Event Notification Report for May 17, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           05/14/1999 - 05/17/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35636  35658  35675  35707  35712  35713  35714  35715  35716  35717  35718  35719 
35720  35721  35722  35723  35724  35725  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35636       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/26/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:47[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        04/26/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GREG SOSSON                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CLIFFORD ANDERSON    R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF TWO LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITORS INDICATING INCONSISTENTLY WITH   |
| THE REMAINING LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITORS                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "Upon review of local power range monitor (LPRM) data for Unit 1, [two]      |
| LPRMs were determined be indicating inconsistently with the remaining LPRMs. |
| The cause is believed to be reversed cable inputs to the LPRM drawer.  The   |
| problem is believed to be under-vessel."                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "As a result of this condition, the 'B' and 'D' [average power range         |
| monitors (APRMs)] and both rod block monitor [(RBM)] channels were declared  |
| inoperable at 2315 [on 04/26/99].  This condition has existed since the      |
| previous refueling outage [which was exited] in June [of] 1998."             |
|                                                                              |
| "The suspect LPRMs are being bypassed which will restore the APRMs and RBMs  |
| to an OPERABLE status."                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Generic investigations are in progress; however, initial review of          |
| operating data indicates normal operation of [the] remaining LPRMs.  This    |
| investigation will analyze any impact on thermal limits and fuel             |
| performance."                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the RBMs are not required for operability at this   |
| time.  However, the unit is currently in a 12-hour limiting condition for    |
| operation (LCO) which requires insertion of a half scram for the two         |
| inoperable APRMs.  This LCO will be exited when the LPRMs are bypassed.  The |
| licensee does not anticipate any problems meeting this LCO action statement. |
| The licensee also stated that with the exceptions noted above, all systems   |
| functioned as designed and there was nothing unusual or misunderstood.       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION  AT 1413 ON 05/14/99 FROM DALE BEGIAN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "This notification is a retraction of a notification made on 04/26/99 (event |
| 35636) involving the discovery of two local power range monitors (LPRM)      |
| indicating inconsistently with the remaining LPRMs.  A review has concluded  |
| that the event did not involve operation outside the plants design basis or  |
| an inoperable (RBM) or (APRM)."                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The notification identified concerns with a potential adverse impact on the |
| operation of the rod block monitor (RBM) or average power range monitor      |
| (APRM) resulting from two LPRM detectors on the same LPRM string having      |
| their connection wiring swapped.  This condition was discovered following    |
| startup from a recent plant shutdown.  During a new control rod pattern      |
| adjustment on April 26, 1999, it was identified that LPRMs 40-17B and 40-17C |
| were indicating inconsistently with the remaining symmetrical LPRMs and      |
| axial power levels."                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "The LGS 1 design requirements for minimum number of LPRM inputs from a four |
| string array into the RBM was met, and the monitor, although degraded,       |
| remained operable. The swapped LPRM inputs were within a 4 rod grouping and  |
| did not significantly impact their associated averaging circuitry which      |
| inputs to the RBM and APRM. These inputs were within the acceptable ranges   |
| and, therefore, did not impact operability of the RBM or APRM."              |
|                                                                              |
| "Currently, the affected LPRMs are bypassed in accordance with Tech Spec     |
| limitations. The LPRM wiring connections will be checked and corrected in    |
| the next Unit 1 refuel outage."                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this retraction.  The NRC     |
| operations officer notified the R1DO (Caruso).                               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35658       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK                     REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/30/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:56[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        04/30/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:10[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CHUCK SMITH                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|2     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - PLANT SECURITY REPORT -                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| A VULNERABILITY TO UNAUTHORIZED/UNDETECTED ENTRY INTO A PLANT VITAL AREA WAS |
| DISCOVERED.  COMPENSATORY MEASURES WERE IMMEDIATELY TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY.    |
| (CONTACT THE HOO FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.)                                    |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
|                                                                              |
| ***UPDATE ON 05/14/99 AT 1326 EST FROM HERB TORBERG TAKEN BY MACKINNON***    |
|                                                                              |
