Event Notification Report for April 08, 1999

24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT

"At 1855 on 4/8/99, a Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis (NCSA) PLANT033.A01 control was lost. This loss was of one control (concentration), which is one contingency of a double contingency design of this NCSA. Moderation was maintained. The concentration control was lost when a surge of UF6 material at less than 1% U-235 sublimed from a cell being returned to service, causing the pressure in an intermediate drum (a type of surge drum) to exceed the NCSA limit of 17 psia. The highest pressure reached was 19.6 psia in the drum. Actions were immediately taken to reduce the drum pressure and it was returned to allowable limits within 45 minutes. The drum temperature was maintained above 220°F during this excursion.

"This is reportable under NRC Bulletin 91-01 24-hour criticality control. There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological exposure as a result of this event."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.

LOSS OF 185 mCi OF Tc-99m

The licensee reported that 185 mCi of Tc-99m (5 unit doses) was lost from the Syncor radiopharmacy facility in Columbus, OH. The missing unit doses were contained in an ammo can which was one of eight cans in this particular shipment. The driver for the shipment stated that only seven cans were located on the shelf when he arrived to pick them up; however, another driver who had picked his shipment up several minutes before stated that there were eight cans located on the shelf when he left the area.

This is an access controlled facility, and the licensee believes that the can was either misplaced within the facility, inadvertently delivered to the wrong customer, or disposed of as an undeliverable shipment. The licensee will submit a written report to the NRC regarding this event.

LARGE OIL SPILL FROM A TRANSFORMER

A TRANSFORMER CONTAINING 9500 GALLONS OF NON PCB OIL STARTED LEAKING AT APPROXIMATELY 0530 BECAUSE OF AN ELECTRICAL FAULT. THE OIL IS HEADING TOWARD POND J-6. EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY TO CONTAIN THE SPILL, BUT IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THE OIL CAN BE PREVENTED FROM LEAVING THE SITE.

THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

IN ADDITION TO THE NOTIFICATIONS LISTED ABOVE HHS (GREEN) WAS NOTIFIED BY THE OPERATIONS CENTER.

* * * UPDATE AT 0817 ON 4/8/99, BY MACCRAE TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *

THE TRANSFORMER HAS STOPPED LEAKING. RESPONSE PERSONNEL BELIEVE THEY WILL BE ABLE TO CONTAIN THE LEAK TO THE J-6 POND.

* * * UPDATE AT 1021 EDT ON 4/8/99 BY J. B. HALCOMB TO FANGIE JONES * * *

As a result of this event the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency was notified (0758 EDT) and a press release was issued (0958 EDT). Both of these are criteria for a 4-hour notification to the NRC of themselves, but are included here as they are part of the event previously reported.

The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Bruce Burgess), NMSS (Steurz), and the Office of Public Affairs.

HOO NOTE BY TROCINE ON 04/15/99: Based upon information on facsimiles received from Portsmouth, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated and declared operational at 0700 on 04/08/99, and the Crisis Manager declared an Alert at 0710 due to concerns with the oil runoff. Activities in the EOC were terminated at 0910, and the Incident Commander declared an "All Clear" (terminated the Alert) at 0958 on 04/08/99.

24-HOUR REPORT - DEAD SEAL FOUND

DIVERS FOUND A DEAD SEAL IN THE SERVICE WATER FOREBAY. THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

* * * UPDATE 1148EDT 5/17/99 FROM STEVE MORRISSEY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee made the following 24-hour report. Unit 1 is presently operating at 91% power.

"A dead seal was discovered in Seabrook Station's Service Water Pumphouse today. This 24-hour notification is made in accordance with Section 4.1 of the Environmental Protection Plan, Appendix B, of the Operating License. The National Marine Fisheries Service in Gloucester, Massachusetts, has been notified under the Marine Mammal Protection Act.

"The resident inspector has been notified."

Notified R1DO(Eselgroth).

CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION INTAKES ISOLATED

The Unit 2 Control Room Ventilation (VC) intake was isolated when valve 2VC6A automatically closed due to a (suspected) invalid high chlorine signal. During troubleshooting activities, a maintenance technician inadvertently closed valve 1VC5B (the Unit 1 VC intake) when he depressed the associated chlorine detector reset button. (The technician mistakenly thought that the VC intake for Unit 1 was isolated.) Control room operators immediately discovered the error and reopened valve 1VC5B. As a result of this event, both units entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 for approximately one minute. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.


HOO NOTE: See event #35564

HPCI TEMPORARILY INOPERABLE

System Affected: During the performance of a regularly scheduled Instrumentation surveillance on the Unit 3 HPCI Steam Line Space High Temperature switches (in accordance with plant procedure 3-SR-3.3.6.1(3D)) personnel noticed that a relay not tested by procedure was chattering. The affected relay 3-RLY-073-23A-K16 was adjacent to a relay 3-RLY-073-23A-K8 which was being tested by the surveillance. While troubleshooting the cause of the chattering relay, a loose wire was found in the power supply pathway for the HPCI logic circuit. This loose wire had the potential to prevent adequate voltage being supplied to the initiation and isolation logic for the Unit 3 HPCI system.

Actions: The loose wire was retightened.

Reportability: The potential for inadequate voltage being available for the HPCI logic circuit resulted in a conservative decision to declare the HPCI system inoperable. In accordance with plant procedure SPP 3.5, code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.72/73 and NUREG 1022 Rev 1 this is reportable as a 4 Hour Non-Emergency report due to any event or condition that alone could have prevented the Fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (d) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. This criteria is specified in 10CFR50.72.b.2.iii as a 4 hour report and in 10CFR50.73.a.2.v as a 30 day written report.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT - VIOLATION OF NCSA

"ON 4/8/99, AT 2300 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT REQUIREMENT #14 OF NCSA-0333_ 015.E03 WAS NOT BEING MAINTAINED ON CELL 33-3-8 WITHIN THE X-333 PROCESS BUILDING. REQUIREMENT #14 STATES IN PART 'IF THE MOTORS ARE OFF, EITHER THE RCW CONTROL VALVE OR THE RCW SUPPLY BLOCK VALVE SHALL BE CLOSED WITHIN 4 HOURS.' THE MOTORS WERE IN FACT OFF AND THE RCW CONTROL VALVE FAILED IN THE OPEN POSITION AND THE RCW SUPPLY VALVE WAS NOT CLOSED WITHIN 4 HOURS, THUS VIOLATING REQUIREMENT #14. VIOLATION OF THIS REQUIREMENT CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF CONTROL "B" (MODERATION) IN THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY MATRIX FOR CONTINGENCY EVENT B.6.b.1. CONTROL 'A' WHICH IS THE PASSIVE BARRIER PROVIDED BY THE
CONDENSER AND COOLER TUBES REMAINED IN PLACE THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. CONTROL WAS NOT ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE 4 HOUR SPECIFIED TIME FRAME THUS MAKING THIS A 4 HOUR NRC EVENT. CONTROL HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND CELL 33-3-8 IS NOW ONSTREAM. (MOTORS ON)"

THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.