication of source range neutron flux during shutdown, refueling and       |
| startup modes.  The source range channels N31/N32 provide a 'High Flux at    |
| Shutdown' alarm in the control room and containment in case of unexpected    |
| reactivity excursions during shutdown and refueling operations.  This alarm  |
| is credited in the Cook licensing basis for detection and mitigation of a    |
| boron dilution event as analyzed in UFSAR.  This function is required to be  |
| available during modes 3, 4, 5 and 6.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Technical Specifications defines a Channel Functional Test as an injection  |
| of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as     |
| practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.     |
| Contrary to this the 'High Flux at Shutdown' alarm is not tested or verified |
| during the Source Range Channel Functional Test.  The function of the Source |
| Range Channels cannot be credited as operable under the Technical            |
| Specifications unless it has been tested in conjunction with these Tech Spec |
| requirements.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Technical Specification compensatory actions have begun which include       |
| verifying the Shutdown Margin requirements are met within one hour and at    |
| least once per 12 hours thereafter.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "It should be noted that there is a great degree of confidence in the        |
| physical functionality of this alarm based on drawing review and the fact    |
| that the alarm came in on a channel spike on 2/4/99.  The inoperability is   |
| based entirely on missed surveillance requirements."                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is revising procedures to test the high flux at shutdown        |
| alarm.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to contact the NRC resident inspector.                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35826       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/15/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:51[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        06/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:24[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BARRY COLEMAN                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/16/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CAUDLE JULIAN        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     M/R        Y       41       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FROM 41% POWER.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| Operators manually scrammed the reactor from 41% power because of lowering   |
| vacuum in the main condenser.   Operators first noticed lowering vacuum at   |
| around 2000 and worked unsuccessfully to fix the problem until the reactor   |
| was eventually scrammed at 2124.  The cause of the loss of vacuum was a      |
| faulty steam jet air ejector.  The turbine was manually tripped after the    |
| scram.  Reactor water level lowered to -20 inches during the transient and   |
| caused an automatic group II isolation.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| Several complications arose during the plant response to this transient.     |
| The 4160 Volt electrical buses 2C and 2D did not switch to their alternate   |
| power supply as expected.  This caused the loss of the recirculation pump    |
| oil pumps and the resultant loss of the recirculation pumps.  These buses    |
| have been restored and recirculation pumps restarted.  Restoring one of the  |
| recirculation pumps resulted in a transient on Unit 1 as described in the    |
| update below.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The outboard MSIVs were manually closed because of low condenser vacuum and  |
| loss of the condensate system.  The inboard 2B MSIV did not auto close as    |
| expected when vacuum reached 10 inches.  This valve could not be shut        |
| manually (remotely) either and still indicates open.  A drywell entry is     |
| planned to ascertain the exact status of this valve.                         |
|                                                                              |
| Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) has been manually started and is being |
| used in conjunction with Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) to maintain reactor     |
| pressure, temperature and water level.  Suppression pool cooling is          |
| operating, although pool temperature has risen to 112� F.  Tech specs        |
| require the plant to be placed in cold shutdown within 36 hours when pool    |
| temperature exceeds 110� F.  Operators are currently preparing to place High |
| Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) online which is expected to reduce the     |
| heat load on the suppression pool and allow its temperature to lower.        |
| Efforts are also in progress to restore the secondary plant to aid in plant  |
| cooldown if necessary.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0041 ON 6/16/99 BY COLEMAN TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *             |
|                                                                              |
| Just prior to this event a hard ground was coming and going on the 600 Volt  |
| bus 1D.  The licensee believes that the ground was caused by the cycling of  |
| the "B" recirculation pump discharge MOV on Unit 2.   The 600 Volt bus 1D is |
| the normal power supply to 2R24-SO18B which feeds the "B" recirculation pump |
| discharge valve 2B31-FO31B.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The "B" RPS MG set tripped causing a half scram, a half group II isolation   |
| (the outboard valves closed), a half group V isolation  (F004 closed & RWCU  |
| pump tripped), reactor building & refueling floor ventilation isolated       |
| (outboard dampers closed), all four Standby Gas Treatment fans auto started, |
| the main control room ventilation went into pressurization mode, and the     |
| fission product monitors isolated (outboard valves).                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the Operations Officer  |
| informed the R2DO (Julian).                                                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35827       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/16/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:58[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        06/16/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:10[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PHIL SANTINI                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/16/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JIMI YEROKUN         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       99       Power Operation  |95       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF ROD POSITION INDICATION RESULTS IN A RUNBACK                         |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0210, Motor Control Center (MCC) 24 deenergized.  This resulted in a     |
| loss of power to rod position indication.  This in turn caused a dropped rod |
| automatic runback to 95% power.  Axial power tilt remained within the band.  |
| Loss of rod position indication placed the plant in a condition which was    |
| outside the limitations of Technical Specification 3.10.6.  Rod position     |
| indication was subsequently recovered at 0225 when this load was             |
| reenergized.   All automatic functions associated with the loss of MCC 24    |
| and the runback occurred as expected."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is investigating whether or not the runback should have reduced |
| power to 85% vs 95% as well as the initial cause for the loss of power to    |
| MCC 24.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35828       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/16/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:53[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        06/15/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        09:30[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/16/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOSEPHINE PICCONE    NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERIC SPAETH                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT                                                |
|                                                                              |
| On 6/15/99, at 0930 the Plant Shift Superintendent's office was notified by  |
| operations personnel that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) was   |
| not being maintained In the X-705 decontamination building.  While           |
| performing operator rounds, Operations personnel discovered that a general   |
| purpose small diameter container in a transport cart, was incorrectly spaced |
| from a 1-inch line containing fissile solution.                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NCSA for this operation. NCSA-0705.004. has a requirement which states   |
| in part, "when moving uranium bearing containers, a minimum 2 feet           |
| edge-to--edge spacing shall be maintained between other uranium bearing      |
| materials and the container being moved."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The Nuclear Criticality Safety staff determined that this incident caused a  |
| loss of control such that only one double contingency control remained in    |
| place.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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