| This follow-up report is due to the ongoing Restart Readiness Assessment     |
| Program walkdown of vital area barriers.   Another vulnerability to          |
| unauthorized/undetected entry into a plant vital area was discovered.        |
| Compensatory measures were immediately taken upon discovery.  (Contact the   |
| HOO for more details.)                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  The R3DO (Roger           |
| Lanksbury) was notified by the NRC operations officer.                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35675       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:38[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        05/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GREG SOSSON                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES LINVILLE       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ISOLATION OF THE 'B' LOOP DRYWELL CHILLED WATER INBOARD SUPPLY AND RETURN    |
| VALVES DURING PERFORMANCE OF A SPECIAL PROCEDURE TO DEENERGIZE A SAFEGUARDS  |
| BUS                                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "On 05/05/99 at 0200 hours, it was discovered that an [engineered safety     |
| feature (ESF)] actuation occurred on the Unit 2 Drywell Chilled Water (DWCW) |
| system.  This isolation occurred at approximately 2300 on 05/02/99 during    |
| performance of a special procedure to deenergize the D22 safeguards bus."    |
|                                                                              |
| "With Unit 2 in OPCON 5, the 'B' loop DWCW inboard supply and return valves  |
| HV-087-222 and HV-087-223 isolated when the power supply to an interposing   |
| relay was deenergized per a special procedure on 05/02/99.  This special     |
| procedure did not properly address the valve closure.  During this special   |
| procedure, power was later removed from both valves.  This removed control   |
| room indication of their position, and their closure was not immediately     |
| detected.  Later, station personnel observed increasing drywell              |
| temperatures. The follow-up investigation revealed the isolation valves were |
| closed by local verification."                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Additional investigation found several containment atmosphere sample valves |
| and primary containment instrument gas [primary containment isolation        |
| valves] that also closed during the loss of power.  These conditions were    |
| also expected but not properly documented in the special procedure."         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| ***RETRACTION ON 05/14/99 AT 1643 EDT FROM DAVID NEFF TAKEN BY MACKINNON***  |
|                                                                              |
| A review of the closure of two primary containment isolation valves has      |
| concluded that the event did not involve a valid ESF actuation signal and    |
| that the equipment affected did not involve the minimum actuation logic for  |
| the isolation control system.  Therefore, an ESF actuation did not occur.    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this retraction by the        |
| licensee.  The R1DO (John Caruso) was notified by the NRC operations         |
| officer.                                                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   35707       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  FLORIDA BUREAU OF RAD CONTROL        |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/12/1999|
|LICENSEE:  CITRUS MEMORIAL HEALTH FOUNDATION, IN|NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:32[EDT]|
|    CITY:  INVERNESS                REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        05/12/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  FL |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  2067-1                AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |RUDOLPH BERNHARD     R2      |
|                                                |JOE HOLONICH         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ADAMS                        |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL REPORTED A RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT,    |
| #FL99-066, WHICH OCCURRED AT THE CITRUS MEMORIAL HEALTH FOUNDATION, INC.,    |
| LOCATED IN INVERNESS, FLORIDA.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| SIX IMPLANTED I-125 SEEDS MEASURING 0.265 mCi EACH WERE REMOVED FROM A       |
| PATIENT AT THE FACILITY.  WHEN THE SEEDS WERE TO BE RETRIEVED FOR SHIPMENT   |
| BACK TO THE MANUFACTURER, ONLY ONE COULD BE FOUND.  A THOROUGH SURVEY OF THE |
| ROOM AND SEWER TRAPS FAILED TO LOCATE THE OTHER FIVE SEEDS.  THE MISSING     |
| MATERIAL WAS PROBABLY LOST IN THE SANITARY SEWER.  A STATE INSPECTOR IS      |
| INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| ***UPDATE ON 05/14/99 AT 1454 HOURS FROM JERRY EAKINS TAKEN BY MACKINNON***  |
|                                                                              |
| ON 05/11/99, THE LICENSEE PERFORMED A PROSTATE IMPLANT USING I-125 SEEDS IN  |
| PRE-LOADED APPLICATORS.  SIX SEEDS IN TWO APPLICATORS WERE UNUSED AND TAKEN  |
| TO THE STERILE PROCESSING DEPARTMENT (SPD).  ON 05/12/99, MS. PETKUS         |
| RETRIEVED THEM TO SHIP BACK TO THE RADIOPHARMACY AND FOUND ONLY ONE SEED.  A |
| THROUGH SURVEY OF THE SPD INCLUDING THE SEWER TRAPS FAILED TO LOCATE THE     |
| MISSING FIVE SEEDS.  THE STATE INVESTIGATOR VISITED THE LICENSEE ON          |
| 05/13/99.  HE DUPLICATED THE RADIATION SURVEYS OF THE LICENSEE AND WAS       |
| UNABLE TO FIND THE MISSING SEEDS.  THE LICENSEE AND THE STATE INSPECTOR HAVE |
| INTERVIEWED ALL THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED.  IT IS SUSPECTED THE SEEDS WERE LOST |
| WHEN THE APPLICATORS WERE OPENED BY MISTAKE FOR STERILIZATION.  THE CAUSE OF |
| THIS INCIDENT IS THE FAILURE OF THE LICENSEE TO CONTROL ACCESSIBILITY OF THE |
| BRACHYTHERAPY SOURCES TO AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL. THIS INCIDENT IS DEFERRED TO  |
| RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| THE R2DO (R. BERN HARD) AND NMSS EO (BRAIN SMITH) WERE NOTIFIED BY THE NRC   |
| OPERATIONS OFFICER.                                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35712       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:30[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        05/13/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICH CHEAR                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       4        Startup          |4        Startup          |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT THE LEAK RATE OF A MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE IS GREATER THAN |
| THE INBOARD LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM PROVEN TREATMENT FLOW RATE                |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "Clinton Power Station has identified that the Inboard Main Steam Isolation  |
| Valve (MSIV) Leakage Control System (LCS) is not calibrated to process the   |
| design MSIV leakage of 28 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) per one main   |
| steam line.  One MSIV has been identified as having a leakage rate of 22.5   |
| scfh which is greater than the Inboard LCS proven treatment flow rate of     |
| 21.3 scfh.  Currently, the engineering team is still investigating."         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the unit was in a 30-day technical specification    |
| limiting condition for operation as a result of this issue.                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35713       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAN ONOFRE               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:54[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE             |EVENT DATE:        05/13/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:44[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MATT THURBURN                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES CAIN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     M/R        Y       97       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND MANUAL INITIATION OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER DUE TO THE  |
| LOSS OF BOTH MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF MAINTENANCE ON   |
| THE FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM  (Refer to event #35721 for a similar event     |
| that occurred on 05/15/99.)                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| At 2144 PDT on 05/13/99, both main feedwater pumps tripped for unknown       |
| reasons.  Reactor operators recognized this loss, manually tripped the       |
| reactor from 97% power, and manually initiated emergency feedwater.  All     |
| rods fully inserted, and all systems functioned as required.  There were no  |
| engineered safety feature actuations other than the manual initiation of     |
| emergency feedwater.  The main steam isolation valves remained open, none of |
| the relief valves opened, and there was no loss of offsite power.            |
|                                                                              |
| The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby).  The reactor        |
| coolant pumps, normal charging and letdown, and pressurizer heaters and      |
| sprays are being utilized for primary system transport, level, and pressure  |
| control.  All containment parameters are normal.  Emergency feedwater is     |
| supplying water to the steam generators, and secondary steam is being dumped |
| to the main condenser.  Offsite power is available.  The 'A' emergency       |
| diesel generator is currently out of service for planned maintenance.        |
| However, the 'B' emergency diesel generator and the crossties from the other |
| unit are available if needed.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The cause of the loss of both feedwater pumps is under investigation.  The   |
| licensee stated that maintenance personnel were performing voltage checks in |
| the feedwater control system at the time of the event.                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to issue a        |
| media/press release.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| ********** HOO NOTE:  Based on plant status calls that occurred on 05/15/99  |
| and 05/16/99, the cause of this event was determined to be a failed relay in |
| the feedwater control system which resulted in closure of feedwater          |
| regulation valve #3FV1121 for the #2 steam generator (E088).  This in turn   |
| resulted in high discharge pressure on both main feedwater pumps.            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35714       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:13[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:13[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RANDY HASTINGS               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JIM LYONS            NRR     |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND MANUAL SAFETY INJECTION DUE TO A STEAM LEAK ON THE   |
| 4B FEEDWATER HEATER STEAM SIDE                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 1 experienced a manual reactor trip [from 100% power] at 0713 CDT due  |
| to a steam leak on the 4B feedwater heater steam side.  The control room     |
| operators also manually safety injected at 0716 [CDT] due to decreasing      |
| pressurizer level.  The steam leak has been isolated.  All equipment         |
| operated as designed during the event.  No injuries have been reported.      |
| [The licensee is] currently performing the [safety injection] termination    |
| procedure.  The unit is currently stable at 2,010 psig and 538�F.  No        |
| release did occur or is occurring."                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the auxiliary feedwater pumps started.  The         |
| emergency diesel generators also started but did not load.  These actions    |
| were expected as a result of the manual safety injection.  All rods fully    |
