Event Notification Report for January 12, 1999

24-HOUR REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATING LICENSE DUE TO INADEQUATE TESTING OF STATION BATTERIES

The licensee reported that testing of the 'B' and 'D' station batteries was not performed in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.8.2.1e due to improper application of a test waiver provided in TS 4.8.2.1d.

The following report was submitted by the licensee via facsimile:

"Technical Specification 4.8.2.1d requires a service test every 18 months. A service test is a discharge test that demonstrates the ability of the battery to meet the design load profile of the DC system under accident conditions. Technical Specification 4.8.2.1e requires a performance test every 60 months. A performance test is a discharge test that measures the capacity of the battery against the manufacturer's rated capacity. This Specification also states, 'Once per 60-month interval this performance discharge test may be performed in lieu of the battery service test required by Specification 4.8.2.1d.' Technical Specification 4.8.2.1f requires a performance test every 18 months when a battery reaches 85% of its design life."

"The B and D train batteries entered service in 1978. The service date is determined from the time they were placed into the service for which they were intended. For these batteries that is the date they were placed on float charge. The batteries have a qualified life of 20 years. Therefore, they reached the 17-year, 85% Technical Specification limit in 1995 per ESR 87-VT-065."

"The following is the time line for battery testing in Unit 2:
1993, routine 60-month performance test (using OPSP06-DJ-0005) in accordance with 4.8.2.1e taking credit
for the service test.
1994, routine 18-month service test (using OPSP06-DJ-0004) in accordance with 4.8.2.1d.
1995, special 18-month performance test (using OPSP06-DJ-0005) in accordance with 4.8.2.1 f. No service
test performed. Credit for the service test is taken based on the performance test in accordance with
OPSP06-DJ-0005, Section 1.1.
1997, special 18-month performance test (using OPSP06-DJ-0005) in accordance with 4.8.2.1f. No service
test performed. Credit for the service test is taken based on the performance test in accordance with
OPSP06-DJ-0005, Section 1.1.
1998, (end of qualified life) the batteries were replaced."

"The testing performed does not meet the requirement of Technical Specification 4.8.2.1e in that Technical Specification 4.8.2.1d only allows credit for the service test once in a 60-month interval. Since the new 60-month interval started in 1993, the testing in 1995 and/or 1997 should have included both a service test and a performance test. Both service and performance tests are required in accordance with our commitment to Reg. Guide 1.129, Rev. 1."

The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector regarding this report.

FIRE DAMAGED CONTAINER OF DRY PRESS CAKE.

An operator noticed a small fire in a polypack located in a ventilated hood which services an oven used to dry press cake. Apparently, the press cake residue had not cooled sufficiently, and it ignited inside the polypack. The fire was promptly extinguished by the operator. Damage was limited to the polypack, which was partially melted during the brief fire.

There were no significant personnel exposures as a result of this event, no significant elevated air sample results, and no releases to the environment.

The Incident Review Committee convened January 13, 1999, to review the event and determine that appropriate actions are being taken to address the event.

The licensee notified the NRC Region II office (David Ayres).

STATE OF KANSAS NOTIFIED OF LEAKING GAS CHROMATOGRAPH SOURCE

ON 1/12/99, THE KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT WAS NOTIFIED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ASH GROVE CEMENT COMPANY LOCATED IN OVERLAND PARK, KANSAS, THAT THEIR PERKIN ELMER GAS CHROMATOGRAPH MODEL # N610-0133 HAD FAILED ITS ROUTINE LEAK TEST. THE TEST WHICH IS PERFORMED EVERY SIX MONTHS REVEALED THAT 0.008 µCi OF THE 15 mCi NICKEL-63 SOURCE HAD LEAKED (0.005 µCi IS THE ALLOWABLE LEAKAGE). THE INSTRUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE MANUFACTURER FOR SERVICE. THERE IS NO RISK SIGNIFICANCE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS EVENT NOR WAS THERE ANY PERSONNEL DOSE OR CONTAMINATION INVOLVED. KANSAS WILL CONTINUE ITS EVALUATION.

Notification under 10 CFR Part 21 for Rosemount Model-1153B Alphaline Nuclear Pressure Transmitter

Rosemounts Nuclear Instruments, Inc., (RNII) discovered two errors contained in the Rosemount Specification and Outline Dimension Drawings for Model-1153 Series-B Alphaline Nuclear Pressure Transmitters. The first error exists in the Specification and Outline Dimension Drawings for all 1153 Series-B Model types (refs. a - d). In each of these drawings, the module qualified life and electronics qualified life shown in Figure 2 are in error. The graphs of Qualified Life vs. Ambient Operating Temperature were incorrectly transposed from ref. E in June of 1985. This error resulted in overstating the qualified life of both the module and the electronics. Model-1153 Series-B Qualification Report (ref. E), Product Data Sheet (ref. F), and Product Manual (ref. G) are all correct, and the error is contained only in the Specification and Outline Dimension Drawings.

