Event Notification Report for January 29, 1999

ALCOHOL FOUND IN THE VITAL AREA (AUXILIARY BUILDING).

THE LICENSEE FOUND A 200ML JACK DANIELS BOTTLE, CONTAINING APPROXIMATELY ONE TEASPOON OF LIQUID, IN A VITAL AREA COMMON TO BOTH UNITS. THE BOTTLE WAS FOUND INSIDE OF A TUBE STEEL STRUCTURAL SUPPORT DURING A ROUTINE RADIATION PROTECTION HOUSE CLEANING AND WALKDOWN. THEY TOOK POSSESSION OF THE BOTTLE AND CONTINUED THE INSPECTION. A SECURITY INVESTIGATION WILL FOLLOW.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.

THE ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL OFFICE WAS NOTIFIED BY TUSCALOOSA STEEL OF AN UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFER OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL.

TUSCALOOSA STEEL REPORTED THAT A TRANSFER OF A DEVICE (RONAN MODEL SA-15, S/N GG390), CONTAINING A 100 MILLICURIE CESIUM-137 SOURCE, TO THE GLADWIN COMPANY IN PITTSBURGH, PA FOR REPAIR HAD OCCURRED. THE MOLD CASTER, WHICH IS THE SOURCE HOLDER, WAS SENT FOR REPAIR INADVERTENTLY WITH THE SOURCE STILL INSIDE. IT IS NOT BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOURCE HOLDER'S SHUTTER WAS OPEN, SINCE NO RADIATION MONITORS WENT OFF WHEN THE MOLD CASTER WAS LEAVING THE PLANT. TUSCALOOSA STEEL CONTACTED THE GLADWIN COMPANY TO HAVE THEM MOVE THE MOLD CASTER TO A REMOTE AREA OF THEIR PLANT AND WAIT FOR RONAN ENGINEERS TO ARRIVE SO THEY CAN REMOVE THE SOURCE AND RETURN IT TO TUSCALOOSA STEEL.

THE OKLAHOMA CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT NOTIFIED THE OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THAT AN INDIVIDUAL HAD A 10 LB. DEPLETED URANIUM SOURCE (POSSIBLY AN AIRCRAFT COUNTER WEIGHT) MEASURING 1.8 MILLIREM/HR AT HIS HOUSE. THE INDIVIDUAL PURCHASED THE SOURCE AT A SURPLUS STORE. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS INFORMED TO KEEP THE SOURCE ISOLATED UNTIL IT IS REMOVED FROM HIS HOUSE.

THE PLANT DECLARED RCIC INOPERABLE DUE TO LOW TURBINE OIL LEVEL.

THE RCIC OUTBOARD TURBINE BEARING OIL LEVEL WAS SLIGHTLY BELOW THE LOW LEVEL MARK AND THE RCIC SYSTEM WAS THEREFORE DECLARED INOPERABLE AT 1450. HPCI HAS BEEN VERIFIED TO BE OPERABLE. THIS CONDITION CAUSED ENTRY INTO A 14 DAY LCO DUE TO RCIC BEING INOPERABLE. AN INSPECTION OF THE OIL SYSTEM DID NOT INDICATE ANY LEAKAGE AND OIL LEVEL HAD ONLY LOWERED SLIGHTLY FROM THE PREVIOUS DAY. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN CALLED IN TO ADD OIL TO THE BEARING. THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.

* * * UPDATE ON 1/29/99 @ 2135 BY WHEELER TO GOULD * * *

RCIC RETURNED TO OPERABLE CONDITION AT 1848 WHEN THE OIL LEVEL ON THE OUTBOARD TURBINE BEARING WAS RESTORED TO ITS PROPER LEVEL. THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.

THE REG 4 RDO (YANDELL) WAS INFORMED.

* * * UPDATE AT 1446 ON 02/09/99 BY BILL GREEN TO JOLLIFFE * * *

UPON FURTHER REVIEW OF THIS EVENT, THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THE RCIC SYSTEM TURBINE HAD BEEN OPERABLE DURING THIS EVENT BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
1) THE SHAFT DRIVEN OIL PUMP PROVIDES PRIMARY LUBRICATION TO THE TURBINE AND OIL LEVEL BEING BELOW THE LOW LEVEL MARK WILL NOT PREVENT THE PUMP FROM PROVIDING ADEQUATE LUBRICATION, AND 2) THE OIL SLINGER RING WAS STILL SUBMERGED BY APPROXIMATELY 1/4 INCH.
THUS, THE RCIC SYSTEM WAS CAPABLE OF OPERATING THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT AND THEREFORE, THE LICENSEE DESIRES TO RETRACT THIS EVENT. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R4DO JOHN PELLET.

AN ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION WAS MADE IN THE FIRE PROTECTION SAFE SHUTDOWN REPORT.

