Event Notification Report for May 12, 1999

THE PLANT HAS OPERATED OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS IN THE PAST DURING STARTUP.

ON 03/18/99, FRAMATOME (B&W) REQUESTED THE LICENSEE REVIEW A PRESSURE-TEMPERATURE LIMIT ANALYSIS FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION APPLICABILITY. THE ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED FOR ANOTHER B&W PLANT AND SHOWED THAT PRESSURE INCREASES ARE LARGER WITH NITROGEN IN THE PRESSURIZER. THIS RESULTED IN A REVISED SET OF LOW-TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION ( LTOP) LIMITS FOR STEAM AND NITROGEN OPERATION AT THE OTHER PLANT. FRAMATOME WAS NOT AWARE OF NITROGEN PRESENCE BEING CONSIDERED IN THE DETERMINATION OF LTOP LIMITS.

OPERATIONS WAS REQUESTED TO USE A DEDICATED LTOP OPERATOR, AS A CONSERVATIVE MEASURE, IF LTOP APPLICABILITY EXISTED AND NITROGEN PRESSURE WAS IN THE PRESSURIZER. THIS IS A COMPENSATORY MEASURE REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.12, CONDITION 'F.'

THE LICENSEE HAS COMPLETED AN EVALUATION THAT CONCLUDED THAT NITROGEN OVERPRESSURE DURING STARTUP COULD RESULT IN LESS THAN 10 MINUTES BEING AVAILABLE FOR OPERATOR RESPONSE AFTER THE ALARM SETPOINT IS REACHED DURING AN LTOP EVENT. SINCE OPERATOR RESPONSE TO AN ALARM IS ONE TRAIN OF THE OCONEE LTOP SYSTEM, THIS MEANS THAT THIS TRAIN HAS BEEN INOPERABLE DURING PORTIONS OF PAST STARTUPS. THE APPLICABLE TIME PERIODS ARE ASSUMED TO HAVE EXCEEDED THE 4 HOURS ALLOWED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.12, CONDITION 'F,' FOR IMPLEMENTING COMPENSATORY MEASURES. SINCE THE LTOP MITIGATION SYSTEM WOULD NOT MEET THE SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION DURING THESE TIME PERIODS, THIS CONDITION IS BEING REPORTED AS OPERATION OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT.

LTOP REQUIREMENTS DO NOT APPLY DURING PLANT OPERATION IN THE RUN MODE, AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO LTOP EVENTS DURING PLANT OPERATION WITH A NITROGEN PRESSURE BUBBLE IN THE PRESSURIZER. THEREFORE, THIS IS NOT CONSIDERED TO REPRESENT AN ACTUAL CHALLENGE TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED.

REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING A QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE TEST.

DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NORMAL QUARTERLY RCIC SURVEILLANCE TEST, THE RCIC TURBINE UNEXPECTEDLY TRIPPED WHEN THE SUCTION PATH WAS SWAPPED FROM THE SUPPRESSION POOL TO THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK. THE CAUSE OF THE RCIC TURBINE TRIP IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME, AND TROUBLESHOOTING IS CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS. THE PLANT IS IN A 14-DAY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION STATEMENT.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED.

******************** UPDATE AT 1600 ON 06/09/99 FROM MITCH ALMETER TO TROCINE ********************

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"In accordance with industry guidance (i.e., NUREG-1022), Nine Mile Point reports RCIC inoperability due to an unplanned occurrence. The inoperability reported on 05/12/99 was as a result of preplanned maintenance and a system configuration which is not expected to be duplicated under design conditions. The preplanned inoperability did not reveal any non-conformance that would have otherwise impacted RCIC operability. Therefore, the RCIC trip/inoperability was not reportable."

"This event notification is being retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Caruso).

THE FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL REPORTED A RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT, #FL99-066, WHICH OCCURRED AT THE CITRUS MEMORIAL HEALTH FOUNDATION, INC., LOCATED IN INVERNESS, FLORIDA.

SIX IMPLANTED I-125 SEEDS MEASURING 0.265 mCi EACH WERE REMOVED FROM A PATIENT AT THE FACILITY. WHEN THE SEEDS WERE TO BE RETRIEVED FOR SHIPMENT BACK TO THE MANUFACTURER, ONLY ONE COULD BE FOUND. A THOROUGH SURVEY OF THE ROOM AND SEWER TRAPS FAILED TO LOCATE THE OTHER FIVE SEEDS. THE MISSING MATERIAL WAS PROBABLY LOST IN THE SANITARY SEWER. A STATE INSPECTOR IS INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT.

