Resolution of Generic Safety Issues: Task CH4: Emergency Planning (Rev. 1) ( NUREG-0933, Main Report with Supplements 1–35 )
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A number of facts about the Chernobyl accident have some bearing on emergency planning and preparedness around U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. This task, outlined in Chapter 4 of NUREG-1251,1174 called for the staff to examine the implications of the accident and the Soviet response for four aspects of U.S. emergency planning: (1) size of the emergency planning zone (EPZ); (2) medical services; (3) ingestion pathway measures; and (4) decontamination and relocation.
ITEM CH4.1: SIZE OF THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES
DESCRIPTION
The Chernobyl accident focused attention on the adequacy of the size of EPZs around U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The Soviets evacuated a total of about 135,000 people as well as considerable farm livestock from Pripyat, Chernobyl, and other towns and villages within 18 miles of the Chernobyl power plant. This evacuation appears to have taken place in several stages, beginning for the approximately 45,000 residents of Pripyat about 36 hours after the initial release and extending over several days to a week. The whole-body radiation dose to the majority of individuals did not exceed 25 rem, although about 24,000 persons in the most severely contaminated areas are estimated to have been exposed to whole-body doses in the range of 35 to 55 rem. The population of Pripyat was initially sheltered as a protective measure and then evacuated when radiation readings increased. In addition to radiation considerations, logistics and contamination control influenced the timing of the evacuation. Despite an apparent lack of site-specific planning, the Soviets mounted a large and generally effective ad hoc response making use of some aspects of civil defense planning. The high initial plume contributed to relatively low initial dose rates in the immediate vicinity. In addition, efforts by the Soviets to prevent rainfall in the immediate vicinity (by cloud seeding other areas) and the spraying of a chemical polymer on evacuation routes to minimize resuspension of deposited activity were also beneficial. The Soviets took ingestion pathway protective measures within the 18-mile zone and well beyond. Ingestion pathway protective measures were also taken in several Soviet bloc countries, in Scandinavia, and in Eastern and Western Europe.
In pursuing this issue, the staff is expected to increase its knowledge, certainty, and understanding of safety issues in order to increase its confidence in assessing levels of safety. Therefore, this issue is considered to be a licensing issue.
CONCLUSION
The Chernobyl accident and the Soviet response did not reveal any apparent deficiency in U.S. plans and preparedness, including the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ size and and the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway EPZ size. These zones provide an adequate basis to plan and carry out the full range of protective actions for the population within these zones as well as beyond them, if the need should arise. Any changes in EPZ sizes should be based on revised insights coming from current U.S. research on severe accident releases. No recommendation resulted from this item which was dropped from further consideration.
ITEM CH4.2: MEDICAL SERVICES
DESCRIPTION
At Chernobyl, KI was distributed to school children within about 6 hours of the accident and to the entire population of Pripyat the morning of the following day; ultimately, it was given to the population in the 18-mile zone and other areas. The Soviets reported no serious adverse reactions to KI. Polish authorities also distributed KI to the population in parts of eastern Poland. This issue called for the staff to review the adequacy of the U.S. Government's policy on KI and the adequacy of medical services around U.S. nuclear power plants.
In pursuing this issue, the staff is expected to increase its knowledge, certainty, and understanding of safety issues in order to increase its confidence in assessing levels of safety. Therefore, this issue is considered to be a licensing issue.
CONCLUSION
The apparently successful use of KI by the Soviets did not alter the validity of U.S. Government policy that pre-distributing or stockpiling KI for use by the general public should not be required; rather, this decision should be made by individual States and by local authorities. Further, the staff concluded that the present arrangements and future plans for medical services around U.S. commercial nuclear power plants are adequate. The national capability is both substantial and growing. Also, the international offers of medical support to the Soviet Union following the Chernobyl accident demonstrate that the U.S. regional and national medical response can be augmented, if necessary by a response from the international medical community. No recommendation resulted from this item which was dropped from further consideration.
ITEM CH4.3: INGESTION PATHWAY MEASURES
This item consists of one recommendation that is evaluated below.
ITEM CH4.3A: INGESTION PATHWAY PROTECTIVE MEASURES
DESCRIPTION
After the Chernobyl accident, human and animal food chains in the Soviet Union and other European countries were contaminated to varying degrees. The Soviet and other affected governmental authorities took measures, both short-term and long-term, to protect the public from receiving unacceptably high levels of radiation through consumption of contaminated food. The contamination level findings and the experience with the Soviet and other European control measures could provide important extensions of the data base for planning of protective measures in the U.S. This issue called for the staff to participate with FEMA and other Federal and appropriate international agencies in planning and eventual execution of efforts to obtain available information on the Soviet and other European post-Chernobyl ingestion pathway contamination and control measures experience and analyze that information in relation to U.S. understanding of the issue.
