Event Notification Report for March 19, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/18/1999 - 03/19/1999
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35487
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: BRAD EKLUND
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: BRAD EKLUND
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 03/19/1999
Notification Time: 11:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/1999
Event Time: 08:24 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/1999
Notification Time: 11:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/1999
Event Time: 08:24 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TRAIN B OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On March 19, 1999 at approximately 0824 MST, engineering personnel determined that a pipe support on the Unit 2 Train B containment spray recirc line piping would not perform its function to support the mini-recirculation piping and could result in a rupture of the pipe during a Recirculation Actuation Signal following a loss of coolant accident.
"Operations personnel have declared Train B containment spray system inoperable per Technical Specification 3.6.6.
"This condition is being reported because suitable redundancy for Containment Spray (two trains operable) was not maintained and is therefore considered outside design bases.
"The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any releases of radioactive materials. There were no adverse safety consequences or implications as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the event.
"Engineering personnel are preparing a change to the piping support design with expected completion within the Technical Specification allowed Completion Time of 72 hours.
"This condition does not apply to the other train of Unit 2 or Palo Verde Units 1 or 3."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector of this notification.
* * * UPDATE AT 1635 ON 3/19/99 BY HAZELWOOD, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *
The licensee desires to retract this event. The design intent of the support is to restrain pipe motion in the vertical direction only. The support is not intended to restrain pipe motion in the axial direction. Subsequent re-inspection of the subject pipe support determined the existence of a gap beneath the bottom end plate. Given the existence of this gap, the pipe support will function as originally intended. Accordingly, there would be no overload condition and the pipe support is acceptable and in accordance with design. Following racking in the pump breaker and performing a functional run, Operations declared the Train B Containment Spray System operable.
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The HOO notified the R4DO (Harrell).
"On March 19, 1999 at approximately 0824 MST, engineering personnel determined that a pipe support on the Unit 2 Train B containment spray recirc line piping would not perform its function to support the mini-recirculation piping and could result in a rupture of the pipe during a Recirculation Actuation Signal following a loss of coolant accident.
"Operations personnel have declared Train B containment spray system inoperable per Technical Specification 3.6.6.
"This condition is being reported because suitable redundancy for Containment Spray (two trains operable) was not maintained and is therefore considered outside design bases.
"The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any releases of radioactive materials. There were no adverse safety consequences or implications as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the event.
"Engineering personnel are preparing a change to the piping support design with expected completion within the Technical Specification allowed Completion Time of 72 hours.
"This condition does not apply to the other train of Unit 2 or Palo Verde Units 1 or 3."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector of this notification.
* * * UPDATE AT 1635 ON 3/19/99 BY HAZELWOOD, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *
The licensee desires to retract this event. The design intent of the support is to restrain pipe motion in the vertical direction only. The support is not intended to restrain pipe motion in the axial direction. Subsequent re-inspection of the subject pipe support determined the existence of a gap beneath the bottom end plate. Given the existence of this gap, the pipe support will function as originally intended. Accordingly, there would be no overload condition and the pipe support is acceptable and in accordance with design. Following racking in the pump breaker and performing a functional run, Operations declared the Train B Containment Spray System operable.
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The HOO notified the R4DO (Harrell).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35488
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT M. PEAL
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT M. PEAL
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/19/1999
Notification Time: 11:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/1999
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/1999
Notification Time: 11:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/1999
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
Person (Organization):
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
Main Steam Isolation Valves Fail to meet Leakage Criteria
The following report is due to the Main Steam Isolation Valves failing the " as found" Maximum Combined Pathway Leakage criteria of 300 scfh. This failure requires a 4 Hr ENS notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i.). The overall Total Combined Maximum Pathway Leakage can not to be determined based on the inability to pressurize the 'C' Outboard and 'D' Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valves. The 'as found' Minimum Combined Pathway Leakage is 255 scfh, which is below the 300 scfh used in the Offsite Dose Analysis. The 'as left' leakage is to be determined following rework of the 'C' Outboard and 'D' Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valves.
The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following report is due to the Main Steam Isolation Valves failing the " as found" Maximum Combined Pathway Leakage criteria of 300 scfh. This failure requires a 4 Hr ENS notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i.). The overall Total Combined Maximum Pathway Leakage can not to be determined based on the inability to pressurize the 'C' Outboard and 'D' Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valves. The 'as found' Minimum Combined Pathway Leakage is 255 scfh, which is below the 300 scfh used in the Offsite Dose Analysis. The 'as left' leakage is to be determined following rework of the 'C' Outboard and 'D' Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valves.
The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35491
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM MCKEE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM MCKEE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/19/1999
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/1999
Event Time: 14:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/1999
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/1999
Event Time: 14:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
JACK MCFADDEN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - FREON RELEASE
The licensee notified the New York Department of Environmental Conservation of a freon leak. More than one pound of freon is believed to have leaked from the air conditioning unit that supports the Technical Support Center.
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.
The licensee notified the New York Department of Environmental Conservation of a freon leak. More than one pound of freon is believed to have leaked from the air conditioning unit that supports the Technical Support Center.
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.