Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRS (Generic Letter No. 84-23)
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555
October 26, 1984
TO ALL BOILING WATER REACTOR (BWR) LICENSEES OF OPERATING REACTORS EXCEPT
LACROSSE, BIG ROCK POINT, HUMBOLDT BAY AND DRESDEN-1)
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT: REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION IN BWRs (GENERIC LETTER
NO. 84-23)
The water level instrumentation in a BWR is relied upon for controlling
feedwater, actuating emergency systems, and for providing the operators
information which is used as basis for actions to assure adequate core
cooling. Many of the actions in the emergency procedures guidelines are
keyed to reactor water level.
The NRC staff has reviewed the S. Levy, Inc. report SLI-8211, "Review of BWR
Reactor Vessel Water Level Measurement System," which was commissioned by
the PWR Owners Group. The report provides a generic evaluation of water
level instrumentation adequacy of BWR/2 through BWR/6 plants and identifies
several improvements in BWR water level measurement and instrumentation
systems which will improve the reliability and accuracy of those systems.
The staff has concluded that changes identified in the emergency procedure
guidelines are adequate for the short term, but permanent physical
improvements should be made on a deliberate schedule to reduce the burden on
the operator. Three potential improvement categories are presented below:
o Improvements to plant(s) that will reduce level indication errors
caused by high drywell temperature. These improvements include
prevention of reference leg overheating or reduction of the vertical
drops in the drywell. (Vertical drop should be measured. from the
condensation pot to the drywell exit point. Maximum drop would allow an
indicated level at the bottom of the normal operating range when actual
level is just above lower tap for worst flashing condition.) Those
plants for which the vertical drop in the drywell has already been
minimized will not have to make additional changes for the drywell
heating effect.
o Review of plant experience relating to mechanical level indication
equipment. Plant experience shows mechanical level equipment is more
vulnerable to failure or malfunction than analog equipment. A number of
plants have already connected analog trip units to their level
transmitters to improve reliability and accuracy. Those plants that use
mechanical level indication should replace the mechanical level
indication equipment with analog level transmitters unless operating
experience confirms high reliability.
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o Changes to the protection system logic that may be needed for those
plants in which operator action may be required to mitigate the
consequences of a break ir a reference leg and a single failure in a
protection system channel associated with an intact reference leg.
Changes will generally result in additional transmitters to satisfy the
single failure criterion. This improvement, under evaluation by NRC,
may be needed in plants where an analysis has demonstrated a
vulnerability.
Implementation of the first two categories of improvements will give
increased assurance that the level instrumentation will provide the
inadequate core cooling instrumentation required by NUREG-0737, Item II.F.2
and thereby satisfy this requirement. Please submit within 30 days a
description of your plans to implement these improvements and your proposed
schedule.
The last improvement is still being evaluated by the staff; hence it is not
a requirement at this time. However, should the continuing evaluation show
that there is a significantly high priority. It will be identified as a new
generic letter.
This request for information was approved by the Office of Management and
Budget under clearance number 3150-0065 which expires September 30, 1985.
Sincerely,
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director
Division of Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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