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Event Notification Report for May 14, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           05/13/1999 - 05/14/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35560  35686  35690  35695  35710  35711  35712  35713  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35560       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEABROOK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/08/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:41[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        02/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KILBY                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/13/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |FRANK COSTELLO       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNESCORTED ACCESS GRANTED INAPPROPRIATELY. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES   |
| TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. CONTACT HOO FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.                    |
|                                                                              |
| ******************** UPDATE AT 1131 ON 05/13/99 FROM MIKE DAVID TO TROCINE   |
| ********************                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "North Atlantic [Energy Service Corporation] is providing this update        |
| because the NRC Daily Report (Event Number: 35560) described this event as   |
| 'Unescorted Access Granted Inappropriately.'  North Atlantic believes that   |
| the Unescorted Access was granted in accordance with the appropriate         |
| procedures and that it did not violate any NRC regulations; hence, it was    |
| appropriate.  Furthermore, the appropriate action was taken when the FBI     |
| information was received.  North Atlantic believes that the event would have |
| been more accurately described as 'Unescorted Access Revoked.'"              |
|                                                                              |
| Contact the NRC operations officer for additional details.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC  operations       |
| officer notified the R1DO (Caruso).                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35686       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/06/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:44[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        05/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARTIN                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/13/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES LINVILLE       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VALVE FAILED LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST (LLRT).                                    |
|                                                                              |
| VALVE 3QSS*V4 IS A CHECK VALVE IN THE QUENCH SPRAY SYSTEM, AND THE CAUSE OF  |
| THE LLRT FAILURE IS UNKNOWN AND BEING INVESTIGATED, BUT MOST LIKELY MAY BE   |
| DUE TO VALVE DEGRADATION.  WHEN THE RESULTS OF ITS LLRT WERE ADDED TO THE    |
| OTHER CATEGORY "C" VALVES' RESULTS, THE TOTAL LEAKAGE EXCEEDED TECHNICAL     |
| SPECIFICATION ALLOWABLE LIMITS OF 43 SCFH (TOTAL MEASURED CATEGORY "C" WAS   |
| 335 SCFH); HOWEVER, THE TOTAL LEAKAGE OF EVERYTHING STILL DID NOT EXCEED THE |
| 0.6 La VALUE.  CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE TO REPAIR THE VALVE PRIOR TO        |
| STARTUP.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED ALONG WITH STATE, LOCAL AND OTHER    |
| GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1134 5/13/99 FROM STEVE LAWHEAD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| Local leak rate testing of valve SIL*V6 (RHS Loop 1 Cold Leg Check Valve)    |
| found the leakage to be excessive.  This leakage, when combined with the     |
| other known leakage, caused TS LCO 3.6.1.2.b to be exceeded.  The TS         |
| requires a combined leakage rate of less than 0.6 La for all penetrations    |
| and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to Pa.  The NRC   |
| resident inspector has been informed of this update.  Notified R1DO          |
| (Cowgill).                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35690       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/07/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:41[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        05/07/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LANGE                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/13/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES LINVILLE       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       59       Power Operation  |59       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) SYSTEM INOPERABLE  |
| AND ENTERED A 14-DAY LCO ACTION STATEMENT.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| THE HPCS SYSTEM FAILED TO MEET THE CHANNEL CHECK CRITERIA AND WAS DECLARED   |
| INOPERABLE, BUT FUNCTIONAL.  TWO TRIP UNITS WERE FOUND NOT TO BE WITHIN THE  |
| 13-INCH LIMIT FOR LEVEL INITIATION INSTRUMENTATION.  (THEY MEASURED 15       |
| INCHES.)  A WORK ORDER HAS BEEN GENERATED TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM BEFORE THE  |
| TIME CLOCK EXPIRES FOR THE LCO ACTION STATEMENT.  THE REACTOR IS CURRENTLY   |
| IN SINGLE LOOP OPERATION AT 59% POWER.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
|                                                                              |
| ***RETRACTION ON 04/13/99 AT 1651 EDT FROM ROY GREEN TAKEN BY MACKINNON***   |
