Event Notification Report for May 18, 1999

1-HOUR SECURITY REPORT

SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO DETECTION/MONITORING/ALARM OF VITAL AREA ACCESS DOORS. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY ACTIONS TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. CONTACT THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS CENTER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

* * * RETRACTED AT 1300 EDT ON 5/19/99 BY MIKE KILEY TO FANGIE JONES * * *

THIS NOTIFICATION WAS RETRACTED AS IT WAS ONLY REQUIRED TO BE LOGGED DUE TO COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY ON THE DEGRADATION. THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R1DO (PETER ESELGROTH)

UNIT 2 MANUALLY SCRAMMED FOLLOWING TRIP OF THE "A" RECIRC PUMP.

Unit 2 was manually scrammed following the unexpected trip of the "A" recirc pump. At the time, electrical maintenance was in progress on the respective motor-generator set. Following the recirc pump trip, operators initiated a manual scram per procedure based on power-to-flow criteria. There was no power peaking observed. All control rods fully inserted. Unit 2 is currently in hot shutdown with steam bleed to the main condenser for decay heat removal. All systems functioned as required. Both the traverse incore probes and the recirc sump isolated during the transient as expected. Offsite power is available and the emergency diesel generators are in standby. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 2108EDT ON 5/18/99 FROM JEFF GROFF TO S.SANDIN * * *

The following information was provided as an update:

"On 5/18/99 at 17:08, operators inserted a manual reactor scram due to operation in the 'Scram Region' of the Power to Flow Map. All control rods fully inserted into the core. Reactor water level is being maintained in the normal operating band using the condensate system.

"Preliminary investigation determined that while performing routine field brush maintenance, a ground occurred tripping the 'A' Recirculation Pump. The subsequent reactor power and flow decrease placed the reactor in the 'Scram Region.'

"Following the scram, water level dropped to approximately 130 inches, the following 'Level 3' isolations occurred as expected:

Group 4 - RHR Shutdown Cooling and Head Spray
Group 13 - Drywell Sumps
Group 15 - Traversing Incore Probe System

"All valves in Group 4 and 15 were closed prior to the event, Group 13 valves closed as designed. No ECCS systems initiated and no SRVs lifted. All Emergency Diesel Generators are available."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector of this update. Notified R3DO(Clayton).

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO REQUEST FOR OFFSITE FIRE FIGHTING ASSISTANCE TO EXTINGUISH MAIN TRANSFORMER FIRE.

THE UNIT IS CURRENTLY IN A REFUELING OUTAGE WITH FUEL IN THE VESSEL WITH NO FUEL MOVEMENTS IN PROGRESS. DURING HI-POT TESTING OF THE MAIN TRANSFORMER WHICH HAD BEEN DISCONNECTED FROM THE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, SMOKE ERUPTED AT 1832EDT. THE FIRE BRIGADE RESPONDED AND A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE PLYMOUTH FIRE DEPARTMENT WAS MADE. AT 1852EDT THE LICENSEE DECLARED AN UNUSUAL EVENT BASED ON "ANY FIRE ONSITE FOR WHICH FIRE FIGHTING ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED." THERE WERE NO INJURIES OR UNACCOUNTED FOR PERSONNEL. PLANT OPERATIONS IS NOT IMPACTED. THE FIRE BRIGADE IS ON SCENE USING CARBON DIOXIDE FOR FIRE SUPPRESSION. LAYDOWN HOSES ARE POSITIONED SHOULD THEY BECOME NECESSARY. THE LICENSEE DESCRIBED THE FIRE AS SMOLDERING WITH NO VISIBLE FLAMES AND WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE A DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AT THIS TIME.

THE LICENSEE CONTACTED STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

* * * UPDATE 2143EDT ON 5/18/99 FROM MIKE ENGLAND TO S.SANDIN * * *

THE UNUSUAL EVENT WAS TERMINATED AT 2125EDT AFTER VERIFYING THAT THE FIRE WAS EXTINGUISHED. THE FIRE DEPARTMENT IS EXITING THE SITE. THE LICENSEE IS PERFORMING A DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AT THIS TIME AND HAS INFORMED STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. NOTIFIED R1(ESELGROTH, ANDERSON), NRR(RICHARDS) AND IRO(MILLER) AND FEMA (DEPUY).

MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION - UNDER DOSE

A patient was prescribed a treatment plan consisting of two doses, 5040 cGy and 2000 cGy using Co-60 therapy. The first dose was given as prescribed on 5/18/99, but the second dose was never given. The prescribing doctor was out of town and his substitute did not notice the second half of the treatment which was written on a second piece of paper. This error was discovered when the original doctor returned to work. The patient was immediately notified of the mistake and requested to come in to finish the treatment. The patient has refused further therapy.

* * * UPDATE AT 1229 ON 7/9/99 BY SHAH, RECEIVED BY POERTNER * * *
The licensee has requested this event be retracted. The licensee consulted with NRC's Region III office and concluded that this event did not constitute a medical misadministration. The Operations center notified R3DO (vegel).