The second error exists only in the Specification and Outline Dimension Drawings for Differential Pressure Transmitter, Model 1153DB (ref. b). In paragraph 4.2.2, the accuracy of the output code "R" following to 22 megarads TID of gamma radiation exposure is incorrectly stated as +/- 1.5% of Upper Range Limit. The correct accuracy value should be +/- 4.0% of Upper Range Limit following exposure to 22 megarads TID gamma radiation exposure. This was a transposition error which occurred in the most recent revision of ref. B on June 27, 1997. The Model-1153 Series-B Qualification Report (ref. e), Product Data Sheet (ref. f), and Product Manual (ref. g) were not affected by this error and are stated correctly.

All affected specification drawings will be revised within 60 days to reflect the correct qualified life vs. temperature relationships as well as output code "R" accuracy. No further action related to this issue is expected.

Offsite notification made to Maryland Department of Natural Resources Division of Forestry due to fire on owners controlled area (Refer to event #35257 for a similar event.)

The licensee was informed at 0849 ET that they had a small fire in the owner controlled area. The fire was extinguished by onsite personnel shortly after the fire was discovered. The fire burned an area approximately 40' by 40'. This is the fourth fire that has occurred in the owner controlled area in the last several months. The licensee asked the Maryland Department of Natural Resources Division of Forestry to investigate the cause of the fire.

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event notification.

SHIPMENT RECEIVED WITH EXCESSIVE SURFACE CONTAMINATION

The U.S. Army made the following report in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1906(d), after receiving a package with excessive external surface contamination. The Anniston Army Depot received a package containing an M1A1 collimator, which normally contains 10 Ci of tritium. The package had been shipped from the USMC training facility in Twentynine Palms, CA, via an undetermined carrier.

Upon receipt of the package, employees of the Defense Logistics Agency performed wipe tests of the package. These tests revealed that the surface of the package was contaminated with an activity of 8,200 dpm/100 cm². In addition, some contamination was discovered inside of the hood where the wipe tests were performed. The tritium source within the collimator appears to be leaking. The U.S. Army is reviewing the shipping papers regarding this package and has contacted NRC Region III (J. Cameron) regarding this event.

(Call the NRC Operations Center for a contact telephone number.)

4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT

THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM PORTSMOUTH:

"ON JANUARY 12, 1999, AT 1420 HOURS, THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY (NCS) STAFF DETERMINED THAT SEVERAL NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVALS (NCSA) FOR X-705 [DECONTAMINATION FACILITY], THAT DEAL WITH DISASSEMBLY OF EQUIPMENT, WERE DEFICIENT. NCSA-0705.042, NCSA-0705.031, [AND] NCSA-0705.33 WERE DEFICIENT IN THAT THEY FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE CONTROLS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE DISASSEMBLY OF EQUIPMENT, PREVIOUSLY CLASSIFIED 'UH' (UNCOMPLICATED HANDLING) BY GEOMETRY, DID NOT LEAD TO AN UNSAFE CONFIGURATION FOR NCS. BUILDING AND NCS PERSONNEL HAVE ASSESSED THE AREA, AND NO UNSAFE CONDITIONS OR DISASSEMBLY ACTIVITIES WERE FOUND."

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: DURING DISASSEMBLY IF A PIECE OF EQUIPMENT CLASSIFIED AS 'UH' BASED ON GEOMETRY, AN UNSAFE CONFIGURATION COULD OCCUR."

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): EQUIPMENT CLASSIFIED AS UH BY GEOMETRY, IF DISASSEMBLED AND PLACED IN A PILE COULD RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONFIGURATION."

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): GEOMETRY IS THE PARAMETER OF CONCERN. HOWEVER, THIS CONTROL COULD BE LOST DURING DISASSEMBLY OF THE EQUIPMENT."

"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): N/A - THE NCSAs WERE EVALUATED AT 100 WT% ENRICHMENT WITH NO MASS RESTRICTIONS."

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: THE NCSA/NCSE DID NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF DISASSEMBLY ON EQUIPMENT CLASSIFIED AS 'UH' BASED ON GEOMETRY."

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: X-705 BUILDING MANAGEMENT HAVE DISCONTINUED DISASSEMBLY OPERATIONS OF EQUIPMENT INVOLVING COMPONENTS PREVIOUSLY CLASSIFIED AS 'UH' BY GEOMETRY. APPLICABLE NCSA/NCSEs WILL BE CORRECTED AND IMPLEMENTED."

"THERE WAS ON LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT."