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Event Notification Report for March 15, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/12/1999 - 03/15/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35387  35461  35462  35463  35464  35465  35466  35467  35468  35469  35470  35471 


!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35387       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/20/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:44[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/19/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        10:05[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/12/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |MIKE JORDAN          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |CHARLEY HAUGHNEY     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  K. A. BEASLEY                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NCFR                     NON CFR REPORT REQMNT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| WATER INVENTORY CONTROL SYSTEM ACTIVATION                                    |
|                                                                              |
| A water inventory control system (WICS) activation occurred on C-360         |
| position 4 autoclave on February 19, 1999, at 1005 CST.  A high level drain  |
| primary alarm was received during a cylinder sampling heat cycle.  The       |
| safety system did operate as required (shuts off steam to the autoclave      |
| which reduces the amount of condensation in the autoclave).  The purpose of  |
| the WICS is to limit the amount of condensate in the autoclave.  The cause   |
| of this actuation is being investigated.  The certificate holder thinks that |
| this event might have been caused by an invalid signal, and if it is         |
| determined that this event was caused by an invalid signal, this event       |
| notification will be retracted at a later time.                              |
|                                                                              |
| The safety system actuation is reportable per Safety Analysis Report,        |
| Section 6.9, Table 1, Criteria J.2, Safety System Actuation due to a Valid   |
| Signal, as a 24-hour event notification.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event.                       |
|                                                                              |
| ***RETRACTION on 03/12/99 at 1324 EST from W. F. Cage taken by               |
| MacKinnon****                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Subsequent investigation and troubleshooting of the autoclave systems has    |
| concluded that the WICS actuated due to an invalid signal.  This condition   |
| is supported by the following:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| 1. The actuation occurred at a point in the heating cycle after the maximum  |
| steam demand and resulting highest condensate load has passed.  Past history |
| has shown that valid actuations occur during maximum steam and condensate    |
| load, not afterward at lower loads.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| 2.  The actuation was initiated by the primary condensate probe only.  The   |
| secondary condensate probe did not alarm until after the steam supply had    |
| been isolated by the WICS actuation, which caused a drop in autoclave        |
| pressure supplying the motive force, driving the condensate out into the     |
| drain.  This, and testing subsequent to the event, proved that both probes   |
| were operable and would have alarmed had water in the drain actually risen   |
| to the probe level.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| 3.  The drain line was inspected, and no obstruction was noted that could    |
| have caused a blockage or disruption of condensate flow.                     |
|                                                                              |
| 4.  Inspection of the autoclave electrical systems indicated that some of    |
| the condensate probe wires were not properly, or firmly, grounded.  These    |
| loose connections are considered to be the most likely cause of the WICS     |
| actuation.  This would be an actuation from an invalid signal, i.e., not     |
| what the safety system is designed to protect against.                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector was not notified of this event by the certificate |
| holder.  The NRC Region 3 (Ron Gardner) and NMSS EO (Fred Combs) were        |
| notified by the NRC operations officer.                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35461       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:07[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:30[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KLIMPLE                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GARY SANBORN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE PLANT DOES NOT MEET THE DESIGN BASIS REQUIREMENT FOR RHR HEAT EXCHANGER  |
| CONTROL VALVES TO BE SECURED IN A SAFE POSITION.                             |
|                                                                              |
| DURING A REVIEW OF THE OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL    |
| (RHR) HEAT EXCHANGER SYSTEM, NO STEPS OR LINEUPS WERE FOUND TO IMPLEMENT THE |
| DESIGN BASIS REQUIREMENT FOR THE RHR HEAT EXCHANGER FLOW AND BYPASS CONTROL  |
| VALVES TO BE SECURED IN THEIR SAFE POSITION.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| THE RHR HEAT EXCHANGER FLOW AND BYPASS CONTROL VALVES WERE FOUND TO BE       |
