Event Notification Report for April 26, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/25/1999 - 04/26/1999
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35632
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: FERNSLER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: FERNSLER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 04/26/1999
Notification Time: 01:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/1999
Event Time: 00:01 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/1999
Notification Time: 01:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/1999
Event Time: 00:01 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 2 | Startup | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNIT 2 WAS MANUALLY SCRAMMED FROM 2% POWER TO PERMIT ENTRY INTO THE DRYWELL FOR REPAIR WORK.
THE UNIT WAS MANUALLY SHUTDOWN TO PERMIT ENTRY INTO CONTAINMENT TO ALLOW PERFORMANCE OF REPAIRS TO THE TRAVERSING INCORE PROBE (TIP) CHANNEL TUBING. PRIOR TO SHUTDOWN, THE UNIT WAS IN THE PROCESS OF RESTARTING FOLLOWING THE NINTH REFUELING OUTAGE. DURING POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING, A RESTRICTION WAS DISCOVERED IN THE TUBING OF THE "C" TIP MECHANISM. THIS PREVENTED INSERTION OF ITS DETECTOR AND CALIBRATION OF ITS ASSOCIATED LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR (LPRM). IN ORDER TO PERFORM REPAIRS, THE REACTOR HAD TO BE SHUT DOWN FOR DRYWELL ENTRY. FOLLOWING THE SHUTDOWN, REACTOR WATER LEVEL REMAINED ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED AT 35.7" AS RECORDED ON THE NARROW RANGE INSTRUMENTATION. ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED, NO ECCS INITIATIONS OR DIESEL STARTS OCCURRED, AND NO SAFETY RELIEF VALVES LIFTED. THIS EVENT IS NOT REPORTABLE AS AN RPS ACTUATION SINCE IT IS PROCEDURALLY RECOGNIZED AS PRE-PLANNED. THE HEAT SINK IS THE SHUTDOWN COOLING TO THE SUPPRESSION POOL. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO CONTINUE COOLING THE UNIT DOWN TO MODE 4.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.
THE UNIT WAS MANUALLY SHUTDOWN TO PERMIT ENTRY INTO CONTAINMENT TO ALLOW PERFORMANCE OF REPAIRS TO THE TRAVERSING INCORE PROBE (TIP) CHANNEL TUBING. PRIOR TO SHUTDOWN, THE UNIT WAS IN THE PROCESS OF RESTARTING FOLLOWING THE NINTH REFUELING OUTAGE. DURING POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING, A RESTRICTION WAS DISCOVERED IN THE TUBING OF THE "C" TIP MECHANISM. THIS PREVENTED INSERTION OF ITS DETECTOR AND CALIBRATION OF ITS ASSOCIATED LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR (LPRM). IN ORDER TO PERFORM REPAIRS, THE REACTOR HAD TO BE SHUT DOWN FOR DRYWELL ENTRY. FOLLOWING THE SHUTDOWN, REACTOR WATER LEVEL REMAINED ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED AT 35.7" AS RECORDED ON THE NARROW RANGE INSTRUMENTATION. ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED, NO ECCS INITIATIONS OR DIESEL STARTS OCCURRED, AND NO SAFETY RELIEF VALVES LIFTED. THIS EVENT IS NOT REPORTABLE AS AN RPS ACTUATION SINCE IT IS PROCEDURALLY RECOGNIZED AS PRE-PLANNED. THE HEAT SINK IS THE SHUTDOWN COOLING TO THE SUPPRESSION POOL. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO CONTINUE COOLING THE UNIT DOWN TO MODE 4.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35634
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: HILBERT-SEMMES
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: HILBERT-SEMMES
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 04/26/1999
Notification Time: 11:13 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/1999
Event Time: 08:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/1999
Notification Time: 11:13 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/1999
Event Time: 08:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LEN WERT (R2)
LEN WERT (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
THE PLANT RECEIVED A TRAIN "B" HIGH CONSEQUENCE-LIMITING SAFEGUARDS (CLS) SIGNAL.
THIS OCCURRED WHEN AN ELECTRICIAN LIFTED A LEAD WHILE REPLACING RELAY "2-CLS-RLY-1B1" IN THE "B" TRAIN HIGH CLS SYSTEM. ONE CONTAINMENT TRIP VALVE FOR THE CONTAINMENT PARTICULATE AND GAS RADIATION MONITORS REPOSITIONED (CLOSED), AND THE PARTICULATE AND GAS RADIATION MONITOR PUMP DE-ENERGIZED. A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL WAS NOT RECEIVED AS IT WAS PROPERLY DEFEATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATION PROCEDURES. THE ELECTRICIANS VERIFIED THAT THE HIGH CLS SYSTEM WAS DE-ENERGIZED AS THEY WOULD EXPECT PRIOR TO PERFORMING WORK TO PREVENT A SPURIOUS ACTUATION. THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. THE HIGH CLS SIGNAL WAS RESET SINCE THE 2/4 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE < 14.2 PSIA MATRIX WAS MET DUE TO THE ACCURACY OF THE GAUGES. THE TRIP VALVE WAS PLACED IN THE PRE-EVENT CONDITION (OPEN), AND THE RADIATION MONITOR PUMP WAS RE-ENERGIZED AND RESTARTED. CORE OFF LOAD WAS NOT IN PROGRESS AT THE TIME OF THIS EVENT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.
