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Event Notification Report for February 12, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           02/11/1999 - 02/12/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35362  35363  35364  35365  

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35362       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VOGTLE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/10/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:59[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/10/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  W. R. DUNN                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |THOMAS DECKER        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|HFIT 26.73               FITNESS FOR DUTY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT -                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| A LICENSED OPERATOR WAS DETERMINED TO BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL      |
| DURING A RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST.  THE EMPLOYEE'S ACCESS AUTHORIZATION  |
| TO THE PLANT HAS BEEN DEACTIVATED.  REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL      |
| DETAILS.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
|                                                                              |
| ***UPDATE ON 02/11/99 AT 0925ET FROM C. MEYER TAKEN BY MACKINNON****         |
|                                                                              |
| A URINE SAMPLE WAS TAKEN ON 02/10/99 AT 2000 HOURS, BUT THE SAMPLE HAS NOT   |
| BEEN ANALYZED.  THE LICENSED OPERATOR  FAILED A BREATHALYZER TEST (TESTED    |
| POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL). THE INDIVIDUAL FAILED A SECOND BREATHALYZER TEST FOR  |
| ALCOHOL FROM A DIFFERENT BREATHALYZER MACHINE.                               |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.  THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER |
| NOTIFIED THE R2DO (TOM DECKER).                                              |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35363       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAN ONOFRE               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/11/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] [3]                STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:48[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE             |EVENT DATE:        02/10/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:37[PST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CLAY WILLIAMS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN PELLET          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| During a postulated seismic event, Component Cooling Water (CCW) isolation   |
| valves which separate the CCW critical loops from the non-critical loop may  |
| not operate.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1137 PST on February 10, 1999, with Unit 2 in a refueling outage and     |
| Unit 3 at about 100 percent power, SCE concluded that isolation valves which |
| separate CCW critical loops [loops to safety-related equipment] from the     |
| non-Critical Loop (NCL) may not have operated during a postulated seismic    |
| event.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The CCW system is required to perform its intended safety function during a |
| seismic event concurrent with a Loss of Coolant Accident. These valves       |
| (28-inch Fisher Type-9241 air/nitrogen-operated butterfly valves) close on a |
| CCW surge tank low-low level alarm or when a Containment Isolation Actuation |
| Signal (CIAS) is received. These isolation valves are normally actuated with |
| non-seismically qualified instrument air and normal nitrogen. During a       |
| postulated seismic event, the air and nitrogen systems are assumed to fail.  |
| A seismically qualified accumulator tank provides the motive force to close  |
| the isolation valves during such events.  This actuation occurs through the  |
| pressurization and venting of pneumatic tubing.                              |
|                                                                              |
| "During outage testing [first time the test has been performed this way] of  |
| the Train A CCW isolation valves, the valves would not stroke closed within  |
| the required time when actuated by the accumulators only.  SCE's             |
| Air-Operated Valve diagnostic testing determined the pneumatic tube sizing   |
| provided insufficient venting to properly actuate the valves, which cause    |
| the isolation valves to stroke slower than desired. When the isolation       |
| valves between one CCW critical loop and the non-critical loop are opened,   |
| SCE now considers that CCW critical loop to be inoperable.                   |
|                                                                              |
| "During past plant operation, it is possible that one CCW critical loop was  |
| out of service while the remaining critical loop was not isolated from the   |
| non-critical loop. If a seismic event were to have occurred in this          |
| configuration, it is possible the plant would not have had an operable train |
| of CCW. Consequently, SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with    |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D).                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Currently, Unit 2 is in Mode 6 in a refueling outage; there is no safety    |
| function requiring the valves to close in this mode.  At  Unit 3, both CCW   |
| trains are functional with the isolation valves for one train closed.  In    |
| this configuration, Unit 3 is in a 72-hour action statement.  SCE plans to   |
| modify the valve actuator design within 72 hours to correct this             |
| condition."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee said that the isolation valves mentioned above should normally  |
| close within 10 to 15 seconds. During testing of the valve, the licensee     |
| believed that it took approximately 47 seconds for the valves to close.      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2002 EST ON 02/11/99 BY CLAY WILLIAMS TO FANGIE JONES * * *  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee noted a typographical error in the original report as reported. |
| The time reported in the first quoted paragraph should be 1137 PM or  2337   |
| PST.                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The R4DO (John Pellet) was notified by the NRC Operations Officer.           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35364       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/11/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:31[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        02/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        19:45[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT POWERS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TORQUE VALUE USED ON THE MSIVs FOUND TO BE LESS THAN REQUIRED BY SEISMIC     |
| ANALYSES                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "During an evaluation of the torque values for the Main Steam Isolation      |
| Valve's (MSIV) actuator cylinder yoke                                        |
| upper flange studs, Clinton Power Station discovered that the torque value   |
| for the lower flange bolts as specified                                      |
| by the vendor manual and plant procedure is much smaller [than] that used in |
| the seismic qualification of the MSIV actuators. The Vendor manual specifies |
| 200 ft-lbs while plant procedures specify 200 to 240 ft-lbs. However, the GE |
| seismic qualification document NEDE-30725 uses 620 ft-lbs.                   |
|                                                                              |
| "A review of the seismic qualification indicated that the minimum applied    |
| torque of 200 ft-lbs is acceptable for                                       |
| mode 4 (cold shutdown), the plant's current mode of operation.               |
|                                                                              |
| " This condition during a seismic event could cause the valve stem to bind   |
| which could have prevented MSIV                                              |
| operation. Thus, a notification is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(c) |
| [because] this condition could have                                          |
| prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed  |
| to control the release of radioactive                                        |
| material."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35365       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK                REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/11/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:56[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        02/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:49[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID JENKINS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |THOMAS DECKER        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO     |
| INABILITY TO ESTABLISH REFERENCE FLOW CONDITIONS.                            |
|                                                                              |
| HPCI SYSTEM WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO INABILITY TO ESTABLISH REFERENCE  |
| FLOW CONDITIONS DURING PERFORMANCE OF THE QUARTERLY OPERABILITY TEST.  THESE |
| CONDITIONS ARE NORMALLY ESTABLISHED AT 2,500 REVOLUTIONS/MINUTE AND 4,550    |
| GALLONS/MINUTE.  DURING THIS PERFORMANCE OF THE TEST, A FLOW OF 4,450        |
| GALLONS/MINUTE WAS OBTAINED WITH REFERENCE TURBINE SPEED.                    |
|                                                                              |
| HPCI SYSTEM IS A SINGLE TRAIN EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM. ACCORDINGLY,    |
| EMERGENCY HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION IS NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.  THE HIGH   |
| PRESSURE REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) REMAINS OPERABLE, AND THE     |
| AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM  (BACKUP SYSTEM FOR HPCI) ALSO REMAINS     |
| OPERABLE.  PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTION 3.5 ALLOWS CONTINUED       |
| OPERATION FOR 14 DAYS WITH HPCI SYSTEM INOPERABLE.                           |
|                                                                              |
| ENGINEERING AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ARE WORKING TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF  |
| THIS EVENT.  ONCE THE CAUSE IS UNDERSTOOD, A CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN WILL BE  |
| DEVELOPED.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+