Event Notification Report for January 15, 1999

4-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN NOTIFICATION INVOLVING ABANDONED EQUIPMENT IN THE X-326 PROCESS BUILDING

THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM PORTSMOUTH:

"ON JANUARY 15, 1999, AT 1410 HOURS, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE X-326 PROCESS BUILDING NUCLEAR CRITICALITY APPROVALS (NCSAs) DO NOT DESCRIBE THE OPERATION/CONTROLS FOR THE FOLLOWING ABANDONED IN PLACE EQUIPMENT: PRODUCT PURIFICATION DISTILLATION TOWER, OLD EVACUATION JETS, OLD SO2 REACTOR, OLD PW BOOSTER CONNECTED TO CELL 25-7-15, AND [AN] OLD FREON DEGRADER."

"THIS IS REPORTABLE DUE TO NOT HAVING ANY NCSA IN PLACE FOR THIS ABANDONED EQUIPMENT."

"THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT."

A PRIOR NRC NOTIFICATION (EVENT #33627) WAS MADE WHICH IDENTIFIED LEGACY EQUIPMENT IN THE X-326 PROCESS BUILDING; HOWEVER, THE ABOVE EQUIPMENT WAS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED. THE EQUIPMENT IS IN GEOMETRICALLY FAVORABLE CONDITIONS AND CONTAINS URANIUM BELOW THE SAFE MASS LIMIT. THIS CONDITION WAS DISCOVERED IN A REVIEW OF COMPLETED NCSAs.

PORTSMOUTH PLANS TO INFORM THE [DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)] SITE REPRESENTATIVE AND HAS INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

* * * UPDATE AT 1955 ON 01/18/99 FROM LARSON TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *

THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM PORTSMOUTH:

"THIS IS REPORTABLE DUE TO NOT HAVING ANY NCSA IN PLACE FOR THIS ABANDONED EQUIPMENT."

UPDATE: DUE TO THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING ABANDONED EQUIPMENT IN THE X-326 BUILDING NOT COVERED BY NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVALS (NCSAs), A SEARCH PERFORMED IN THE X-705 [AND] X-700 [BUILDINGS] REVEALED ABANDONED EQUIPMENT THAT MAY NEED NCSAs. THE PLANT IS FOLLOWING IT'S PROCEDURE FOR ANOMALOUS NCSA CONDITIONS, AND FURTHER EVALUATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS TO DETERMINE IF THIS ABANDONED EQUIPMENT MEETS THE FISSILE MATERIAL LIMITS. THE FISSILE MATERIAL LIMIT OF 15 GRAMS U235 BY PLANT PROCEDURES REQUIRES NCSAs."

"THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT."

PORTSMOUTH INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (GAVULA), NMSS EO (SURMEIER), AND IRO (CONGEL).

* * * UPDATE AT 1643 ON 01/20/99 FROM HALCOMB TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *

THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM PORTSMOUTH:

"DUE TO PROBLEMS CONCERNING ABANDONED EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED IN THE X-326 BUILDING NOT COVERED BY AN NCSA, A PLANT WIDE SEARCH WAS INITIATED TO IDENTIFY ALL EQUIPMENT WHICH MAY MEET THE FISSILE MATERIAL LIMITS AND WOULD REQUIRE AN ACTIVE NCSA. THIS SEARCH HAS IDENTIFIED THAT THE X-344, X-333, AND THE X-330 BUILDINGS CONTAIN ABANDONED EQUIPMENT THAT WILL REQUIRE AN NCSA. ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN BOUNDARIED OFF AND AN ANOMALOUS NCS CONDITION REPORT COMPLETED."

"THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT."

PORTSMOUTH INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (LANKSBURY), NMSS EO (BELL), AND IRO (CONGEL).

*** UPDATE ON 01/21/99 AT 1847 EST FROM SISSLER TAKEN BY MacKINNON ***

During ongoing plant search for abandoned equipment, additional equipment was discovered in the X-326 building which may meet the fissile material limits and would require an active NCSA. The identified equipment has been boundaried off and an anomalous NCS condition report completed.

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Lanksbury) and NMSS EO (Bell) .