| inserted as a result of the manual reactor trip, and the main steam          |
| isolation valves were manually closed.   In addition, the licensee stated    |
| that the manual safety injection was considered to be an engineered safety   |
| feature actuation and that there were no emergency core cooling system       |
| injections.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The reactor is currently stable in Hot Shutdown.  The reactor coolant pumps, |
| normal charging and letdown, and pressurizer heaters and sprays are being    |
| utilized for primary system transport, level, and pressure control.  All     |
| containment parameters are normal.  Auxiliary feedwater is supplying water   |
| to the steam generators, and secondary steam is being dumped to atmosphere   |
| because the main steam isolation valves were manually closed.  There has     |
| been no history of steam generator tube leakage.  Offsite power is           |
| available, and the emergency diesel generators are running unloaded at this  |
| time.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify         |
| Kewaunee County, and Manitowoc County, and the state.                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35715       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:37[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        05/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:52[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RONALD GIULIANI              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       4        Startup          |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FROM 4% POWER DUE TO A LEVEL TRANSIENT ASSOCIATED WITH  |
| A FEED REGULATING VALVE MALFUNCTION                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "While in steady state conditions of 4% [reactor] power and 34" reactor      |
| level [at] 0723 [CDT], the [motor-driven reactor feed pump] feed regulating  |
| valve (1FW004) malfunctioned causing a level excursion to [approximately]    |
| 42".  This level transient was controlled by [manually] isolating feedwater  |
| to the reactor vessel.  Reactor level returned to [approximately] 30"[, and  |
| at approximately] 0738 [CDT], feedwater was reestablished to the vessel.  As |
| reactor feed was established, the transient was not able to be controlled    |
| and level increased.  [At] 0752 [CDT], the motor-driven reactor feed pump    |
| tripped on a level 8 signal [when level reached 52"], and the reactor mode   |
| switch was then manually placed into the [shutdown] position.  This caused a |
| reactor scram.  All rods fully inserted.  All systems functioned as expected |
| following the scram [with one exception described below].  The plant is in   |
| Mode 3 and is proceeding to Mode 4.  Feedwater is being supplied to the      |
| vessel from the [condensate and condensate booster] system.  Reactor         |
| pressure is [approximately] 430 psig and is steady.  The plant will be       |
| cooled down to Mode 4 in a controlled manner using bypass valves and         |
| shutdown cooling."                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "[Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)] was being tested at the time of the |
| scram.  [However,] RCIC did not trip on level 8.  This will be investigated. |
| It is possible that the level channels required for this trip did not reach  |
| the trip setpoint.  RCIC was manually tripped after the scram to control     |
| cooldown rate."                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the reactor protection system trip on level 8 was   |
| bypassed because the unit was in Mode 2 with the mode switch in the startup  |
| position.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to issue a        |
| media/press release.                                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35716       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:49[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        05/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRETT BOISMENER              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN CARUSO          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|HFIT 26.73               FITNESS FOR DUTY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| A CONTRACT SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL.                           |
|                                                                              |
| A CONTRACTOR FULFILLING A SUPERVISOR POSITION WAS STOPPED BY SECURITY PRIOR  |
| TO ENTERING THE PROTECTED AREA DUE TO THE ODOR OF ALCOHOL.  THE INDIVIDUAL   |
| WAS ESCORTED TO  FITNESS FOR DUTY WHERE A FOR-CAUSE TEST WAS CONDUCTED.  THE |
| TEST RESULTS WERE CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL.  THE INDIVIDUAL'S          |
| UNESCORTED ACCESS WAS IMMEDIATELY REVOKED.  THE INDIVIDUAL'S SUPERVISOR WILL |
| BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM AN IMPACT OF QUALITY AND SAFETY REVIEW OF THE         |
| INDIVIDUAL'S WORK.  (CONTACT THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL       |
| INFORMATION.)                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35717       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: THREE MILE ISLAND        REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:34[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP            |EVENT DATE:        05/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  J. SCHORK                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN CARUSO          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| A FLOOD PATH WAS DISCOVERED BETWEEN THE UNIT 1 TURBINE BUILDING AND CONTROL  |
| BUILDING.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Two penetrations between the Three Mile Island Unit 1 Turbine Building (a    |
| non-flood protected structure) and the Control Building (a flood protected   |
| structure) have been found to allow the free flow of flood waters from the   |
| Turbine Building into the Control Building in the event of the maximum       |
| predicted flood at Three Mile Island.  This is a non-conformance made to the |
