Event Notification Report for March 18, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
03/17/1999 - 03/18/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35471 35476 35477 35478 35479 35480 35481 35482
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35471 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/15/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:57[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 03/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:05[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TIM HOLLAND |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/17/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RONALD GARDNER R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNANTICIPATED REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SUCTION VALVE ISOLATION |
| DURING PERFORMANCE OF A REVISED TEST PROCEDURE |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "During the performance of CPS No. 9054.04 (RCIC Automatic Suction Shift |
| Test), the RCIC suction valve from the suppression pool (1E51-F031) |
| automatically isolated on a valid low steam line pressure signal. This |
| isolation was not intended to occur during the performance of this |
| procedure." |
| |
| "The isolation occurred following the removal of a simulated RCIC steam line |
| pressure signal of > 60 psig. When the current steam line pressure of 0 |
| psig was picked up by the logic, the 1E51-F031 isolated as designed." Upon |
| receipt of the valid low steam line pressure signal, all systems functioned |
| as required. There was nothing unusual or not understood. |
| |
| The licensee stated that the test procedure was newly revised and that some |
| of the steps had been swapped. The steps should have requested opening of |
| the other suction source, closure of this suction source, and then removal |
| of the simulator. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION 1511 3/17/1999 FROM SCHOFFAL TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "The Low RCIC steam supply line pressure indicates that the pressure of the |
| steam may be too low to continue operation of the RCIC turbine. The |
| isolation function for this valve is for equipment protection and is not |
| assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR. However, the |
| instrumentation providing the trip isolation signal also provides a diverse |
| signal to indicate a possible system break. |
| |
| "A review of this event has concluded that this issue is not reportable |
| under the provisions of 10CFR50.72 as an actuation of an engineered safety |
| feature. The basis for this conclusion is the isolation of valve 1E51-F031 |
| is an actuation of a single component in a complex system (including the |
| RCIC, Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation, and Leak Detection Systems), |
| and the actuation of this valve, by itself, would not mitigate the |
| consequences of the possible system leak that could cause the low RCIC steam |
| line pressure condition. This determination is consistent with the guidance |
| provided in NUREG 1022, Section 3.32." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this retraction. The NRC |
| Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Geoffrey Wright). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35476 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:10[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:36[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID JENKINS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/17/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO A VALVE PACKING |
| LEAK |
| |
| "On March 17, 1999 at 03:36, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System was |
| declared inoperable due to being isolated because of a large steam leak from |
| the packing on the steam line outboard isolation valve. This valve was |
| being tested in accordance with a quarterly periodic test to verify valve |
| operability. The steam leak has been secured by isolation of the inboard |
| isolation valve. |
| |
| "The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System is a single-train system used to |
| prevent overheating of the reactor fuel in the event of a reactor isolation |
| accompanied by a loss of feedwater. The High Pressure Coolant Injection |
| System (approximately ten times the flow rate as the Reactor Core Isolation |
| Cooling System) remains operable. Plant technical specification 3.5.3 allow |
| continued operation for 14 days with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling |
| System inoperable. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System is not |
| considered an engineered safety feature at the Brunswick Plant. It is, |
| however, included in plant technical specifications. |
| |
| "Engineering and maintenance personnel are working to determine the |
| corrective action plan at this time." |
| |
| The system is expected to be restored within 14 days. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 35477 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
|LICENSEE: NDT & INSPECTIONS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:39[EST]|
| CITY: PEMBROKE PINES REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 03/17/1999|
| COUNTY: BROWARD STATE: FL |EVENT TIME: 05:12[EST]|
|LICENSE#: 2941-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/17/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
| |DON COOL EO NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ROSEMARY HOGAN IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: EAKINS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL REPORTED A STOLEN RADIOGRAPHY |
| CAMERA. |
| |
| THE CAMERA (AEA TECHNOLOGY MODEL 66B) IS THE PROPERTY OF NDT & INSPECTIONS |
| OF PEMBROKE PINES, FL. IT CONTAINS 88.3 CURIES OF IRIDIUM-192. IT WAS |
| STOLEN FROM A TRAILER AT THE RADIOGRAPHER'S HOUSE IN PEMBROKE PINES, FL |
| BETWEEN 0400 AND 0440 ON 03/17/99. THE SOURCE SERIAL NUMBER IS C9062. THE |
| INDIVIDUALS THAT STOLE THE DEVICE ALSO HAVE THE KEYS FOR THE CAMERA. THERE |
| WILL BE A PRESS RELEASE BY BROWARD COUNTY. |
| |
| THE FLORIDA REPORT NUMBER IS FL99-039. |
| |
| CONTACT THE HOO FOR STATE TELEPHONE NUMBER. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1230 ON 03/17/99 BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| THE NRC ENTERED THE MONITORING PHASE OF NORMAL RESPONSE MODE AT 1230 AS A |
| RESULT OF THIS EVENT. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED IRO (CONGEL), |
| CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE (WEBER), EDO (TSCHILTZ), OPA (LANDAU), AND OTHER FEDERAL |
| AGENCIES (VIA FAX AND PHONE). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35478 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MCGUIRE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:47[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:15[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHUCK RARY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/17/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT |
| |
| A contract employee access to the plant was terminated when the final |
| background check revealed falsified information had been submitted on the |
