Event Notification Report for February 16, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
02/12/1999 - 02/16/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35366 35367 35368 35369 35370 35371
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 35366 |
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| REP ORG: U. S. ARMY (ACALA) |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/12/1999|
|LICENSEE: U. S. ARMY (ACALA) |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:38[EST]|
| CITY: ROCK ISLAND REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 02/10/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: IL |EVENT TIME: [CST]|
|LICENSE#: 12-00722-06 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| |JOHN GREEVES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TIM MOHS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOST MUZZLE REFERENCE SENSOR |
| |
| A unit stationed in Kuwait removed a foggy muzzle reference sensor (MRS) |
| containing 10 curies of tritium. The MRS was triple bagged and transported |
| to headquarters for maintenance in a truck, which was used for transporting |
| garbage to the dump before its removal at headquarters. The MRS was |
| apparently dumped with the garbage in a Kuwait dump. A safety investigation |
| is underway. Their reference number is 99-11. The device is not considered |
| a hazard to personnel. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35367 |
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| FACILITY: THREE MILE ISLAND REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/12/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:11[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:50[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN S. SCHORK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LAURIE PELUSO R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| CONTAINMENT AIR SAMPLING SYSTEM PLACED OUT OF SERVICE FOR EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE |
| |
| The licensee discovered that two automatic closure containment isolation |
| valves (CM-V-1 and 3) on the containment air sampling system process lines |
| have excessive leakage. This was discovered as a result of maintenance |
| troubleshooting of leakage found in the containment air sampling system |
| during the annual containment atmosphere post-accident sampling system |
| surveillance. The redundant isolation valves have been closed, and the |
| monitor can remain out of service for 72 hours with 8-hour grab samples |
| being taken of containment atmosphere per Technical Specification 3.1.8. |
| Work is underway to install a passive barrier (pipe cap) on the inside |
| containment end of each process line, after which the associated valves will |
| be repaired. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35368 |
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| FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/12/1999|
| UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:30[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:54[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: WILLIAM KISNER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |THOMAS DECKER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3 N Y 98 Power Operation |98 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NOTIFIED THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, OFFICE OF RADIATION |
| CONTROL |
| |
| The State of Florida, Department of Health, Office of Radiation Control was |
| notified of the following event. |
| |
| An individual departing alarmed the portal monitor. Upon investigation it |
| was discovered that the individual's jacket contained a "hot particle." The |
| individual is a French national working on site on the Appendix R (Mecatiss) |
| project. The individual was aware of the contamination and had exited |
| French nuclear plant(s) with out any questions. The particle was removed |
| and the jacket returned. The particle was determined to be Co-60 and reads |
| 450,000 dpm by direct frisk with an RM-25 meter with standard pancake probe. |
| The Beta reading was 8 millirem per hour, open window, with an RO-20 survey |
| instrument. This has been determined to be reportable under |
| 10CFR20.2203(a)(3)(ii), and a 30 day written report will be issued. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Region 2 Division of |
| Reactor Safety (Bruce Mallett). |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 35369 |
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| REP ORG: COLTEC INDUSTRIES |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/15/1999|
|LICENSEE: SYNCHRO-START CORPORATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:26[EST]|
| CITY: BELOIT REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 01/20/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: WI |EVENT TIME: [CST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/15/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| |LAURIE PELUSO R1 |
+------------------------------------------------+THOMAS DECKER R2 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JAMES C. GOLDING |JOHN PELLET R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE |VERN HODGE NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 10-CFR-PART-21 NOTIFICATION FROM COLTEC INDUSTRIES, FAIRBANKS MORSE ENGINE |
| DIVISION, REGARDING SYNCHRO-START -- ESSB-4AT SPEED SWITCHES, MODEL SA2110 |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Coltec |
| Industries: |
| |
| "On January 20, 1999, Coltec Industries, Fairbanks Engine Division (FMED), |
| became aware of a potential safety hazard associated with the Synchro-Start |
| -- ESSB-4AT speed switches supplied to PSE&G -- Hope Creek Nuclear Power |
| Station. FMED had supplied four Synchro-Start ESSB-4AT Model-SA2110 speed |
| switches to Hope Creek in late 1997 and early 1998, which malfunctioned |
| after approximately 70 hours of energization. Hope Creek had previously |
| evaluated the failures as not being a substantial safety hazard. |
| |
| "In the ... root cause investigation, FMED evaluated the starting circuitry |