| NRC (originally made to the AEC) as documented in Section 2.6.5.i of the     |
| Three Mile Island Final Safety Analysis Report.                              |
|                                                                              |
| The flood protection procedure will be modified as soon as possible to       |
| require the installation of plugs in the identified flow path in the event   |
| of a pending flood.  Additionally, a review of the event of the identified   |
| condition will be performed in an Licensee Event Report.                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   35718       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  CITY OF NEW YORK DEPT. HEALTH        |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/1999|
|LICENSEE:  BETH ISREAL MEDICAL CENTER           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:00[EDT]|
|    CITY:  NEW YORK CITY            REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        05/14/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NE |EVENT TIME:        12:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  DOCKET:  Y                                    |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |CHARLES CAIN         R4      |
|                                                |BRAIN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICHARD BORRI                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE EVENT REPORTED BY THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH  |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REPORTED THE FOLLOWING             |
| INFORMATION:                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| JEMS SANITATION LOCATED IN LYNDHURST, NEW JERSEY, HAD RECEIVED A SHIPMENT OF |
| MUNICIPAL WASTE WHICH SET OFF THEIR RADIATION DETECTORS.  THE MUNICIPAL      |
| WASTE IS BEING SHIPPED BACK TO BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER LOCATED IN NEW     |
| YORK CITY.  THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH WILL INVESTIGATE THIS  |
| EVENT.  NO FURTHER INFORMATION COULD BE GIVEN BY THE CALLER.                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35719       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DRESDEN                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/15/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] [3]                STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:47[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3           |EVENT DATE:        05/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:56[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PETE KARABA                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/15/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE OF A CONTROL ROOM HVAC REFRIGERATION AND CONDENSING UNIT TO RESTART  |
| DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0456 hours on May 15, 1999, the 'B' Control Room HVAC Refrigeration and  |
| Condensing Unit (RCU) would not restart during surveillance testing. The 'B' |
| RCU is a single train system and, therefore, is believed to be reportable    |
| per ComEd Reportability Manual SAF 1.17.  The 'B' RCU is required to operate |
| during design basis accidents to remove the heat from the Main Control Room. |
| The Air Filtration Unit remains operable.  This places both units in a       |
| 30-day Tech. Spec. LCO."                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35720       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BROWNS FERRY             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/15/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:25[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4           |EVENT DATE:        05/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:56[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RODNEY NACOSTE               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/15/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RUDOLPH BERNHARD     R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR SCRAM DURING MAIN TURBINE MECHANICAL OVERSPEED TESTING  |
|                                                                              |
| While the licensee was resetting the mechanical overspeed trip during main   |
| turbine mechanical overspeed testing, the main turbine tripped which         |
| generated an automatic reactor scram.  All control rods fully inserted into  |
| the core.  The resulting scram caused reactor vessel water level to lower to |
| below the primary containment isolation system group 2 (drywell), group 3    |
| (reactor water cleanup), group 6 (ventilation), and group 8 (traversing      |
| incore probes) isolation setpoint resulting in those isolations along with   |
| control room emergency ventilation system and the standby gas treatment      |
| system initiations.  Reactor feedwater is maintaining reactor vessel water   |
| level, and the turbine bypass valves are maintaining reactor vessel          |
| pressure.  All emergency core cooling systems and the emergency diesel       |
| generators are fully operable if needed.  None of the safety-relief valves   |
| opened, and the offsite electrical grid is stable.                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is investigating what caused the turbine trip/reactor scram.  A |
| Licensee Event Report will be filed with the NRC within 30 days concerning   |
| this event.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35721       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAN ONOFRE               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/16/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:08[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE             |EVENT DATE:        05/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:58[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MATT THURBURN                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/16/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES CAIN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     M/R        Y       24       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FAILURE OF A MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE AND  |