|                                                                              |
| IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE CHANNEL CHECK CRITERIA WAS MET AND THAT THE  |
| HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM WAS, THEREFORE, NOT INOPERABLE.  PROCEDURAL  |
| GUIDANCE THAT LED TO THE INOPERABLE DETERMINATION HAS BEEN CHANGED AFTER     |
| ENGINEERING PROVIDED THE NECESSARY JUSTIFICATION.                            |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.  THE R1DO (JOHN CARUSO)    |
| WAS NOTIFIED BY THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER.                                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35695       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/09/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:22[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/09/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:45[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/13/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |MONTE PHILLIPS       R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN GREEVES         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LARSON                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4-HOUR REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1645 ON 05/09/99, DURING A PRESSURE DECAY TEST OF THE #1 AUTOCLAVE IN THE |
| X-342 BUILDING, A LIGHT DUSTING OF UO2F2 WAS OBSERVED INSIDE THE AUTOCLAVE,  |
| AND A HEAVIER ACCUMULATION OF UO2F2 WAS OBSERVED ON THE PRESSURE DECAY       |
| FILTER USED TO PREVENT URANIUM FROM ENTERING THE AUTOCLAVE DURING THIS TEST. |
| THE AUTOCLAVE WAS PLACED IN A CONTAINMENT MODE ISOLATING IT FROM ALL SUPPORT |
| SYSTEMS.  HEALTH PHYSICS TECHNICIANS PERFORMED CONTAMINATION AND AIRBORNE    |
| SAMPLING, AND ALL SAMPLES WERE LESS THAN DETECTABLE LIMITS.  HAVING URANIUM  |
| INSIDE THE SHELL OF THE AUTOCLAVE IS A LOSS OF ONE CONTROL OF THE DOUBLE     |
| CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE CONTAINED IN NCSA_342A002.  THE ACCUMULATION OF UO2F2  |
| ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE PRESSURE DECAY FILTER IS NOT EXPECTED.  ADDITIONAL     |
| EVALUATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED AT THIS TIME.                                |
|                                                                              |
| THERE IS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR                        |
| RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.   |
| THIS EVENT DOES NOT PRESENT ANY IMMINENT DANGER OF A CRITICALITY.            |
|                                                                              |
| THE AUTOCLAVE HAS BEEN ISOLATED FROM ALL POTENTIAL MODERATOR SOURCES, SO     |
| CRITICALITY IS NOT POSSIBLE.  MODERATION, ENRICHMENT, AND GEOMETRY           |
| PARAMETERS WERE MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT.  THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF       |
| URANIUM INSIDE THE AUTOCLAVE SHELL AND OUTSIDE OF THE UF6 CYLINDER WAS A     |
| LOST PARAMETER.  THE AUTOCLAVE WAS TAGGED TO PREVENT ANY OPERATION UNTIL     |
| RECOVERY PLANS ARE DEVELOPED.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL.             |
|                                                                              |
| ***UPDATE ON 05/13/99 AT 2248 EDT FROM J. CASTLE TAKEN BY MACKINNON***       |
|                                                                              |
| REVISION TO THE NCS ANOMALOUS CONDITIONS INCIDENT REPORT (NSI-99-02603 REV.  |
| 1) IDENTIFIES THAT THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF U-235 THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RELEASED |
| IN THE AUTOCLAVE WAS 755.2 GRAMS.  THIS AMOUNT OF U-235 IS LESS THAN THE     |
| ALWAYS SAFE MASS OF 800 GRAMS FOR 5% ENRICHED MATERIAL AND IS WELL BELOW THE |
| SUBCRITICAL LIMIT OF 1640 GRAMS AT 5% ENRICHMENT.  THIS INCIDENT REPRESENTS  |
| A DEGRADATION IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY FOR THE MASS CONTROL PARAMETER BUT DID |
| NOT RESULT IN A LOSS OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY BASED ON THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF    |
| MATERIAL POTENTIALLY LOST.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  THE EVENT RESULTED IN A DUSTING OF URANIUM   |
| INSIDE THE AUTOCLAVE (A/C) SHELL AS WELL AS URANIUM ON THE PRESSURE DECAY    |
| FILTER.  THE MAXIMUM CREDIBLE AMOUNT OF U-235 RELEASED INSIDE THE A/C WAS    |
| CALCULATED BY ENGINEERING TO BE 755.2 GRAMS OF U-235 BASED ON ASSUMING THE   |
| ENTIRE AVAILABLE UF6 PIPING VOLUME AND PRESSURE DECAY FILTER VOLUME WERE     |
| FILLED WITH URANIUM AT MAXIMUM DENSITY PRIOR TO THE EVENT.  THIS IS LESS     |
| THAN THE SAFE MASS OF 800 GRAMS U-235 AT 5% ENRICHMENT AND MUCH LESS THAN    |
| THE SUBCRITICAL MASS LIMIT OF 1,640 GRAMS OF U-235.  THEREFORE, A            |
| CRITICALITY COULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED WITHOUT THE ADDITION OF MORE MASS AND    |
| MODERATION TO THE AUTOCLAVE.  BOTH ADDITIONS ARE UNLIKELY AS THE AUTOCLAVE   |
| IS SHUTDOWN AND ISOLATED, PENDING CLEANUP.  THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE |
| WAS, THEREFORE, STILL MET FOLLOWING THIS EVENT.                              |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO OF HOW CRITICALITY   |
| COULD OCCUR):  A CRITICALITY WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF MORE THAN 300 lbs OF  |
| WATER IS ADDED TO THE AUTOCLAVE.  THE AUTOCLAVE HAS BEEN ISOLATED FROM ALL   |
| POTENTIAL MODERATOR SOURCES.  AT LEAST 885 GRAMS OF U-235 WOULD NEED TO BE   |