***************** UPDATE AT 1102 ON 05/07/99 FROM LISA HILLBERT-SEMMES TO TROCINE ******************
The licensee is retracting this event notification.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1113 on April 26, 1999, a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification was made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) due to an ESF actuation. An inadvertent Unit 2 High Consequence Limiting Safeguards (CLS) signal for Train 'B' was caused by maintenance activities when replacing a High CLS relay (#2-CLS-RLY-1B1) with Unit 2 in Refueling Shutdown. The High CLS signal only initiated the closure of containment trip valve #2-RM-TV-200B, which caused the sample pump, #2-RM-P-200, for the containment particulate and gaseous radiation monitors to de-energize."
"NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73, states that 'The Commission is interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the consequences (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events where an ESF actuated unnecessarily.... Usually, the staff would not consider this to include single component actuations because single components of complex systems, by themselves, usually do not mitigate the consequences of significant events.'"
"Based on further review of this event and guidance provided in NUREG-1022, it was determined that this event was not reportable as the High CLS signal was invalid and resulted in the actuation of only one component which did not mitigate the consequences of the event."
"This notification is made to retract the report made on April 26, 1999, based on the above discussion."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R2DO Chris Christensen.
THIS OCCURRED WHEN AN ELECTRICIAN LIFTED A LEAD WHILE REPLACING RELAY "2-CLS-RLY-1B1" IN THE "B" TRAIN HIGH CLS SYSTEM. ONE CONTAINMENT TRIP VALVE FOR THE CONTAINMENT PARTICULATE AND GAS RADIATION MONITORS REPOSITIONED (CLOSED), AND THE PARTICULATE AND GAS RADIATION MONITOR PUMP DE-ENERGIZED. A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL WAS NOT RECEIVED AS IT WAS PROPERLY DEFEATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATION PROCEDURES. THE ELECTRICIANS VERIFIED THAT THE HIGH CLS SYSTEM WAS DE-ENERGIZED AS THEY WOULD EXPECT PRIOR TO PERFORMING WORK TO PREVENT A SPURIOUS ACTUATION. THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. THE HIGH CLS SIGNAL WAS RESET SINCE THE 2/4 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE < 14.2 PSIA MATRIX WAS MET DUE TO THE ACCURACY OF THE GAUGES. THE TRIP VALVE WAS PLACED IN THE PRE-EVENT CONDITION (OPEN), AND THE RADIATION MONITOR PUMP WAS RE-ENERGIZED AND RESTARTED. CORE OFF LOAD WAS NOT IN PROGRESS AT THE TIME OF THIS EVENT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.
***************** UPDATE AT 1102 ON 05/07/99 FROM LISA HILLBERT-SEMMES TO TROCINE ******************
The licensee is retracting this event notification.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1113 on April 26, 1999, a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification was made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) due to an ESF actuation. An inadvertent Unit 2 High Consequence Limiting Safeguards (CLS) signal for Train 'B' was caused by maintenance activities when replacing a High CLS relay (#2-CLS-RLY-1B1) with Unit 2 in Refueling Shutdown. The High CLS signal only initiated the closure of containment trip valve #2-RM-TV-200B, which caused the sample pump, #2-RM-P-200, for the containment particulate and gaseous radiation monitors to de-energize."
"NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73, states that 'The Commission is interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the consequences (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events where an ESF actuated unnecessarily.... Usually, the staff would not consider this to include single component actuations because single components of complex systems, by themselves, usually do not mitigate the consequences of significant events.'"
"Based on further review of this event and guidance provided in NUREG-1022, it was determined that this event was not reportable as the High CLS signal was invalid and resulted in the actuation of only one component which did not mitigate the consequences of the event."
"This notification is made to retract the report made on April 26, 1999, based on the above discussion."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R2DO Chris Christensen.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35636
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG SOSSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG SOSSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 04/26/1999
Notification Time: 23:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/1999
Event Time: 23:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/1999
Notification Time: 23:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/1999
Event Time: 23:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF TWO LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITORS INDICATING INCONSISTENTLY WITH THE REMAINING LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITORS
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Upon review of local power range monitor (LPRM) data for Unit 1, [two] LPRMs were determined be indicating inconsistently with the remaining LPRMs. The cause is believed to be reversed cable inputs to the LPRM drawer. The problem is believed to be under-vessel."