| and confirms that this is not a substantial safety hazard at Hope Creek due |
| to redundant circuitry. However, the investigation revealed that it is |
| likely that one more ESSB-4AT Model-SA2 110 speed switch manufactured by |
| Synchro-Start may have been supplied to the nuclear industry or non-nuclear |
| application by a supplier other than Coltec Industries. The list of possible |
| recipients of the suspect speed switch are: Wolf Creek Nuclear, Engine |
| Systems Inc, Florida Keys Electric, Interstate Power Company, Rolls Royce, |
| and Traycanna. Therefore, notification is being made of the potential |
| substantial safety hazard that might exist at other nuclear facilities that |
| have purchased an ESSB-4AT speed switch in late 1997 and early 1998. |
| |
| "The Engineering Report also determined the root cause of the speed switch |
| failures to be personnel error at Synchro-Start. A personnel error was made |
| by picking the wrong current limiting resistor from stock for installation |
| into the speed switch power supply circuit card. Corrective actions have |
| been taken by Synchro-Start to prevent recurrence including moving the stock |
| location of the resistors, retraining personnel, and changing procedures to |
| verify proper resistor during bench testing. |
| |
| The Engineering Report from Coltec Industries also stated, "While the |
| degradation described in the Part 21... pertains only to PSE&G at Hope Creek |
| and the ESSB-4AT speed switch, Coltec Engineering has also evaluated the |
| applicability to other power stations that use a similar speed switch, such |
| as models ESSB-2AT and --3AT, in a similar circuit arrangement. These other |
| models of speed switch would also use the same internal power supply. |
| Coltec identifies the power stations listed below. It should be noted that |
| Hope Creek is the only installation that employs the ESSB-4AT for speed |
| switch requirements. Coltec has not been notified of any other speed switch |
| degradations at any of the other nuclear power stations; Hope Creek is the |
| only instance. |
| |
| "Alabama Power--Farley |
| Entergy--Arkansas Nuclear One |
| Georgia Power--Hatch I |
| Detroit Edison--Fermi 2 |
| Northeast Utilities--Millstone 3 |
| Public Service New Hampshire--Seabrook |
| Angra Brazil |
| Duquesne Light--Beaver Valley |
| SCE&G--V C Summer |
| PECO--Limerick |
| Union Electric--Callaway |
| Kansas Gas and Electric--Wolf Creek |
| PSE&G--Hope Creek |
| |
| "Coltec Engineering has also reviewed the starting circuitry for the above |
| mentioned power stations. All of the above stations have the similar |
| redundant starting circuitry found at Hope Creek with four exceptions. The |
| four exceptions are Alabama Power, Detroit Edison, Northeast Utilities, and |
| Angra Brazil. At these four plants, if the installed speed switch should |
| fail, the diesel would then fail to start, because of the failed speed |
| switch, and not perform its intended design function. At this time, there |
| is no substantive safety hazard because none of these plants have received |
| any suspect speed switches. |
| |
| "Therefore, this investigation and finding at Hope Creek is not considered a |
| substantial safety hazard as defined by [10 CFR] Part 21. This is due to |
| the redundancy in the starting circuitry. However, since there may be one |
| remaining speed switch with an improper internal power supply, there may be |
| a safety hazard depending on the configuration of the starting circuitry and |
| the incorporation of redundancy at that site." |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a contact address and telephone |
| number.) |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35370 |
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| FACILITY: MONTICELLO REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/15/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:58[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 02/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:19[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM McKAY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/15/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GARY SHEAR R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) GROUP IV ISOLATION DURING TESTING |
| |
| During a quarterly HPCI test run, a Group IV high steam flow isolation was |
| received. The cause of the high steam flow isolation is under |
| investigation. |
| |
| The licensee stated that the isolation had not yet been reset and that all |
| other emergency core cooling systems are operable and available if needed. |
| The unit is currently in a 14-day limiting condition for operation because |
| HPCI is out of service. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35371 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/15/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:33[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 02/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:45[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GARY CLEMENTS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/15/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |THOMAS DECKER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) UNANALYZED COND OP | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| DISCOVERY THAT UNIT 1 FUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (FWST) CHANNEL 3 WAS NOT |
| PLACED IN BYPASS WITHIN 6 HOURS OF BECOMING INOPERABLE |
| |
| FWST Channel 3 was tripped shortly after 0800 today to facilitate a |
| modification to change out a transmitter. With this channel removed from |
| service, plant technical specifications require the licensee to place the |
| channel in bypass within 6 hours. At 2145, it was discovered that the |
| channel had not been placed in bypass within 6 hours of becoming inoperable, |
| and the unit entered Technical Specification 3.0.3. The channel was |
| successfully placed in bypass within 2 minutes, and Technical Specification |
| 3.0.3 was exited at 2147. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021