Information Notice No. 84-71: Graphitic Corrosion of Cast Iron in Salt Water
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 84-71 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 20555 September 06, 1984 Information Notice No. 84-71: GRAPHITIC CORROSION OF CAST IRON IN SALT WATER Addressees: All holders of a nuclear power reactor operating license (OL) or construction permit (CP). Purpose: This notice is provided to inform licensees and applicants of a potentially significant problem pertaining to graphitic corrosion of cast iron in salt or brackish water. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude or ameliorate a similar problem from occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements and, therefore, no specific action or response is required. Description of Circumstances: On May 3, 1984, Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. reported that a through-wall corrosion attack had been identified in the salt water side of a component cooling system heat exchanger at Calvert Cliffs Unit 2. Visual examination of corresponding components for Unit 1 (then operating at 100% power) disclosed evidence of leakage. Unit 1 was shut down on May 6 because of concerns about the integrity of the component cooling system. On May 14, 1984, the licensee determined that corrosion damage to the salt water heat exchangers was so extensive in both units that these systems could not survive a design-basis seismic event. This required that Unit 2 suspend refueling and restore containment integrity and that Unit 1 remain in cold shutdown with full containment established. These requirements remained in effect until repairs (structural, as well as leak tightness) could be completed. At Calvert Cliffs, each unit has two auxiliary cooling water systems that contain condensate grade water with corrosion inhibiting additives. The "component" cooling system serves most of the nuclear plant cooling needs and the "service water" cooling system principally serves balance-of-plant cooling needs, but also serves the emergency diesel generators, the spent fuel pool, and containment air coolers. Thus, both systems are safety-related. 8409040187 . IN 84-71 Page 2 of 3 September 06, 1984 The plant cooling systems are, in turn, cooled by a salt water cooling system. This system consists of redundant and separable supply headers and redundant discharge headers, which ultimately combine in a single overboard discharge pipe. Each supply header is served by a dedicated pump and a spare "swing" pump can be connected to either supply header. Each supply header, in turn, supplies a full capacity heat exchanger for each of the plant cooling systems. Materials of the salt water system are: cast iron for pump casings, valve bodies and water boxes for the heat exchangers; pipe is flanged cement lined cast iron; and the once-through tube bundles are 90-10 copper-nickel with aluminum bronze tube sheets. Discussion: Graphitic corrosion is a long-known phenomenon where an electrolytic cell is established between the graphite and the iron within the cast iron itself when in contact with water containing enough dissolved salts to act as an electrolyte. This may be sea water or brackish water. Generally the phenomenon occurs on ocean-going ships and in coastal or tidal estuary industrial plants. It can, however, occur at inland plants if the raw cooling water is sufficiently contaminated. The corrosion can be accelerated by the presence of copper-based alloys (the tube bundles). On the other hand, the attack on the cast iron can be minimized by the installation of "sacrificial" zinc plates to take the corrosion attack. Other ways of reducing the corrosion attack consist of using alternate (but more expensive) materials to replace the cast iron, or applying a corrosion resistant coating to the cast iron. This latter approach must be very carefully implemented, particularly in the presence of copper-based parts, because a small break in the coating concentrates the attack and accelerates the local rate of corrosion. Where corrosion resistant coatings are used, good practice indicates use of sacrificial zinc plates also. Direct current electric potential (cathodic protection) may also be used, but must be carefully monitored or it may do more harm than good. Graphitic corrosion is often not readily apparent from visual examination. As the iron is dissolved away, the graphite structure remains, and, particularly where covered by a film of silt or marine growth, the surface may appear relatively sound, even though it is highly permeable to water and has no strength. Examination for graphitic corrosion historically has been performed by use of a test hammer on the wetted surfaces to determine the depth and extent of attack. At Calvert Cliffs, the licensee reports that use of an ultrasonic thickness gage from the outside could locate the interface between sound metal and corroded material. At 2.25 megahertz discrimination was not adequate, but at 1/2 to 1 megahertz the L-wave technique produced acceptable accuracy. . IN 84-71 Page 3 of 3 September 06, 1984 Replacement water boxes were available and installed on three component cooling water heat exchangers. Temporary repairs were made to others. All water boxes, after cleaning, were coated with a coaltar-epoxy anticorrosion compound. A full complement of replacement water boxes is now on site, and further replacements will be made when appropriate outages occur. A long- term program for monitoring the integrity of cast iron components in salt water service is being developed. NRC requirements do not include specific provisions for checking the degree of corrosion in safety-related components and in some cases extensive corrosion may not be visually apparent. In this case, graphitic corrosion progressed to the point of seismic and structural inadequacy and caused an extended forced outage of both units. Accordingly, licensees are advised to review their maintenance programs in light of the need to preclude substantial degradation of safety related components due to corrosion. We are advised that the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations plans a similar publication on this event, providing additional detail. No written response or specific action is required by this notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office. Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contact: J. B. Henderson, IE (301) 492-9654 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021