Bulletin 75-04: Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station
BL75004
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
March 24, 1975
J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region I
N. C. Moseley, Director, Region II
J. G. Keppler, Director, Region III
E. M. Howard, Director, Region IV
R. H. Engelken, Director, Region V
IE BULLETIN NO. - 75-04 - CABLE FIRE AT BROWNS FERRY
NUCLEAR POWER STATION
The subject Bulletin should be dispatched for action to the following
facilities by close of business on March 24, 1975.
Arkansas 1
Brunswick 2
Calvert Cliffs 1
Cook 1
Hatch 1
Indian Point 2
Millstone 1
San Onofre 1
Three Mile Island 1
The Bulletin should also be dispatched for information to all other power
reactor facilities with operating license or construction permit no later
than close of business on March 26, 1975.
The text of the Bulletin and draft letter to licensees are enclosed for this
purpose.
John G. Davis
Deputy Director for
Field Operations
Office of Inspection
and Enforcement
Enclosures:
As stated
.
-2-
Distribution:
D. F. Knuth, IE
J. G. Davis, DDFO:IE
L. I. Cobb, A/D, IE (3)
H. H. Brown, D, ISP
D. Thompson, AD, IP, OOE:IE
B. H. Grier, AD, CO:IE
C. W. Kuhlman, AD, REMP:IE
Director NRR
Director, RL
Director, TR
Assistant Directors, RL (6)
Assistant Directors, TR (4)
H. D. Thornburg, Chief, FSEB:IE
J. L. Crews, FSEB:IE
FADreher; GCGower; SEBryan; GHSmith; FSEB:IE
M. Meadows, Secretary, DDFO:IE
D. Hodges, Secretary, FSEB:IE (Original)
Central Files
EDO Reading Files
IE Files
IE Reading Files
DDFO:IE Reading Files
.
IE Bulletin No. 75-04 Date: 3/24/75
CABLE FIRE AT BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR POWER STATION
DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES:
Preliminary information from Tennessee Valley Authority regarding a fire
which occurred on March 22, 1975, at their Browns Ferry site near Athens,
Alabama, indicates that the fire was started as a result of construction
activities. The fire resulted in the shutdown of two operating nuclear
plants and made several safety systems inoperative, including systems
normally used for decay heat removal during shutdown. The workmen were
engaged in construction activities on a third unit not yet licensed for
operation by NRC.
Initial information indicates that during the installation and testing of
cable through-wall penetrations an open flame ignited a flammable material
used in the penetration seals.
ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY LICENSEES:
The following actions are requested of selected Licensees with operating
power reactor facilities and major construction activities at a common site:
1. Review your overall procedures and system for controlling construction
activities that interface with reactor operating activities, with
particular attention to the installation and testing of seals for
electrical cables between compartments of the reactor building, e.g.,
control room to cable spreading room.
2. Review the design of floor and wall penetration seals, with particular
attention to the flammability of materials.
3. Evaluate your procedures for the control of ignition sources which may
be used for leak testing or other purposes in areas containing
flammable materials.
4. Report to this office, in writing within 20 days of the date of this
Bulletin, the results of your reviews or evaluations regarding items 1
through 3 above.
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY LICENSEES MAY BE REVISED:
The actions requested of Licensees above may be revised as additional
details of the Browns Ferry occurrence are available and evaluated by the
NRC.
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021