A REVIEW ASSOCIATED WITH AN ENGINEERING FIRE PROTECTION SELF-ASSESSMENT HAS IDENTIFIED AN ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION REGARDING AN OPERATOR ACTION CREDITED IN THE FIRE PROTECTION SAFE SHUTDOWN REPORT. POTENTIAL FIRE-INDUCED SPURIOUS OPERATION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LOOP DRAIN VALVES 2RCS-MOV557A , B, OR C, IN CONJUNCTION WITH SPURIOUS OPERATION OF THE DOWNSTREAM VALVES, RCS EXCESS LETDOWN VALVES 2CHS-HCV137 AND 2CHS-MOV201 WAS NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED. THE UNIT 2 FIRE PROTECTION SAFE SHUTDOWN REPORT STATES THAT IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE-INDUCED SPURIOUS OPERATION OF 2RCS-MOV557A, B, OR C, THE OPERATOR COULD MANUALLY CLOSE EITHER 2CHS-MOV201 OR 2CHS-HCV137 TO ISOLATE THE RESULTING EXCESS LETDOWN FLOW. OPERATION OF THESE VALVES FROM THE CONTROL ROOM DOES NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT SINCE THE FIRE MAY HAVE DAMAGED THE CONTROL AND/OR POWER CIRCUITS. LOCAL MANUAL OPERATION OF THESE VALVES WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE WITHIN THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS BECAUSE OF INACCESSIBILITY IN CONTAINMENT.

AT 1806, POWER WAS REMOVED FROM THE RCS LOOP DRAIN VALVES TO ISOLATE THIS POTENTIAL FLOW PATH AND THUS RESTORE COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR POST-FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS.

THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.

******************** UPDATE AT 1457 ON 03/01/99 FROM GEORGE STOROLIS TO GOULD ********************

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"This notification is made to retract a prior NRC non-emergency event notification, made on January 29, 1999,
at approximately 1855 hours. The prior notification followed the determination of a design basis event, in
accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(ii)(B), and identified an inappropriate operator action credited in the Fire
Protection Safe Shutdown Report (FPSSR). The credited operator action involved local manual operation to
close the reactor coolant system (RCS) excess letdown heat exchanger isolation 2CHS*MOV201 or the
downstream control valve 2CHS*HCV137 to terminate an unplanned letdown flow event through the RCS
excess letdown heat exchanger. This unplanned letdown flow event would result from fire-induced operation
(opening) of the RCS loop drain valves 2RCS*MOV557A, or B, or C, in conjunction with the 2CHS*MOV201
and 2CHS*HCV137. During the ongoing FPSSR self-assessment, it was recognized that the location of these
valves within containment would preclude access to the valves. Due to the combination of the normal RCS
letdown flow and the unplanned RCS excess letdown flow, it was then determined that the plant design basis
requirement of achieving approach to cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours could not be assured."

"Subsequent Nuclear Engineering Department evaluation following the January 29, 1999, event notification has determined the maximum total time required to achieve cold shutdown with the inability to isolate the letdown flow path, is achievable within the 10 CFR [Part 50,] Appendix R design basis requirement of 72 hours. This shutdown can be accomplished with the existing plant design and current operating procedures. This evaluation included consideration of the maximum expected RCS letdown flow, the capability to achieve cold shutdown boration conditions within 10 hours and meeting the overall requirement of achieving cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours, and the capacity of one charging pump to meet the flow requirements during the shutdown/cooldown sequence, assuming maximum normal letdown flow."

"Under the assumed failure conditions, the maximum total letdown flow rate (normal and unplanned, due to the spurious valve openings) would be 202 gpm, consisting of the following:

- 37 gpm for the excess flow path due to the fire-induced operation (opening) of the RCS loop drain valves
2RCS*MOV557A, or B, or C, in conjunction with the 2CHS*MOV201 and 2CHS*HCV137 or downstream
control valve 2CHS*HCV389, and

- 165 gpm for the normal letdown flow path consisting of one 45-gpm orifice and two 60-gpm orifices."

"In addition to that described above, the charging pump must supply flow, as indicated, for the following:

- 70 gpm for the charging pump recirculation flow (minimum flow of 60 gpm) [and]

- 28 gpm seal water supply flow to the Reactor Coolant Pumps."

"Comparison of the maximum total required charging pump flow rate (including the flow from the excess letdown flow path created from the fire-induced opening of RCS valves described above) with the specific pump curves, shows adequate capability of a charging pump to provide this flow rate."

"The time of 10 hours to borate to cold shutdown concentration described in the FPSSR requires a letdown/boration flow of approximately 12 gpm, based on the most limiting reactivity conditions. This flow requirement is well within the capability of the letdown and charging systems and, therefore, would be achievable."

"Based on the subsequent evaluation as described above, a condition did not exist which would have prevented meeting the design requirement to achieve approach to cold shutdown condition within 72 hours. In addition, as a result of this event notification retraction, Licensee Event Reporting regarding this issue is not required nor is planned."