* * * UPDATE ON 01/25/99 AT 1255 EST FROM RICHARD LARSON TO FANGIE JONES * * *

During ongoing plant sweeps for abandoned equipment, additional equipment was discovered in the X-326 and X-333 buildings which may meet the fissile material limits and would require an active NCSA. The equipment consists of GCEP (Gaseous Centrifugal Enrichment Process) sample carts that are no longer used. The carts in the X-326 building have been determined not to have two major components which could contain fissile materials; however, the carts in the X-333 building are still being investigated. The equipment has been boundaried off and an NCS condition report completed.

The NRC resident inspector was notified and the onsite DOE representative will be notified by the certificate holder. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Tony Vegel), NMSS EO (Don Cool), and IRO (Frank Congel).

LOSS OF COMMERCIAL OFFSITE POWER AND AUTOMATIC REACTOR SHUT DOWN

There was a loss of commercial offsite power to the entire National Institute of Standards site during a winter storm. As a result, the National Bureau of Standards Reactor automatically shut down at 0526 on 01/15/99. All four shim arms (safety blades) and the regulating rod fully inserted. The emergency diesel generator started and is currently supplying power. There is flow through the core with the primary D2O, and there is a heat sink using a small secondary pump that supplies a cooling tower. Core temperature is being maintained by cycling the small pump on and off.

There was no emergency declared. It is currently anticipated that it will be several hours before commercial power is restored.

(Contact the NRC Operations Center for a site contact telephone number.)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO THE LOSS OF TWO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"[An] electrical failure [resulted] in the loss of auxiliary feedwater suction swapover to [the] nuclear service water [system] rendering [two] auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable. Per [Technical Specification] 3.7.2.1, with [two] auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, the unit must be placed in Hot Standby within 6 hours and in Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours. [The] electrical failure also swapped controls for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to the local panel.

"List of safety-related equipment not operational: [emergency core cooling system] train 'B' due to '2B' safety injection pump [emergent work and] control room ventilation train 'B' [due to planned maintenance]."

The licensee is currently investigating this failure. There were no ongoing maintenance or surveillance activities ongoing at the time of the event.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

BOTH CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION TRAINS INOPERABLE FOR ABOUT 11 HOURS

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"EVENT DESCRIPTION: On 01/14/99 at 1305 [CST,] the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) train 'B' was placed in service for flow rate testing following scheduled replacement of the charcoal trays. At the time CREV train 'B' was started, CREV train 'A' was the only operable CREV train. When CREV 'B' was started, the CREV primary unit selector switch (0-XSW-31-7214) was placed in the 'B' position. This in conjunction with CREV 'B' in service for testing, rendered CREV 'A' incapable of automatically starting on a valid initiation signal. Thus, both CREV trains were inoperable from 1305 hours on 01/14/99 until 0008 hours on 01/15/99.

"REPORTABILITY LOGIC: This condition is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii) as an event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems or structures that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. [A licensee event report (LER)] is also required within 30 days per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v) and (vi).

"Additionally, Unit 2 and 3 Technical Specifications Section 3.7.3.D requires [that Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)] 3.0.3 be entered immediately with two CREV subsystems inoperable. LCO 3.0.3 requires [that] action be initiated within 1 hour to place the affected units in MODE 2 within 7 hours. LCO 3.0.3 was not entered at the time both CREV subsystems were inoperable. Therefore, this condition also requires submission of an LER within 30 days per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation or condition prohibited by technical specifications."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1701 ON 1/20/99, BY SWAFFORD TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *

The licensee desires to retract this event. The logic for the retraction follows:

The initial report was categorized as an event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems or structures that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Both CREV trains were considered inoperable due to Train B undergoing testing following charcoal tray replacement and Train A being incapable of automatically starting on a valid initiation signal due to the primary unit selector switch being in the B position.

After further review and successful completion of post maintenance testing of the B train, it has been determined that the B train would have been able to fulfill its safety function during the time it was being tested. The B train was in the required accident alignment during the time the selector switch was in the B position and post maintenance tests confirmed the operability of the train. As a consequence, TVA has concluded that this event does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72.

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. Notified R2DO(Christensen).

GREATER THAN 1% OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBES REQUIRE PLUGGING

"This notification is being made in accordance with San Onofre Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.5.2.11, 'Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program.' Table 5.5.2.11-1 of this specification requires SCE to provide prompt notification to the NRC in accordance with 1OCFR5O.72 when one percent or more of the inspected tubes in a steam generator are found defective and require plugging or repair.

"During the current Unit 2 Cycle 10 refueling outage, SCE is currently inspecting 100 percent of the tubes in both Unit 2 steam generators. On January I5, 1999, at 0630 PST, SCE determined that the number of defective tubes in steam generator E-088 is greater than one percent of the total tubes and require repair or plugging. The inspections are continuing and the inspection results will be provided as required by Technical Specification 5.7.2.

" While the Technical Specifications require SCE to submit this report, the condition itself does not meet the reporting criteria of 1OCFR5O.72. At the time of this report, Unit 1 remains permanently shutdown and Unit 3 is operating at about 100% power.

"This report will be discussed with the NRC Resident Inspectors."

PART 21 NOTIFICATION RELATED TO MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)

"The purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a defect under 10 CFR 21, 'Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance.' The defect concerns the Operating Limit for the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) in Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) analyzed using the BISON fast transient analysis code. Specifically, the defect involves incorrect modeling of the reactor vessel lower plenum volume in the BISON code, which could lead to the establishment of non-conservative MCPR Operating Limits in plant technical specifications.

"The Enclosure summarizes the evaluation performed by ABB Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE). If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me [Ian C. Rickard] or Virgil Paggen of my staff."

This event effects WNP-2 current operating cycle (Cycle 14).

LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION OF A 1 QUART TRANSMISSION OIL SPILL INTO THE STORM DRAIN SYSTEM

"On January 15, 1999, at 1350 hours, a notification was made to the New York State Department of Conservation (NYSDEC), Spill Report No. 9812715. The notification was made because approximately one (1) quart of transmission fluid (oil) was spilt onto the ground and was washed by existing weather into the storm drain system which discharges into the plant cooling water discharge canal. Plant systems were reviewed and there were no plant events or occurrences that appear to be causally related. The water in the discharge canal is river water that has been used for cooling plant equipment during plant operation. The discharge canal has oil containment barriers that are designed to contain the majority of oil discharges. Additional action was taken to install temporary absorbent oil collection booms in the discharge canal. Plant personnel initiated cleanup which is continuing at this time.

"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(vi), for any event related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to another government agency (i.e., NYDEC) has been or will be made."

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

PART 21 NOTIFICATION RELATED TO THE XL-S96 CPR CORRELATION FOR SVEA-96 FUEL

"The purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a defect as defined in 10 CFR 21, 'Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance.' The defect concerns the XL-S96 Critical Power Ratio (CPR) correlation for ABB SVEA-96 fuel assemblies for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). Specifically, the defect concerns the XL-S96 CPR correlation, which is based solely on a cosine axial power shape. The defect could lead to non-conservative Operating Limit MCPRs and monitored CPRs for top-peaked axial power shapes.

"The Enclosure summarizes the evaluation performed by ABB Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE). If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me [Ian C. Rickard] or Mr. Virgil Paggen of my staff."

This event effects WNP-2 current operating cycle (Cycle 14).

BOTH VACUUM BREAKER PRESSURE SWITCHES FAIL QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE

"During an instrument Functional Test, on January 15, 1999, the trip point settings for redundant pressure switches which actuate the Pressure Suppression Chamber Reactor Building Vacuum Breakers were found to exceed the value required by Tech Specs.

"This condition was initially evaluated for reportability under 10 CFR 50.72 on January 15, 1999 at approximately 1530 and determined to not be reportable. Subsequent review has conservatively determined that this condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii).

"Under certain accident conditions, this condition could have resulted in higher differential pressure
(vacuum) between the Pressure Suppression Chamber and Reactor Building than specified by Technical
Specifications and therefore, if assumed design margin is not credited, could have challenged primary
containment integrity.

"This condition was corrected immediately upon identification."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

THREE M43A1 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTORS MISPLACED IN GERMANY

The U.S. Army reported that three M43A1 chemical agent detectors, each containing 250 µCi of Am-241, had been misplaced between mid-December 1998 and mid-January 1999. The detectors were issued to the 324th Signal Company, and they were being deployed to an unspecified location. The paperwork regarding these detectors was not completed properly, and the Army believes that they are still in possession of the detectors. The U.S. Army plans to contact the German government regarding this event.

******************** UPDATE AT 1653 ON 04/27/99 FROM JEFF HAVENER TO TROCINE ********************

The missing M43A1 chemical agent detectors were located. Apparently, the items had been deployed, but the paperwork did not show that the items had been shipped out and still indicated that the items were located in the unit.

The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera) and NMSS EO (Combs).

(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)