Event Notification Report for May 26, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/25/1999 - 05/26/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35751 35763 35764 35765 35766 35767 35768
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35751 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HARRIS REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/21/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:53[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/21/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:16[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK ELLINGTON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/25/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ANN BOLAND R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INADVERTENT START OF THE 'B' CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP DUE TO AN INVALID START |
| SIGNAL |
| |
| While performing the test of the Sequencer Block Circuit and Containment Fan |
| Cooler, Train 'B' (#OST- 1095) with the plant at 100% power, a maintenance |
| technician placed multimeter leads on the wrong terminal points. These |
| terminal points were adjacent to the desired points. This caused an |
| inadvertent start of the 'B' Containment Spray Pump. This invalid actuation |
| was the result of an invalid signal generated by the maintenance technician. |
| Investigation indicates that no other components actuated. |
| |
| The pump was aligned in standby and no flow was admitted to containment. |
| The pump operated for approximately two minutes with adequate recirculation |
| flow before it was secured. No equipment damage occurred and the 'B' |
| Containment Spray system is currently operable. The licensee has |
| conservatively determined that the pump start constitutes an ESF actuation. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1817 ON 5/25/99 BY ELLINGTON, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * * |
| |
| On May 21, 1999, Harris Nuclear Plant performed a four hour non-emergency |
| notification for an ESF actuation on the inadvertent starting of the B |
| Containment Spray Pump. Harris Nuclear Plant has subsequently determined |
| that no other components actuated nor would have actuated as a result of |
| this event. The B Containment Spray Pump cannot by itself mitigate the |
| consequences of an accident. In order for the Containment Spray System to |
| mitigate the consequences of an accident, a downstream header isolation |
| valve would have been required to open. This header isolation valve remained |
| shut during this event. Harris Nuclear Plant has determined that this event |
| was a single component actuation with no other components actuated and this |
| single Component actuation could not have alone mitigated the consequences |
| of an accident. Therefore, Harris Nuclear Plant retracts the May 21, 1999 |
| four hour non-emergency notification per guidance provided in NRC |
| NUREG-1022, Revision 1 page 53. |
| |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. The HOO notified the |
| R2DO (Decker). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35763 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/25/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:58[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/25/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:28[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL BAIN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/25/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD CONTE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 M/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP BECAUSE OF A SECONDARY SIDE STEAM LEAK |
| |
| The reactor was manually tripped from 100% power because of a steam leak in |
| the 1A feedwater heater. All control rods fully inserted. Both motor |
| driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were started and are maintaining water |
| level in the steam generators. Decay heat is being removed by use of the |
| steam generator atmospheric reliefs. |
| The MSIVs are shut. The plant is stable in hot standby. |
| |
| The steam leak was discovered when oscillations in the feedwater heater |
| water level resulted in a main control board annunicator. Personnel sent to |
| investigate the feedwater heater reported a steam leak in the pipe leading |
| up to the flange to which the relief valve is connected. Operators then |
| manually tripped the reactor. |
| |
| Access to the turbine building is restricted while the feedwater heater is |
| steaming down. A 120 V instrument AC panel switched to an alternate power |
| supply during the plant transient. This had no effect on the plant's |
| response. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and will notify state and |
| local officials. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35764 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: THREE MILE ISLAND REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/25/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:03[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/25/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:21[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN SCHORK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/25/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD CONTE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PRESSURIZER SUPPORT BOLTS WOULD EXCEED ALLOWABLE STRESS DURING AN |
| EARTHQUAKE |
| |
| At 1621 hours on May 25, 1999, utilizing preliminary calculations (not yet |
| design verified), GPU Nuclear determined that a condition outside the design |
| basis of the plant exists at TMI-1 and that an immediate report to the NRC |
| in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(B)(i)(ii)(B) is required. |
| |
| A review of the design of the bolts that insert into the Pressurizer Support |
| Lugs found that in the event of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (the Maximum |
