Information Notice No. 84-69, Supplement 1: Operation of Emergency Diesel Generators
SSINS No.: IN 84-69, Supplement 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 20555 February 24, 1986 Information Notice No. 84-69, SUPPLEMENT 1: OPERATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS Addresses: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a construction permit (CP). Purpose: Information Notice 84-69, issued on August 29, 1984, was provided to alert recipients of potentially significant safety problems that can arise when one or more emergency diesel generators (EDGs) are operated in modes other than the prescribed standby service mode, such as loaded on non-emergency buses parallel with offsite power sources. The purpose of this supplement is to reemphasize the need for licensees to review the information provided in IN 84-69, in addition to the information contained herein, for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar problems at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this supplement do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. Description of Circumstances: Following a 10 CFR 50.72 report made to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center on August 12, 1985, it was discovered that Crystal River Unit 3 was continuously running the one operable EDG loaded in parallel with the grid while the other EDG was declared inoperable. Crystal River Technical Specifications require fast starting of the operable EDG (i.e., verifying that the diesel starts from ambient conditions and accelerates to the required speed within a required period of time) within 1 hour after the declaration of an inoperable EDG and every 8 hours thereafter. Because of a concern about increased EDG wear and reduced overall EDG reliability, the licensee chose to keep the EDG running loaded parallel to the offsite grid rather than fast starting the EDG every 8 hours. The licensee believed that continuous running was an acceptable alternative to the test starts required by the Technical Specifications and that the EDG was operable per Technical Specifications while running in parallel with the offsite power system. The licensee indicated also that it was aware of IN 84-69 and had implemented procedures that prohibited operating the EDG parallel to the grid during inclement weather (e.g. , lightning, heavy winds). . IN 84-69, Supplement 1 February 24, 1986 Page 2 of 3 Discussion: When an EDG is operated connected to offsite or nonvital loads, the emergency power system is not independent of disturbances on the nonvital and offsite power systems that can adversely affect emergency power availability. The situation is of particular concern when the onsite emergency power system is already in a degraded condition due to an EDG being inoperable and the operable EDG is loaded on non-emergency loads. In this condition, a disturbance in the non-emergency power system could result in both a loss of offsite power and a disabling of the remaining emergency power source. Although the events described in IN 84-69 occurred due to weather conditions, the concerns of the IN apply to parallel operation of EDGs with non-emergency loads at all times. If a fault develops while the EDG is connected to non-emergency buses, EDG availability for subsequent emergency demands may be affected. In some design configurations, the EDG would trip as a result of overcurrent or reverse power, actuate a lockout device, and require local operator action to reset the lockout. In such cases, the EDG is recoverable, but the timeliness of its availability is not comparable to that of having the EDG in its normal standby service. In other design configurations the EDG may not trip, but the operation of the load sequencer may be adversely affected. The load sequencer timers are often linked with the closing of the EDG output breaker or with detection of loss of voltage on the bus. If the EDG does not trip, conditions are not proper for the designed operation of the load sequencers. Consequently, the EDG cannot perform automatically in a manner comparable to that of having the EDG in its normal standby mode. Another potential concern deals with the vulnerability of the EDG to trip signals which are bypassed for emergency demands but are operable for manual starts and during running for test purposes. The EDG would be more vulnerable to such trips. The licensee's concern regarding excessive test starts is valid. In this particular case, the licensee was encouraged to address that concern more directly by submitting changes to the plant Technical Specifications. Such changes were approved for North Anna Unit 2 on April 25, 1985. . IN 84-69, Supplement 1 February 24, 1986 Page 3 of 3 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office. Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contacts: Joseph G. Giitter, IE (301) 492-9001 J. T. Beard, NRR (301) 492-7465 Attachment: List of Recently Issued Information Notices
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021