| ADDED TO THE AUTOCLAVE IN ADDITION TO AT LEAST 300 POUNDS OF WATER IN ORDER  |
| FOR A CRITICALITY TO BE POSSIBLE IN THE AUTOCLAVE GEOMETRY.  THE AUTOCLAVE   |
| HAS BEEN ISOLATED FROM ALL POTENTIAL SOURCES OF MODERATION AND URANIUM.      |
| MODERATION AND ENRICHMENT CONTROL WERE MAINTAINED, AND ALSO, GEOMETRY OF THE |
| PRESSURE DECAY FILTER WAS MAINTAINED.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE   |
| FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  THE PRESENCE OF UO2F2 INSIDE THE AUTOCLAVE SHELL  |
| IN AN AMOUNT LESS THAN A SAFE MASS REPRESENTS A DEGRADATION IN ONE OF THE    |
| TWO CONTROLS FOR DOUBLE CONTINGENCY, BUT IT DOES NOT REPRESENT A COMPLETE    |
| LOSS OF THAT CONTROL. TWO UNLIKELY, INDEPENDENT AND CONCURRENT EVENTS WOULD  |
| STILL NEED TO OCCUR IN ORDER FOR A CRITICALITY TO BE POSSIBLE IN THE         |
| AUTOCLAVE.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
| AT 1805 HOURS ON 05/09/99,  THE AUTOCLAVE WAS DANGER TAGGED TO PREVENT ANY   |
| OPERATION UNTIL RECOVERY PLANS ARE DEVELOPED.                                |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE CERTIFICATE     |
| HOLDER.  THE NMSS EO (JOE HOLONICH) AND R3DO (ROGER LANKSBURY) WERE NOTIFIED |
| BY THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER.                                               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35710       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BYRON                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/13/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:47[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/13/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:10[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVE FLOWERS                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/13/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO AN INADVERTENT POWER RANGE HIGH FLUX SIGNAL    |
| DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF SURVEILLANCE TESTING                               |
|                                                                              |
| At 0810 CDT, Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip from 100% power    |
| due to an inadvertent power range high flux trip signal during the           |
| performance of instrumentation and control surveillance testing.  All rods   |
| fully inserted.  Following the trip, feedwater isolated as expected, and the |
| auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started on low 2 steam generator     |
| level (18% narrow range) as designed.  (Steam generator level decreased to   |
| 0% narrow range, and normal steam generator level is 63%.)  In addition, the |
| 'K' steam dump failed to reclose, and this caused reactor coolant system     |
| temperature to decrease slightly below the P-12 setpoint of 550F for a      |
| short period of time.  (Normal temperature is 557F.)  When temperature      |
| reached 550F, the steam dumps automatically isolated.  The 'K' steam dump   |
| was manually isolated.  The steam dumps were re-opened when temperature went |
| above 550F.  All other post-trip actuations occurred as expected.  None of  |
| the primary safety valves or power-operated relief valves lifted.  However,  |
| some of the secondary feedwater heater relief valves lifted.  The licensee   |
| stated that it is not unusual for these valves to lift following a reactor   |
| trip, and the licensee plans to isolate them.  The licensee also stated that |
| these valves are not large enough to cause a problem with cooldown.  There   |
| were no emergency core cooling system actuations, and none were required.    |
| An investigation to determine the exact cause of the reactor trip is in      |
| progress.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The unit is currently stable in Mode 3.  The reactor coolant pumps, normal   |
| charging and letdown, and pressurizer heaters and sprays are being utilized  |
| for primary system transport, level, and pressure control.  Containment      |
| parameters are normal.  Secondary steam is being dumped to the condenser,    |
| and water is being supplied to the steam generators via the auxiliary        |
| feedwater pumps and startup feedwater pump.  The licensee plans to secure    |
| auxiliary feedwater.  Offsite power is available, and the emergency diesel   |
| generators are operable and available if needed.  The licensee is in the     |
| process of re-closing the ring bus located in the switchyard to increase     |
| offsite power reliability.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   35711       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  GREEN BAY PACKAGING                  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/13/1999|
|LICENSEE:  GREEN BAY PACKAGING                  |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:12[EDT]|
|    CITY:  WINCHESTER               REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        05/21/1998|
|  COUNTY:  FREDERICK                 STATE:  VA |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  45-25268-01           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/13/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |RUDOLPH BERNHARD     R2      |
|                                                |SCOTT MOORE          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  M. DICKEY                    |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|IBBF 30.50(b)(2)(ii)     EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INTERMITTENT STUCK SHUTTER (MECHANICAL  PROBLEM) ON OHMART SCANNING GAUGES   |
