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Event Notification Report for February 19, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           02/18/1999 - 02/19/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35382  35383  

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35382       |
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| FACILITY: WOLF CREEK               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/18/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  KS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:00[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        02/18/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  FERGUSON                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/18/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LAWRENCE YANDELL     R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| Improper sequencing could have allowed a control room fire to create a hot   |
| short across any of several main control board hand switches.                |
|                                                                              |
| During corrective actions associated with LER 98-004-00 (submitted to NRC by |
| letter dated November 6, 1998), Wolf Creek Generating Station personnel      |
| determined that off-normal procedure OFN RP-017 sequence of actions          |
| historically allowed control power to be removed from the "B" train ESF bus  |
| before rotating the Normal / Isolate switch to the "Isolate" position.  This |
| improper sequencing could have allowed a control room fire to create a hot   |
| short across any of several main control board hand switches (i.e., ESW "B", |
| CCW "B", Charging "B", Load Centers on "B" train, Pressurizer Backup         |
| Heaters, and Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) "B"); the most significant of  |
| which is the EDG "B."   This hot short could potentially result in a loss of |
| availability of any or all of the previously listed components.  Because a   |
| loss of offsite power and the loss of EDG "A" are assumed coincident with a  |
| control room fire, the loss of EDG "B" could result in a station blackout.   |
| The resultant scenario is inconsistent with Wolf Creek fire safe shutdown    |
| commitments associated with Appendix R of 10CFR50, which are contained in    |
| Letter #SLNRC 84-109.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| As noted above, this is a historical occurrence.  Revision 12 of the         |
| controlling procedure (OFN RP-017) corrected the improper sequencing.        |
|                                                                              |
| In accordance with NUREG-1022, this event is reportable as a condition       |
| outside the design basis of the plant.                                       |
| This issue also constituted a loss of safe shutdown capability and a         |
| violation of License Condition 2.C (5), which indicates that Wolf Creek may  |
| not make changes to the approved fire protection program which significantly |
| decreases the level of fire protection to the plant without prior NRC        |
| approval.  Section 2.F of the Operating License requires Wolf Creek to       |
| report any violations of Section 2.C of the Operating License to the NRC     |
| within 24 hours,                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The root cause and associated corrective actions will be reported to the NRC |
| in a supplement to LER 98-004 and will include systems affected, actuations  |
| and their initiating signals, causes, effect of the event on the plant,      |
| actions taken or planned, etc.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.                 |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35383       |
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| FACILITY: PERRY                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/18/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:39[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        02/18/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN STETSON                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/18/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MIKE JORDAN          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       97       Power Operation  |97       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| LEAKAGE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT EXCEEDED ITS 60 GPH LIMIT.                       |
|                                                                              |
| AT 2040 ON 02/18/99, RELIEF VALVE #1E12-F0036 ON THE LINE FROM THE RHR HEAT  |
| EXCHANGERS TO THE RCIC SYSTEM WAS DETERMINED TO BE LEAKING AT 75 GPH INTO    |
| THE AUXILIARY BUILDING EQUIPMENT DRAIN SUMP.  THE RCIC SYSTEM IS ALIGNED TO  |
| THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK, NOT TO THE SUPPRESSION POOL.  IN THE EVENT THAT |
| THE RCIC SYSTEM IS NEEDED IN AN ACCIDENT, IT COULD ALIGN TO THE SUPPRESSION  |
| POOL, RESULTING IN SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEAKING OUT OF CONTAINMENT.  THE   |
| PLANT IS NOT IN ANY LCO ACTION STATEMENT AT THIS TIME, BUT WHEN REPAIRS TO   |
| THE VALVE COMMENCES, THE RCIC SYSTEM WILL BE DECLARED INOPERABLE AND THE     |
| LICENSEE WILL ENTER A 14 DAY LCO.  THE HPCS SYSTEM HAS BEEN VERIFIED TO BE   |
| OPERABLE.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.                     |
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