| SUBSEQUENT INCREASING STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVELS  (Refer to event #35713   |
| for a similar event that occurred on 05/13/99.)                              |
|                                                                              |
| While operators were making preparations to place the turbine on line,       |
| feedwater regulation valve #3FV1111 for the #1 steam generator (E089) failed |
| open.  Operators attempted to manually close the valve, but the valve did    |
| not respond.  As steam generator water levels trended up, a pre-trip alarm   |
| on high steam generator level was received, and operators manually tripped   |
| the reactor from 24% power at 2358 PDT on 05/15/99.  (Steam generator water  |
| levels did not reach the trip setpoint.)  All rods fully inserted, and all   |
| systems functioned as required.  There were no engineered safety feature or  |
| emergency core cooling system actuations, and none were required.  The main  |
| steam isolation valves remained open, none of the relief valves opened, and  |
| there was no loss of offsite power.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Reactor coolant system (RCS) cooled down farther than normal following the   |
| manual trip due to the overfeeding of the steam generators.  RCS temperature |
| normally stabilizes at approximately 545�F.  However, during this transient, |
| the RCS cooled down to approximately 530�F before operators tripped the main |
| feedwater pump and manually initiated auxiliary feedwater.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby).  The reactor        |
| coolant pumps, normal charging and letdown, and pressurizer heaters and      |
| sprays are being utilized for primary system transport, level, and pressure  |
| control.  All containment parameters are normal.  Auxiliary feedwater is     |
| supplying water to the steam generators, and secondary steam is being dumped |
| to the main condenser.  Offsite power is available.  The emergency diesel    |
| generators and emergency core cooling systems are operable and available if  |
| needed.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The cause of the feedwater regulation valve failure is under investigation.  |
| The licensee stated that there were no maintenance activities ongoing at the |
| time of the event.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35722       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/16/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:34[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/16/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:52[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROYCE BROWN                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/16/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES CAIN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP                       |
|                                                                              |
| The Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped from 100% power due to a loss of 1C |
| reactor coolant pump flow.  The 1C reactor coolant pump tripped due to an    |
| undervoltage condition on the 1H 13.8-kV auxiliary bus.  All rods fully      |
| inserted, and all systems functioned as required.  Main feedwater isolated   |
| on the plant trip, and auxiliary feedwater actuated as expected.  The        |
| pressurizer and steam generator power-operated relief valves remained closed |
| during the event, and the main steam isolation valves remained open.  There  |
| was no loss of offsite power, and there were no emergency core cooling       |
| system injections.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby).  The 1C reactor        |
| coolant pump is still secured, and primary system transport control is being |
| maintained with the reactor coolant pumps in the remaining three loops.      |
| Normal charging and letdown and pressurizer heaters and sprays are being     |
| utilized for primary system level and pressure control.  Auxiliary feedwater |
| has been secured, and main feedwater is supplying water to the steam         |
| generators.  Secondary steam is being dumped to the condenser.  Offsite      |
| power is available, and the emergency diesel generators and emergency core   |
| cooling systems are operable and available if needed.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The cause of the undervoltage on the 1H 13.8-kV auxiliary bus is being       |
| investigated.  The 1H 13.8-kV auxiliary bus has protection circuits that     |
| strip the two big loads (the reactor coolant pump and circulating water      |
| pump) on undervoltage.  At this time, it appears that the feed to the        |
| protection circuitry on the C phase may have failed.  Preliminary            |
| indications reveal that the bus itself did not fail.  There were no          |
| maintenance or surveillance activities occurring at the time of the event.   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35723       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/16/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:35[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        05/16/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KENNETH GRACIA               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/16/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN CARUSO          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INOPERABILITY OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DUE TO MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE       |
| (MSIV) LEAKAGES IN EXCESS OF LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING LIMITS                  |
|                                                                              |
| Local leak rate testing of the MSIVs on main steam line 'C' revealed         |
| leakages in excess of the 1% per day technical specification leakage limit.  |
