Information Notice No. 84-04: Failure of Elastomer Seated Butterfly Valves Used Only During Cold Shutdowns
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 84-04 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 18, 1984 Information Notice No. 84-04: FAILURE OF ELASTOMER SEATED BUTTERFLY VALVES USED ONLY DURING COLD SHUTDOWNS Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or construction permit (CP). Purpose: This information notice is provided as a notification of recently observed failure of redundant elastomer seated butterfly valves used only during cold shutdowns. No specific action is required in response to this information notice, but it is expected that recipients will review the information presented for applicability to their facilities. Description of Circumstances: On April 19 and August 26, 1983, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District reported (LER 83-14) that the two reactor building purge inlet valves and the two reactor building purge outlet valves failed their local leak rate tests at the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station. The leakage value for the purge inlet valves was greater than the surveillance acceptance criteria for total local leak rate. The purge outlet valves were unable to hold pressure sufficient to test. All four valves were Allis Chalmers Model 60WR butterfly valves. The purge inlet and outlet valves located inside containment have Limitorque Model SMB-3 motor operators. The purge inlet and outlet valves located outside containment have air operators of Allis Chalmers design. Investigation by the utility's engineers revealed a series of problems that contributed to the leakage. 1. The purge inlet valve located outside containment required adjustment of the elastomer seat. 2. The purge inlet valve located inside containment had damage to the elastomer seat and was found to be past the normally fully closed position by approximately one inch. 8312120117 . IN 84-04 January 18, 1984 Page 2 of 3 3. The purge outlet valve located inside containment had a damaged elastomer seat. 4. The purge outlet valve located outside containment required adjustment of the elastomer seat and was found to be not fully closed by approximately one inch. Further investigation by the utility's engineers and vendor representatives indicated that the purge inlet valve located inside containment went past the fully closed position because of problems with its motor operator brakes. Since the valve, itself, did not have any stops, the valve disk could drift past its fully closed position. The motor operator brakes were replaced and the valve was cycled to verify proper operation. This investigation also indicated that the reason the purge outlet valve located outside containment did not go to the fully closed position was a lack of lubrication of the mechanical linkage of the valve operator. This lack of lubrication made the linkage act to retard the closure of the valve thus preventing full closure. The linkage was lubricated and the air cylinder was cleaned and lubricated. The valve was exercised to confirm proper operation. In addition to the above actions, the valve seats were replaced and adjusted, as required. Although not indicated in the LER, a contributing factor quite likely was the fact that these valves are only opened during cold shutdowns. During normal plant operations, they are closed and rendered inoperable. Thus, in order to provide adequate assurance of proper purge isolation and to provide information for the utility's engineers to evaluate the performance of the valves, the licensee has implemented programs to: 1. Ensure proper lubrication of the valves through a new preventative maintenance program. 2. Perform a local leak rate test of the purge inlet and outlet valves before bringing the unit out of cold shutdown conditions in preparation for normal operations. 3. Perform a local leak rate test before the initial purge during each cold shutdown.. IN 84-04 January 18, 1984 Page 3 of 3 No written response to this notice is required. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the appropriate NRC Regional Office, or this office. Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contact: R. J. Kiessel, IE (301) 492-8119
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021