Information Notice No. 82-52: Equipment Environmental Qualification Testing Experience - Updating of Test Summaries Previously Published in 81-29
SSINS No.:
IN 82-52
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20555
December 21, 1982
Information Notice No. 82-52: EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION
TESTING EXPERIENCE - UPDATING OF TEST
SUMMARIES PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN
81-29
Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or
construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
This information notice is provided to inform licensees of the status and
test results on the series of environmental qualification testing published
in Information Notice 81-29 dated September 24, 1981. It is expected that
licensees will review the information for applicability to their facilities.
Description of Circumstances:
Information Notice 81-29 disseminated several adverse test results as they
were brought to the attention of the NRC staff. Some of these results have
now been evaluated by the involved testing organizations; others remain
unresolved.
The enclosed series of test summary reports (Attachment 1) will provide the
latest status and progress of the environmental qualification tests
described in IN 81-29. Other information notices relating to equipment
environmental qualification matters that have been published during 1982 are
also included in Attachment 1. Please note that information contained in
Notice 4 through Notice 9 is not related to environmental testing and,
therefore, will not be addressed in the future as part of the NRC Equipment
Environmental Qualification Testing Experience Series. No specific response
to this information notice is required.
Since the purpose of this information notice is to provide a timely update
of the adverse test results disseminated in IN 81-29, other test results
that have been brought to the attention of the NRC during this period will
be evaluated and considered for inclusion in the next information notice.
The NRC does not intend to publish successful qualification test results,
except for that equipment for which adverse test results have already been
published. The results of those successful tests will only be published as
they are voluntarily brought to the attention of NRC by industry.
.
IN 82-52
December 21, 1982
Page 2 of 2
Questions regarding the details of the enclosed test summary reports should
be directed either to the manufacturer of the component or the organization
that performed the testing (cognizant design and/or test agency). Both are
listed on each report.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Engineering and
Quality Assurance
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: N. B. Le
(301) 492-9673
Attachments:
1. Series of Environmental Qualification Test Summary Reports
2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
.
Attachment 1
IN 82-52
December 21, 1982
Page 1 of 11
Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 1
Test Summary Report No. 2
Equipment: Limitorque valve operator, type SMB, size 00
Test Facility: Limitorque Corporation
Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Failed Component: Valve operator drive motor (manufactured by Reliance
Electric Co.)
Type of Test: Environmental qualification of SMB class valve operators per
IEEE 321-1974 (harsh environment) and IEEE 382-1972
Description of Failure(s):
Update: This is an ongoing program. Failures were previously described in
IN 81-29. Further tests were performed and Westinghouse Electric
Corporation concluded that the present motor design will not
successfully pass the Westinghouse specified test parameters.
Failure Mode: Previous reported failures have been evaluated by further
testing. Failure mode is now attributed to the severe requirement imposed by
the Westinghouse specified temperature profile.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Limitorque Corporation is
pursuing the modification of the motor. This effort is under way to qualify
the motor actuator assembly to a higher temperature profile.
Generic Implications: Limitorque has successfully repeated a previously
conducted environmental accident profile test on the SMB valve operator to
the less severe IEEE 323-1971 and earlier standards.
.
Attachment 1
IN 82-52
December 21, 1982
Page 2 of 11
Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 2
Test Summary Report No. 2
Equipment: ITT Barton Westinghouse lot 4 transmitters, group A
Test Facility: Westinghouse - Forest Hills
Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Failed Component: Connector assembly
Type of Test: Environmental qualification of ITT Barton Westinghouse lot 4
transmitters, group A
Description of Failure(s):
Update: Failures involved erroneous output during temperature ramps and
were previously described in IN 81-29. Further testing was
performed to evaluate failure mode. Satisfactory resolution of the
failures has been established, according to Westinghouse. No
further actions are indicated by the test agency.
Failure Mode: Problem encountered during high-energy-line break as described
in Summary report No. 1 has now been attributed to the inadequate contact in
the connector assembly that apparently is sensitive to elevated temperature.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Satisfactory modification was
made to the connector assembly and the transmitter was successfully
retested, according to Westinghouse.
Generic Implications: According to Westinghouse the test program is
completed Final reports have been submitted to the NRR for review.
.
Attachment 1
IN 82-52
December 21, 1982
Page 3 of 11
Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 3
Test Summary Report No. 2
Equipment: D. G. O'Brien electrical penetration assembly, model K connectors
Test Facility: Sandia National Laboratories
Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: NRC/RES
Failed Component: Conductors shorted at connector assembly
Type of Test: Simulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) environmental test
to examine methodology.