| CONFIGURED WITH THE SOLENOID VENT VALVES IN AN ENERGIZED CONDITION,          |
| THEREFORE, POTENTIALLY ALLOWING THE NON-SAFETY-RELATED POSITIONER TO CONTROL |
| THE VALVE.                                                                   |
| FAILURE OF ONE OF THE NON-SAFETY POSITIONERS (DUE TO ADVERSE CONDITIONS)     |
| COULD HAVE DRIVEN THE VALVES TO THEIR NON-SAFETY  POSITION  AT THE ONSET OF  |
| A POSTULATED ACCIDENT, THEREBY PREVENTING THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY OF THE  |
| LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| THIS CONDITION WAS RESOLVED AS SOON AS IT WAS IDENTIFIED BY DE-ENERGIZING    |
| AND REMOVING THE FUSES FOR THE VALVES.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35462       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HARRIS                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:48[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        03/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:39[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEITH HOLBROOK               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |EDWARD MCALPINE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP AND MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION      |
| CAUSED BY HIGH STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| This is a report of the following actuations:  ESF-P-14, Turbine Trip and    |
| Main Feedwater Isolation; auxiliary feedwater actuation; and a reactor       |
| trip.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| A loss of control of the "C"  feed regulating valve caused steam generator   |
| water level to increase.  Operators attempted to take manual control but had |
| very little control from the main control room.  The  steam generator water  |
| level exceeded the 82.4% high steam generator water level trip setpoint      |
| causing a P-14 (steam generator high level override) actuation.  This        |
| actuation resulted in a turbine trip/reactor trip and a loss of both running |
| main feedwater pumps.  It also caused all main feedwater isolation valves to |
| close.  All control rods fully inserted.  No primary/secondary plant code    |
| safety valves or power-operated relief valves opened.  Both motor-driven and |
| the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started on low    |
| steam generator water level following the reactor trip.  The steam dump      |
| bypass control system is operating properly and is maintaining a T(ave) of   |
| 557F.  At the present time, steam generator water levels are being          |
| maintained by one operating motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.           |
| Troubleshooting is in progress to determine the failure of "C" feedwater     |
| regulating valve (air-operated valve).                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The offsite electrical grid is stable, and all emergency core cooling        |
| systems and the emergency diesel generators are fully operable if needed.    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35463       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MCGUIRE                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:24[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE WILDER                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |EDWARD MCALPINE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       82       Power Operation  |82       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Discrepancies between Plant Fire Protection Program and 10CFR50, Appendix  |
| R, Safety Evaluation Report -                                                |
|                                                                              |
| A self initiated technical audit of the McGuire Fire Protection Program      |
| identified apparent deviations from the approved Fire Protection Program.  A |
| potential discrepancy exists between the McGuire Fire Protection Program and |
| the NRC description provided in Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Supplement   |
| 6, regarding Appendix R, Section III.G.3.  Additional deviations from        |
| certain licensee commitments regarding testing were also identified in the   |
| audit.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee's engineering staff has evaluated deviations identified by the  |
| audit team and has determined that the fire protection related systems are   |
| fully operable.  In addition, these deviations have no impact on achieving   |
| and maintaining safe shutdown following a design bases fire event.           |
|                                                                              |
| McGuire Facility Operating License (FOL) NPF-9 (Unit 1) and NPF-17 (Unit 2)  |
| require 24-hour notification to the NRC for deviations from the approved     |
| Fire Protection Program. The above deviations are being reported under that  |
| license condition criterion.  A follow-up report describing the cause of the |
| deviations and corrective actions will be submitted to the NRC within 14     |
| days.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35464       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:08[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:14[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PHIL SHORT                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RONALD GARDNER       R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       73       Power Operation  |73       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FOR BOTH UNITS INOPERABLE FOR 4 MINUTES -       |