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FROM 73% POWER DUE TO UNEXPECTED HIGH MAIN TURBINE VIBRATION

While the licensee was in the process of increasing load after exiting a refueling outage, vibrations on the #1 and #2 bearings for the main turbine were noted to be increasing unexpectedly. As a result, operators began to decrease load at 0036 on 05/18/99 with the unit at approximately 83% reactor power. Operators manually tripped the reactor from 73% power at 0041. At that time of the manual reactor trip, vibrations on the #1 and #2 bearings were at a level of about 10½ mills and 12 mils, respectively. The limits on vibration are either 10 mils for 15 minutes or when a vibration of 12 mils is reached.

All control rods fully inserted as a result of the manual reactor trip, and all systems functioned as required. There were no engineered safety feature actuations or emergency core cooling system injections, and none were required.

The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The reactor coolant pumps, normal charging and letdown, and pressurizer heaters and sprays are being utilized for primary system transport, level, and pressure control. All containment parameters are normal. Emergency feedwater was manually initiated and is currently supplying water to the steam generators. Secondary steam is being dumped to the condenser. Offsite power is available, and the emergency diesel generators and emergency core cooling systems are operable and available if needed.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1545 BY PROPPER, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *

"The cause of the high vibrations experienced on May 18 were attributed to light rubbing within the new mono-block high turbine rotor. The HP Turbine initial vibration readings were less then 2 mils during rollup through the critical speeds when packing rubs would normally be identified. No rubs were identified prior to the 83% power level.

"While increasing power well within the prescribed limits for power increases, it is believed that the opening of the #4 control valve at approximately 83% power caused a thermal transient in the HP Turbine. The thermal transient resulted in slightly uneven heating and growth of the turbine casing.

Actions taken to preclude this event prior to restart included:

Greasing of the HP turbine skids to allow unrestricted shell casing growth

Changed setting on the MSR digital controls system which placed the MSR in pressure mode prior to 75% load. Ensuring that the MSR controls were at 100% open on the high range valve at 75% reactor power.

Decreased the rate of power change at the #4 control valve crack point to 1.5% per hour to allow more time for thermal expansion of the HP Turbine.

"The net result was that the unit increased power uneventfully upon restart at 0207 on 5/19/99, with breaker closure at 0225. The #4 control valve started opening at 89% power at 0809 on 5/20/99. The plant is currently at 98% power and awaiting engineering review prior to increasing to 100%."

Primary Containment Isolation Signal (PCIS) unexpectedly generated during planned maintenance on the "B" channel Radiation Monitoring System.

"While de-energizing the 'B' channel Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) to replace a power supply, an unexpected 'B' channel actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS, an ESF system)
occurred. The single channel actuation resulted in isolation of three Containment Isolation Valves, electrical load shedding of two non-1E ventilation fans, and automatic starts of the 'B' channel Filtration Recirculation and Ventilation (FRVS) fans and Safety Auxiliaries Cooling Pump (SACS). All isolations and actuations occurred as designed. The power supply was re-energized and plant systems and components restored. The impact on plant operation from this single channel PCIS actuation was minimal. All plant safety systems remained capable of performing their required functions, except for the 'B' Switchgear Room Cooler which had been removed from service for scheduled maintenance. As a result of the change in Reactor Building pressure, the Reactor Building to Turbine Building steam tunnel blowout panel briefly indicated open, and is currently closed. A visual inspection of the blowout panel is in progress.

"The initial investigation has determined that de-energizing the 'B' channel RMS power supply simulated high Reactor Building exhaust and Refueling Floor exhaust radiation signals from the three RMS channels which input into the 'B' PCIS channel. Investigation into the root cause of the single channel actuation is in progress."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform local authorities (LAC Township).

* * * UPDATE 1453 EDT ON 5/18/99 FROM BREADY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee has completed the visual inspection of the blowout panel with no abnormalities noted. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Eselgroth).

DEFICIENT CONTROL RELAYS IDENTIFIED DURING PRE-INSTALLATION TESTING.

ON 4/2/99, THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED THAT CONTROL RELAYS (NBFD65NR) MANUFACTURED BY EATON CORPORATION CONTAINED A MANUFACTURING DEFICIENCY, I.E., "THE RELAY COIL HAD BEEN INCORRECTLY WIRED SUCH THAT THE INTERNAL RELAY DESIGN, WHICH INCLUDES A PICK UP AND A HOLD COIL, WOULD OPPOSE EACH OTHER AT LOWER VOLTAGES AND PROHIBIT HOLDING COIL ACTUATION WHICH RESULTED IN EXCESSIVE RELAY CHATTER." THIS DEFECT WAS IDENTIFIED DURING PRE-INSTALLATION TESTING PRIOR TO USE IN THE REACTOR TRIP LOGIC. NO DEFICIENT RELAYS ARE INSTALLED.