Description of Failure(s):
Update: Failures were previously described in IN 81-29. Sandia is
currently running thermal expansion-compression tests on the
silicone grommet to better understand the seal behavior during
elevated temperature accelerated aging and LOCA environmental
tests. The Duke Power Company reran the environmental
qualification test of the D. G. O'Brien electrical penetrations at
Wyle Laboratory in the period March/May of 1982. The Duke Program
included testing model K as well as models C, D, E, F, and L
electrical penetrations. In the Duke test program, silicone
grommet and silicone interfacial seals were all thermally aged in
an unassembled state. The seal parts were then assembled (but
torqued) and irradiated; the seal was then torqued before LOCA
testing.
Failure-Mode
Update: Test results are being evaluated by Duke. The model K exhibited no
anomalies during the latest test according to Duke Power. However,
some of the other models exhibited short circuits during the LOCA
test phase.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations: This program is an ongoing
program. Evaluation of test results by Duke Tower Co. is in progress.
Generic Implications: Application of model K connectors is limited to the
Catawba, McGuire, and Yankee Rowe facilities. The qualification test
previously performed by D. G. O'Brien for the McGuire plant and the recent
Duke rerun test program indicate that model K connectors have successfully
passed test criteria.
.
Attachment 1
IN 82-52
December 21, 1982
Page 4 of 11
Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 4
Test Summary Report No. 2
Equipment: Dresser safety valve, model 31709NA
Test Facility: Combustion Engineering
Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI)
Failed Component: Seat surface
Type of Test: Performance testing for PWR relief and safety valves
Description of Failure(s):
Update: Failure to close/open at set points was previously described in IN
81-29. Test program is now complete. EPRI has issued an interim
test report.
Failure Mode: Problem appeared to be caused by steam from the blowdown
operation. Scratches or marks were found on valve seat surface.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations: The seat surfaces were lapped,
the valve was reassembled, to allow the other tests to continue. No other
corrective actions were indicated in the EPRI report.
Generic Implications: The EPRI interim test report is under evaluation by
NRR.
.
Attachment 1
IN 82-52
December 21, 1982
Page 5 of 11
Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 5
Test Summary Report No. 2
Equipment: Dresser safety valve, model 31739 A
Test Facility: Combustion Engineering
Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI)
Failed Component: Seat surface
Type of Test: Performance testing for PWR relief and safety valves
Description of Failure(s):
Update: Failure to achieve rated flow with high back pressure was
previously described in IN 81-29. Test program is now complete.
EPRI has issued interim report which states that at one time
during test, the rated lift of the valves was not maintained at
pressure 6% above design set point. Seat surfaces were lapped and
other tests were performed.
Failure Mode: Scratches on the seat surfaces and galled guiding surfaces
were observed, according to the EPRI report.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Seat surfaces were lapped to
minimize seat leakage to allow the other tests to continue. No other
corrective actions were indicated in the EPRI report.
Generic Implications: The EPRI interim test report is under evaluation by
NRR. NRC is also currently reviewing information received from licensee
owner groups in regard to a related matter identified at Oconee 1 and 2
pertaining to the ring setting issue.
.
Attachment 1
IN 82-52
December 21, 1982
Page 6 of 11
Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 6
Test Summary Report No. 2
Equipment: Dresser power-operated relief valve (PORV), model 31533VX-30
Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories
Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI)
Failed Component: Valve bellows
Type of Test: EPRI/PWR safety and relief valve test program
Description of Failure(s):
Update: Failure of valve to close on demand during water tests was
previously described in IN 81-29. Evaluation test was performed,
and steam was found to have leaked past the valve pilot stem.
Valve was disassembled and bellows were found to have several
partially failed welds. Valve was reassembled with new bellows and
valve cycled successfully. Test program is now complete. EPRI has
issued an interim test report.
Failure Mode: Valve malfunction caused by leakage through the failed welds
in bellows.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations: No further action indicated in
the report.
Generic Implications: The EPRI report concludes that the partially failed
welds in the bellow have no potential impact on valve operation. Interim
test report on this valve is under evaluation by NRR. The damage was
determined to have no potential impact on valve operation, according to
EPRI. Interim test report on this test is under evaluation by NRR.
.
Attachment 1
IN 82-52
December 21, 1982
Page 7 of 11
Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 7
Test Summary Report No. 2
Equipment: Target Rock power-operated relief valve (PORV), model 80X-006-1
Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories
Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI)
Failed Component: Not determined
Type of Test: EPRI/PWR safety and relief valve test program
Description of Failure(s):
Update: Failure of valve to close after deenergization was previously
described in IN 81-29. Test program is complete and an interim
report has been issued by EPRI. Valves were disassembled after
each test and no damage was observed, according to the EPRI
report.