"As a result of this condition, the 'B' and 'D' [average power range monitors (APRMs)] and both rod block monitor [(RBM)] channels were declared inoperable at 2315 [on 04/26/99]. This condition has existed since the previous refueling outage [which was exited] in June [of] 1998."
"The suspect LPRMs are being bypassed which will restore the APRMs and RBMs to an OPERABLE status."
"Generic investigations are in progress; however, initial review of operating data indicates normal operation of [the] remaining LPRMs. This investigation will analyze any impact on thermal limits and fuel performance."
The licensee stated that the RBMs are not required for operability at this time. However, the unit is currently in a 12-hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) which requires insertion of a half scram for the two inoperable APRMs. This LCO will be exited when the LPRMs are bypassed. The licensee does not anticipate any problems meeting this LCO action statement. The licensee also stated that with the exceptions noted above, all systems functioned as designed and there was nothing unusual or misunderstood.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1413 ON 05/14/99 FROM DALE BEGIAN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"This notification is a retraction of a notification made on 04/26/99 (event 35636) involving the discovery of two local power range monitors (LPRM) indicating inconsistently with the remaining LPRMs. A review has concluded that the event did not involve operation outside the plants design basis or an inoperable (RBM) or (APRM)."
"The notification identified concerns with a potential adverse impact on the operation of the rod block monitor (RBM) or average power range monitor (APRM) resulting from two LPRM detectors on the same LPRM string having their connection wiring swapped. This condition was discovered following startup from a recent plant shutdown. During a new control rod pattern adjustment on April 26, 1999, it was identified that LPRMs 40-17B and 40-17C were indicating inconsistently with the remaining symmetrical LPRMs and axial power levels."
"The LGS 1 design requirements for minimum number of LPRM inputs from a four string array into the RBM was met, and the monitor, although degraded, remained operable. The swapped LPRM inputs were within a 4 rod grouping and did not significantly impact their associated averaging circuitry which inputs to the RBM and APRM. These inputs were within the acceptable ranges and, therefore, did not impact operability of the RBM or APRM."
"Currently, the affected LPRMs are bypassed in accordance with Tech Spec limitations. The LPRM wiring connections will be checked and corrected in the next Unit 1 refuel outage."
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this retraction. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Caruso).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Upon review of local power range monitor (LPRM) data for Unit 1, [two] LPRMs were determined be indicating inconsistently with the remaining LPRMs. The cause is believed to be reversed cable inputs to the LPRM drawer. The problem is believed to be under-vessel."
"As a result of this condition, the 'B' and 'D' [average power range monitors (APRMs)] and both rod block monitor [(RBM)] channels were declared inoperable at 2315 [on 04/26/99]. This condition has existed since the previous refueling outage [which was exited] in June [of] 1998."
"The suspect LPRMs are being bypassed which will restore the APRMs and RBMs to an OPERABLE status."
"Generic investigations are in progress; however, initial review of operating data indicates normal operation of [the] remaining LPRMs. This investigation will analyze any impact on thermal limits and fuel performance."
The licensee stated that the RBMs are not required for operability at this time. However, the unit is currently in a 12-hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) which requires insertion of a half scram for the two inoperable APRMs. This LCO will be exited when the LPRMs are bypassed. The licensee does not anticipate any problems meeting this LCO action statement. The licensee also stated that with the exceptions noted above, all systems functioned as designed and there was nothing unusual or misunderstood.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1413 ON 05/14/99 FROM DALE BEGIAN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"This notification is a retraction of a notification made on 04/26/99 (event 35636) involving the discovery of two local power range monitors (LPRM) indicating inconsistently with the remaining LPRMs. A review has concluded that the event did not involve operation outside the plants design basis or an inoperable (RBM) or (APRM)."
"The notification identified concerns with a potential adverse impact on the operation of the rod block monitor (RBM) or average power range monitor (APRM) resulting from two LPRM detectors on the same LPRM string having their connection wiring swapped. This condition was discovered following startup from a recent plant shutdown. During a new control rod pattern adjustment on April 26, 1999, it was identified that LPRMs 40-17B and 40-17C were indicating inconsistently with the remaining symmetrical LPRMs and axial power levels."
"The LGS 1 design requirements for minimum number of LPRM inputs from a four string array into the RBM was met, and the monitor, although degraded, remained operable. The swapped LPRM inputs were within a 4 rod grouping and did not significantly impact their associated averaging circuitry which inputs to the RBM and APRM. These inputs were within the acceptable ranges and, therefore, did not impact operability of the RBM or APRM."
"Currently, the affected LPRMs are bypassed in accordance with Tech Spec limitations. The LPRM wiring connections will be checked and corrected in the next Unit 1 refuel outage."
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this retraction. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Caruso).