| REPORTED AFTER PERFORMANCE OF AN NRC INSPECTION.                             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported two past incidents which occurred at their facility    |
| after an NRC inspection determined that the two past incidences should have  |
| been reported.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| On 05/19/98 or 05/20/98, the shutter of an Ohmart scanning gauge, used to    |
| measure the thickness of paper, was found to intermittently stick open.  As  |
| of late 1993, the Ohmart scanning gauge (Model # OD120) contained 300        |
| millicuries of Kr-85.  Kr-85 is a beta-gamma emitter with a half life of     |
| 10.76 years.  On 05/21/98, Alternative Process Service of Alabama repaired   |
| the intermittently sticking shutter on the gauge.  There was no exposure to  |
| personnel in the area when the shutter was stuck open because the gauge is   |
| hard to get to (0.5" gap).   It was determined that broken screws had caused |
| the shutter to intermittently stick open.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| On 05/03/99, a shutter on a different Ohmart scanning gauge was found to be  |
| stuck open.  The licensee lightly tapped the source case of the Ohmart       |
| scanning gauge (Model # OD120) which caused the shutter to go closed.  The   |
| licensee called Honeywell Measurex and informed them that the shutter had    |
| stuck open on the scanning gauge.  Honeywell Measurex will send someone to   |
| Green Bay Packaging during the week of 05/17/99 to repair the scanning       |
| gauge.  This gauge also contained 300 millicuries of Kr-85 as of late 1993.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35712       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:30[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        05/13/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICH CHEAR                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       4        Startup          |4        Startup          |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT THE LEAK RATE OF A MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE IS GREATER THAN |
| THE INBOARD LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM PROVEN TREATMENT FLOW RATE                |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "Clinton Power Station has identified that the Inboard Main Steam Isolation  |
| Valve (MSIV) Leakage Control System (LCS) is not calibrated to process the   |
| design MSIV leakage of 28 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) per one main   |
| steam line.  One MSIV has been identified as having a leakage rate of 22.5   |
| scfh which is greater than the Inboard LCS proven treatment flow rate of     |
| 21.3 scfh.  Currently, the engineering team is still investigating."         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the unit was in a 30-day technical specification    |
| limiting condition for operation as a result of this issue.                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35713       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAN ONOFRE               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:54[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE             |EVENT DATE:        05/13/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:44[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MATT THURBURN                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES CAIN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     M/R        Y       97       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND MANUAL INITIATION OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER DUE TO THE  |
| LOSS OF BOTH MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF MAINTENANCE ON   |
| THE FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| At 2144 PDT on 05/13/99, both main feedwater pumps tripped for unknown       |
| reasons.  Reactor operators recognized this loss, manually tripped the       |
| reactor from 97% power, and manually initiated emergency feedwater.  All     |
| rods fully inserted, and all systems functioned as required.  There were no  |
| engineered safety feature actuations other than the manual initiation of     |
| emergency feedwater.  The main steam isolation valves remained open, none of |
| the relief valves opened, and there was no loss of offsite power.            |
|                                                                              |
| The cause of the loss of both feedwater pumps is under investigation.  The   |
| licensee stated that maintenance personnel were performing voltage checks in |
| the feedwater control system at the time of the event.                       |
|                                                                              |
| The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3.  The reactor coolant pumps,       |
| normal charging and letdown, and pressurizer heaters and sprays are being    |
| utilized for primary system transport, level, and pressure control.          |
| Containment parameters are normal.  Emergency feedwater is supplying water   |
| to the steam generators, and secondary steam is being dumped to the main     |
| condenser.  Offsite power is available.  The 'A' emergency diesel generator  |
| is currently out of service for planned maintenance.  However, the 'B'       |
| emergency diesel generator and the crossties from the other unit are         |
| available if needed.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to issue a        |
| media/press release.                                                         |
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