Resolution of Generic Safety Issues: Issue 86: Long Range Plan for Dealing with Stress Corrosion Cracking in BWR Piping (Rev. 1) ( NUREG-0933, Main Report with Supplements 1–35 )

DESCRIPTION

Historical Background

In March 1982, leaks were detected in the heat-affected zones of the safe-end-to-pipe welds in two of the 28 in. diameter recirculation loop safe ends at Nine Mile Point Unit 1. Subsequent UT revealed extensive cracking at many weld joints in the recirculation system. The cause of the cracking was determined to be intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC).

Although cracking in large diameter piping had been found previously in Germany and Japan, the finding at Nine Mile Point Unit 1 was the first known U.S. occurrence of IGSCC in large piping (pipe diameters > 10 in.). IE Information Notice 82-39⁶⁰⁸ was issued on September 21, 1982 to alert all BWR licensees to the problem. The staff held meetings with GE, EPRI, and BWR Owners to discuss the relevance of the Nine Mile Point cracking to other BWRs. The near-term inspection of welds in large-diameter recirculation piping was discussed at a meeting of the staff with BWR licensees on September 27, 1982. Following this, IE Bulletin 82-03⁶⁰⁹ was issued on October 14, 1982 and required the 8 BWRs that were scheduled for outages through January 31, 1983 to perform inspections of a reasonable sample of the recirculation system welds during their respective outages.

After cracking in large-diameter piping was observed in 5 of the first 7 plants inspected in response to IE Bulletin 82-03,⁶⁰⁹ the staff issued IE Bulletin 83-02⁶¹⁰ to extend the inspection requirements to all other BWRs. On August 1, 1983, the EDO established a Piping Review Committee to investigate specific incidents of pipe cracking at all plants with emphasis to be placed on IGSCC that had been reported in the recirculating systems of BWRs. Under the auspices of the NRC Piping Review Committee, a Task Group on Pipe Cracking was convened to develop a long-range plan for dealing with IGSCC.

The status and results of inspections of piping welds for IGSCC conducted at various operating BWRs were reported to the Commission in SECY-83-267,⁶¹² SECY-83-267A,⁶¹³ SECY-83-267B,⁶¹⁴ SECY-83-267C,⁶¹⁵ SECY-84-9,⁶¹⁶ SECY-84-9A,⁶¹⁷ and SECY-84-166.⁶¹⁸ The short-term reinspection and repair criteria were issued to BWR licensees in Generic Letter 84-11⁶²⁰ on April 19, 1984, and were to be used in inspections subsequent to the issuance of IE Bulletins 82-03⁶⁰⁹ and 83-02.⁶¹⁰ The Task Group report (NUREG-1061,⁶¹¹ Volume 1) was drafted in April 1984 and submitted to the Commission in July 1984 with SECY-84-301,⁶¹⁹ the staff's long-range plan for dealing with IGSCC in BWR piping. NUREG-1061,⁶¹¹ Volume 1, which includes value/impact analyses for the four possible solutions discussed below, was published in August 1984.

Safety Significance

Pipe cracking resulting from IGSCC can cause a LOCA which, in turn, contributes to core-melt frequency.

Possible Solutions

The results of the Task Group study indicate that there are four possible solutions for preventing IGSCC in BWRs: (1) piping replacement without hydrogen water chemistry (HWC) - considered to be a long-term fix; (2) induction heating stress improvement and HWC - considered to be a long-term fix; (3) augmented inspection, weld repair, and HWC - considered to be a partial intermediate fix; and (4) augmented inspection and weld repair without HWC - considered to be only a short-term fix.

The staff's long range plan for resolving the problem called for the following actions: (1) issuance of NUREG-1061⁶¹¹; (2) incorporation of the Task Group recommendations into NUREG-0313,⁷⁵⁰ Revision 2, and issuance of this document; (3) preparation of a generic letter that incorporated NUREG-0313,⁷⁵⁰ Revision 2, and issuance of this letter to all BWR licensees requesting their proposals for bringing their plants into compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g); and (4) pursuance with the appropriate industry Code Committees changes in the areas of NDE personnel qualification and inspection procedures to bring ASME XI¹⁴ requirements into conformance with the staff's recommendations.

CONCLUSION

In January 1988, NUREG-0313,⁷⁵⁰ Revision 2, was published and Generic Letter 88-01¹¹¹¹ was issued outlining the staff positions on IGSCC in BWR austenitic stainless steel piping; MPA B-84 was established by NRR for implementation purposes. Thus, this issue was RESOLVED and requirements were established.

REFERENCES

0014. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, "Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1974. 0608. IE Information Notice 82-39, "Service Degradation of Thick-Walled Stainless Steel Recirculation Systems at BWR Plants," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 21, 1982. [ML082460509] 0609. IE Bulletin 82-03, "Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Thick-Wall Large Diameter, Stainless Steel Recirculation System Piping at BWR Plants," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 14, 1982 [8208190238], (Rev. 1) October 28, 1982 [ML031210727]. 0610. IE Bulletin 83-02, "Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Large Diameter Stainless Steel Recirculation System Piping at BWR Plants," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 4, 1983. [ML031210776] 0611. NUREG-1061, "Report of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Piping Review Committee," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (Vol. 1) August 1984, (Vol. 2) April 1985, (Vol. 3) November 1984, (Vol. 4) December 1984, (Vol. 5) April 1985. 0612. SECY-83-267, "Status Report on Observation of Pipe Cracking at BWRs," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1, 1983. [8307250565] 0613. SECY-83-267A, "Update of Status Report on Observation of Pipe Cracking at BWRs (SECY-83-267)," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 11, 1983. [8307250578] 0614. SECY-83-267B, "Update of Status Report on Observation of Pipe Cracking at BWRs (SECY-83-267 and 267A)," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 8, 1983. [8308230648] 0615. SECY-83-267C, "Staff Requirements for Reinspection of BWR Piping and Repair of Cracked Piping," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 7, 1983. [8311160350] 0616. SECY-84-9, "Report on the Long Term Approach for Dealing with Stress-Corrosion Cracking in BWR Piping," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 10, 1984. [8402230344] 0617. SECY-84-9A, "Update of Status Report on BWR Pipe Cracks and Projection of Upcoming Licensee Actions," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 27, 1984. [8402230347] 0618. SECY-84-166, "Update of Status Report on BWR Pipe Cracks and Projection of Upcoming Licensee Actions," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 20, 1984. [8405180011] 0619. SECY-84-301, "Staff Long Range Plan for Dealing with Stress-Corrosion Cracking in BWR Piping," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 30, 1984. [8408090406] 0620. Letter to All Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits for Boiling Water Reactors, "Inspections of BWR Stainless Steel Piping" (Generic Letter 84-11), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 19, 1984. [ML031150695] 0750. NUREG-0313, "Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1977, (Rev. 1) July 1980, (Rev. 2) January 1988. 1111. Letter to All Licensees of Operating Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs), and Holders of Construction Permits from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping (Generic Letter 88-01)," January 25, 1988. [ML031130463]