The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is in the process of rescinding or revising guidance and policies posted on this webpage in accordance with Executive Order 14151 Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing, and Executive Order 14168 Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government. In the interim, any previously issued diversity, equity, inclusion, or gender-related guidance on this webpage should be considered rescinded that is inconsistent with these Executive Orders.

Event Notification Report for March 19, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/18/1999 - 03/19/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35383  35432  35483  35484  35485  35486  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35383       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/18/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:39[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        02/18/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN STETSON                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/18/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MIKE JORDAN          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       97       Power Operation  |97       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LEAKAGE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT EXCEEDED ITS 60 GPH LIMIT.                       |
|                                                                              |
| AT 2040 ON 02/18/99, RELIEF VALVE #1E12-F0036 ON THE LINE FROM THE RHR HEAT  |
| EXCHANGERS TO THE RCIC SYSTEM WAS DETERMINED TO BE LEAKING AT 75 GPH INTO    |
| THE AUXILIARY BUILDING EQUIPMENT DRAIN SUMP.  THE RCIC SYSTEM IS ALIGNED TO  |
| THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK, NOT TO THE SUPPRESSION POOL.  IN THE EVENT THAT |
| THE RCIC SYSTEM IS NEEDED IN AN ACCIDENT, IT COULD ALIGN TO THE SUPPRESSION  |
| POOL, RESULTING IN SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEAKING OUT OF CONTAINMENT.  THE   |
| PLANT IS NOT IN ANY LCO ACTION STATEMENT AT THIS TIME, BUT WHEN REPAIRS TO   |
| THE VALVE COMMENCES, THE RCIC SYSTEM WILL BE DECLARED INOPERABLE AND THE     |
| LICENSEE WILL ENTER A 14 DAY LCO.  THE HPCS SYSTEM HAS BEEN VERIFIED TO BE   |
| OPERABLE.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 0806 EST ON 3/18/99 BY BRIAN STETSON TO FANGIE JONES * *  |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Upon further engineering review, the doses calculated with a leakage of 135  |
| gph were determined to be less that allowed by both 10CFR50 Appendix A and   |
| 10CFR100.  Since no regulatory limits would have been exceeded during an     |
| accident, a condition that was outside of the design basis did not exist.    |
| Therefore, the licensee has retracted this event notification.               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector of this retraction.  The    |
| Headquarters Operations Officer informed the R3DO (Geoffrey Wright).         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35432       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HADDAM NECK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/02/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:24[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        03/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:17[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PIONTKOWSKI                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/18/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MICHAEL MODES        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Decommissioned   |0        Decommissioned   |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| A POTENTIAL ERROR WITH THE DOSE TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL WAS IDENTIFIED     |
|                                                                              |
| CR-99-0127 IDENTIFIES A POTENTIAL ERROR WITH THE DOSE TO CONTROL ROOM        |
| PERSONNEL DURING A POSTULATED RESIN FIRE ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE        |
| LICENSEE'S UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR).  THE MAXIMUM ORGAN  |
| DOSE REPORTED IN THE UFSAR (SECTION 6.4.4.1) IS 3.83 REM FOR BONE.  USING    |
| THE SAME CONSERVATIVE SOURCE-TERM ASSUMPTIONS GIVEN IN THE UFSAR AND THE     |
| DOSE CONVERSION FACTORS FROM FEDERAL GUIDANCE REPORT 11, THE PRELIMINARY     |
| RECALCULATED DOSE IS 54 REM CDE (BONE) AND 3.2 REM CEDE.  THE 54 REM BONE    |
| DOSE EXCEEDS THE 50 REM LIMIT PRESCRIBED IN 10CFR50 APPENDIX A, GENERAL      |
| DESIGN CRITERION (GDC) 19, "CONTROL ROOM."                                   |
|                                                                              |
| THIS ERROR IS SPECIFIC TO THE CALCULATED CONTROL ROOM DOSE FROM THE RESIN    |
| FIRE ACCIDENT SCENARIO.  A SIMILAR ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED FOR THE RESIN FIRE |
| ACCIDENT SCENARIO TO CALCULATE THE OFFSITE DOSE TO MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC.    |
| THIS CALCULATION USED A DIFFERENT METHODOLOGY THAN THE CONTROL ROOM DOSE     |
| ANALYSIS AND HAS BEEN VERIFIED.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| IF THE PLANT OPERATED AS PRESENTLY ALLOWED, THE POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO        |
| CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS COULD EXCEED THE DESIGN BASIS OF GDC 19 FOR THE       |
| LIMITING RADIOLOGICAL                                                        |
| EVENT, A SPENT RESIN FIRE.  IN ACTUAL PRACTICE, THE REQUIRED RADIOACTIVE     |
| CONTENT OF RESIN DOES NOT EXIST AT ANY ONE PLACE ON SITE, THEREFORE, AN      |
| ACTUAL EVENT EXCEEDING THE GDC 19 CRITERIA IS NOT CURRENTLY POSSIBLE.        |
|                                                                              |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1813 ON 3/18/99, BY BOWER, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *             |
| The licensee is retracting this event based on a new calculation using the   |
| actual curie content of the contamination in the resin.  Best estimates put  |
| the bone dose due to a resin fire at slightly over 20 rem, well below the 50 |
| rem limit.  Hoo notified R1DO (McFadden).                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35483       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/18/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:25[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        03/17/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        19:51[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/18/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |LARRY CAMPER         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  W.G. HALICKS                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i)     ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "On 3/17/99, at 1951 CST, the C-315 Normetex pump UF6 release detection      |
| system failed.  120 Volt AC circuit breaker No. 5 in C-315 power panel CPD-1 |
| tripped which removed power from both channels of the Normetex UF6 release   |