|                                                                              |
| UNIT 1 IS OPERATING AT 100% POWER, AND UNIT 2 IS OPERATING AT 73% POWER.     |
|                                                                              |
| ON 03/12/99, DURING AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION, LICENSEE ENGINEERING          |
| DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL DETERMINED THAT THE UNIT 2 TURBINE-DRIVEN (TD)          |
| AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW)                                                    |
| PUMP FLOW RATE HAD BEEN SET INCORRECTLY DURING A PREVIOUSLY PERFORMED TEST.  |
| LICENSEE PERSONNEL DETERMINED THAT THIS CONDITION AFFECTED THE ENTIRE AFW    |
| SYSTEM.  (PORTIONS OF THE AFW SYSTEM ARE SHARED BY BOTH UNITS.)              |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1314 CST ON 03/12/99, THE LICENSEE ADMINISTRATIVELY DECLARED THE UNIT 1   |
| TD AFW PUMP, THE UNIT 2 TD AFW PUMP, AND THE TWO SHARED MOTOR-DRIVEN (MD)    |
| AFW PUMPS INOPERABLE (AND THUS, THE ENTIRE AFW SYSTEM) AND ENTERED TECHNICAL |
| SPECIFICATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION STATEMENT 15.3.0.B     |
| (a.k.a. 3.0.3).  ALL FOUR AFW PUMPS REMAINED FUNCTIONAL.  THIS CONDITION IS  |
| CONSIDERED TO BE OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASES OF THE PLANT.                      |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1318 CST ON 03/12/99, THE LICENSEE TRIPPED THE UNIT 2 TD AFW PUMP AND     |
| DECLARED IT INOPERABLE, ENTERED TECH SPEC LCO A/S 15.3.4.C.1 (72 HOUR        |
| SHUTDOWN LCO), DECLARED THE OTHER THREE AFW PUMPS OPERABLE, AND EXITED TECH  |
| SPEC LCO A/S 15.3.0.B.  THUS, ONLY THE UNIT 2 PORTION OF THE AFW SYSTEM IS   |
| INOPERABLE.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE IS DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.                              |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35465       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:23[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        03/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:34[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PHIL BREIDENBAUGH            |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |TOM MOSLAK           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - RCIC SYSTEM VALVES CLOSED TO ISOLATE CONTAINMENT DURING MAINTENANCE        |
| ACTIVITIES -                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1234 ON 03/12/99, WITH UNIT 3 AT 100% POWER, A PRIMARY CONTAINMENT        |
| ISOLATION OCCURRED FOR THE REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM      |
| DURING RESTORATION FROM MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.  THE ISOLATION OCCURRED WHEN |
| THE OUTBOARD STEAM ISOLATION VALVE WAS JOGGED OPEN TO REPRESSURIZE THE STEAM |
| LINE TO THE RCIC TURBINE.  WHEN THE VALVE WAS JOGGED OPEN, A MOMENTARY HIGH  |
| STEAM FLOW SIGNAL OCCURRED AND BOTH INBOARD AND OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVES    |
| CLOSED TO THEIR ISOLATION POSITION.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1620 ON 03/12/99, THE LICENSEE RESET ALL SYSTEMS TO NORMAL.               |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   35466       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  COOPER ENERGY SERVICES               |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/1999|
|LICENSEE:  COOPER ENERGY SERVICES               |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:27[EST]|
|    CITY:  GROVE CITY               REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        03/12/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  PA |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EST]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/12/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |TOM MOSLAK           R1      |
|                                                |RONALD GARDNER       R3      |
+------------------------------------------------+GARY SANBORN         R4      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN M. HORNE                |VERN HODGE           NRR     |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i)      DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Amendment to 10 CFR Part 21 - Cooper-Bessemer KSV Emergency Diesel         |
| Generator Power Piston Failure -                                             |
| (Refer to event #32416 for additional information.)                          |
|                                                                              |
| Following the failure of a KSV power piston due to a hydraulic lock at       |
| Commonwealth Edison Zion Station in January, 1997, Cooper Cameron            |
| Corporation issued a Part 21 notification letter dated May 29, 1997,         |
| reference QCG-10389.  The piston which failed had a minimum crown thickness  |
| of 0.040 inches, but had operated successfully for several years, and failed |
| only because of the unusual hydraulic lock event.  That letter recommended   |
| that KSV pistons be inspected for crown thickness by ultrasonic or other     |
| methods when the pistons were exposed in the course of normal maintenance    |
| activities.  A conservative minimum thickness limit of 0.100 inches was      |
| established.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| In the 2 years since the Zion failure, a total of 198 or more pistons have   |