| Hypothetical Earthquake (MHE)) the bolts would be exposed to loads in excess |
| of allowable stress as analyzed in the TMI-1 FSAR |
| |
| The bolts have been determined to be operable utilizing building and |
| equipment damping factors (7% / 7%) in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide |
| 1.61. However, the TMI-1 FSAR utilizes more conservative damping factors (2% |
| building / 2.5% equipment). When bolt load calculations are performed |
| utilizing the FSAR factors, the MHE shear stress exceeds the allowable |
| stress by approximately 25% and the MHE seismic stress slightly exceeds the |
| allowable stress by approximately 1.5%. However, when the calculations are |
| performed using the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 damping factors of 7% building |
| / 7% equipment, the MHE shear and MHE seismic stresses are well within the |
| allowable stress. |
| |
| GPU Nuclear intends to finalize the calculations and to resolve the |
| non-conformance with the design basis as stated in the FSAR by either: |
| |
| Restoring the bolts to within the plant design basis via, the plant |
| modification process or, |
| |
| Revising the plant design basis via a license amendment. |
| |
| This condition has been documented in the GPU Nuclear Corrective Action |
| Program (CAP T1999-0264). |
| |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35765 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/25/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:27[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 05/25/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK LANGE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/25/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD CONTE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) INOPERABLE |
| |
| "HPCS is inoperable but available. During an independent review of the In |
| Service Inspection (ISI) program plan it was found that 52 welds in the HPCS |
| system were improperly exempted from ISI requirements. These welds are |
| located between the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) and the HPCS pump suction |
| valve (MOV101). In addition, the weld inspections are required by ASME |
| section XI. Preparations are being made to perform the required ISI weld |
| exams." |
| |
| The HPCS LCO is 14 days. All other ECCS equipment is operable. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35766 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/25/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:29[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 05/25/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:24[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARTIN MANTENFEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/25/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD CONTE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RCIC STEAM EXHAUST CHECK VALVES FAIL LEAK TEST |
| |
| TWO IN SERIES REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) STEAM EXHAUST CHECK |
| VALVES FAILED THEIR LEAK TESTS. THE LEAKAGE WAS IN EXCESS OF 10.1 GALLONS |
| PER MINUTE. NO PRESSURE COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE LINE DURING THE TEST. |
| THE PLANT IS SHUTDOWN IN REFUELING MODE SO RCIC IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE |
| OPERABLE. CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN BEFORE STARTUP. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE HAS NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 35767 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/25/1999|
|LICENSEE: UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:52[EDT]|
| CITY: SEATTLE REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 11/21/1998|
| COUNTY: STATE: WA |EVENT TIME: 12:00[PDT]|
|LICENSE#: WN-C001-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/25/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |THOMAS ANDREWS R4 |
| | NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY FRAZEE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| This is notification of an event in Washington state as reported to the |
| WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection. |
| |
| STATUS: new/closed |
| |
| Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON |
| City and state: SEATTLE, WA |
| License number: WN-C001-1 |
| Type of license: ACADEMIC BROAD SCOPE |
| 9 |
| Date of Event: Unknown |
| Location of Event: Seattle, WA |
| ABSTRACT: An "ownerless" surplus gas chromatograph (and detector cell) |
| was being stored in a hallway at the University. An inventory check in |
| late December 1998 noted the unit was no longer in the hallway and was |
| presumed to have been put into better storage. By late January 1999, |
| further checking had revealed that the unit probably had been taken to |
| the UW Surplus Property Department. Records indicated the unit probably |
| had been sold at auction on November 21, 1998 (there is some uncertainty |
| because some items having no apparent value were discarded prior to the |
| auction). The University RSO contacted the complete list of buyers in an |
| attempt to recover the unit, however none of the buyers remembered |
| acquiring a gas chromatograph at the auction. Some buyers also noted |
| discarding items which had no apparent value immediately after the |
| auction. The RSO has determined that the unit was most likely discarded |
| in the trash in November either by UW Surplus Property Department or by |
| one of the buyers. A contributing cause to this loss was failure of the |
| Surplus Property Staff to notify the UW Radiation Safety Office of the |
| auction. UW Radiation Safety routinely conducts "walk-through" |
| inspections prior to auctions and as worked with Surplus Property Staff |
| to help them identify hazardous equipment. There was no explanation why |
| the Radiation Safety Office had been removed from the auction |
