Event Notification Report for January 20, 1999

EXPOSURE GREATER THAN TEDE OF 5 REM (Refer to event #35305 for a similar event.)

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED VIA FACSIMILE TO THE NRC OPERATION CENTER FROM THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL (TDH-BRC) AS AN AGREEMENT STATE REPORT:

"INCIDENT #7410 - TECHNICAL WELDING, PASADENA, TX, L02187, NOTIFIED THE TDH-BRC OF A 5.2-R 1998 ANNUAL EXPOSURE TO A RADIOGRAPHER. THE DOSE DURING THE [3] MONTHS OF THE YEAR RESULTED FROM CALCULATED ASSESSMENTS. THE BADGES WERE LOST. THE LICENSEE CONFIRMED THE OVEREXPOSURE ON 01/20/99. THE TDH-BRC IS INVESTIGATING."

THERE WAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON THE FACSIMILE.

PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

The licensee commenced a unit shutdown in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.7 after both standby diesel generators failed to reach required voltage and frequency within the required time (ten seconds) during a surveillance test. The licensee stated that the methodology for the test has been changed, and this was the first test performed using the new methodology.

The old test procedure recorded the time for the diesel generators to start and reach required voltage and frequency, although the generators normally overshoot the targets slightly before reaching a steady state value. The revised test methodology records the time for the diesel generators to reach steady state voltage and frequency. The licensee reported that one diesel generator reached steady state within 15 seconds, and the other reached steady state within 22 seconds.

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.

ERDS UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TESTING

The Turkey Point Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) link will be removed from service for approximately eight to ten hours in order to perform Year 2000 (Y2K) compliance testing of the plant Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System (ERDADS). The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE AT 1955 ON 1/20/99, BY HICKEY, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *

The licensee returned the ERDS link to service at 1830. The NRC resident inspector will be informed. The Operations Center notified the R2DO (Christensen).

UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF APPROXIMATELY 50% OF CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS

"Loss of redundant ANNUNCIATOR Power Supplies has rendered a substantial number of safety related annunciators inoperable. This required a GSEP notification - Unusual Event, (MU-6 - Loss of Annunciators for >= 15 minutes). Backup indications are available and increased main control board monitoring has been implemented."

The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector.

Event #35280 involved the same equipment.

***UPDATE on 01/21/99 at 1450 ET by Dave Kruck taken by MacKinnon****

Unusual Event terminated at 1311 CT. The annunciator system is functional. The root cause for the failure had not been completed at the time of this event update notification. Troubleshooting and repairs of the annunciator system are continuing. R3DO (Lanksbury), NRR EO (Dennig), & FEMA (Canupp) notified.

The NRC resident inspector was been notified of this event update by the licensee.

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABLE

At 1413 on January 20, 1999, the E4150-F022, "HPCI turbine exhaust drain pot stop/check valve," which drains to the suppression pool, failed to meet stroke time requirements (28.6 seconds versus <=27 seconds required).

The valve was closed and locked per Technical Specifications 3.6.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves, at 1600. With the E4150-F022 valve closed, it has been determined that the HPCI system is inoperable. This valve path provides a drain path for the drain pot during accident conditions.

Repair efforts are in progress.

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.

******************** UPDATE AT 1505 ON 02/04/99 FROM RON SERDA TO TROCINE ********************

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"On January 20, 1999, the HPCI turbine exhaust two-inch drain containment isolation valve E4150-F022 stroke tested at 28.6 seconds. The Inservice Test (IST) Program acceptance criteria was 27 seconds. IST requirements for acceptance and possible repairs of the valve were evaluated.

"The valve's stroke acceptance time was evaluated by Engineering Functional Analysis (EFA) 99-11550. The EFA concluded that [a] stroke time [of] 30 seconds is acceptable, and therefore, 28.6 seconds is acceptable. The HPCI system [limiting condition for operation] was exited on January 21, 1999, based on the results of the EFA and the subsequent IST Program Evaluation, 99-003.

"Therefore, [the] event notification of January 20, 1999, is retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Kozak).

LATE NOTIFICATION ON REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE ON 01/20/99

On 01/20/99 at 1730 EST, RCIC became inoperable as a result of two inoperable primary containment isolation valves being closed to satisfy Technical Specification 3.6.3. RCIC was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.7.4 (14 days to restore to operable status). Initial assessment conclude that an immediate report was not required. However, upon additional review, it has been determined that a 4-hour report is required in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(iii)(D). RCIC was restored to operable status on 01/22/99 at 1142 EST. The technical specifications mentioned above were exited at the time. During the time period RCIC was out of service, all emergency core cooling systems were fully operable.