| been measured at seven different sites.  Of these, one was found initially   |
| in our plant with a thickness of 0.070 inches and was destroyed.  All other  |
| pistons checked have been above the 0.100-inch limit, and the actual         |
| measured thickness was recorded for 157 of these.  All but seven of those    |
| documented have had a minimum thickness of 0.150 inch or greater.  The       |
| distribution of minimum thickness for the pistons has been documented to be  |
| from 0.100 to >0.400 inches.  These results, in combination with the         |
| successful operating history of the KSV engine, provide reasonable assurance |
| that all potentially defective pistons have been removed from service.       |
|                                                                              |
| Based on this information, Cooper-Bessemer believes it is not necessary to   |
| continue to measure the thickness of piston crowns during other maintenance  |
| activities.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| This 10 CFR Part 21 Amendment applies to the following plants:               |
| Region 1 - Nine Mile Point and Susquehanna                                   |
| Region 3 - Byron and Zion                                                    |
| Region 4 - Cooper, Palo Verde, Waterford, South Texas and Grand Gulf.        |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC Operations Center for a contact telephone number.)             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35467       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON            REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:37[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:00[PST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ART WELLS                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GARY SANBORN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Hot Shutdown     |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - PLANT SECURITY REPORT -                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| A SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO PERIMETER MONITORING OCCURRED.    |
| COMPENSATORY MEASURES IMMEDIATELY WERE TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY.  REFER TO THE   |
| HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35468       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:39[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        03/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:31[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOE RUTTAR                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |TOM MOSLAK           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| -Control room personnel access door latch mechanism may not withstand HELB   |
| pressure in the turbine building-                                            |
|                                                                              |
| A licensee preliminary review of an error in an analysis assumption for the  |
| pressure applied to a control room personnel access door due to a high       |
| energy line break (HELB) in the turbine building indicates that the door     |
| latch mechanism may not withstand the applied pressure.                      |
|                                                                              |
| The control room door has been latched with an alternative latching          |
| mechanism and will remain closed against this pressure so there are no       |
| current operability concerns.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| This situation results in a historical condition where Unit 3 may have       |
| operated outside its design basis.  Engineering evaluation is continuing.  A |
| conservative decision has been made to report this condition as a condition  |
| outside the design basis of Unit 3 pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)       |
| pending the results of this evaluation.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35469       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:02[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:12[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TIM FRAWLEY                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/13/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GARY SANBORN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |WILLIAM BECKNER, EO  NRR     |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |ROSEMARY HOGAN       IRO     |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DUE TO A FAULT IN A SWITCHYARD CIRCUIT       |
| BREAKER -                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1412 CST ON 03/12/99, DURING PLANT SWITCHYARD ACTIVITIES, UNIT 2          |
| EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF POWER TO THE #2 STANDBY TRANSFORMER DUE TO A FAULT IN  |
| A SWITCHYARD CIRCUIT BREAKER.  THIS CONDITION CAUSED TRAIN 'B' AND TRAIN 'C' |
| 4160-VOLT ESF BUSES TO ACTUATE ON A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER.  THE FOLLOWING    |
| ESF SYSTEMS ACTUATED: TRAIN 'B' AND TRAIN 'C' ESF EDGs, ESSENTIAL COOLING    |
| WATER SYSTEM, ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM, COMPONENT COOLING WATER        |
| SYSTEM, CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM, AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (ON RECIRC  |
| MODE).                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| DURING THIS EVENT, THE SPENT FUEL POOL TEMPERATURE INCREASED APPROXIMATELY   |