"Power will be restored to the RCS loop drain valves."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations center notified the R1DO (Modes).

CONDITION THAT WOULD RESULT IN A NON-CONSERVATIVE INPUT TO THE ROD BLOCK MONITORING SYSTEM.

DURING A UNIT 2 MINOR MAINTENANCE INVESTIGATION ON A LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR (LPRM) BYPASS LIGHT, TROUBLESHOOTING PERSONNEL FOUND A WIRING CONCERN INVOLVING LPRM INPUTS TO THE UNIT 2 ROD BLOCK MONITORING (RBM) SYSTEM. TWO LPRM LOCATIONS WERE FOUND SWAPPED WITHIN THE RBM SYSTEM. THIS CONDITION WOULD CAUSE A NON-CONSERVATIVE INPUT TO THE RBM SYSTEM DURING CONTROL ROD MOVEMENT, THEREFORE ALLOWING UNIT 2 TO POTENTIALLY OPERATE OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS. PER PROCEDURE, BOTH LPRMS WERE BYPASSED TO RETURN BOTH CHANNELS BACK TO OPERABLE STATUS.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.

THE PLANT ENTERED A 14 DAY LCO DUE TO HPCI BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE.

THE HPCI SYSTEM WAS ISOLATED AND DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO A SUSPECTED PROBLEM WITH STEAMLINE FLOW SWITCH TRIP SETPOINT. IT WAS DETERMINED THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE SETSCREW INTERNAL TO THE BARTON DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH HAD NOT BEEN TIGHTEN AFTER PERFORMANCE OF THE LAST CALIBRATION. THIS CONDITION COULD CAUSE EXCESSIVE DRIFT.

A SECOND CONCERN IS THE SWITCH'S RESPONSE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT MAY BE AFFECTED WITH A LOOSE SCREW. HPCI WAS ISOLATED TO MAINTAIN PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY AND A MAINTENANCE REQUEST HAS BEEN SUBMITTED. THIS CONCERN MAY ALSO BE APPLICABLE TO OTHER SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS AND THEY WILL BE CHECKED TO ENSURE THE SETSCREW IS APPROPRIATELY TIGHTENED. RCIC IS OPERABLE.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.

* * * RETRACTED AT 1021 EST ON 3/3/99 BY KEN GRACIA TO FANGIE JONES * * *

The licensee has determined that the as-found trip setting for the steamline flow switch was satisfactory. Also, the as-found setting of the steamline flow switch was greater than the indication that occurs when the HPCI turbine is initiated and was greater than the indication that occurs during HPCI turbine operation. The HPCI system was operable before the surveillance and was returned to service within the Technical Specification timeframe for HPCI. The steamline flow switch was replaced because its performance, based on previous calibrations, was degrading. The steamline flow switch was, in fact, operable and therefore, there was no violation of Technical Specifications.

The instrument plate screw(s) protrude through the instrument scale because that feature is a calibration convenience only. The seismic qualification of the steamline flow switch was not affected by the screws that did protrude through the scale plate.

Therefore, this event notification is retracted as not reportable.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO (Michael Modes).

THE PLANT DECLARED DIVISION 1 AND 2 SERVICE WATER INOPERABLE.

THE DIV 1 AND DIV 2 SERVICE WATER PUMPS(SX) BEARINGS WERE DETERMINED TO BE DEGRADED AND THIS CONDITION REPRESENTED A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE SX PUMPS WOULD BE UNABLE TO PERFORM THEIR DESIGN FUNCTION FOR AN EXTENDED 30 DAY TIME PERIOD. THESE PUMPS ARE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT ACCIDENT MITIGATION, SAFE SHUTDOWN AND RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL. THIS CONDITION PUT THE PLANT IN A LCO FOR THE SUPPORTED SYSTEMS TO SUSPEND ALL FUEL MOVEMENT AND OPERATIONS WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR DRAINING THE VESSEL.

THIS CONDITION WAS DISCOVERED 1/9/99 AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE INITIATED THE SAME DAY ON BOTH DIVISIONS AND COMPLETED WITHIN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS. DIV 1 IS REPAIRED AND DECLARED OPERABLE AND DIV 2 IS REPAIRED AND WILL BE DECLARED OPERABLE UPON COMPLETION OF POST-REPAIR DOCUMENTATION REVIEW.

THE LICENSEE DID NOT DETERMINE THIS EVENT REPORTABLE UNTIL 1/29/99 @ 1359.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.

SECURITY REPORT -

UNACCOUNTED FOR PERSONNEL DOOR LOCK PULLER. COMPENSATORY MEASURES IMMEDIATELY TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1541 EST ON 2/8/99 FROM GREGORY SCOTT TO S.SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this event. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for details. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO(Pellet)