| announcement database. This was corrected. There is little likelihood |
| of human exposure to the radioactive source if it was sent to the |
| landfill for disposal with the other trash. |
| |
| What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? WAC |
| 246-221-240(1)(b) Reporting the loss of radioactive material in a |
| quantity requiring notification within 30 days of occurrence. |
| |
| Activity and Isotope(s) involved: 15 millicuries of Ni-63 as of November |
| 1, 1997 |
| |
| Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (Mfg., Model, serial number) Perkins-Elmer gas |
| chromatograph source model B3C0119, serial number 3512. |
| Leak test? Source was last leak tested on September 19, 1998. No |
| indication of leakage. |
| Disposition/recovery: Source is believed to have been discarded into the |
| trash sent to a landfill. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35768 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:29[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/25/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 21:05[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/26/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |TONY VEGEL R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 | NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RON CRABTREE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING THE LOSS OF ONE OF THE TWO |
| DOUBLE CONTINGENCY CONTROLS |
| |
| "On 5/25/99 at 2105 hours, while processing waste water solution through |
| X-705 microfiltration filter press 'A', approximately 5 gallons of solution |
| leaked from between the second and third filter plates, spilling onto the |
| floor. At the time of this spill, Operations personnel were processing a |
| 2072 liter 'batch' of waste water which contained 29.44 grams of U-235 at an |
| enrichment of 1.4 wt % U-235. Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety Personnel |
| determined the leak to be a loss of a single control (physical integrity of |
| the system) such that only one of the double contingency controls (geometry) |
| remained in place. |
| |
| "This event is reportable under NRC Bulletin 91-01, 24-hour criticality |
| control. |
| |
| "There was no radioactive / radiological exposure as a result of this |
| event. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| On May 25, 1999, approximately 5-gallons of concentrate leaked from filter |
| press A in the microfiltration system. The leak occurred between the second |
| and third filter press plates, most likely the result of a failed 0-ring. |
| NCSA.0705_076 covers the use of inadvertent containers in X-705, given the |
| concern of leaks/spills from the various solution bearing systems. |
| NCSA.0705_076 considers the leak/spill of more than 4.8-liters from any |
| system to be an unlikely event, given the design and physical integrity of |
| the systems (i.e., the systems are designed and built to contain the |
| solution). While this leak resulted in greater than 4.8-liters spilling from |
| the system in question, the second contingency was not violated in that the |
| solution did not accumulate in an unsafe geometry (it spilled to the floor |
| and spread out into a safe slab geometry). |
| |
| "Based on sampling and batching calculations performed on the concentrate |
| storage tank (i.e., T.103A) the total mass of material to be fed to the |
| filter press is known prior to introducing concentrate into the filler |
| press. NCSA-0705_015 limits the mass of U-235 to be processed (i.e., in a |
| single batch) to a maximum of 350 grams. Per the filter press batch sheet |
| for batch 103A-511, the batch being fed when this leak occurred contained |
| 29.44 grams U-235. This amount of material is well below the safe mass of |
| material, even at 100 wt% enrichment (ref. GAT-225). The actual enrichment |
| of the material being processed was 1.4% U-235, per the filter press batch |
| sheet for batch 103A-511. Therefore, while one of the contingencies was |
| lost, the safety significance for this occurrence was low given the |
| prerequisite for limiting the mass in the batch to 350 grams U-235. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| A significant amount of uranium-bearing solution would have to leak from a |
| system and accumulate in an unsafe geometry in order for a criticality to |
| occur. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| The parameters being controlled for this event were volume of a leak in a |
| system in X-705. NCSA-0705_076 considers it unlikely that a leak of more |
| than 4.8-liters would occur given the physical integrity of systems in |
| X-705. In addition, the mass of U-235 in the batch being processed was |
| limited to a maximum of 350 grams. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| Based on PR-PST-99-02948 and filter press batch sheet for batch 103A-511 |
| the volume of solution which leaked was approximately 5-gallons. The maximum |
| amount of U-235 in the concentrate was 29.44 grams and the maximum |
| enrichment of material was 1.4 wt% U-235. It should be noted that the actual |
| mass of U-235 which was in the leaked solution would be less than 29.44 |
| grams, since the total amount of solution being processed was 2072 liters. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| NCSA-0705_075 considers it unlikely that more than 4.8-liters of solution |
| would leak from a system given the physical integrity of the systems used in |
| X-705. The leak in question resulted in approximately 5-gallons of solution |
| leaking from the filter press. This amount of solution exceeded the |
| considered limit for the unlikely event and resulted in the loss of double |
| contingency for this leak. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS |
| IMPLEMENTED:" |
| |
| Operations informed the NRC resident inspector and will inform the DOE site |
| representative. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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