The work is expected to be done primarily under FEMA's coordination together with other appropriate Federal agencies, such as FDA and EPA, and international agencies such as IAEA. The NRC will participate in this work to assure adequate representation of NRC's interest in the effort and to obtain the information needed for NRC's purposes. The information to be sought is expected to encompass contamination level findings for various human and animal foodstuffs, as well as water bodies, including variation with time and place, and the nature, timing, effectiveness, and problems of various protective measures taken by the affected countries. Future analyses are expected to relate findings to U.S. source term research results. The work of CY 1988 is expected to be devoted primarily to establishment of interagency and international contracts and arrangements and development of a research plan, in cooperation with FEMA and other agencies. The plan is expected to encompass both near-term work, focusing on the short-term experience, and long-term plans for a number of future years, for lessons of the long-term experience.
In pursuing this issue, the staff is expected to increase its knowledge, certainty, and understanding of safety issues in order to increase its confidence in assessing levels of safety. Therefore, this issue is considered to be a licensing issue.
CONCLUSION
As a part of the improvements to NUREG-0933, the NRC staff clarified in SECY-11-0101, "Summary of Activities Related to Generic Issues Program," dated July 26, 2011,1967 that the Generic Issues Program will not pursue any further actions toward resolution of licensing and regulatory impact issues. Because licensing and regulatory impact issues are not safety issues by the classification guidance in the legacy Generic Issues Program, these issues do not meet at least one of the Generic Issues Program screening criteria and do not warrant further processing in accordance with Management Directive 6.4, "Generic Issues Program," dated November 17, 2009.1858 Therefore, this issue will not be pursued any further in the Generic Issues Program.
ITEM CH4.4: DECONTAMINATION AND RELOCATION
This item consists of two recommendations that are evaluated separately below.
ITEM CH4.4A: DECONTAMINATION
DESCRIPTION
The practicality and effectiveness of measures to decontaminate structures, land, etc. after a major accident can be a significant factor in evaluation of accident consequences as well as in formulation of plans and approaches for post-accident decontamination. The experience with post-Chernobyl decontamination in the Soviet Union could provide important extensions of the data base. This issue called for the staff to participate with FEMA and other Federal and international agencies in planning and eventual execution of efforts to obtain available information on the Soviet post-Chernobyl decontamination experience and analyze that information in relation to U.S. understanding of the issue.
The work is expected to be done primarily under FEMA's coordination, together with other appropriate federal agencies such as EPA and FDA and international agencies such as IAEA. The NRC will participate in this work to assure adequate representation of NRC's interest in the effort and to obtain the information needed for NRC's purposes. The information to be sought is expected to encompass methods, timing, and effectiveness of decontamination of various areas and objects. Future analyses are expected to relate findings to U.S. source term research results. The work in CY 1988 is expected to be devoted primarily to establishment of interagency and international contacts and arrangements and development of a research plan, in cooperation with FEMA and other agencies, in connection with acquisition and analysis of Soviet information that may become available over the next several years.
In pursuing this issue, the staff is expected to increase its knowledge, certainty, and understanding of safety issues in order to increase its confidence in assessing levels of safety. Therefore, this issue is considered to be a licensing issue.
CONCLUSION
As a part of the improvements to NUREG-0933, the NRC staff clarified in SECY-11-0101, "Summary of Activities Related to Generic Issues Program," dated July 26, 2011,1967 that the Generic Issues Program will not pursue any further actions toward resolution of licensing and regulatory impact issues. Because licensing and regulatory impact issues are not safety issues by the classification guidance in the legacy Generic Issues Program, these issues do not meet at least one of the Generic Issues Program screening criteria and do not warrant further processing in accordance with Management Directive 6.4, "Generic Issues Program," dated November 17, 2009.1858 Therefore, this issue will not be pursued any further in the Generic Issues Program.
ITEM CH4.4B: RELOCATION
DESCRIPTION
Notwithstanding cultural and socioeconomic differences, the Soviet experience in connection with post-accident evacuation and relocation of the population of contaminated towns and villages near the Chernobyl reactor may well offer valuable lessons for U.S. emergency planning. This issue called for the staff to participate, with FEMA and other appropriate Federal and international agencies, in developing plans and arrangements for learning about and from the Soviet post-Chernobyl relocation experience.
Plans and interagency and international arrangements will be developed, under FEMA coordination, together with other Federal agencies and international bodies such as IAEA. Logistical, socioeconomic, health, and psychological considerations are expected to be included in the information to be sought.
In pursuing this issue, the staff is expected to increase its knowledge, certainty, and understanding of safety issues in order to increase its confidence in assessing levels of safety. Therefore, this issue is considered to be a licensing issue.
CONCLUSION
As a part of the improvements to NUREG-0933, the NRC staff clarified in SECY-11-0101, "Summary of Activities Related to Generic Issues Program," dated July 26, 2011,1967 that the Generic Issues Program will not pursue any further actions toward resolution of licensing and regulatory impact issues. Because licensing and regulatory impact issues are not safety issues by the classification guidance in the legacy Generic Issues Program, these issues do not meet at least one of the Generic Issues Program screening criteria and do not warrant further processing in accordance with Management Directive 6.4, "Generic Issues Program," dated November 17, 2009.1858 Therefore, this issue will not be pursued any further in the Generic Issues Program.
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