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Event Notification Report for March 18, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/17/1999 - 03/18/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35471  35476  35477  35478  35479  35480  35481  35482  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35471       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/15/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:57[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        03/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:05[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TIM HOLLAND                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/17/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RONALD GARDNER       R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNANTICIPATED REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SUCTION VALVE ISOLATION  |
| DURING PERFORMANCE OF A REVISED TEST PROCEDURE                               |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "During the performance of CPS No. 9054.04 (RCIC Automatic Suction Shift     |
| Test), the RCIC suction valve from the suppression pool (1E51-F031)          |
| automatically isolated on a valid low steam line pressure signal.  This      |
| isolation was not intended to occur during the performance of this           |
| procedure."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The isolation occurred following the removal of a simulated RCIC steam line |
| pressure signal of > 60 psig.  When the current steam line pressure of 0     |
| psig was picked up by the logic, the 1E51-F031 isolated as designed."  Upon  |
| receipt of the valid low steam line pressure signal, all systems functioned  |
| as required.  There was nothing unusual or not understood.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the test procedure was newly revised and that some  |
| of the steps had been swapped.  The steps should have requested opening of   |
| the other suction source, closure of this suction source, and then removal   |
| of the simulator.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION 1511 3/17/1999 FROM SCHOFFAL TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| "The Low RCIC steam supply line pressure indicates that the pressure of the  |
| steam may be too low to continue operation of the RCIC turbine.  The         |
| isolation function for this valve is for equipment protection and is not     |
| assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR.  However, the    |
| instrumentation providing the trip isolation signal also provides a diverse  |
| signal to indicate a possible system break.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "A review of this event has concluded that this issue is not reportable      |
| under the provisions of 10CFR50.72 as an actuation of an engineered safety   |
| feature.  The basis for this conclusion is the isolation of valve 1E51-F031  |
| is an actuation of a single component in a complex system (including the     |
| RCIC, Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation, and Leak Detection Systems), |
| and the actuation of this valve, by itself, would not mitigate the           |
| consequences of the possible system leak that could cause the low RCIC steam |
| line pressure condition.  This determination is consistent with the guidance |
| provided in NUREG 1022, Section 3.32."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this retraction.  The NRC    |
| Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Geoffrey Wright).                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35476       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK                REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:10[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        03/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        03:36[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID JENKINS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/17/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO A VALVE PACKING      |
| LEAK                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "On March 17, 1999 at 03:36, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System was   |
| declared inoperable due to being isolated because of a large steam leak from |
| the packing on the steam line outboard isolation valve.  This valve was      |
| being tested in accordance with a quarterly periodic test to verify valve    |
| operability.  The steam leak has been secured by isolation of the inboard    |
| isolation valve.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System is a single-train system used to  |
| prevent overheating of the reactor fuel in the event of a reactor isolation  |
| accompanied by a loss of feedwater.  The High Pressure Coolant Injection     |
| System (approximately ten times the flow rate as the Reactor Core Isolation  |
| Cooling System) remains operable. Plant technical specification 3.5.3 allow  |
| continued operation for 14 days with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling      |
| System inoperable.  The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System is not         |
| considered an engineered safety feature at the Brunswick Plant.  It is,      |
| however, included in plant technical specifications.                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Engineering and maintenance personnel are working to determine the          |
| corrective action plan at this time."                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The system is expected to be restored within 14 days.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   35477       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
|LICENSEE:  NDT & INSPECTIONS                    |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:39[EST]|
|    CITY:  PEMBROKE PINES           REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        03/17/1999|
|  COUNTY:  BROWARD                   STATE:  FL |EVENT TIME:        05:12[EST]|
|LICENSE#:  2941-1                AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/17/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|                                                |DON COOL  EO         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+ROSEMARY HOGAN       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  EAKINS                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL REPORTED A STOLEN RADIOGRAPHY        |
| CAMERA.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| THE CAMERA (AEA TECHNOLOGY MODEL 66B) IS THE PROPERTY OF NDT & INSPECTIONS   |
| OF PEMBROKE PINES, FL.  IT CONTAINS 88.3 CURIES OF IRIDIUM-192.  IT WAS      |
| STOLEN FROM A TRAILER AT THE RADIOGRAPHER'S HOUSE IN PEMBROKE PINES, FL      |
| BETWEEN 0400 AND 0440 ON 03/17/99.  THE SOURCE SERIAL NUMBER IS C9062.  THE  |
| INDIVIDUALS THAT STOLE THE DEVICE ALSO HAVE THE KEYS FOR THE CAMERA.  THERE  |
| WILL BE A PRESS RELEASE BY BROWARD COUNTY.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| THE FLORIDA REPORT NUMBER IS FL99-039.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| CONTACT THE HOO FOR STATE TELEPHONE NUMBER.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1230 ON 03/17/99 BY STRANSKY * * *                           |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC ENTERED THE MONITORING PHASE OF NORMAL RESPONSE MODE AT 1230 AS A    |
| RESULT OF THIS EVENT.  THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED IRO (CONGEL),     |
| CHAIRMAN'S  OFFICE (WEBER), EDO (TSCHILTZ), OPA (LANDAU), AND OTHER FEDERAL  |
| AGENCIES (VIA FAX AND PHONE).                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35478       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MCGUIRE                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:47[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:15[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CHUCK RARY                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/17/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| A contract employee access to the plant was terminated when the final        |
| background check revealed falsified information had been submitted on the    |
| individual's background information.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| Refer to the HOO log for additional information.                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35479       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:29[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:50[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CORNAX                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/17/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JACK MCFADDEN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       99       Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PORTION OF WELD CHANNEL VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee discovered that two valves (EW-1 and EW-2) associated with the  |
| post accident containment ventilation system were closed.  This condition    |
| resulted in the partial inoperability of zone 4 of the weld channel          |
| ventilation system.  The licensee entered 7-day Technical Specification LCO  |
| Action Statement 3.3.D.1.a as a result of this condition.  The valves were   |
| reopened at 1235, restoring the system to service.  The licensee is          |
| investigating the cause of this event.  The NRC resident inspector has been  |
| informed of this event by the licensee.                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   35480       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING CONSULTANT  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
|LICENSEE:  CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:00[EST]|
|    CITY:  PITTSBURGH               REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        03/17/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  PA |EVENT TIME:             [EST]|
|LICENSE#:  37-18456-02           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/17/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |JACK MCFADDEN        R1      |
|                                                |FRED COMBS           NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RAY MCFEEDERS                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAD1 20.2202(a)(1)       PERS OVEREXPOSURE      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POSSIBLE PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Dosimetry results from the period of 1/25/99 to 2/24/99 indicate that a      |
| technician received a deep dose of 6615 mrem (66.15 mSv), as recorded by his |
| film badge.  The licensee reported that this individual normally operates a  |
| Troxler moisture/density gauge, but did not use the gauge during the period. |
| The licensee plans to interview the technician to determine whether he was   |
| working near any sources that could have accounted for this dose reading.    |
| The licensee has already contacted NRC Region 1 regarding this event.        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35481       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY            REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:22[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  C. HINES                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/17/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JACK MCFADDEN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|ACNC 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(C)  COND OUTSIDE EOPS      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       98       Power Operation  |98       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL TO DAMAGE HHSI PUMPS DURING A FIRE DUE TO HYDROGEN INTRUSION       |
|                                                                              |
| "On 3/5/99, at approximately 2002 hours a four-hour non-emergency Unit 2     |
| event notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2) was made to identify  |
| potential loss of High Head Safety Injection (HHSI)/Charging Water pump      |
| capability due to hydrogen intrusion into the pump's suction piping          |
| resulting from inadequate Pre-Fire Plan procedures to isolate the Unit       |
| Volume Control Tank (VCT) outlet valves.  Following this notification, an    |
| extent of condition review of this concern has been in progress on Unit 1.   |
|                                                                              |
| "This Unit 1 review has determined that the Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan operating   |
| procedures for actions to respond to a postulated fire in Control Building   |
| fire areas CR-1, CR-4, and CS-1 and Primary Access Building fire area PA-1G  |
| do not adequately ensure isolation of the VCT outlet valves MOV-CH-115C or   |
| E.  Operating Manual 10M-56C.4.C directs opening Refueling Water Storage     |
| Tank (RWST) outlet valves MOV-CH-115B or D using the benchboard controls.    |
| However, this action may not be successful because the valve's control       |
| circuits may be affected due to the postulated fire.  10M-56C.4.E directs    |
| the Operator to deenergize and manually open MOV-CH-115B or D, but does not  |
| direct closing MOV-CH-115C or E.  The postulated fire may result in the loss |
| of Reactor Coolant System letdown makeup flow to the VCT.  Consequently,     |
| when MOV-CH-115B or D are opened to align the RWST to the HHSI/Charging      |
| pumps, intrusion of hydrogen from the VCT into the pump's suction piping may |
| occur, if the VCT outlet has not been isolated.  This may result in damage   |
| to and unavailability of the HHSI/Charging pumps.  10M-56.B.4.2 directs the  |
| Operator to align the RWST to the HHSI/Charging water suction header through |
| the Low Head Safety Injections.  10M-56B.4.2.B-4 directs the Operator to     |
| locally open MOV-CH-115B or D and close MOV-CH-115C or E if the fire does    |
| not prevent entry into the boron blender cubicle area.  This action is       |
| inadequate because it does not address the loss of MOV-CH-115C and E due to  |
| fire.  If these valves remain open due to fire damage of the valves or       |
| associated electrical cables and the Operator is unable to gain access to    |
| this area because of the fire, hydrogen from the VCT could be introduced     |
| into the HHSI/Charging pumps suction and damage to the operating pump could  |
| occur.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Preliminary calculation by the engineering department shows that limiting   |
| VCT tank pressure to a maximum of 36 psi will prevent hydrogen intrusion     |
| from the VCT as described in the events above.                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Operations will institute compensatory actions to limit VCT pressure.  In   |
| addition, a continuous fire watch is being implemented for the Primary       |
| Auxiliary Building 722-foot elevation.  In addition, Operations will         |
| restrict hot work permits in this area.  These interim compensatory actions  |
| will remain in place until long-term compensatory actions have been          |
| completed."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.   |
|                                                                              |
| [HOO note: See related EN 35446.]                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35482       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:35[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        03/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN STETSON                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/17/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       91       Power Operation  |91       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STRUCTURES COULD BE DAMAGED DUE TO TORNADO LOADING                           |
|                                                                              |
| "The Perry design for tornado depressurization effects has been reviewed in  |
| response to OER PS 33978/Z05106. This review has confirmed that safety       |
| related structures are designed against failure using conservative           |
| assumptions that they are not vented, thus allowing full tornado             |
| depressurization across the building walls and slabs.                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Exterior doors to the plant are not designed to resist tornado              |
| depressurization loads, and thus are expected to fail in the event of the    |
| design basis tornado. This will expose building internals to some degree of  |
| depressurization. In most cases, safety related building interior walls are  |
| constructed from reinforced concrete and are inherently strong.              |
| Architectural walls have been used in the Central Complex and they have not  |
| been designed to consider these potential tornado depressurization loads."   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification by the     |
| licensee.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+