| detection system.  The breaker trip was determined to be the result of a     |
| failure of the "A" power supply which, along with the (parallel) "B" power   |
| supply, supplies 200 Volt DC power to the Normetex pump UF6 release          |
| detection heads.  The breaker trip removed power from both the "A" and "B"   |
| power supplies, thus disabling the UF6 release detection system.  No other   |
| safety systems in the C-315 were affected by this loss of power.  The        |
| Normetex pump UF6 release detection system was declared inoperable and a     |
| continuous smoke watch was initiated in the affected area as required by TSR |
| 2.3.4.3.  Repairs were immediately initiated and the system was declared     |
| operable at 0138 on 3/18/99, and returned to service.                        |
|                                                                              |
| "This event report is submitted in accordance with Safety Analysis Report    |
| Table 6.9-1, Criteria J.1. And 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as a safety equipment     |
| failure.  The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."              |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35484       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/18/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:48[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        03/18/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:27[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ANTHONY PETRELLI             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/18/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JACK MCFADDEN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM                               |
|                                                                              |
| "As part of the corrective actions for LER 99-01, Niagara Mohawk Engineering |
| is performing a review of control circuits associated with the fire          |
| protection program needed during the control room fire scenario.  During     |
| this review engineering identified that the control circuits for the service |
| water intake bar rack heaters are not capable of isolation from the control  |
| room.  If a control room fire were to occur, these control circuits and      |
| associated heaters may not function.  The bar rack heaters are required to   |
| operate on each service water intake structure to prevent the formation of   |
| anchor ice which would cause a loss of service water flow required to        |
| support safe shutdown, when lake temperature is less than 39 degrees F.      |
|                                                                              |
| "As compensatory action for this deficiency, a roving fire patrol is being   |
| established once per 24 hours in the control room, relay room, and adjacent  |
| cable raceway areas.  Fire detection and suppression automatic systems are   |
| currently in service."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35485       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/18/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [3] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:33[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        03/18/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PAT NAVIN                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/18/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JACK MCFADDEN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL FOR FIRE INDUCED FLOODING                                          |
|                                                                              |
| During a review of the Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) methodology, it was         |
| determined that potential damage from a postulated fire in Fire Areas 6N     |
| (Unit 2), 6S (Unit 2), 13N (Unit 3) and 13S (Unit 3) could result in         |
| spurious operation of high/low pressure interface MOVs and air operated      |
| valves in the RHR or Core Spray systems.  The sustained opening of these     |
| valves could result in pressure relief valve discharge and resultant         |
| unacceptable flooding of a sump pump room in the Unit 2 or Unit 3 Reactor    |
| Building.  These sump pump rooms contain instruments associated with the     |
| HPCI and RCIC systems.  Water damage to these instruments may result in loss |
| of these systems which are required for FSSD in the identified fire areas.   |
| RHR and Core Spray piping integrity would be maintained during the           |
| postulated event.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Previous analysis did not adequately consider potential effects of the       |
| flooding on other systems.  Hourly roving fire watch patrol inspections have |
| been established for the identified fire areas.  A temporary plant           |
| alteration is being pursued to remove power from one of the valves in the    |
| impacted high/low pressure interfaces which will be adequate to isolate the  |
| water flow paths.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| This condition represents a failure to maintain the provisions of the Fire   |
| Protection Program (Appendix R to 10 CFR 50).                                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   35486       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  U.S. STEEL                           |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/18/1999|
|LICENSEE:  U.S. STEEL                           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:42[EST]|
|    CITY:  GARY                     REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        03/18/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  IN |EVENT TIME:        12:00[CST]|
|LICENSE#:  13-07964-07           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/18/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|                                                |JOSEPHINE PICCONE    NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DEAN LARSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NDAM                     DAMAGED GAUGE/DEVICE   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED DURING MAINTENANCE                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported that a Texas Nuclear moisture density gauge, model     |
| number 5010A, serial number B153, was damaged by a cutting torch during      |
| maintenance activities.   The gauge contains a 1 Ci Am-241 source.  The      |
| torch cut a small hole in the outer case of the gauge.   The gauge was       |
| surveyed for both loose contamination and higher than normal radiation       |
| levels.  Both surveys indicated that the source had not been damaged and was |
| stowed in its shielded position.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The gauge has been removed from service pending a review by the device       |
| manufacturer.  There were no personnel over exposures as a result of this    |
| event.                                                                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021