Failure Mode: Not determined
Possible Corrective Action Considerations: No corrective actions were
indicated in the report.
Generic Implications: The EPRI interim test report is under evaluation by
NRR. Information indicates that there are presently no valves of this design
in operating plants, but they are planned for use in some plants under
construction.
.
Attachment 1
IN 82-52
December 21, 1982
Page 8 of 11
Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 8
Test Summary Report No. 2
Equipment: Control Component Incorporated (CCI) power-operated relief valve
(PORV)
Test Facility: Wyle Laboratories
Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI)
Failed Component: Not determined
Type of Test: EPRI/PWR safety and relief valve program
Description of Failure(s):
Update: Failures of valve to close during prescribed steam tests were
previously described in IN 81-29. Closure delay times from 2 to 40
seconds were observed under various tests. Valve was disassembled
and no internal damage was observed that might affect the ability
of the valve to open or close on demand. Test program is complete
and EPRI has issued an interim test report.
Failure Mode: Not determined
Possible Corrective Action Considerations: No corrective actions were
indicated in the report.
Generic Implications: The interim test report is under evaluation by NRR.
Information indicates that the CCI PORV is being or will be used at McGuire
1 & 2, and Catawba 1 & 2.
.
Attachment 1
IN 82-52
December 21, 1982
Page 9 of 11
Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 9
Test Summary Report No. 2
Equipment: Crosby safety valve 3K6
Test Facility: Combustion Engineering
Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI)
Failed Component: Not determined
Type of Test: Steam, low and high ramp rate, high back pressure test
Description of Failure(s):
Update: Failures involving valve oscillations and closures outside of set
points were previously described in IN 81-29. According to the
test report, galled guiding surfaces and damaged internal parts
were found. Damaged parts were either refurbished or replaced
before continued testing. Test program is complete, and an interim
test report has been issued by EPRI.
Failure Mode: Not determined
Possible Corrective Action Considerations: The report indicated that
scratches or marks were found on surfaces; the scratched surfaces were
lapped before reassembly for continued testing. No other corrective actions
were identified in the report.
Generic Implications: The EPRI interim report is under evaluation by NRR.
Information indicates that the Crosby safety valve 3K6 is being used or will
be used at St. Lucie 1 & 2 and Fort Calhoun.
.
Attachment 1
IN 82-52
December 21, 1982
Page 10 of 11
Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No. 10
Test Summary Report No. 2
Equipment: ASCO solenoid valves, NP-1 series
Test Facility: ASCO/Isomedix Inc./Wyle Laboratories
Cognizant Design and/or Test Agency: Automatic Switch Co. (ASCO)
Failed Component: Viton elastomer seals in NP-1 series valves
Type of Test: Radiation simulation for design-basis event (DBE)
Description of Failure(s):
Update: Failure involved material deterioration at high radiation exposure
and was previously described in IN 81-29. Detailed information is
now available in ASCO Report No. AQR-67368/Re. 0, dated 8-82. This
report concludes that the ASCO solenoid valve, NP-1 series
containing Viton dynamic seals should not be used in application
where the valves may be required to shift position following
exposure to total gamma radiation doses in excess of 20 megarads.
Failure Mode: Solenoid valve will not shift position upon receipt of a
specified-operating signal (65 V DC or 0.080 amps) following a total gamma
radiation exposure in excess of 20 megarads.
Possible Corrective Action Considerations: Each licensee should review its
system requirements to determine whether or not Viton elastomers are
acceptable for its application. ASCO has recommended that Viton elastomers
be replaced with ethylene propylene (EPDM) elastomers on valves required to
operate under accident conditions following a DBE. Please note that NRC is
in the process of proposing a bulletin requesting each licensee to assess
the design of each facility and determine if equipment with Viton parts
should be replaced with EPDM parts or other equally qualified parts, as
recommended by ASCO.
Generic Implications: The described failure is confined only to the ASCO
NP-1 series where Viton elastomer seals are used, and not NP-8300 as was
previously reported in IN 81-29.
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Attachment 1
IN 82-52
December 21, 1982
Page 11 of 11
Equipment Environmental Qualification Notice No.11
Related Information Notices
Information Notices relating to equipment environmental qualification
matters that have been published during 1982 are:
IN 82 - 03 Environmental Tests of Electrical Terminal Blocks.
IN 82 - 11 Potential Inaccuracies in Wide Range Pressure
Instruments Used in Westinghouse Designed Plants.
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