Information Notice No. 84-64: BWR High-pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Initiation Seal-in and Indication
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 84-64 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 20555 August 15, 1984 Information Notice No. 84-64: BWR HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INITIATION SEAL-IN AND INDICATION Addressees: All boiling water reactor (BWR) licensees and applicants for an operating license. Purpose: This notice is provided to inform recipients of a potential problem in the initiation logic (both automatic and manual) that might prevent the HPCI initiation from going to completion. The problem is compounded by erroneous system status indication that could be confusing to the operator. This potential problem could also exist on the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and take appropriate action. Suggested actions in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or response is required. Description of Circumstances: The NRC senior resident inspector at the Shoreham Station discovered that the HPCI initiation logic did not go to completion in all cases but did cause a status light to come on indicating that the HPCI initiation was sealed-in. The problem arose from a combination of two design characteristics. First, the HPCI pump discharge valve was interlocked with the HPCI turbine steam valves. Second, contacts from the seal-in circuit operated the "initiation sealed-in" indicator and operated all the required components for HPCI startup, except the HPCI pump discharge valve. On automatic actuation, the HPCI pump discharge valve would not start to open until both the turbine steam inlet valve and turbine stop valve were no longer at their fully closed positions and the initiation signal was still present. If the initiation signal was not present when the steam valves moved off their seats, the pump discharge valve would not open. If the pump discharge valve did not open, the HPCI system would not perform its required safety function and the initiation seal-in circuitry would not satisfy its design objective. . IN 84-64 August 15, 1984 Page 2 of 3 For manual initiation, a system-level manual pushbutton switch at Shoreham was wired in parallel with the low water level relay contacts. The switch itself had no mechanical seal-in feature. Therefore, unless the operator held the pushbutton for about 12 seconds, which was long enough for the turbine steam valves to leave their fully closed positions, the HPCI would not inject into the vessel and the HPCI system would come up to an active standby mode with the flow being recirculated through the miniflow bypass line. Manual operation of the pump discharge valve would then be required to achieve injection flow. Discussion: Besides Shoreham, at least one other late-model BWR-4 design (Hope Creek) was known to have a similar design deficiency. Design changes at both Shoreham and Hope Creek have provided for a seal-in of the HPCI initiation signal. In some earlier BWR designs, HPCI manual initiation is provided at the component level rather than at the system level. With these designs, the manual open switch contact for the pump discharge valve bypasses the interlock with the steam valves. Operation of this switch will cause the valve to open, but the valve may immediately cycle back to the closed position if the steam valves have not yet opened sufficiently to satisfy the interlock at the time the switch is released. Manual startup of the HPCI system in a particular sequence of components may avoid the manual initiation problem. In many plant designs, both old and new, the system status indication that the HPCI logic is sealed-in could be anomalous and unnecessarily generate the potential for operator confusion. However, there are other system indicators (such as HPCI flow) that do give reliable information regarding the status of the HPCI system. Licensees and applicants should review their system descriptions, operating procedures, and operator training programs to ensure that special characteristics of the HPCI and RCIC initiation logics and system status indicators are adequately addressed. Appropriate operator awareness may be sufficient to allay short-term safety concerns while longer term actions to rectify any design deficiencies are being investigated and implemented. In particular, if manual initiation of HPCI requires holding a switch for several seconds, then licensees may wish to consider appropriate precautionary statements in procedures and precautionary labels next to the HPCI manual initiation switch. . IN 84-64 August 15, 1984 Page 3 of 3 No written response to this information notice is required. If you need additional information about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical contacts listed below. Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contacts: J. T. Beard, NRR (301) 492-7465 Eric W. Weiss, IE (301) 492-4973 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021