| 1.5F, AND THE TRAIN 'B' ESF EDG (#22) OUTPUT BREAKER FAILED TO CLOSE        |
| AUTOMATICALLY.  THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE TRAIN 'B' ESF EDG (#22)            |
| INOPERABLE, EVEN THOUGH IT IS FUNCTIONAL (72-HOUR LCO).                      |
|                                                                              |
| THERE WAS NO FIRE, AND NO PERSONNEL WERE INJURED.  THE LICENSEE RESTORED ALL |
| SYSTEMS TO NORMAL.  UNIT 2 IS STABLE AND OPERATING AT 100% POWER.            |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE FAULT IN THE SWITCHYARD       |
| CIRCUIT BREAKER AND THE TRAIN 'B' ESF EDG (#22) OUTPUT BREAKER FAILING TO    |
| CLOSE AUTOMATICALLY.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO SUBMIT A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ON THIS EVENT TO THE    |
| NRC.                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| THIS EVENT HAD NO IMPACT ON UNIT 1.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS ON SITE DURING THIS EVENT AND REPORTED IT TO  |
| REGION 4.                                                                    |
| REGION 4 PERSONNEL WERE AWARE OF THIS EVENT PRIOR TO THE LICENSEE REPORTING  |
| IT TO THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER.                                            |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1207 ON 03/13/99 FROM TIM FRAWLEY TO JOLLIFFE * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1412 CST ON 03/12/99, DURING THE LOSS OF POWER TO #2 STANDBY TRANSFORMER, |
| THE LICENSEE ENTERED TECH SPEC 3.0.3 FOR UNIT 2 DUE TO THE LOSS OF POWER TO  |
| TWO 13.8-KV STANDBY BUSES AND THE INOPERABLE CONDITION OF THE TRAIN 'B' ESF  |
| EDG (#22); THIS CONDITION IS NOT COVERED UNDER THE ACTIONS OF TECH SPEC      |
| 3.8.1.1 (AC ELECTRICAL POWER SOURCES).                                       |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1530 CST ON 03/12/99, THE LICENSEE RESTORED POWER TO THE TWO 13.8-KV      |
| STANDBY BUSES.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1553 CST ON 03/12/99, THE LICENSEE EXITED TECH SPEC 3.0.3 FOLLOWING       |
| SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.8.1.1.1.a.  THIS      |
| CONDITION IS REPORTABLE TO THE NRC UNDER SECTION 2.G OF FACILITY OPERATING   |
| LICENSE NPF-80.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| UNIT 2 IS STABLE AND OPERATING AT 100% POWER.                                |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.  THE NRC OPERATIONS        |
| OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R4DO (GARY SANBORN), NRR EO (BILL BECKNER), AND IRO MGR |
| (ROSEMARY HOGAN).                                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35470       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEABROOK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:31[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        03/13/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:32[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PATRICK CYR                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/13/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |TOM MOSLAK           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|HFIT 26.73               FITNESS FOR DUTY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| A CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR WAS DETERMINED TO BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL  |
| DURING A RANDOM TEST.  THE CONTRACTOR'S ACCESS AUTHORIZATION TO THE PLANT    |
| HAS BEEN TERMINATED.  REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.           |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35471       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/15/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:57[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        03/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:05[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TIM HOLLAND                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/15/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RONALD GARDNER       R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNANTICIPATED REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SUCTION VALVE ISOLATION  |
| DURING PERFORMANCE OF A REVISED TEST PROCEDURE                               |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "During the performance of CPS No. 9054.04 (RCIC Automatic Suction Shift     |
| Test), the RCIC suction valve from the suppression pool (1E51-F031)          |
| automatically isolated on a valid low steam line pressure signal.  This      |
| isolation was not intended to occur during the performance of this           |
| procedure."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The isolation occurred following the removal of a simulated RCIC steam line |
| pressure signal of > 60 psig.  When the current steam line pressure of 0     |
| psig was picked up by the logic, the 1E51-F031 isolated as designed."  Upon  |
| receipt of the valid low steam line pressure signal, all systems functioned  |
| as required and  there was nothing unusual or not understood.                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the test procedure was newly revised and that some  |
| of the steps had been swapped.  The steps should have requested opening of   |
| the other suction source, closure of this suction source, and then removal   |
| the simulator.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+