Part 21 Report - 1999-292

ACCESSION #: 9910070274

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RG AND E

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
89 EAST AVENUE,
ROCHESTER, N.Y.
14649-0001

TELEPHONE AREA CODE 716 546-2700

October 5, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Facsimile Number 301-816-5151
Telephone Number 301-816-5100

Subject:

Initial Notification of 10 CFR Part 21 Defect R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

The enclosed initial notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance, Section 21 (d) (3) (I), which requires "Initial notification by facsimile". Written notification, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Section 21 (d) (3) (ii), will be provided by November 4, 1999.

Very truly yours, Joseph A. Widay

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Enclosures

10 CFR 21 INITIAL FACSIMILE NOTIFICATION

I.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INFORMING THE COMMISSION:
	NAME:	Joseph A. Widay Vice President and Plant Manager
	ADDRESS:	Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649
II.	IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACILITY, THE ACTIVITY, OR THE BASIC COMPONENT SUPPLIED FOR SUCH FACILITY WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT:
	The basic component is a W2 switch, supplied by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. This component was purchased safety-related for use in various locations at Ginna Station.
III.	IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITY OR SUPPLYING THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT:
	The W2 switch was supplied to Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (.RG&E) by Westinghouse Electric Corporation:
		Westinghouse Electric Corporation 200 Cheswick Avenue Cheswick, PA 15024
IV.	NATURE OF THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY AND THE SAFETY HAZARD WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY:
	The deficiency was detected by RG&E during a collective maintenance work order. A safety-related W2 switch drawn, from stock did not operate satisfactorily after being installed in the Main Control Board for use as the control switch for Safety Injection Pump 1C (1/SIP1C2). The switch did work properly before installation in the Main Control Board position. However, subsequent to installation the switch mechanism. would bind and would not spring return to the "after close" or "after trip" positions. The switch is expected to function properly in both positions.
	The Substantial Safety Hazard created by the switch potentially being stuck in the "trip" position is that the associated ECCS pump circuit breaker would not auto-close following a Safety Injection Actuation System (ST) signal; therefore, the associated ECCS pump would not perform its safety function. This postulated failure, in conjunction with another postulated single failure, Could cause a loss of safety function for the ECCS System.
	If the associated ECCS pump was operating, such as during testing, the switch being stuck in the "close" position would prevent the associated ECCS pump breaker from auto-closing if an undervoltage condition occurred coincident with, a SI signal. This could cause the breaker to lock-out and prevent the pump from performing its safety function.
	RG&E considers the nature of the defect to be a manufacturing deficiency. Westinghouse Electric Corporation was unable to provide the requested evaluation and results at this time. Therefore, RG&E has reached the following conclusions:
	Upon inspection of the deficient W2 switch, there appeared to be a small gap between the metal mounting face plate and the switch mechanism. This gap appeared to be the result of the plate being slightly oversized. Therefore, when the switch was installed in the Main Control Board, it would slightly compress and cause the switch shaft to bind on its bushing. Additionally it may also have been due to the bushing neck not being deep enough and causing the faceplate to bow upon installation against a solid surface, thus causing the shaft to bind.
V.	THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION OF SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY WAS OBTAINED:
	The information was obtained on April 9, 1999, during the implementation of a corrective maintenance work order to replace the W2 switch in the Main Control Board for Safety Injection Pump 1C (1/SIP1C2). This is a follow-up report to the 10CFR21 Substantial Safety Hazard Evaluation Interim Report submitted by RG&E on May 27, 1999.
VI.	IN THE CASE OF A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A DEFECT OR FAILS TO COMPLY, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ALL SUCH COMPONENTS IN USE AT, SUPPLIED F OR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNA STATION:
	There are numerous W2 switches of this model number permanently installed at Ginna Station, all of which are operating satisfactorily. The deficient W2 switch was installed in the Main Control Board for Safety Injection Pump 1C (1/SIP1C2). The deficient switch is one of two switches RG&E purchased from Westinghouse per PO# NQ-15824-A-JW. The other W2 switch procured under this purchase order is currently installed for the Diesel Generator A Supply Breaker (1/EG1A1) and performs satisfactorily.
VII.	THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL BE TAKEN; THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTION; AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN OR WILL BE TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE ACTION:
	After the deficiency was discovered by RG&E, the deficient W2 switch was returned to Westinghouse on May 14, 1999, for evaluation and root cause analysis. To date, RG&E has not received the results from Westinghouse, but will ultimately have the deficient W2 switch replaced by Westinghouse. An acceptable W2 switch was obtained from stock and installed in the Main Control Board for Safety Injection Pump 1C(1/SIP1C2). The second switch that was procured from Westinghouse per the same purchase order is installed for the D/G A Control Switch (1/EG1A1) and functions satisfactorily. This switch is tested on a monthly basis. A visual inspection of W2 switches was performed on the current stock at Ginna Station. The results of this inspection were satisfactory, with no gaps being identified between the metal mounting face plate and, the mechanism.
VIII.	ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY ABOUT THE FACILITY, ACTIVITY, OR BASIC COMPONENT THAT HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL BE GIVEN TO PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES:
	None

10/05/1999 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event

Power Reactor			Event #	36261
Site:	GINNA		Notification Date/Time:	10/05/1999 08:54 (EDT)
Unit:1	Region: 1	State: NY	Event Date/Time:	10/05/1999 08:54 (EDT)
Reactor Type:	[1] W-2-LP		Last Modification:	10/05/1999
Containment Type:	DRY AMB		Notifications:	JOHN KINNEMAN R1
NRC Notified by:	JOE WIDAY			VERN HODGE NRR
HQ Ops Officer:	JOHN MacKINNON
Emergency Class:	NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:	21.21
	UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH

Unit	Scram Code	RX Crit	Init Power	Initial RX Mode	Curr Power	Current RX Mode
1	N	Yes	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

W2 SWITCH SUPPLIED BY WESTINGHOUSE DRAWN FROM STOCK DID NOT OPERATE PROPERLY AFTER BEING INSTALLED.

W2 SWITCH WAS SUPPLIED TO ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION BY WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION. A SAFETY RELATED W2 SWITCH WAS DRAWN FROM STOCK DID NOT OPERATE SATISFACTORILY AFTER BEING INSTALLED IN THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD FOR USE AS THE CONTROL SWITCH FOR SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1C (1/SIP1 C2). THE SWITCH DID WORK PROPERLY BEFORE INSTALLATION IN THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD POSITION. HOWEVER, SUBSEQUENT TO INSTALLATION THE SWITCH MECHANISM WOULD BIND AND WOULD NOT SPRING RETURN TO THE "AFTER CLOSE" OR "AFTER TRIP" POSITIONS. THE SWITCH IS EXPECTED TO FUNCTION PROPERLY IN BOTH POSITIONS.

THE SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD CREATED BY THE SWITCH POTENTIALLY BEING STUCK IN THE "TRIP" POSITION IS THAT THE ASSOCIATED ECCS PUMP BREAKER WOULD NOT AUTO-CLOSE FOLLOWING A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SYSTEM (SI) SIGNAL; THEREFORE, THE ASSOCIATED ECCS PUMP WOULD NOT PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION. THE POSTULATED FAILURE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANOTHER POSTULATED SINGLE FAILURE, COULD CAUSE A LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION FOR THE ECCS SYSTEM.

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