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

******************** UPDATE AT 1631 ON 02/16/99 FROM ROY GREEN TO TROCINE ********************

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"... RCIC was declared inoperable when it was believed [that] the starter coils for two RCIC containment isolation valves (CIVs) would not function properly in a degraded voltage situation, and the CIVs were closed to comply with technical specifications..

"Subsequent review has determined that since the event or condition was associated with the containment isolation function only and [since] the reporting criteria is concerned with RCIC injection, the event is not reportable. The operator actions to close the CIVs in accordance with technical specifications [do] not constitute an event or condition as discussed in the NUREG guidance. Therefore, notification of the event is retracted. Additionally, evaluation and testing has concluded that the starter coils in question would have functioned under all design conditions.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Trapp).

10-CFR-PART-21 NOTIFICATION FROM COLTEC INDUSTRIES, FAIRBANKS MORSE ENGINE DIVISION, REGARDING SYNCHRO-START -- ESSB-4AT SPEED SWITCHES, MODEL SA2110

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Coltec Industries:

"On January 20, 1999, Coltec Industries, Fairbanks Engine Division (FMED), became aware of a potential safety hazard associated with the Synchro-Start -- ESSB-4AT speed switches supplied to PSE&G -- Hope Creek Nuclear Power Station. FMED had supplied four Synchro-Start ESSB-4AT Model-SA2110 speed switches to Hope Creek in late 1997 and early 1998, which malfunctioned after approximately 70 hours of energization. Hope Creek had previously evaluated the failures as not being a substantial safety hazard.

"In the ... root cause investigation, FMED evaluated the starting circuitry and confirms that this is not a substantial safety hazard at Hope Creek due to redundant circuitry. However, the investigation revealed that it is likely that one more ESSB-4AT Model-SA2 110 speed switch manufactured by Synchro-Start may have been supplied to the nuclear industry or non-nuclear application by a supplier other than Coltec Industries. The list of possible recipients of the suspect speed switch are: Wolf Creek Nuclear, Engine Systems Inc, Florida Keys Electric, Interstate Power Company, Rolls Royce, and Traycanna. Therefore, notification is being made of the potential substantial safety hazard that might exist at other nuclear facilities that have purchased an ESSB-4AT speed switch in late 1997 and early 1998.

"The Engineering Report also determined the root cause of the speed switch failures to be personnel error at Synchro-Start. A personnel error was made by picking the wrong current limiting resistor from stock for installation into the speed switch power supply circuit card. Corrective actions have been taken by Synchro-Start to prevent recurrence including moving the stock location of the resistors, retraining personnel, and changing procedures to verify proper resistor during bench testing.

The Engineering Report from Coltec Industries also stated, "While the degradation described in the Part 21... pertains only to PSE&G at Hope Creek and the ESSB-4AT speed switch, Coltec Engineering has also evaluated the applicability to other power stations that use a similar speed switch, such as models ESSB-2AT and --3AT, in a similar circuit arrangement. These other models of speed switch would also use the same internal power supply. Coltec identifies the power stations listed below. It should be noted that Hope Creek is the only installation that employs the ESSB-4AT for speed switch requirements. Coltec has not been notified of any other speed switch degradations at any of the other nuclear power stations; Hope Creek is the only instance.

"Alabama Power--Farley
Entergy--Arkansas Nuclear One
Georgia Power--Hatch I
Detroit Edison--Fermi 2
Northeast Utilities--Millstone 3
Public Service New Hampshire--Seabrook
Angra Brazil
Duquesne Light--Beaver Valley
SCE&G--V C Summer
PECO--Limerick
Union Electric--Callaway
Kansas Gas and Electric--Wolf Creek
PSE&G--Hope Creek

"Coltec Engineering has also reviewed the starting circuitry for the above mentioned power stations. All of the above stations have the similar redundant starting circuitry found at Hope Creek with four exceptions. The four exceptions are Alabama Power, Detroit Edison, Northeast Utilities, and Angra Brazil. At these four plants, if the installed speed switch should fail, the diesel would then fail to start, because of the failed speed switch, and not perform its intended design function. At this time, there is no substantive safety hazard because none of these plants have received any suspect speed switches.

"Therefore, this investigation and finding at Hope Creek is not considered a substantial safety hazard as defined by [10 CFR] Part 21. This is due to the redundancy in the starting circuitry. However, since there may be one remaining speed switch with an improper internal power supply, there may be a safety hazard depending on the configuration of the starting circuitry and the incorporation of redundancy at that site."

(Call the NRC operations officer for a contact address and telephone number.)