| The revealed leakages of 280 standard liters per minute (slm) and 255 slm    |
| exceed the limit of 210.5 slm.  These MSIVs are containment isolation        |
| valves, and this makes the primary containment system inoperable.  However,  |
| the unit is currently shut down with the vessel head removed as part of a    |
| refueling outage.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that secondary containment was not lost because the main |
| steam line plugs are in place in the vessel's steam nozzles (before the      |
| MSIVs).  Therefore, the ongoing fuel shuffle has not been suspended.  The    |
| licensee has suspended all work on lines in the drywell that would open      |
| anything downstream of the plugs.  The licensee cannot commence work on the  |
| MSIV until a contingency plan is developed to either establish secondary     |
| containment downstream of the valves or finish fuel moves so that secondary  |
| containment would no longer be required.  The first fuel shuffle is          |
| scheduled to be completed by midnight tonight.                               |
|                                                                              |
| Contingency plans are to repair the MSIVs during the ongoing refueling       |
| outage.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| Prior to this issue, one of the MSIVs in the 'C' main steam line failed its  |
| quarterly stroke-time test.  The valve was declared inoperable, and the      |
| second MSIV in the 'C' main steam line was closed to isolate the line on     |
| 03/27/99.  The unit remained at 80% reactor power until commencement of the  |
| current refueling outage on 05/08/99.  Prior to 03/27/99, the 'C' main steam |
| line was in service.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35724       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRAIDWOOD                REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/16/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:34[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/16/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:43[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  C. WALRATH                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/16/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)   PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO SMALL AIR POCKETS IN THE    |
| HIGH AREAS OF THE COMMON RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL TRAIN INJECTION LINES         |
|                                                                              |
| Small air pockets in high point areas of common residual heat removal train  |
| injection lines. The licensee is unable to completely remove the small air   |
| pockets at this time.  The licensee entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 at |
| 0843 CST.  Unit 1 commenced reactor shutdown at 1231 CST.  All emergency     |
| core cooling systems are fully operable except the residual heat removal     |
| system, which is available to perform its required functions but is not      |
| operable.   The emergency diesel generators are fully operable, and the      |
| electrical grid is stable.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee continues to troubleshoot in trying to remove the air pockets.  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35725       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/17/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:29[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        05/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        00:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RAY MARTIN                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/17/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN CARUSO          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF POWER SIGNAL ON THE 'A' TRAIN GENERATOR LOAD SEQUENCER               |
|                                                                              |
| A loss of power signal occurred when the licensee restored the 'A' train     |
| generator load sequencer as part of restoration from an 'A' train bus        |
| outage.  At the time, most of the major components were tagged out of        |
| service and deenergized because the unit was 'B' train protected due to the  |
| 'A' train outage.  However, some of the smaller components (valves and       |
| dampers) did move when the loss of power signal occurred.  The licensee      |
| believes that the signal was valid because the sequencer remembered that the |
| bus was deenergized earlier this evening.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Nothing that actuated affected the licensee's ability to cool the core or    |
| the spent fuel pool.  In addition, anything needed by technical              |
| specifications was not affected.  Therefore, the licensee believes that the  |
| affect on the plant was minimal.  All systems functioned as required, and    |
| all affected components have subsequently been restored to normal.           |
|                                                                              |
| The cause of this event is currently under investigation.  At this time, the |
| licensee hypothesizes that either there was something tagged out that was    |
| confusing the sequencer or that the procedure sequence did not reset the     |
| sequencer memory.  The licensee stated that the procedures were followed     |
| step by step.  It was also noted that the procedure had a large revision bar |
| and that something may have been left out.  The licensee plans to            |
| investigate whether or not the procedure step sequence was proper.  The      |
| licensee also plans to correct this problem before the unit enters Mode 4    |
| (when the sequencer is required to be operable by technical specifications). |
| The current estimated restart date is 06/15/99.                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector, the applicable state and   |
| local agencies, and the Department of Environmental Protection.              |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021