***UPDATE ON 05/14/99 AT 1454 HOURS FROM JERRY EAKINS TAKEN BY MACKINNON***

ON 05/11/99, THE LICENSEE PERFORMED A PROSTATE IMPLANT USING I-125 SEEDS IN PRE-LOADED APPLICATORS. SIX SEEDS IN TWO APPLICATORS WERE UNUSED AND TAKEN TO THE STERILE PROCESSING DEPARTMENT (SPD). ON 05/12/99, MS. PETKUS RETRIEVED THEM TO SHIP BACK TO THE RADIOPHARMACY AND FOUND ONLY ONE SEED. A THROUGH SURVEY OF THE SPD INCLUDING THE SEWER TRAPS FAILED TO LOCATE THE MISSING FIVE SEEDS. THE STATE INVESTIGATOR VISITED THE LICENSEE ON 05/13/99. HE DUPLICATED THE RADIATION SURVEYS OF THE LICENSEE AND WAS UNABLE TO FIND THE MISSING SEEDS. THE LICENSEE AND THE STATE INSPECTOR HAVE INTERVIEWED ALL THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED. IT IS SUSPECTED THE SEEDS WERE LOST WHEN THE APPLICATORS WERE OPENED BY MISTAKE FOR STERILIZATION. THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT IS THE FAILURE OF THE LICENSEE TO CONTROL ACCESSIBILITY OF THE BRACHYTHERAPY SOURCES TO AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL. THIS INCIDENT IS DEFERRED TO RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS.

THE R2DO (R. BERN HARD) AND NMSS EO (BRAIN SMITH) WERE NOTIFIED BY THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER.

FAILURE OF THE UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM - 24-HOUR NOTIFICATION

THE FACILITY EXPERIENCED A FAILURE OF THE UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SAFETY SYSTEM IN C-333, UNIT 5, CELL 3. THE FAILURE OCCURRED DURING THE TWICE-PER-SHIFT TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENT (TSR) SURVEILLANCE WHICH REQUIRES A TEST FIRING OF THE DETECTOR HEADS. THE SAFETY SYSTEM WAS IMMEDIATELY DECLARED INOPERABLE, AND THE TSR-REQUIRED ACTIONS, WHICH INCLUDE PLACING A SMOKE WATCH IN THE AFFECTED AREA, WERE IMPLEMENTED. IN ADDITION, THE OPERATING PRESSURE OF THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT WAS REDUCED TO BELOW ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE WHICH PLACED THE EQUIPMENT IN A MODE IN WHICH THE SAFETY SYSTEM WAS NOT REQUIRED TO BE AVAILABLE AND OPERABLE.

THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED.

* * * UPDATE 0900EDT ON 5/26/99 FROM TOM WHITE TO S.SANDIN * * *

THIS REPORT IS BEING RETRACTED BASED ON THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

"On May 19, 1999, NRA provided the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) with guidance related to the reportability of PGLD surveillance testing failures. Subsequent to the subject notification, the reportability of process leak detection (PGLD) TSR testing failures has been reviewed. This concluded that the twice per shift test causes the PGLD alarm system to be out of service until the system is reset and that the TSR Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO) action time begins at the point the test is initiated. Thus, failures that occur during testing occur when the system is out of service and under active LCO. Failures occurring while equipment is out of service are not reportable under 10CFR76.120 (c) (2) unless there is firm evidence that the inoperability existed prior to the test. Therefore, this notification is being retracted. This has been discussed with the PGDP Senior NRC Resident.

"PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-99/2737; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-1999-037. NRC Event Notification Worksheet No. 35709."

Notified R3DO(Vegel) and NMSS(Combs).

PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (ONE OF THREE SOURCES) DUE TO A TRANSFORMER LOCKOUT

At 0038 CDT, the east bus (345 kV) was lost due to a lockout on the #7 transformer. The loss of the east bus resulted in the loss of normal power to the 'A' safeguards bus (4.16 kV). On loss of power to the #7 transformer, a shutdown sequencer actuation occurred due to low power. This caused the 'A' emergency diesel generator to automatically start and load the bus. The following equipment also automatically started: 'A' centrifugal charging pump, 'A' component cooling water pump, 'A' essential service water pump, 'A' control room air conditioning unit, 'A' class 1E air conditioning unit, 'A' motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, 'A' and 'C' containment coolers, and the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required and that there was nothing unusual or not understood.

At 0058 CDT, the licensee reset the #7 transformer lockout, and the east bus was restored to service at 0059 CDT. At 0244 CDT, the licensee re-energized the #7 transformer (the normal power feed to the safeguards bus transformer), and normal offsite power was restored to the 'A' emergency bus at 0256 CDT.

The transformer lockout was initially believed to be caused by a lightening strike and was later determined to be caused by a raccoon.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.