| individual's background information. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| Refer to the HOO log for additional information. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35479 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:29[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:50[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CORNAX |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/17/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JACK MCFADDEN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 99 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PORTION OF WELD CHANNEL VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE |
| |
| The licensee discovered that two valves (EW-1 and EW-2) associated with the |
| post accident containment ventilation system were closed. This condition |
| resulted in the partial inoperability of zone 4 of the weld channel |
| ventilation system. The licensee entered 7-day Technical Specification LCO |
| Action Statement 3.3.D.1.a as a result of this condition. The valves were |
| reopened at 1235, restoring the system to service. The licensee is |
| investigating the cause of this event. The NRC resident inspector has been |
| informed of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 35480 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING CONSULTANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
|LICENSEE: CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:00[EST]|
| CITY: PITTSBURGH REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 03/17/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: PA |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: 37-18456-02 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/17/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |JACK MCFADDEN R1 |
| |FRED COMBS NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RAY MCFEEDERS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAD1 20.2202(a)(1) PERS OVEREXPOSURE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POSSIBLE PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE |
| |
| Dosimetry results from the period of 1/25/99 to 2/24/99 indicate that a |
| technician received a deep dose of 6615 mrem (66.15 mSv), as recorded by his |
| film badge. The licensee reported that this individual normally operates a |
| Troxler moisture/density gauge, but did not use the gauge during the period. |
| The licensee plans to interview the technician to determine whether he was |
| working near any sources that could have accounted for this dose reading. |
| The licensee has already contacted NRC Region 1 regarding this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35481 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:22[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: C. HINES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/17/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JACK MCFADDEN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
|ACNC 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(C) COND OUTSIDE EOPS | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 98 Power Operation |98 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL TO DAMAGE HHSI PUMPS DURING A FIRE DUE TO HYDROGEN INTRUSION |
| |
| "On 3/5/99, at approximately 2002 hours a four-hour non-emergency Unit 2 |
| event notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2) was made to identify |
| potential loss of High Head Safety Injection (HHSI)/Charging Water pump |
| capability due to hydrogen intrusion into the pump's suction piping |
| resulting from inadequate Pre-Fire Plan procedures to isolate the Unit |
| Volume Control Tank (VCT) outlet valves. Following this notification, an |
| extent of condition review of this concern has been in progress on Unit 1. |
| |
| "This Unit 1 review has determined that the Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan operating |
| procedures for actions to respond to a postulated fire in Control Building |
| fire areas CR-1, CR-4, and CS-1 and Primary Access Building fire area PA-1G |
| do not adequately ensure isolation of the VCT outlet valves MOV-CH-115C or |
| E. Operating Manual 10M-56C.4.C directs opening Refueling Water Storage |
| Tank (RWST) outlet valves MOV-CH-115B or D using the benchboard controls. |
| However, this action may not be successful because the valve's control |
| circuits may be affected due to the postulated fire. 10M-56C.4.E directs |
| the Operator to deenergize and manually open MOV-CH-115B or D, but does not |
| direct closing MOV-CH-115C or E. The postulated fire may result in the loss |
| of Reactor Coolant System letdown makeup flow to the VCT. Consequently, |
| when MOV-CH-115B or D are opened to align the RWST to the HHSI/Charging |
| pumps, intrusion of hydrogen from the VCT into the pump's suction piping may |
| occur, if the VCT outlet has not been isolated. This may result in damage |
| to and unavailability of the HHSI/Charging pumps. 10M-56.B.4.2 directs the |
| Operator to align the RWST to the HHSI/Charging water suction header through |
| the Low Head Safety Injections. 10M-56B.4.2.B-4 directs the Operator to |
| locally open MOV-CH-115B or D and close MOV-CH-115C or E if the fire does |
| not prevent entry into the boron blender cubicle area. This action is |
| inadequate because it does not address the loss of MOV-CH-115C and E due to |
| fire. If these valves remain open due to fire damage of the valves or |
| associated electrical cables and the Operator is unable to gain access to |
| this area because of the fire, hydrogen from the VCT could be introduced |
| into the HHSI/Charging pumps suction and damage to the operating pump could |
| occur. |
| |
| "Preliminary calculation by the engineering department shows that limiting |
| VCT tank pressure to a maximum of 36 psi will prevent hydrogen intrusion |
| from the VCT as described in the events above. |
| |
| "Operations will institute compensatory actions to limit VCT pressure. In |
| addition, a continuous fire watch is being implemented for the Primary |
| Auxiliary Building 722-foot elevation. In addition, Operations will |
| restrict hot work permits in this area. These interim compensatory actions |
| will remain in place until long-term compensatory actions have been |
| completed." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| [HOO note: See related EN 35446.] |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35482 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:35[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 03/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN STETSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/17/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 91 Power Operation |91 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STRUCTURES COULD BE DAMAGED DUE TO TORNADO LOADING |
| |
| "The Perry design for tornado depressurization effects has been reviewed in |
| response to OER PS 33978/Z05106. This review has confirmed that safety |
| related structures are designed against failure using conservative |
| assumptions that they are not vented, thus allowing full tornado |
| depressurization across the building walls and slabs. |
| |
| "Exterior doors to the plant are not designed to resist tornado |
| depressurization loads, and thus are expected to fail in the event of the |
| design basis tornado. This will expose building internals to some degree of |
| depressurization. In most cases, safety related building interior walls are |
| constructed from reinforced concrete and are inherently strong. |
| Architectural walls have been used in the Central Complex and they have not |
| been designed to consider these potential tornado depressurization loads." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification by the |
| licensee. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021